

## Lecture 14, Part I: Chapter 9 “The Notion of Judgment”

[0:00]

- Introductory remarks about the importance of judgment in Lonergan.
  - “The startling strangeness” of the fully human notion of reality reached by correct understanding.
  - Animal vs. human realism.
  - The source of our doubting that our understanding is *knowing*.
  - Lonergan’s claim that “knowing is understanding correctly,” i.e. grasping intelligibility, which is not “already out there now.”

[5:40]

- One of the reasons that Lonergan devotes the first chapters to science is to show that the reality of universe of natural science is intelligible, not “out there”
- Reality and unreality from the perspective of animal realism.
- The reality of theoretical entities is intelligibility; that makes them “strange” because they are not ‘tangible’ for the animal extroverted sense; they do not partake in ‘already out there now’ expected by animal consciousness.
- How real are quarks, electromagnetic waves, and other such entities?
- Lonergan's unique position on realism involves *understanding correctly*.
- “Understanding correctly” is the topic of Chapters 9 and 10.
- This entails appropriating our judgment and our reflective understanding.

[8:58]

- The dichotomy of the two types of realism (animal and human) makes us doubt that understanding is really knowing.
- This leads to two unsatisfactory options:
  - Naïve realism claims that knowing is simple, based on observations. For it, understanding plays no significant role, it merely classifies those things taken as real by “taking a look”.
  - Kantian Idealism stresses the constructive role played by consciousness. But it claims to only reach knowledge of appearances, not immediate knowledge of things.
  - If consciousness is constitutive, our knowledge is limited to the objectivity of appearances.

[14:49]

- Lonergan's cognitional structure as *one* single structure of knowing with the *three* basic levels of consciousness addressed in *Insight*:
  - 1: Experiencing
  - 2: Insight
  - 3: Reflective insight and Judgment
- Each level has conscious activities proper to it.
- After *Insight*, there are higher levels of consciousness include Value Judging & Choosing (4<sup>th</sup> level), and religious consciousness (5<sup>th</sup> level); Lonergan also later speculates about a “0<sup>th</sup> level” of dreaming.

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- Lonergan's "intentionality analysis" is similar in some ways to a phenomenological analysis.
- So Chapter 9 presents a kind of phenomenology of acts of judging
- The act of consciousness (*noesis*) can be distinguished from the object (*noema*) of consciousness (the latter is not already out there now).
- Phenomenology studies the relation of constituting acts to constituted objects.
- Since objects are constituted by activities of consciousness, phenomenology begins with the objects and works back to the constituting activities.
- This has strong resemblances with self-appropriation.

[22:50]

- The 3 approaches to the self-appropriation/phenomenology of judging in Chapter 9:
- The 1<sup>st</sup> approach distinguishes two distinct mental attitudes with regard to a proposition.
  - We can entertain a proposition as a possibility and ponder its meaning.
  - Or we can judge the proposition as 'being the case, being so'; we can *posit* it.
- Self-appropriation of judging requires identifying propositions which are intended with this *second* type of mental attitude, attending to that positing, and understanding what sort of an activity it is.

[27:08]

- Contrast between Kant and Aquinas on the meaning of "judgment."
- Judgment as entertaining a possibility and as synthesizing is done by understanding, not by judging, according to Lonergan.
- Kant defines judgment in terms of *composition and division*, not in terms of the *act of positing*.
- While Aquinas also uses composition and division to speak of judgment (*iudicare*), Lonergan was influenced by Aquinas's second option in what he will mean by "judging." He interprets judgment as the distinct mental attitude of positing (or denying); this involves a commitment to the proposition.

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- The 2<sup>nd</sup> approach considers judgment in relation to the other activities surrounding it.
  - In particular, judgment in relation to the very distinctive type of question, "Is it so?"

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- The 3<sup>rd</sup> approach involves personal commitment.
  - We have more control over our judgments than over sense experiences and insights.
  - More dependent on sources other than ourselves in acts of seeing, or in having insights, than in judging.
  - Thus we are more responsible for them. We can always defer judging with "I don't know."

[35:00]

- Summary of Lonergan's three approaches to the self-appropriation of judgment.

[36:20]

- Elaboration of judgment as an answer to the question "Is it so?"
- The activity of judging resolves the 'Is it so?' question and thus releases the tension, just as insight releases the tension of a what/where/why/who questions.

[38: 39]

- Question about the relation of judgment and understanding in Kant and Lonergan.
  - Lonergan's second level of consciousness corresponds to Kant's Understanding
  - Kant confines judgment to Understanding, but Lonergan sees it as a distinct activity on a distinct, higher level, the third level of consciousness.
  - Thus Lonergan's version of judgment is more personal on the 3<sup>rd</sup> level, and even more so on the 4<sup>th</sup> level.
  - Discussion of higher levels consciousness and the construction of a life.
  - Yet even the activities of the 3<sup>rd</sup> level of consciousness are also matters of self-transcendence.

[45:34]

- Question about the meaning of 'positing' and the difference between *positing a judgment* and *judging*.
  - Positing is committing, affirming a proposition as true.
  - Positing a proposition is the same as judging a proposition.
  - The ["borrowed"] content of a judgment is an intelligibility that comes from a direct insight and then is affirmed or denied in a judgment [and affirming or denying is the "proper" content of a judgment].

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- Question about whether insight into intelligibility avoids the problem of mediation.
  - Judging *is* a second level of mediation.
  - Kant denies the possibility of intellectual intuition. Lonergan agrees; but he spells out the kind of mediation involved in going from understanding to positing.
  - Newman helped Lonergan realize that reasoning toward positing is discursive, it is mediating; reason is not an unmediated intuitive connection with the real or the true.

[52:35]

- Question: If we cannot yet judge whether the universe is systematic or non-systematic, is that because we have not yet had the insight, or because we do not yet have enough data?
  - This is due to the lack of the virtually unconditioned; data are not the only conditions for grounding judgments; further discussion.

[54:08]

- The Contents of Judgment: 3 Kinds
  - Proper content. Affirmation or denial is what judgment itself proper contributes to consciousness. This is the content that "supervenes" upon all the contents of prior conscious activities (e.g., intelligible contents of understanding, data contents of sensations, etc.)
  - Direct borrowed content. This is borrowed from the relevant insight, from the "Is it so?" question that always arises from the prior, direct borrowed content.
  - Indirect borrowed content. This is found in the reflective act linking question and answer.
- In short, the insight comes first; then the answering of the "Is it so?" question (by a 'Yes' or a 'No').
- How one answers depends not on a coin flip, but on reasonably affirming or denying the question.
- How one *genuinely, reasonably* satisfies the tension in the "Is it so?" question is addressed in Ch. 10.
- The indirect borrowed content which satisfies that tension comes in a "reflective act of understanding," which grasps the *reasonableness of* judging (positing; affirming or denying).

[1:02:31]

- The *context* of judgment: knowing is a dynamic structure.
- Judgments are plural and we situate them in relation to one another.
- All our prior judgments are the context of our new ones; all judgments must be brought into coherence with each other.

[1:05:00]

- Question about the role of revelation and faith in judgment, particularly for the religious believer.
  - Discussion of belief in general, not just religious belief.
  - We affirm or deny beliefs on a basis different from that obtained in an act of reflective understanding (an “immanently generated” ground of judging).
  - Believing is accepting something said by someone else as trustworthy.
  - In believing, a value judgment about the source of the statement forms the ground for the reasonableness of believing.
  - We need to understand the activity of judging before we can discuss believing in general and religious believing in particular.

End of Part I.