

# ***A Course on *Insight****

## ***Insight and Beyond***

Prof. Patrick Byrne of the Philosophy Department at Boston College offered a year-long course on Lonergan's magnum opus, *Insight* during the 2009-2010 academic year. The course was entitled "Insight and Beyond." It is intended to make both the fundamental and the more difficult parts of *Insight* accessible to a wide audience. During the second half of the Spring 2010 semester, the course was originally intended also to explore the developments in Lonergan's post-*Insight* works on meaning, interpretation, history, ethics, values and religion. However, class discussion of the 20 chapters of *Insight* itself required nearly the entirety of the two semesters.

The course lectures, discussions and visual aids have been made available online for anyone interested in Lonergan's thought, using the Echo 360 course-capture technology. Viewers will not need to purchase the Echo 360 application. Instructions for using the Echo 360 files, including technical requirements, are available at the link below.

Each class meeting has been broken up into two components for ease of viewing. An outline (or summary of highlights) of the topics treated each component has also been provided. These outlines include the times when the topics are treated in the Echo 360 recording. Viewers can scan the outlines for topics of interest, and move the cursor to the appropriate time, without needing to view the entire class. Links to the each of the Echo 360 recordings and corresponding outlines are provided in the lists for the two semesters

Class 1 September 9<sup>th</sup> 2009

## **Insight & Beyond: Lecture 1, Part I:**

### **Introduction to Lonergan's Thought**

#### **Summary of Material**

- Bernard Lonergan's biography and philosophical career.
- Lonergan's philosophical influences: Aquinas, the Social Encyclicals, Hegel, Marx.
- Abiding concern with the philosophical problem of human history.
- Lonergan's early studies of Aquinas, and their relevance to "insight"
- Reconciling the question of history with the problem of divine grace and human freedom.
- Not only a new philosophy of history, but also a new philosophy of nature.
- In Aquinas's analogical explorations of the doctrine of the Trinity, Lonergan discovers the importance of insight.
- Development of the book *Insight* and its publication.
- Relevance of *Insight* to 20th century theology.
- Insight as a prologue to Lonergan's thought on ethics, human existence, and personal relations.

# **Insight & Beyond:**

Lecture 1, Part I:

Introduction to Lonergan's Thought

9<sup>th</sup> September 2009

Bernard Lonergan S.J.  
(1904-1984)

Born 17-12-04, Buckingham, Quebec

Joined Society of Jesus, 1922

Influenced by J. H. Newman and Plato

Influenced by Social Encyclicals 1930s and Hegel  
and Marx

Catholic thought must meet challenges of modern  
science and historical method

Two studies of Aquinas, 1940s

*Insight*, 1957

*Method in Theology*, 1972

Taught at Boston College, 1977-1983

## Bernard Lonergan's biography and philosophical career.

Okay, so let me tell you a little bit about Bernard Lonergan and his career. He was born in 1904 in Buckingham, Quebec, which is an English-speaking city in the French-speaking province of Quebec. And some people reflect on whether or not there was something about the fact that *he was a minority within a minority that led to the kinds of concerns and issues and approaches that he had, because he was very unconventional in many ways.*

He joined the Jesuits, the Society of Jesus, in 1922 at the age of 18, and was a Jesuit priest all his life.

One of the things that is interesting about Lonergan's career is what we learned about his career after he died. Many of us, myself included, the first thing that we ever read of Lonergan was *Insight*. And then some of us, who became interested in his work, went back and looked at the things that he wrote somewhat earlier, in *the nineteen-forties*.

But he was **already** a very active writer in *the nineteen-thirties*, **although** he published very little, almost nothing, of what he actually wrote in the nineteen-thirties — though he wrote several hundred pages of things which remained in manuscript form. And we discovered, among other things, that one of *the earliest influences on him was Plato, and also John Henry Newman*. Now, that was a surprise to many of us, because Lonergan was known at the time his book *Insight* came out in the nineteen fifties — *Insight* was published originally in 1957; **there were** a couple of small revisions. A second edition came out in 1958, **but** there were no further revisions after that during his lifetime. And what *you* have is the critical edition, which goes back and picks up some of the material from the manuscript, the originally submitted

manuscript, and some corrections, and everything.<sup>1</sup> But during his lifetime the book changed almost not at all from what he published in 1957. And as I was saying, Lonergan was known at the time his book *Insight* came out in the nineteen fifties, and most of us thought of Lonergan, and he was spoken of and written of, as a *Neo-Thomist*: that he was indebted to the metaphysics, the epistemology, and so on, of Thomas Aquinas. Now in many ways, that is true! But what is very different about Lonergan is *how he came to Aquinas, and what he found in Aquinas!*

### Lonergan's philosophical influences:

Aquinas, the Social Encyclicals, Hegel, Marx.

Abiding concern with the philosophical problem of human history.

For it turns out that *among the most important early influences on Lonergan were Plato and Newman*. He was also influenced, in a very profound way, by *the Social Encyclicals of the Roman Catholic Church of the nineteen thirties*. These were the Encyclicals that addressed *issues of social justice and cultural distortions*, and so on, and particularly called attention to the plight of the workers. And for that reason, Lonergan was also very influenced by, and very interested in, *the work of Georg Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx*. Now almost nobody knew about this until after he died, when Father Frederick Crowe and other scholars started going through the papers that he had in his room.

Father Crowe tells the story that one time he was talking to Lonergan, and Lonergan said, "Well here, I'll draw you a diagram!" He opened up his drawer and took out a piece of paper from the drawer which was type-written on one side and he turned it over and started drawing the diagram on the other side! And Father Crowe said: "Oh no, no, no!" [Murmur of laughter]. Father Crowe has been the person who has preserved Lonergan's early unpublished works in the archives up in Toronto.

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<sup>1</sup> Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*: vol. 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992).

But it was then that we found out about this big interest in Hegel and Marx. Because Lonergan, as we'll say, as I'll try to explain a little bit later on — *The biggest and, I think, the most abiding concern of Lonergan throughout his whole life from the early nineteen-thirties — from probably the time he was about twenty-eight or maybe thirty — to the very end of his life was the problem of human history.* And in Hegel and Marx he saw two people he admired for taking seriously, as a philosophical problem, the problem of human history.

And in particular, Lonergan was influenced by a historian by the name of *Christopher Dawson*, who said, who wrote, that one of the greatest lacks in Thomist philosophy — so Dawson was writing in the nineteen-hundreds, the nineteen-teens and the nineteen-twenties — *one of the greatest lacks in Thomist philosophy was its inability to have given a good philosophy of history.* And Lonergan, probably at about the age of thirty or thirty-two, decided he was going to be the man who was going to solve that problem. And we didn't know this until after he died!

There are a couple of very long essays, one called “On the Restoration of All Things”, which is a reflection that takes off from a passage from one of the letters of St Paul the Apostle where that phrase is used. And *Lonergan works out a very early preliminary version of his philosophy of history at that time.* But he never published it. It's about ninety pages long.<sup>2</sup> It remained in his drawer until after he died. And then it was published a few years after he died by Professor Mark Morelli of Loyola Marymount University in the *Method Journal*. And that was when we began to discover this abiding concern that he had.

Now the reason why I am making a big deal of this, as I'll try to show in a few minutes: *I think it makes a big difference as to how we think about what the book Insight is all about. I've come to have the opinion that Lonergan's approach to the problem of history is **the** problem that is animating Insight.* And if you don't have a

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<sup>2</sup> It is unclear on the sound recording whether Pat says nineteen or ninety, neither of which indeed seems to fit the essay to which he is referring. Perhaps he has in mind the total pagination of a number of papers written at that time. The essay to which he is explicitly referring is “*Panton Anakephaliosis*”, which was published in *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 9:2 (1991) pp. 134-171.

problem with history, this may not be a very interesting book for you! Ah, but hopefully we will begin to see what some of the issues there are.

**Reconciling the question of history with the problem of  
divine grace and human freedom;  
not only a new philosophy of history, but also a  
new philosophy of nature.**

**In Aquinas's analogical explorations of the doctrine of the Trinity,  
Lonergan discovers the importance of insight.**

So after he did these early works of *his own kind of speculative thinking about the problem of history*, and what it was that was needed to go beyond the work of Hegel and Marx, *he then set off for doctoral studies at the Gregorian University in Rome. And he was assigned a topic, or was proposed a topic, having to do with Aquinas's theory of grace and freedom.*

Now the reason why grace and freedom is an issue has to do with a theme that comes up in Christian thought of *predestination*. It gets different versions in different denominations, whether in Catholic or different Protestant denominations: *how to think about the phenomenon of those who are called to salvation*. And this is not a course in Theology and this is not a course in grace or — or it will be a course on freedom in the second semester... But that was an issue that was put to him by his advisor, who said that: “The prevailing schools of Catholic thought on the problem of grace and freedom don't seem to make too much sense of Aquinas's texts. Why don't you go do that?”

*As far as I can tell, that doctoral work seems to be the first time that Lonergan really began to study Aquinas in a serious, scholarly, and sustained way in Aquinas's own right. Until then, he knew about Aquinas, he had some course work that was not perhaps directly coming from Aquinas, but was sort of a Thomistic epistemology, a Thomistic metaphysics, a Thomistic Theology. So he had read here and there! But actually to do the sustained scholarly work — he didn't really start to do this until he worked on this doctoral dissertation on grace and freedom.*

And there *he discovered some very important things, important things that are going to play into, not only his philosophy of history, but also his philosophy of nature, of the natural world; what comes to be known — what he comes to call “emergent probability”, which is going to be our concern for several weeks in this class. Emergent probability is his way of thinking about the natural sciences, the modern natural sciences, and the world of the modern natural sciences.* And the key ideas he got, he got when he was doing his work on grace and freedom.

The problem of grace and freedom is this: *If God graces a human being, then how is it that people operating under the sway of grace, that they are acting freely? That is usually not the way in which the problem of freedom is posed; but* it was the problem that was the starting point for his dissertation, although it kind of took off from there and went in other directions. When he eventually came back to the problem of [human freedom](#), it is to the more frequent problem that people have about freedom, which is: *If the world is governed by the laws of nature, then how can human beings have free choice?* And that is something that Lonergan *is* going to deal with, but *he has backed into it from this problem about grace and freedom.*

*So the first of his two studies of Aquinas in the nineteen-forties was his work on his doctoral dissertation, which was later published as a series of articles in the journal *Theological Studies*, and has more recently appeared in the *Collected Works from University of Toronto Press*.<sup>3</sup>*

Interesting side note [here](#): Lonergan was scheduled to defend this dissertation, but between the time that he completed his dissertation and the defence was scheduled, all members of the British Commonwealth were ordered to evacuate Italy, because it was a few months before [Italy's entry into](#) the Second World War. So he actually had to get on a boat in [May of 1940](#) without having defended his doctoral dissertation, and he had to defend it by proxy. I still haven't quite figured out how this happened! [[Murmur of amusement](#)]. But he had been evacuated without

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<sup>3</sup> Bernard Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St Thomas Aquinas*, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, vol. 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).

defending his dissertation. And he went back to Canada, where he lived for many years until the end of the Second World War.

And then [some time later, in 1953](#), he went back and started teaching at the Gregorian University in Rome, [about eight years](#) after the war.

*The second of his studies was his investigation of Thomas Aquinas's theory of the Trinity, a theme that he came back to over and over again.<sup>4</sup> This was* partly because he had the responsibility for teaching, at the Gregorian University, courses in Systematic Theology on the Christian doctrine of the Triune God, the Trinitarian God. And so part of that was to try to understand how Aquinas thought about this. And in doing so, *he came to the conclusion that everyone who had written on it before him had missed **the** most fundamental idea in Aquinas, upon which Aquinas's whole Systematic Theology of the Trinity was based. And they fundamentally missed – Anybody have a guess?... Insight!*

His basic discovery was that *Aquinas knew what an insight was, and used it as the basis for his Trinitarian theological writings, and that almost everybody that followed Aquinas missed the importance of what Aquinas discovered there.* Now that is a long story! We'll talk about it a little bit as — partly next week when we talk about the relationship between insight and concepts.

But Lonergan saw that this fundamental way of approaching insight, and *using insight as the primary analogate for the being of the Divine Being*, that people had missed that, and therefore were construing the Trinity in ways in Systematic Theology that were not Aquinas's, and [in manners Lonergan](#) thought defective in all sorts of ways because of that.

*So those are his two Aquinas studies, but they came in the nineteen-forties, more than a decade after his real philosophical interests and projects were under way. He then found, through these two basic discoveries in these two studies of*

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<sup>4</sup> Bernard Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).

*Aquinas*<sup>5</sup>, the resources that he thought would really bring forward this project of a philosophy of history.

Development of the book *Insight* and its publication.

Relevance of *Insight* to 20th century theology;

*Insight* as a prologue to Lonergan's thought on ethics, human existence, and personal relations.

The book *Insight* was published — He began writing the book *Insight* about a year after he finished the last of his Trinitarian articles, the articles on Aquinas's Trinitarian theory. And it took him about four years to write *Insight*. *It was completed about 1953, and it took a couple of years to get edited and published. It came out in 1957. So it grew out of those studies of Aquinas, but it has recontextualized what he discovered in Aquinas in all sorts of ways.*

There is not a lot of mention of Aquinas in the book *Insight*. The periodic mentions are interesting and important, but there is not a great deal of interest — *Certainly a lot of Thomist scholars don't really recognize Lonergan as an authentic Thomist.* There is some dispute about that!

Anyway, the book *Insight* came out, as I've indicated already, in 1957. But as he said in a sort of a quick remark at one point: he was called back to teach in Rome at the Gregorian somewhere around 1953, and so he had to round off the work that he was working on into this bare weight here!!<sup>6</sup>

[Pat lifts his copy of the book and balances it in his hands].

That's a rounded off volume!!

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<sup>5</sup> The two basis discoveries were (i) the incipient clue for emergent probability, which developed from his work on grace and freedom and later played into his philosophy of nature and his philosophy of history, and (ii), his grasp of insight and its role in Thomist Trinitarian theology.

<sup>6</sup> Bernard Lonergan, "Insight Revisited", in *A Second Collection*, eds. William F. J. Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrrell (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), pp. 263-278, at p. 268.

In other words, *he had to stop doing what he intended to finish. And what he intended to finish was to show how this [the book as we have it] had some relevance to problems in Theology of the twentieth century.* Now, there's a long footnote at the very beginning of the "Epilogue" where he says [roughly]: "Don't think that I didn't think about personal relations. I think they are the most important thing, but it would have required a much longer book to write about personal relations."<sup>7</sup> So we can be grateful perhaps, or perhaps not, that he didn't write about personal relations, or what he meant by that.

So he did understand *the book Insight* as the prologue to a proper way to approach problems in Theology, and *he saw Theology in the twentieth century as in very, very great need of reform. And he saw that as his objective. But he did not complete that project until 1972.*

So this *period* between 1957 and 1972 is some of what we are going to look at in the latter half of the second semester. *How did his thought about human meaning, value, ethics, human existence, history, society, religion, how did all that change and grow in that period, to complement and supplement what he set forth as his original starting point in Insight.*

And then shortly after the completion of *Method in Theology*, Lonergan taught here at Boston College for about six years. And then he came down with what was his terminal illness in the Fall semester of 1983. He was not able to complete the class that he started, and he died a year later just short of his eightieth birthday.

So that is a little bit about Lonergan; and maybe that's a good place to take a break.

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<sup>7</sup> Bernard Lonergan, *Insight*, p. 754, n. 1: "Since I believe personal relations can be studied adequately only in this larger and more concrete context [that of a larger work], the skimpy treatment accorded them in the present work is not to be taken as a denial of their singular importance in human living."

Insight & Beyond: Lecture 1, Part 2:  
“Introduction” & “Preface;” Exercises in Self-  
Appropriation.

**Summary of Material**

- Student question regarding Lonergan’s personality and presence.
- Lonergan emphasized the dimension of feelings in ethics. Living amid the political turmoil of 1940s Europe added urgency to his intellectual concerns, particularly the project of history.
- Student question about which languages Lonergan had mastered.
- The Many Kinds of Human Knowing. Lonergan did not privilege physical and scientific knowledge. Examples of kinds of knowing: interpersonal, religious, aesthetic, self-knowledge, etc.
- One Single Structure of Knowing. Lonergan gives a single model for all kinds of knowing which nonetheless respects diversity. The relation of knowing to sense experience, and of sense experience to questioning. How inquiry guides insight.
- Insight as self-correcting process (example of scientific method).
- Wonder and Inquiry as Basic. Insight as a supervening act of understanding. Inquiry as the basis of science.
- Objectivity & Subjectivity. Objectivity as the fruit of authentic subjectivity. Being responsible to the process of inquiry; examples of authenticity.

- Self-Correcting Process of Inquiry and Insight. Scientific method as a self-correcting process. Insights are expressed in hypothesis in ways that transform our experience.
- The Goal of Insight. Know the precise activity of consciousness during insight. Cognitional theory and descriptive phenomenology as methods of knowing one's consciousness. The invitation to know oneself.
- The Structure of Insight: Lonergan's reasons for beginning *Insight* with a discussion of mathematical and scientific insights. To allow for us to witness how we formulate our insights and inverse insights. To reestablish the natural world as an emergent setting for human history and communities.
- The Five Characteristics of Insight. Illustrations of insights from physics and geometry.
- The role of imagination in insight: "The Three 'I's: Inquiry, Imagination, Insight." Different philosophical traditions and how they explain way concepts originate. The role of imagination, inquiry and insight in concept formation.
- Class exercise self appropriation of insights: Paying attention to how insights come about. Class discussion.

# Insight & Beyond:

## Lecture 1, Part 2:

### “Introduction” & “Preface;” Exercises in Self-Appropriation.

9<sup>th</sup> September 2009

#### Student question regarding Lonergan’s personality and presence.

Question: I’m wondering, if it’s okay at this time — I would be curious since you were kind of in the presence of Lonergan, if you would kind of like humanize him for us: like talk about his personality, his demeanour. Maybe you have like an anecdotal story that would shed light on what it was like to be in his presence?

Pat: I find it awkward, I find it awkward! [laughter!]. I was about your age, and he was older than I am. And he was *really smart!* And *I was in awe of him, and I was at the point of just beginning to try to understand his ideas, his thought, his writings.* And ... So ... *He had a funny sense of humour! He had a very sing-songy voice:* you’ll hear me imitate him from time to time!

#### Lonergan in this later work emphasized the dimension of feelings in ethics.

Here you go: One time I was in class, and somebody asked him about Jean Piaget, and you’ll discover that he had a great appreciation for the work of Jean Piaget. Jean Piaget was a Swiss developmental psychologist; he *was just an amazing, brilliant man!* And Lonergan had this great appreciation for his work. But *Piaget worked primarily in the area of cognitive development, or intellectual development. And when he wrote about moral development, it was relatively thin compared to the richness, and the texture, and the detail of all of the things that he had to say about the development of children’s intelligences. What he had to say about moral development was relatively limited.* Now, Lonergan refers to Piaget both

to his things on intellectual development and on moral development in the book *Topics in Education*, in a number of places.<sup>8</sup> *But somebody pushed him one time on the moral development thing.* So Lonergan — And this was after he had published *Insight* and it was after he had published *Method in Theology*. And one of the things that we'll see in the second semester is *the importance of feelings in ethics for Lonergan.* And Lonergan kind of threw up his hands and said: “Piaget didn't know anything about feelings, eh?” [Pat imitates the inimitable tones of Father Lonergan! Huge laughter!] His *sing-songy* way of talking! And he had a funny sense of humour. *He would be laughing about things, and it would take you a while to figure out what it was he was laughing about!*

[laughter]

Living amid the political turmoil of 1940s Europe added urgency to Lonergan's intellectual concerns, particularly the project of history.

There's a wonderful book by William Mathews, a biography, called *Lonergan Quest*.<sup>9</sup> ... I'll bring it along next time. And Mathews traces Lonergan's life up to the time of the publication of *Insight*. And one of the things in there that comes out very strongly — Every now and then you get this little glimpse of Lonergan situated in his classes in Rome, while the *Fascisti* are demonstrating across the Piazza, and *you get the sense* — we get glimpses of it in *Insight* and in some of his other writings, — but we discovered especially after his unpublished papers were revealed, *that he was extremely preoccupied with the rise of Fascism, with Nazism, and with Communism. He saw those as deadly forces in the twentieth century — they caused a great deal of suffering — all of which, or at least two out of the three, were rooted in a certain conception of what human history was! It was one of the animating forces behind Lonergan's concern with history.* So every now and again you get this kind of

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<sup>8</sup> Bernard Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, eds. Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan: vol. 10 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).

<sup>9</sup> William A. Matthews, *Lonergan's Quest: A Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).

glimpse of Lonergan, and *why he was taking these intellectual problems, these abstract, abstruse intellectual problems with such passion.*

Also there are times there when you get a sense of how lonely the man was. *He was a thinker ahead of his time,* and he had a great deal of difficulty communicating his ideas to people.

And what I learned was: I would ask him a question, and I would never understand the answer! And it would take me about a week to figure out why that was an answer to my question! So he had that experience of being a person who had something important to contribute to humankind, and not being very well understood.

So — but — Mathews's book — I'll bring it along next time to read a couple of passages. But thanks for the question! I know that's helpful for people to have some kind of connection, to make that kind of connection. It's not just a bunch of words! Okay, thanks!

Ah, any other questions at this point?

### Student question about which languages Lonergan had mastered.

Question: This is a sort of related question, Lonergan's relation to languages: when he was reading Plato was he reading it in Greek, and when he was reading Aquinas was he reading it in Latin or in translation?

Pat: That's a really good question! I don't know the answer about Plato and reading it in Greek! I'm pretty sure he first started reading Plato not in Greek! I'm not sure when he got — He studied Greek in his High School education, so he learned both Latin and Greek as well as — He read German and French. I'm not sure when he acquired those. So those — And then Italian also. *So he knew those five languages, six languages including English.* When he got to the point when he could actually work in Greek, I am not sure. But his studies of Aquinas were in Latin. His education was in Latin. He had to be able to teach in Latin when he was in Rome; he had to be able to take classes in Latin when he was in Rome. He took classes in Latin, and read Latin texts when he was — prior to the time when he went

to Rome. So Latin he was very fluent in. He wrote many of his theological works, from the period when he taught in Rome, in Latin. They had to be translated from Latin into English.

Any other questions? ... Okay!

### The Many Kinds of Human Knowing.

Lonergan did not privilege physical and scientific knowledge.

Examples of kinds of knowing: interpersonal,  
religious, aesthetic, self-knowledge, etc.

So, what about Lonergan? *The first important thing to know about Lonergan is that for Lonergan there are many different ways of knowing, many different kinds of human knowing!*

### Many Kinds of Human Knowing

This needs to be emphasized for a couple of reasons. One of them is a reason which is not so much in play now, but it was in play when I was about your age, when I was studying philosophy! *Philosophy in the United States at the time was dominated by Logical Positivist thought, and there was really only one kind of knowing. There was only one kind of thing that counted as knowing. And it was empirically justified knowing. It was natural scientific knowing, particularly physics, as the paradigmatic example of knowing. And everything was to be measured according to that standard.*

Now, because that was the style of philosophy that dominated the English-speaking world at that time, when *Insight* came out it was easy to form the impression that Lonergan thought that way too. As I mentioned before, and as you'll see in a moment, *the first big chunk of Insight is all about natural scientific knowing.* And I actually had a class when I was in Graduate School, and the Professor in that class said:

“The problem with Lonergan is **that** he thinks that natural science is the standard form of knowing, and that everything else is derivative.”

*That is simply not true!* I wasn’t — I was suspicious of that claim when it was made in my presence in the classroom, and now I am *really* suspicious of it *because I think it is wrong!* [**Subdued if audible smiles.**] But it is not hard to see why people would form that impression.

So I want to begin with that! I want to begin with that. *For Lonergan, there are many kinds of knowing.* After his work *Insight*, he will talk about *differentiations of consciousness*. We will see that a little bit in some of the selections from the *Topics in Education* volume.<sup>10</sup> *What he means by ‘differentiations of consciousness’ is the different kinds of knowing, the different ways in which human consciousness gets formed, and gets exercised.* And so *there is a big respect for the different kinds of knowing.* And **in the display that follows**, I didn’t put them in the order in which they appear in *Insight*. **My order is as follows:**

## Many kinds of Human Knowing

I **began** then **with** what arguably are perhaps some of the most important contributions of Lonergan’s thought to philosophy for human living: and that is that *human knowing in the full-fledged sense occurs in everyday common sense*. It occurs **as well** in the realm of *interpersonal relations*. It also occurs in the *scientific realm*; in *Math and Logic*; in the *realms of art and aesthetic appreciation*.

**Again**, there is a very different kind of knowing that is involved in becoming a *scholar*. Lonergan used to like to talk about William Albright<sup>11</sup>, who was an Old-Testament scholar and an archaeologist. And he said **that** the thing that impressed

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<sup>10</sup> Bernard Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, eds. Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan: vol. 10 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).

<sup>11</sup> William F. Albright (1891–1971) was an American archaeologist, biblical scholar, linguist and expert on ceramics.

him about Albright was that Albright could pick up a piece of pottery and just by feeling it in his fingers, he could date it within fifty years! *And the question arises as to how do you get to the point where you can make those kinds of judgments accurately and on a consistent basis? That's one form of scholarship! Or another form of scholarship is to be able to pick up a text by an author, and be able to discover the things that are, and are not, part of what the author means.*

I remember one time teaching a class, just some students, and we read a poem. So I said: "Well, what do you think is the mood of this poem? And one of the students said: "I think it's boring!" I didn't say it, but I thought: "I think *you* are boring!" [laughter!] Definitely there was no boredom in that poem! But *nevertheless it takes a development of our knowing to become sophisticated in being able to use our knowing in the realm of scholarship. Interpretation — understanding an author in the context that they come from, the cultural, historical context that they come from.*

Another kind of knowing, as we'll see, and a special kind of knowing and one central to the project of *Insight*, is *self-knowledge*. And self-knowledge is among *the most difficult kinds of knowledge, but there is real knowledge!* It is not just the subject of *opinion* about yourself. But there is such a thing as *self-knowledge*, as well, of course, as self-delusion!

And *Philosophical Knowledge*: *Lonergan has a take on what is meant by philosophical knowledge.* It is a little different than perhaps many other thinkers and their takes on philosophy. But *in philosophy also there is real knowledge.* *Philosophy is not just idle speculation; it is not just idealized — ideas that have no knowledge basis to them. But there is real philosophical knowledge! There is a method to it!*

And then lastly, but not least, *there is knowledge in matters having to do with Religion and Theology;* although there is a lot of craziness in both those areas as well!

*So Lonergan acknowledges the diversity, the plurality, the differentiatedness of the different kinds of human knowing.* And, as we'll see, even within each of those

categories that I put up there — just to give you a sense about the diversity of knowledge as Lonergan understands it — even within each of those, there **are** other kinds of knowledge or specializations that take place. **Within** common sense, there is the common sense of Boston College, and there is the common sense of the University of Texas; and there is the common sense of the University of Freiburg, and they are not the same! There is the common sense of how to behave in a restaurant in Boston, and the common sense of how to behave in a restaurant in Rome! And they are not the same.

So that even within any one of those [**pointing to the display board**], there are going to be further specializations! So *Lonergan was a great respecter of the great diversity of the kinds of knowing!*

**One Single Structure of Knowing.**

**Lonergan gives a single model for all kinds of knowing  
which nonetheless respects diversity.**

**The relation of knowing to sense experience, and  
of sense experience to questioning.**

**How inquiry guides insight.**

*Nevertheless, despite everything I have said, for Lonergan there is a single structure of knowing. So this is what Lonergan understood as his unique contribution to the history of epistemology, the field of philosophy that has to do with the problem of knowing.*

**One Single Structure of Knowing.**

And so Lonergan is going to set forth — and it is going to be set forth *gradually* as we make our way through the book *Insight* — he is going to make *the claim that there is a single structure of knowing. And some of the most important elements in this structure, as he articulates it, he got from his studies of Aquinas. However,* they don't appear in Aquinas in this straightforward and obvious way as he then comes to

present them. But nevertheless he credited Aquinas, and defined in his writings on Aquinas where he saw this, and what he made of it.

So *human knowing begins* — and this is perhaps not the most dramatic breakthrough anybody ever had — *human knowing begins with the activities of experiencing!* And by experiencing we mean *first and most paradigmatically, sense experiencing*. So seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, smelling, and the kind of kinaesthetic sense that we have of experiencing our bodies as they move, as they ache, as we have our postures. So *you might say that there are six kinds of sense experiencings, and those are the first part, the lowest level as Lonergan is going to call it, in the structure of human knowing.*

Significantly, and I think this is — I am going to argue and I am going to try to make the claim, and I am going to try to get you to discover that this is true about yourselves — *this is what is perhaps most significant about Lonergan: his claim that at the core of human knowing is human inquiry, human questioning!* So our knowledge, for Lonergan, begins in experiencing, but does not end in experiencing! Our knowledge is not primarily experiencing. Our experiencing is the beginning, the starting-point, the point of departure for our knowing, because it is our experiencing that gives rise to our questions. About our experiences, we ask all kinds of questions.


And when you go to write your “Insight Description Papers”, among the things I am going to ask you to do, is to *pay attention to what the questions were that came out of the experiences that preceded your insights!*

And the questions we ask are of many different kinds: “What was that sound?” “Why did she do it?” “How many times do I have to tell him?” All the questions that we ask: the who? the what? the why? the where? the how? the when?

*Those are questions that are not — whose answers are not given in our experience, and if they were given in our experience we wouldn't be asking them. But questions have this funny character of directing us towards we know-not-what!*

Questions *then* are a second kind of human activity over and above your experiencing, and they direct us away from our experience towards something that we don't, and in fact cannot, experience [in the strict sense of 'experience' used to this point]! And that is, they direct us towards insights!

Now, just a terminological question: It is almost always the case that if Lonergan uses the word 'understanding' he means insight, and if he uses the word 'insight' he means understanding. Many authors have very technical distinctions between understanding, and knowledge, and sensibility, and intuition, and all sorts of things. But for the sake of the book *Insight*, it's very seldom that Lonergan ever uses the word 'understanding' when he doesn't mean insight, or that he uses the word 'insight' when he doesn't mean understanding.



The difficulty with the English word 'insight' is that there is no gerund. You can't say 'insighting.' Did I get that right? Is that the gerund?

Student: Yeah! [A gerund is a verb form that functions as a noun. Gerunds in English end in *-ing*.]

Pat: Yeah. That's the gerund. It is the gerund! [Smile on Pat's face]. Okay! You can't say 'insighting', so if you want to say 'understanding' you have to kind of shift around the language a little bit, but —

*Now, insights or acts of understanding are different kinds of activities than any of our experiences — what Lonergan strictly speaking means by ‘experiences’.*

Now, there is a way of using the word ‘experience’ that’s very broad and very large. And *the word* ‘experience’ can be used to cover a whole range of things including the experience of having an insight, the experience of falling in love, the experience of having anxiety attacks. There are all kinds of things that count as experience *in a very broad sense in common usage*. People will talk about “a person of experience”, *someone* who has expertise in the health-care field, in the field of education, in the field of law, in the field of finance. People use the word in a broad and undifferentiated way.

*But Lonergan is using the word ‘experience’ in a very specific way to speak of the activities, and the contents of those activities, about which we ask questions and then have insights.*

So for example, if you say “The experience of having an insight is not quite the same as the experience of seeing a sail-boat on the lake! *You can of course ask questions about both of these kinds of experiences.*

*So questions structure our **cognitional** activities. They make experiences be that about which we ask, and they make insights be that which responds, to those questions.*

*However, when we have insights, they are not necessarily correct! They are not necessarily about reality!*

### **Insight as self-correcting process (example of scientific method).**

*About our insights, we **go on to** ask the further questions: Well, is it so? Is what I have understood in my insight correct? Is it real? Is it objective? Or is it a half-baked idea? Is it something that is merely an illusion? And just as the first level of questions heads us beyond our sense experiences and our imaginative experiences and our memories of our experiences — just as those first levels, that first level of*

*question, heads us on to the second level of activities, so also the questions about our insights heads on to yet a further kind of activity, **judgments of facts**. So when we ask Is it so?, we are seeking some kind of activity; we are seeking the activity of making a judgment that says Yes it is so, or No, it is not so!*

Now it will take us a while before we get — It will take us almost the whole semester to get this far [Pat gestures to the diagram, presumably pointing just to “Judging Facts”] in Lonergan’s structure of knowing.

But Lonergan doesn’t stop there, because once we know what the story is, once we know what the factual situation is, once we are in a situation when we understand correctly what is going on there, we spontaneously ask: What will I do? What shall I do? What should I do? *What good can I accomplish in the situation in which I find myself, and correctly understand to be the situation that I’m in? And those questions too head for something beyond just knowing what the case is. They head towards making judgments of value, particularly ethical value, and responding with decisions!*

Now you can print — this power point will be up, and you can print this little page out [the structure of cognitional process and decision], and you will have everything there is to know about Lonergan [smile in voice], but you won’t understand any of it! You won’t understand any of it!

[Subdued laughter!]

That’s what this course is about! *What is that structure all about? How does it manifest itself in those many different realms in which we saw that Lonergan says there is just one structure of knowing that manifests itself in so many different ways?*

**Wonder and Inquiry as Basic.**

**Insight as a supervening act of understanding.**

**Inquiry as the basis of science.**

Lonergan entitled the book *Insight*. *I’ll try to explain why, I think, why he says that the oversight of insight is such an important thing.* On the very first page of *Insight*, in the “Preface”, second paragraph, he writes this: ... If you have the book

with you, it is page three in the Toronto edition. Does anyone have one of the older 1958 editions? ... Because I will refer [as well](#) to those pages of the old edition. If anybody has the older edition, I can give you those page references as well! If you have the Toronto edition with you, this is on page three, of the “Preface”. And Lonergan writes this:

**By insight, then, is meant not any act of attention or advertence or memory but the supervening act of understanding. (CWL 3, p. 3).**

The word ‘supervening’ is a key word which we will talk about again next week, and a couple of other times as well. *Supervening means, [in this usage here](#), that insight is an activity, a conscious activity that we perform, that is not reducible to the level of experiencing. It supervenes, and it supervenes by the mediation of the questions which pull us out of our experiences towards a very different kind of activity with a very different kind of content, namely insight. So Lonergan is saying that [insight](#) is a supervening act.*

**It is not any recondite intuition but the familiar event that occurs easily and frequently in the moderately intelligent, rarely and with difficulty only in the very stupid. In itself it is so simple and obvious that it seems to merit the little attention that commonly it receives. (CWL 3, p. 3).**

*For a variety of reasons, [then](#), many having to do with the history of philosophy, [Lonergan came to believe](#) the big lesson that he learned from Aquinas, that the history of philosophy had largely ignored this activity of insight and its characteristics, its unique and special characteristics. And [he also thought that this oversight was responsible for a great number of distortions in philosophy, and in disciplines like economics, like history, like theology, like ethics, that took their point of departure from certain assumptions about the nature of human understanding and human knowing.](#)*

So as Lonergan says *in the passage just read*, *insight* seems to deserve the little attention that it has received. And so he titled the book *Insight*, because of the importance that he saw in the implications of paying attention to our insights.

Wonder and Inquiry as Basic.
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But with all due respect, *if it were up to me*, I would have entitled the book *Inquiry*, because at the very heart of Lonergan's philosophical enterprise is the human phenomenon of *inquiring*.

And as I hope you'll discover, it is impossible to really understand what an insight is — so important to Lonergan — unless you understand that *insights always come in response to the tension of inquiry*. *The tension of inquiry is essential to human understanding*. *In inquiry, we are already in not yet; we are beyond ourselves and yet not beyond ourselves*. We are pulled away from where we are, but we are not yet arriving at where that inquiry is pulling us. And *without understanding insight as a response to that peculiar — almost impossible to describe — experience of inquiry, you don't really know what an insight is!*

So I'm placing a great deal of attention here, and drawing *your* attention, to *the importance of inquiry in the Lonergan philosophical project*. And just a couple of remarks from *Insight*:

**Prior to the neatly formulated questions of systematizing intelligence, there is *the deep-set wonder in which all questions have their source and ground*. (CWL 3, p. 208, emphases added).**

So Lonergan's going to talk about the '**pure question**'. It's not as though he is unaware of the role that language plays in the structuring of our inquiry, but it is *the emphasis that our inquiry is being structured, that prior to linguistically formulated, or directed, or shaped questioning, there is the phenomenon of pure wonder, which is at the heart of human consciousness, and which language does some structuring of*.

In his post-*Insight* writings, Lonergan is going to make the argument that *language comes out of inquiry, that language is invented and developed and created in response to the human desire to understand how to express himself or herself. So fundamental to all human beings is this deep-seated wonder out of which our questions come and our expressed questions have their source of origin.*

And [in the book \*Insight\*](#) he goes on to make the big point that *the spirit of inquiry is at the basis of the scientific project.*

**There is, then, common to all [human beings] *the very spirit of inquiry that constitutes the scientific attitude.***

(CWL 3, p. 197, emphases added).

It's what's at the basis of science.

Now I just want to emphasize how strange and unique that is, to talk about science in that way. If you think about this — and we'll talk about this in the next couple of weeks — If you think about how people talk about science, the things that are emphasized is that *science is about truth!* Well, yeah, science is about truth. But *so is common sense!* There'll be a real big argument with a lot of people about that, but science isn't unique, it doesn't have a monopoly on truth, though people will talk that way, especially in the period of history we are in, which is *the post-Enlightenment period, in which science comes to be the overwhelming paradigm for what counts as real knowledge.*

What makes scientific knowledge be scientific knowledge in the modern period? *Empirical verifiability! Empirical data! Evidence!* So to think about science as about truth, and about evidence, and about the empirical, and the verifiable — *there is nothing wrong with that!* But there is a way in which it is putting the wrong emphasis on it. *From Lonergan's point of view, what is really most fundamental about science is inquiry. And all the verification, all the search for empirical data, is guided by the inquiry, and it's as though nobody is noticing this! So if there is an oversight of insight, I would argue that there is also an oversight of inquiry.*

And I would say that one of the most important things for me personally, that was transformative of the way that I try to live, was *paying respect to myself as an inquirer. Paying respect, being respectful and faithful to my inquiry. And to not go round pretending to have answers to questions that I don't have answers to! To respect the questions, to live the questions, that is really so fundamental to Lonergan's thought!*

### Objectivity & Subjectivity.

Objectivity as the fruit of authentic subjectivity.

Being responsible to the process of inquiry.

Examples of authenticity.

There is also a connection — interesting — I'm just putting it out there now, for us to — as a kind of a sound-byte for you to hold on to, a *mantra* to hold on to for a while, until it begins to make sense for you! *Lonergan makes the very strange claim that “Objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity.”*<sup>12</sup>

### Objectivity and Subjectivity

Now in many writings — perhaps not always the most sophisticated writings — objectivity and subjectivity are thought of as polar opposites! That is not the case for Lonergan.

*Objectivity, in Lonergan's view, requires a certain highly developed, responsible, form of subjectivity! And it's a developed form of subjectivity that takes seriously oneself as an inquirer.*

Later on, after *Insight*, Lonergan will say that authenticity, human authenticity, consists in **being attentive**, attending to what your experiences are and not ignoring them; **being intelligent**, pursuing your questions in a serious way and letting the questions be your guide; and also with regard to **being reasonable**, reasonable in the sense not of: “Be reasonable, and give up that stupid philosophy study that you are

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<sup>12</sup> Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972), p. 292.

doing!” Or “Give up that stupid Theology study that you are doing! Be reasonable! Study finances!” Or whoops! “Maybe we don’t want to study finances these days! But study something like engineering that has got a practical import!”

[Gentle laughter of recognition from some students!]

That’s a meaning of being reasonable! But *for Lonergan, being reasonable means pursuing that second kind of question: Is that really so? And not being satisfied by anything less than an answer that really does authentically answer that question.* And *being responsible*: What should I do? What ought I do? What is the good thing for me to do? And not resting with anything less than what satisfies that inquiry. And to *be loving* is the highest form of being responsible! *Lonergan claims that to be loving, in the most profound and unconditional sense, is not at all incompatible with objectivity.* The problem with the division between being objective and being loving: you know, “Love is blind!” and — “Oh, he can’t see the flaws in somebody because he’s in love with her!” and all these kinds of things which, of course, are altogether too true! But *the big problem is not that people can’t be objective because they love too much; the big problem is that people can’t be objective because they don’t love enough!* And Lonergan is going to make a strong argument — one of the things that we will look at in the second semester — that

*unconditional loving and objectivity are not opposites, but in fact, that unconditional loving is a prerequisite for real objectivity.*

Now those are very strange claims to make. And it will take us a while to see how Lonergan is going to build a case for it.

But here is another reason why Lonergan starts where he does, *that is, with maths and the sciences.* *Lonergan is going to make the case for this dynamic of inquiry being part of natural science — the alleged paradigm of real objectivity — so that in a sense nobody knows what science is.* *He wishes to show* that he is not some romantic who is wanting to throw science out the window, and go out and have a love-fest out on the Common!

[Considerable laughter.]

*Lonergan is a man who knows what science is, and who can still make the case that love is the source of authenticity and objectivity. Now, it is a very strange claim to make!*

### Example of Authenticity

[Some laughter at a picture of Lt Colombo which appears.]

Some of you will have seen my friend, Peter Falk, alias Lieutenant Colombo! Back a number of years, longer ago than I care to mention, back before many of you were conceived, there was this TV series called “Colombo”, and Peter Falk played the lead character in it. And he was this kind of bumbling — he seemed like a bumbling, but of course he was as sly as a fox, or he was dumb like a fox! They were always kind of high-profile murders. Nobody, I think, committed a murder on this show who made less than a hundred million dollars a year! And so **Colombo** was always trapped with this big bad rich guy, who thought he could get away with it! And he would say: [Pat imitates Colombo’s voice]:

*“You know, these things bother me! I go home to my wife, and you know, she says, ‘You’re crazy!’” And then, just as he is about to go out the door and leave the wealthy and probably guilty man to his own devices, Colombo would turn and say to the man: “You know, this thing is bothering me! When I came in, the needle was still on the record player! This bothers me! Why was that?”*

And the rich smart girl or guy would try to brush it off! “Oh, I told you ...” And of course, gradually, by paying attention to the things that bothered him, the questions that nagged at him, Colombo always got the bad guy! So, an example of authenticity in this sense, Lieutenant Colombo!

So one student went out and bought the whole series of Colombo tapes! He was worrying about authenticity!!

[Laughter]

**Self-Correcting Process of Inquiry and Insight.**  
**Scientific method as a self-correcting process.**  
**Insights are expressed in hypothesis in ways that**  
**transform our experience.**

*Now, why is it that paying attention to our inquiry is so important in the project of authenticity? It is because we don't have just one question, but we have a self-correcting cycle of questioning. And this is something that we're going to see the importance of, as Lonergan builds his case for the structure of human knowing. The self-correcting process of learning isn't just one question, but questions that lead to insights, that lead to transformations of our experience, that in turn lead to more questions and more insights. This is what Lonergan calls the self-correcting cycle of knowing.*

<b>Self-Correcting Process of Inquiry and Insight</b>
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**The spontaneous and self-correcting process of learning is a circuit in which insights reveal their shortcomings by putting forth deeds or words or thoughts, and through that revelation prompt further questions that lead to complementary insights. (CWL 3, p. 197).**

And it sort of works like this: *you have an experience.* Some of you perhaps know this charming show on Public Radio called “Car-Talk”, by these two fellows who have a very humorous way of approaching **problems** — And people call in! And they'll describe the sounds their cars are making, or the smokes they're making, or the thumps that they're making; and the **two fellows** will do this kind of analysis over the radio, over the telephone basically — **to the people who** are calling in! So people call in that have *experiences* of some kind of malfunction with their car. And there's a *question*: “What's going on? What's wrong with my car?” And the “Car-Talk” guys will propose the answer to the question. They'll say **something like**:

“Ah, it’s probably the linkage in the drive-shaft! So what I want you to do is go out there right now, put on the emergency brake, and rev the engine up, and see if it makes this kind of noise!” *And it doesn’t make that kind of noise!* So we’ve got a *new kind of question. We’ve got a couple of sets of experiences, and the first insight wasn’t the right one.*

So, *the self-correcting process*, as Lonergan understands it, is this cycle in which *experiences give rise to questions, and questions to insights, the insights to acts which change our experiences, which give rise to more questions, and further insights which complement and correct the other insights.*

*So that is why authenticity and objectivity have something to do with one another. It isn’t just answering one question, but being attentive to the further questions. And the further questions are often much more subtle and much easier to dismiss than the original questions were.*

And, as I mentioned *already*, for Lonergan inquiry is really the *defining core, the animating experience and central phenomenon, in scientific knowledge.*

<b>Self-correcting Scientific Method</b>
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The *self-correcting process of inquiry operates in a slightly differentiated fashion in scientific inquiry, namely, that when you are in the scientific method* — and we’ll see how this gets amplified in various ways as we work our way through the first chapters of *Insight* — *in doing science, insights get expressed first in hypotheses.* So there *are* important reasons why this has to be done when you are doing science.

Now, in the previous diagram, the one on the ‘Self-Correcting Process of Inquiry and Insight,’ *I did not have the word ‘hypothesis’ up there, ‘hypothesis formation’.* And part of what you are going to read about next week is **definitions**. And definitions are part of the hypothesis formation process. So when Lonergan is talking about definitions in chapter one *of the book Insight*, he is talking about going from insights to hypotheses. We need definitions to formulate hypotheses. In the previous diagram, **however**, we went directly to actions. *Insights sometimes get expressed, not in language, but in deeds! In much of our common sense practical living, we express our understanding by acting, and not necessarily by putting it in language.*

In science it is important to express our insights in **explicit** hypotheses as the basis for experiments. And the *experiments give us new experiences* “to worry about”, like Colombo. But again, the important thing here is to notice that the role that Lonergan assigns to experiment is not this direction [**Pat points to the diagram below, presumably rejecting an upward movement, and affirming one back to experience.**]

*The experiments are not there primarily — which is not to say they don’t — but they are not there primarily to verify the hypothesis, to prove the hypothesis. The experiments are there to express the hypotheses in ways that transform our experiences, providing new data, and so allowing our knowledge to grow!* So Lonergan has a very different way of thinking about the role of experiment!

Anybody that’s done scientific work knows that your experiments are very troublesome, because they are always raising new questions. *They don’t just verify what you want them to verify: they have the troublesome capacity to raise new questions.* So Lonergan wants to draw attention to that aspect — and as we’ll see down the road — **this** has important implications for what scientific verification is as well.

## The Goal of *Insight*.

Know the precise activity of consciousness during insight.

Cognitive theory and descriptive phenomenology as  
methods of knowing one's consciousness.

The invitation to know oneself.

So, having said that — So this is a little bit of an introduction to Lonergan's Epistemology, or **what** he prefers to call his *Cognitive Theory*. Okay. *What's the difference between epistemology and cognitive theory, at least as Lonergan understands it?* Again, towards the end of this semester, I'm going to look at Lonergan's theory of objectivity, and we can talk about that some more. But for openers:

*Cognitive theory* has to do with what are the actual operations that human beings engage in. *What are their conscious activities? Cognitive theory is asking the question, as he puts it: "What are we doing when we are knowing?" It is what, in another context, might be called a descriptive phenomenology — just letting ourselves discover, and pay attention to, and sort out, what it is we are doing when we are knowing. Paying attention to the experiences, to the questions, to the insights, and so on.*

*Epistemology, on the other hand* — at least as Lonergan understands it — *epistemology has to do with the question of: well, why does doing that produce knowledge?* You see, it's a second question! In what is sometimes called the "History of Epistemology", epistemology is understood to deal fundamentally with **the following** problem: *how can what is going on inside my consciousness be objective knowledge of what is going on outside my consciousness?* So the "History of Epistemology" starts with what is sometimes called *the bridge or the chasm problem*: *how do I form a bridge over the chasm between what's inside my consciousness and what's really out there? That's not how Lonergan thinks about the epistemology question, because raising the epistemology question in that way is assuming that you've got a correct knowledge of what is going on in your consciousness in the first place. So he wants to make that the prior question. What*

*actually is going on in my consciousness? Then we can raise the question about: How is doing that possible to bring about real knowledge?*

So that's a distinction that Lonergan is going to make. It's not a distinction that is made by any other philosopher that I know of! There are philosophers — Martin Heidegger in particular — who see that there is a prior set of considerations that need to be dealt with before you can pick up the so-called bridge problem, or the epistemology problem. This [distinction between cognitional theory and epistemology](#) is Lonergan's way of talking about the bridge problem, and it is a little different from Heidegger's, though in some ways, yes, he has some similarities with Heidegger.

So what I have given you is just, sort of, the Cliff Notes, the overview about Lonergan's cognitional theory, and some hints of where this is going to go with regard to the question of epistemology.

But now I want to step back and ask what is this book [[picks up a copy of the book \*Insight\*](#)] — What's the nature of this book? And Lonergan tells us in the "Introduction" that:

**More than all else the aim of the book is to issue an invitation to a personal, decisive act — [to know yourself].** (*CWL* 3, p. 13).

Goal of the book *Insight*?

That's the aim of the book. There it is! And then, and the italics are Lonergan's, a little bit later on he says: *And, if you do understand what understanding is, if you do understand what it means to have an insight, you will not only*

*understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding.* (*CWL* 3, p. 22, author's emphases).

Now some of you perhaps have had some experience with *post-modern thought*. People who are very influenced by post-modern thought get to page twenty-two of *Insight*, close the book, that's it!! Another modernist, totalitarian, totalizing, meta-narrative ... Well?!?

[Some quiet amused laughter].

And Lonergan's language *there* — You know, *there is something to be suspicious about in this language!* And *I am going to try to make the case, as we go through this work, that the post-modernist critique, in so far as it is legitimate of certain thinkers, it's not accurate with regard to Lonergan.*

But I've put that up there [the boxed quotation from p. 22 of *CWL 3*] because it *throws some light on* what this book's about! *This book is about giving us an invariant base for the broad lines of all that is there to be understood.* And we are going to have to see what he means by that, what claims he makes about it, and what criticisms there are to be had. So that's what the book is about!

### The Structure of Insight.

Lonergan's reasons for beginning *Insight* with a discussion of mathematical and scientific insights:

to allow for us to witness how we formulate our insights and inverse insights.

to reestablish the natural world as an emergent setting for human history and communities.

The table of contents of the book
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Okay, so what I have here is the Table of Contents of the chapters of *Insight*. *If this is meant to be a personal invitation to a personal act of self-knowledge, why does so much of it have to do with natural science? Why does he start the way he did?* That's a question I wanted to throw out first, to reflect on a little bit, and as we get into those chapters, I am going to try to give a little bit deeper understanding.

But *here at least is why Lonergan says he begins with those long and difficult chapters on science. He claims that it has to do with clearness, and distinctness, and exactitude*, and for that reason he felt obliged to give an account of insight and its expansion in mathematics and scientific illustrations.

### Structure of *Insight*?

He writes as follows:

**If one's apprehension of those activities is to be clear and distinct, then one must prefer the fields of intellectual endeavor in which the greatest care is devoted to exactitude and in fact the greatest exactitude is attained. For this reason, then, I have felt obliged to begin my account of insight and its expansion with mathematical and scientific illustrations. (CWL 3. p. 14).**

That might make a certain kind of sense! *It might make a certain kind of sense to a person with a certain kind of background like Lonergan's.* Unfortunately, it's very pedagogically ineffective! That's why I expect that most of you are going to write about insights that you had in common sense knowing, and not on insights that you had in your scientific knowing, although some of you may do that. *If what you want is to have people appropriate their acts of understanding, why begin with something that is so alien to most people's backgrounds and living practices?*

Now, scientific education was *much more respected* and much more — many more people knew science [when Lonergan was writing this book](#) than [know science](#) today. There's lots of reasons for that — environmental disasters, development of weaponry, and lots of other things! But people don't know science as well as they did back in the middle nineteen fifties! And they didn't know it that well then!

### Structure of *Insight*?

**Further, while all acts of understanding have a certain family likeness, a full and balanced view is to be reached only by combining in a single account the evidence obtained from different fields of intelligent activity. Thus, the precise nature of the act of understanding is to be seen most clearly in mathematical examples; the dynamic context in which understanding occurs can be studied to best advantage in an investigation of scientific methods; the disturbance of that dynamic context by alien concerns is thrust upon one's attention by the manner in which various measures of common nonsense blend with common sense. (CWL 3, p. 4).**

If that's the goal, then why structure the book in the way he did? Well, as he says, he has ordered the book to begin to focus on “**the precise nature of the act of understanding [that] is to be seen most clearly in mathematical examples.**” (CWL 3, p. 4). *I'm going to suggest that what is seen most clearly in mathematical examples is how we formulate our insights; that for most people mathematical insights are not that easy to come by! So it's the formulation thing, in that section in chapter one on definition, that I think is the reason why he begins with mathematics.*

There is also something in there, [that is, in this first chapter, something that is easier to grasp in mathematical examples](#) — *a very important thing* — about *inverse insight*. People have inverse insights. I won't say you have them all the time, and they certainly aren't always correct! But *it's very difficult to get clear about the difference between an inverse insight and a mistake outside of the realm of mathematics*. So I think that is one of the reasons he starts with mathematical examples, rather than the one that he professes.

**The dynamic context in which understanding occurs can be studied to best advantage in an investigation of scientific methods. (CWL 3, p. 4).**

So that self-correcting cycle that we talked about, that I illustrated with a

diagram a moment ago, that's what Lonergan sees as the scientific process. He thinks that the dynamic 'self-correcting cycle' is best illustrated in science. Well, yes and no! *What's complicated about the self-correcting process in common sense knowing is, as we will see, it's bound up and interlaced with bias. Common sense is not only intelligent, it's also biased, and they come mixed together, like the weeds and the wheat in the parable.* And it's not as though natural science is without biases, but they are less obtrusive and less prominent than they are in much of daily living. So although Lonergan doesn't present it that way, I think in fact that is a reason why he introduces math and science.

**The disturbance of that dynamic context by alien concerns [by what he is going to call 'biases'] is thrust upon one's attention by the manner in which various measures of common nonsense blend with common sense. (CWL 3, p. 4).**

So bias and common sense intelligence **often** come together! So this is his strategy! He is telling us why he wrote the book the way he did: to start with science. And I think there is some justification — there's some truth to that!

*But I think he also has another reason for beginning that way.*

And he does say that *this book is written from a moving viewpoint.* That structure of **cognition** that I laid out for you a few minutes ago — it's not going to be presented on page one, it's not going to be presented in chapter one. It's not even going to be presented in the first five chapters. *It takes Lonergan a while to work out and to develop the things that he thinks need to be developed for you to appropriate that structure as your own. And in particular the implications, that human beings do engage in all those activities in that structured fashion, the implications for knowledge, the implications for reality, the implications for scientific method, the implications for ethics, for human living, for religious matters. Those are the things that take a while to work out!*

Structure of *Insight*?

**For the single book may be written from a moving viewpoint, and then it will contain, not a single set of coherent statements, but a sequence of related sets of coherent statements. Moreover, as is clear, a book designed to aid a development must be written from a moving viewpoint. (CWL 3, p. 18).**

And so he says *there is a moving viewpoint, in which you don't have a single set of statements, but a revised set of statements*. Now there are going to be times with Lonergan when you may think that he is contradicting himself — he actually never really does! But there are going to be times when it looks like he has contradicted himself, but in fact he has moved from one context to the next.

The table of contents of the book

But I think there is another way of thinking about what Lonergan is up to in the way in which he has organized the book *Insight* — that heavy emphasis on the natural sciences. It goes back to some remarks that he said — something I referred to early on — a couple of strong statements that he made at various points. These are from the nineteen eighties:

**Goal of *Insight*?**

**All my work has been introducing history into Catholic theology.**

**The whole problem in modern theology, Protestant or Catholic, has been the introduction of historical scholarship.**

Now, Lonergan was a theologian. He early on didn't think he could be a theologian because he thought he had some very strange ideas about philosophical issues.

Later on, he came to realize that it was important to develop a rounded-out, critically grounded philosophy, and particularly a philosophy of history, for the sake of good theology.

So if history was in fact his real concern, why begin with the natural sciences?

Later on *in this course*, as we go on through the book, I am going to suggest that what Lonergan is doing in the early parts of that book is exploring the implications of modern natural science. Because modern natural science has been for many an alienating force. Now, it has been a force that has given us a view of the natural world which is alien to us, which is a cold, meaningless, purposeless, material phenomenon, and that human beings at best are strangers in that world which is given to us by the natural sciences. And so you are faced with kind of the alternatives of being a hard-headed critical scientific thinker, or a soft-headed, soft-hearted, liberal, romantic thinker.

And I think *that* what Lonergan is doing at the very beginning *of the book* is going back and giving a radical reinterpretation of modern science in its origins and in its intentions, *in order* to show that modern science, separated from extra-scientific, philosophical assumptions about what science is, gives us a world in which human beings are at home, that they are not aliens! *Lonergan, in my view, seeks to show* that human consciousness, human feelings, human moral aspirations are not alien to the natural world, but in fact that the natural world is a proper setting, a setting that he is going to call an emergent setting, out of which human meaning, and human living, and human history, and the creation of human communities, is a natural development, if only we could *understand* it that way!

So my suggestion is that *the reason why Lonergan has made all these — has focussed so much of his attention on natural science is because it's essential for the project that he wants to carry off in the rest of the book, which is a reinvigoration of human history and human living.*

*There* is actually more on the PowerPoint, but we are getting towards the end of the period.

## The Five Characteristics of Insight

### Illustrations of insights from physics and geometry.

Before we end the period, *I want to do an exercise that's going to be a group exercise in self-appropriation.* And this exercise is to give you some background as you read chapter one, and particularly section one of chapter one, where Lonergan talks about the phenomenon of insight itself.

*And Lonergan will say a number of things, by way of introduction, about the nature of an insight, things which are, I think, meant to be sort of descriptors, primarily intended, as he says, to bring you to appropriate for yourselves the activities of insight, and inquiry, and imagination. So he will say — this is on page twenty-eight — He'll say — he'll give five characteristics of insight. Now, don't think that these are exclusive or all, that is to say, applicable exclusively to insights and to all insights! In other words, he is not seeking to provide a formal or strict definition of insight here. What these five characteristics are is pedagogical directives! They are not the defining features! It's not like defining a circle and getting all the elements in the definition right, capturing the circle all and only (omni et soli). These are simply things that are meant to begin to help you to reflect and appropriate insights for yourself. And so he says this. He says that:*

**insight (1) comes as a release to the tension of inquiry, (2) comes suddenly and unexpectedly, (3) is a function not of outer circumstances but of inner conditions, (4) pivots between the concrete and the abstract, and (5) passes into the habitual texture of one's mind. (CWL 3, p. 28).**

And then he gives a couple of illustrations. One is the illustration of *Archimedes* in the midst of the tension of inquiry, *having been* set a problem by *Hiero*, the king of Syracuse, to find out whether or not his crown is *made of* pure gold, or whether or not the goldsmith has maybe adulterated his gold a little bit, and pilfered some of the remainder of the gold for his own profit. And it's a beautiful crown, so he doesn't want to chop into it to see if there is any lead on the inside. And so he sets

Archimedes a problem. Archimedes comes up with the insight while he is taking a bath. ... And so Lonergan gives that illustration.

And he gives another illustration of trying to figure out what the *definition of a circle* is. What **is it that** makes a circle be a circle?

**The role of imagination in insight.**

**The Three 'I's: Inquiry, Imagination, Insight.**

**Different philosophical traditions and how they explain  
the way concepts originate.**

**The role of imagination, inquiry and insight in concept formation.**

*Exercise in Self-appropriation*

*In both of those instances, the Archimedes example and that of the definition of a circle, in addition to the tension of inquiry, there is also the use of one's imagination. Neither Archimedes, nor you, the reader, when you are reading about the definition of a circle, are sticking with the experiences, the sense experiences that we have in the first place. Archimedes, in particular, is very much involved in imagination. He is imagining all sorts of things. And then the third 'I', besides inquiry and imagination is insight.*

### **The Three 'I's**

- 1** Tension of Inquiry
- 2** Imagination
- 3** Insight

And so we are going to do a little exercise here — Oh, **before I begin**, I just want to draw your attention to the epigraph for the book *Insight*. It is on the title page. Right under Lonergan's name, there is some Greek:

*Τὰ μὲν οὖν εἶδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ*

And the translation of the Greek is:

**The understanding understands the forms  
— or the ideas, the εἶδη — in the images.**

So **there is an intimate, and important**, connection for Lonergan between imagination and insight! And why is this important? *It's important because this is what Lonergan found in his reading of Aquinas; Aquinas got it from Aristotle; and Lonergan sees it as a radical **and more correct** alternative to the tradition that develops from Duns Scotus, through Christian Wolff, into Kant.*

*So Lonergan sees a radical **and unfortunate** turn that was taken in western philosophy by not paying attention to this intimate connection between image, inquiry, insight, and, as we'll see later on, concepts. That **unfortunate turn, that set of oversights**, is not the way in which concepts are thought of in the **original work** of Aristotle and Aquinas, to drastically and **massively** oversimplify **the issues**. That other tradition, **from Duns Scotus down to Kant**, will say “We have the concepts and we apply them to our experiences.”*

*For Lonergan, however, our concepts emerge from our inquiry, our use of our imagination, and the creative intelligence that comes out of the interplay between imagination and inquiry as it expresses what's understood in that interplay. So it's a very different tradition.*

**Class exercise self appropriation of insights.**

**Paying attention to how insights come about.**

**Class discussion.**

**So now**, today, we're going to focus a little bit on the interplay between imagination, experience, inquiry, and insight. And I'm going to give you an exercise. I'm going to ask you to try — Some of you, I know, already have seen this exercise, but for those of you who haven't: *I'm going to ask you to focus on what's going on as you try to*

answer the question I'm going to pose for you, the problem I'm going to pose to you. I'm going to draw a line [Pat draws a straight horizontal line on the board] and I'm going to put the letters of the English alphabet either above or below the line. And the question I have for you is "Where does the next letter go?"

And there is one rule to this — It's going to be a collaborative exercise, and we are going to help each other. But most of all, what we are going to help each other do is to pay attention to what we are doing as we are trying to figure out this problem — the answer to this problem. And for that reason, it is important to not blurt out the answer you're going to have, because that ruins the experience for the people who haven't had that answer yet.

What I am going to ask you to do is first of all to just tell me where you think the next letter goes. And then to pay attention to what it is you are doing as you're trying to figure out where the next letter goes. Eventually, I will ask you to share with people what kinds of thinking you've been doing, what kinds of images you've been proposing to yourself, what kinds of questions have been going through your mind, as you try to figure this out. If you're pretty sure you've got the answer, anything you share shouldn't be a dead giveaway, but it should be something that you think will be helpful to the others in the class. Okay?

Okay! So here's the line. [Pat writes the letters on the board as shown below:] And the first letter of the alphabet is A, followed by B, C, D, E, and F.

A            E F  
—————  
B C D

Okay. So those, A, E, and F go above the line, and B, C, and D go below the line. Where to you think, the next letter, which is G, would go?

Student:        Below the line.

Pat:            It goes below the line. Okay.

A            E F  
—————  
B C D        G

Pat: And the next one's H. Does somebody have a suggestion?

Student: Above the line.

A				E	F		H
<hr/>							
	B	C	D				G

Pat: Okay. Let's pause there! Can you tell me your name?

Student: Natalie.

Pat: Natalie. Okay. *Did anyone think that G and H went someplace different than Natalie thought they might? ... No. ... Everybody thought they went where she suggested? ... Katie?*

Katie: Yeah. I thought there was a '1, 3, 2,' pattern [not very audible].

Pat: Okay. So notice what Katie was doing. She was saying words just now, but *those words were actually images she had*. She was — whenever you — when you talk to yourself: you're walking across the campus and you say, I'm going to this interview, and I'm going to say this, and I'm going to say that! *You're putting yourself in an imaginative situation, and some of the imagining that you are doing is the imagining of saying words, because you are not actually saying words. When you start to say those words, people start to look at you! [A little laughter]. So you're using your imagination.*

*And imagination is a sophistication, it's a differentiation, that children eventually learn how to do between what they're sensing in the immediate and what they're constructing that is sensibly similar. It's similar to sensibility, but it's not the same as sensibility. We'll talk about that later on in the semester.*

So Katie was imagining to herself some words. She was saying some words to herself, and *one of the ways in which we do get insights is by the word-images, as well as the pictorial images, as well as the sound-images, in some cases even the touch- or kinaesthetic images, that we give to ourselves, inspired by that tension of inquiry. So it's our inquiry that's guiding us to do this kind of imagining. We're doing an intelligent, inquisitive kind of imagining for the sake of — in this case*

*getting an insight of a certain kind, that answers a certain question.* So Katie was giving herself those images, but they — they were wrong only in the sense of, once you got the other letters up there, they didn't work.

Notice that *Katie's images and insight* worked fine up to a certain point, up to F. Your images and your insight, that this is a numerical sequence, actually did work for that sequence up to, and including, F; but then, *when G and H were added*, it doesn't work for the extended sequence *to those points*.

*So this is the experience of inquiry giving rise to insight, giving rise to an experiment* — in this case, Katie didn't get the answer right when *she wanted the next letter to be* someplace else — *and then, a further question*. It wasn't that image. *That image wasn't helpful*. So what's a better image? ... Erin?

Erin: I got them right. [*Laughter*]. So do you want me to say where I think the next letter goes, or do you want me to say what the process is, *how I can connect them*?

Pat: Let's hold off for a minute. I want to — *Notice what I'm doing here! I'm exaggerating the tension of an inquiry*. That's because it's so — *We've been so well educated to suppress the tension of inquiry. It's not fun! Actually it is fun!!* But in a culture in which we are expected to come up with answers really quickly, and we don't do it, because actually nobody comes up with all the answers quickly. *But you can look like you come up with the answers quickly*. In a culture like that, we learn to not pay attention to the tension of inquiry. *And it's so important for this process to learn how to pay attention to the tension of inquiry!* ... Jonathan?

Jonathan: So I had a question as soon as you finished describing how the exercise would proceed. So a preliminary thing. And that question was — I'm making it a little more explicit now than it probably actually occurred to me, but — *what are the ways in which letters can give distinguishing data?* And a few came to mind.

Pat: Okay. Good! So, you know, that's a way in which the inquiry got structured in the direction in which Jonathan took it. It leads to different kinds of images. And, Katie's approach is an approach that many people take! ... Did any of

you try [the Sesame Street alphabet song](#) [Pat sings the first line of this:] A B C D E F G? Did anybody try that?

[Murmur of musical appreciation]

I've had people tried that before. So you figure out where middle C is [Pat sings again] so CD is high, so it must go below the line, so you go up and down the scale. And you kind of invert the scale. Some people have tried that. Ah, that doesn't work! H is actually, I think, A flat.

[Some laughter].

Okay. Ah, anybody try anything else? .... [Hand goes up:] Can you tell me your name?

Student: Jeff. Ah, yeah, G actually caused a lot of tension for me, because the way I saw it so far was a matter of straight lines or just curves. And so the G had both, and so I didn't know whether like, the top ones had to be exclusive, like if it contained any straight line it had to go above the line, or any curve thing, like, it had to go below —

Pat: Okay. Let's stop there. *Did anything happen to anybody in the room when Jeff said that?*

[Laughter]

Students: *Insight.*

[Laughter]

Pat: Okay! ... So, go ahead Jeff. I just wanted —

Jeff: — That [reaction](#) clarified my answer I guess. So G will go below the line.

Pat: Because?

Jeff: Because B and D also have straight lines.

Pat: Okay. And, what else?

Jeff: Oh, they have curves.

Pat: So ... So where does 'I' go?

Student: Top.

A		E F	H I
<hr/>			
B C D		G	

Pat: Uh, uh. And J?

Students: Bottom.

A		E F	H I
<hr/>			
B C D		G	J

Pat: Because?

Students: Because they are curved!

Pat: Because the letters on the bottom have some curved lines!

Okay. So this is a little bit of an experience — I dragged it out a little bit on purpose here; as I said, *to give people an experience of the tension of inquiry; and also to get you to be paying attention to what you are doing as you are in that tension of inquiry, in your imaginations, as you try to find, to hit, as Lonergan will say, to hit upon the image, the phantasm.* The Greek word that is in that epigraph from the *De Anima* is the word *phantasma*, the word for image. *It's necessary to have images to get the idea, the forms, or what Lonergan is going to call the intelligibilities.*

Now, there's something really weird about that, and Aristotle himself makes a big deal about it. And *certainly by the time you get to the period of Scotus, to Wolff, to Kant, they do all recognize that there is a radical disproportion between the formal and the sensible, the formal and the material.* And so **the question arises**: *how can you have something material, like an image, be causative of something formal, like an idea or an intelligibility, which has no sensible [Pat says 'intelligible' here] content. Lonergan makes a point of it: our insights and their contents, their intelligibilities, supervene upon the level of sensible experiences. So how is it possible that a*

*phantasm could give rise to something formal like an idea or an intelligibility, or a concept?*

*Lonergan's answer to that is: our questioning transforms our images from mere images into the sort of thing that has an intellectual spark to it, or the light of intelligence in it. So it's our inquiry that's responsible for making images capable of that power.*

And if you are *emphatic* about the distinction between the form and the phantasm you can't really believe that *understanding understands forms in the phantasms*. But for Lonergan, that was the crucial thing that he learned, not in the first place from Aristotle, but from Aquinas who learned it from Aristotle.

First two levels: Experiencing and Understanding
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So the point to this exercise, then, was to give you the experience that, no matter what anybody tells you, *you do in fact use your imaginations in order to give intelligible form answers to questions like that.*

*But one thing I wanted to point out to you is: notice how your experiencing of the letters changed between the time I started putting them up, the time when they became puzzles for you, and the time when you actually got the insight.*

*Nothing on the board actually changed.*

So Lonergan says *that insight* is not a function of outer circumstances — the board, the chalk, the molecules of calcium carbonate — they didn't change. The light reflecting off it didn't change. What changed were the conscious activities with which you were receiving the sense impressions that originated from those unchanging objects. And the changing thing that was most important for you was that insight, where people said: "Now, I've got it!"

Notice also that when you had the insight, the tension of inquiry was resolved! A defining feature of an insight is that it resolves the tension of inquiry. And as long

*as you don't have the resolution of that tension of inquiry, you don't have the insight that you are desiring by means of that inquiry.*

Okay. Let's stop there! Questions? We have a couple of minutes before seven. ... Any questions? ... Igor?

Igor: It's just a reflection question; ah, when you were talking that Lonergan chooses mathematics and sciences first, would there be any connection with the Pythagorean approach to find the divine truths, divine knowledge?

Pat: Ah, there could be —

Igor: — he uses ideal models —

Pat: Sure, there could be a connection there. So Lonergan did have a deep appreciation for the fact that in mathematics, you have the — as I said — you have *in maths the place where the movement from understanding the purely intelligible to expressing it is most evident*. And in the Pythagorean tradition, the intelligibility that is, so to speak, most prominent in the doing of mathematics becomes the key to thinking about the world, the divine, and so on and so forth. So there is *some* connection there. I wouldn't push it too far though. [Lonergan](#) is not a Pythagorean *per se*. He certainly doesn't think that — There's a part of the Pythagorean tradition that conceived of all mathematics on the model of the intelligibility that is appropriate to numbers. And the Pythagorean tradition ran into a big problem with the incommensurability of the diagonal of the square in comparison to the integers [measuring the sides](#). We are going to talk about that next week, with the inverse insight. So there's something about the Pythagorean tradition that Lonergan would have been very respectful of, but there is also some limitations to it that he would see himself as needing to go beyond! ... Ah, Leonard?

Leonard: When you first put up that puzzle, I mean, how did I know — or how did anyone trying to figure out the puzzle — know that there was sufficient data, when we had to make an assumption that there was in fact some sort of an intelligibility here to be had? Do you always have to make that assumption?

Pat: *The answer to that is no. And that it why inverse insights are important. Because you can have questions, the answer to which is: there isn't an*

*answer, or at least, there is not the kind of answer that I am anticipating.* So we are going to talk about that in class next week. That's important!

I thought you were going to ask a different kind of question, which is related to the 'How did I know that there was sufficient evidence?' *What you really knew was your question. And that was the most important thing. Because, about the evidence that you were given, you had a question. And that was guiding you.* It might have been a question that ultimately you could come to realize that it didn't have an answer, didn't have an adequate answer, *that it* was not finitely answerable, and so on! But as a question, it had an orientation to it, and that orientation was your guide. It guided how you imagined! And it guided the dead ends — *it guided you to recognize the dead ends you ran into, and therefore to try other imaginations.* So, how did you know? *You didn't know yet by having an insight. That was going to come later on. You knew by desiring to know.*

*And at the heart of this approach that Lonergan has to philosophy and other issues, is the guidance of our inquiry. The thing that he means by authenticity is the radical surrender to yourself as an inquirer. You give yourself over to your inquiry. To really take that seriously is a scary thing.* Because, exactly for the reason that you asked: how do I know by inquiring that I'm not just being foolish? How do I know by inquiring that it's just not going to lead anywhere? So, it's a really good question. Part of the answer is what we'll talk about in terms of inverse insights: that not every question has an answer, or at least not every question has an answer of the kind that we anticipated it ought to have. And so we'll talk about that next week. Okay?

All right. If you have any questions or issues about the class, please feel free to email me. This is a very busy week, but I'll get back to you as soon as I possibly can.