

# **Insight and Beyond**

Class 13, Part One: December 9<sup>th</sup> 2009

**“The Longer Cycle, Cosmopolis, and Philosophy”**

*(Insight, Chapter 7 § 8)*

## **Summary of Material**

Introductory remarks on chapters 7 and 8 and their relation to the whole of *Insight*.

Review of Lonergan’s characterization of the natural world and of the construction of human subjectivity in relation to emergent probability.

Brief discussion of insights as phenomena *within* the process of emergent probability.

Chapter 8 as seemingly discontinuous in relation to the preceding chapters.

The question of the cycles of progress and decline.

Lonergan concerned to develop a philosophy that would provide guidance in addressing the problem of decline.

Brief discussion of redemption (addressed in Ch. 20 & *Topics in Education*).

## Problem of Historical Cycles: Why do Human Achievements Decay?

The effects of group bias:

- How it interacts with the self-correcting cycle of intelligence;
- How it twists the social order so the latter no longer conforms to a coherent set of ideas; they lack intelligible connectedness with one another.

Dialectical development — interference of two principles, which in doing so, modify each other.

Only a fraction of ideas, those associated with power, are left remaining.

Biases develop and become more complex in response to intelligible normativity.

Produces the social surd: mutilated remains of ideas, a mixture of rational and irrational (as in “real numbers” which are syntheses of rational to irrational numbers).

Interactions are a combination of rational and irrational actions and responses which interfere with one another.

Thus Lonergan’s aim is to account for irrationality in society (as a deviation from the normative self-correcting intelligence).

Yet group bias tends to create the principle for its own reversal.

When the injustices of group bias grow, reform or revolutionary groups use their commonsense techniques and methods to replace the biased groups.

Yet common sense cannot correct general bias.

The latter limits the effectiveness of common sense, for it is only adapted to deal with concrete, short term results.

Examples of how general bias resists challenging, longer-term views:

Rachel Carson's *The Silent Spring* warned against environmental hazards;

Machiavelli's political thought emphasized the principle of power over intelligence;

The cultural and political chaos that arises in the absence of a critical philosophy and/or adequate theology.

Quote on the social consequences of the collapse of the medieval synthesis in philosophy and theology (*Insight*, 256).

Lonergan firmly held that a coherent socio-political order requires a critical philosophy and a sound theology.

Student question about when decline is mistakenly perceived as progress, and whether this is due to bias.

- Overall, yes. General bias is the series of small accommodations of people saying, “I don’t see any *immediately* bad consequences that will come of *X*.” But the longer cycle is so gradual, and it also gradually changes people’s commonsense habits of mind and heart. So they find acceptable certain outcomes that the early generation would have found abhorrent — but the earlier generation could not foresee that *X* would lead to such outcomes.
- For instance, people initially opposed the notion of enlightened self-interest as a principle of economic behavior, versus the common good mediated by a sovereign power; yet this is an idea that we all now accept. But we struggle with the consequences. For Lonergan, the problem is to discern the intelligible from the unintelligible (since common sense is a mixture of both).

Student question as to whether group bias can pose as a seeming defence against general bias (a kind of academic elitism).

- Discussion on how common sense cannot account for every new strange situation. In our inventory of insights, we also need insights that relate to the long term, the invariant, to matters that transcend the immediate. Rather than an elite intellectual class, therefore, Lonergan advocates a widespread form of education that cultivates theoretical thinking in combination with practical thinking.

The Problem of Historical Cycles, continued.

How general bias combines with group bias to erode human achievements:

- The short cycle of group bias, (e.g., the cycles of alternating predominance of political parties);
- The longer cycle of general bias.

Cosmopolis

What is Cosmopolis?

- It is defined heuristically as an  $X$  that answers the problem of the longer cycle of decline.
- It discovers, approves, and teaches the insights beneficial to the long term.
- It makes operative the timely and fruitful ideas that are otherwise inoperative.

- Lonergan very much has in mind the ideas about political power that led to WWII.
- It combats the idea that only ideas backed by force can be operative.

Cultural products, in addition to philosophy and science, are needed to help reverse decline.

Philosophy can only sway a pure intelligence, which human beings are not.

A philosophy of self-appropriation is needed to understand the basic dynamics of history, and to distinguish between the intelligible and unintelligible — appropriating oneself as intelligent as the basis for this distinction.

*The importance of the radical distinction between intelligibility and unintelligibility sets up the importance and the placement of Chapter 8 in Insight.*

Because human beings are not only pure intelligences, but “compounds in tension.”

Self-appropriation is essential as a grounding for the human sciences.

Humans are marked by affectivity and intersubjectivity, and this interferes with their intellectual functioning.

The importance of the non-intellectual, cultural aspect of learning.

Culture's role is to cultivate, not repress affectivity, in accordance with the self-correcting process of insight.

Question about whether Lonergan contradicts himself in a certain passage (quote from p 267).

- Discussion of how Cosmopolis is indeed capable of reversing decline, exploration of culture versus compromise (the latter reinforces decline).

Question about how the secular movement of the 18th century would be viewed by Lonergan.

- Lonergan would see secularism as a phenomenon of general bias, as a doctrine that reality is purely immanent and naturalistic. Yet a way of thinking about transcendence is needed to reverse the longer cycle of decline.

Question as to whether it is 'rational' and 'irrational' to vaccinate a child; in light of Kantian reasoning versus economic risk assessment.

- 'Rational' is behaving in accordance with the unrestricted desire to know, leaving no question aside unanswered. 'Irrationality' is anything that interferes with the self-correcting process driven by the unrestricted desire. Extended discussion of rationality and common sense. Usually by "rational" people mean "commonsensical," but common sense is not identical with fidelity to the pure unrestricted desire of questioning. Discussion of common sense as intellectual and commonsense belief, and of disease as a nonsystematic process.

Question about the lack of a higher viewpoint from which to perceive general bias.

- More precisely, it is common sense that cannot reverse the longer cycle of decline, being inherently committed to general bias. Further elaboration of what higher viewpoints are and how they relate to common sense.

End of Part One

Class 13, Part One: December 9<sup>th</sup> 2009

**Chapter 7, § 8**

**“Cosmopolis, and Philosophy”**

Introductory remarks on chapters 7 and 8 and their relation to the whole of *Insight*.

Review of Lonergan’s characterization of the natural world and of the construction of human subjectivity in relation to emergent probability.

Brief discussion of insights as phenomena *within* the process of emergent probability.

Chapter 8 as seemingly discontinuous in relation to the preceding chapters.

The question of the cycles of progress and decline.

Lonergan concerned to develop a philosophy that would provide guidance in addressing the problem of decline.

Brief discussion of redemption (addressed in Ch. 20 & *Topics in Education*).

What I’d like to do in today’s class — I said we would focus on Chapter Eight on “Things” (*CWL 3*, pp. 270-295): and we will do that! But there were a couple of things that I felt I wanted to emphasize. At the end of Chapter Seven, “Common Sense as Object” (*CWL 3*, pp. 232-269), we really kind of ran out of time to give them adequate attention, so I wanted to talk a little bit about that and see if people had questions. I know that you’ve been writing your papers and preparing for Chapter Eight, so stuff on Chapter Seven may be a distant memory; but *nevertheless I think it’s a very important section of Chapter Seven* [Pat seems to be referring specifically to § 8 on “General Bias” *CWL 3*, pp. 250-267] *to help us situate*

*what Lonergan thinks he is doing as a philosopher.* So I wanted to talk about that, perhaps not in great detail, because some of it flows over into Chapter Eight.

The placement of Chapter Eight is kind of puzzling, when you think about it. He begins with some reflections *on scientific method, and then the world that is made known to us by scientific method.* And then you could say, because his account of the world is a very evolutionary account, *he sees an evolutionary account as implicit in the rise of statistical methods in complementarity to classical scientific methods. And from that he makes a strong argument that the world is not so much a determinist world but rather an evolutionary world. There's a lot of unpredictability, contingency, nonsystematic processes, and creativity.*

So to then talk about the human, the worlds of common sense, the human being as constituted in their personalities by the self-correcting cycle in which adding insight to insight, among other things, is adding to the kind of person that they are. *As they put together their dramatic persona by the use of insight, the self-correcting process, they are participating in a phenomenon of emergent probability, doing very much the transforming that is characteristic of emergent probability.*

And then the Chapter Seven, on “Common Sense as Object” (CWL 3, pp. 232-269) that we saw last week, *the word ‘Object’ refers to social organization and historical organization. So by common sense human beings not only put themselves together as persons, but they also put their corporate identities together, through the use of the self-correcting cycle and the accumulation of insights.*

So where I was — before Jeff asked his questions [to which](#) we are going to come back to<sup>1</sup> — is just situating the first seven chapters, and seeing there a kind of a natural flow. And then all of a sudden — kaboom! — we’re talking about “Things”! *And it seems a very, very big disruption in the flow of the book.* When you have the opportunity for the next class to read Chapters Nine “[The Notion of Judgment](#)” (CWL 3, pp. 296-303) and Ten, “[Reflective Understanding](#)” (CWL 3, pp. 304-340) you’ll see that there is a certain kind of resumption, because he’s been talking about *the first two levels of consciousness* up until now, and now he’s going to go on and talk about *the third level of consciousness*, having to do with judgment and reflective insight, reflective understanding. But Chapter Eight [on “Things”](#) (CWL 3, pp. 270-295) is kind of there, and *why is it there?* ... I’m going to try to explain

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<sup>1</sup> This presumably refers to some earlier exchanges that were not recorded.

why, I think, it follows very — I won't say naturally — but *very importantly* from Chapter Seven, and particularly [from](#) the concerns that Lonergan has towards the end of Chapter Seven, “[Common Sense as Object](#)” (*CWL 3*, pp. 232-269).

## **Problem of Historical Cycles**

### **Why do Human Achievements Decay?**

Because group bias, **“the course of development has been twisted. The social order that has been realized does not correspond to any coherently developed set of practical ideas.**

**“It represents the fraction of ideas that were made operative by their conjunction with power, the mutilated remnants of once excellent schemes.”** (*CWL 3*, p. 249).

**“Let us name this residue the social surd.”**  
(*CWL 3*, p. 255).

So as we saw, Lonergan was concerned in his whole career, and particularly in Chapter Seven, “[Common Sense as Object](#)” (*CWL 3*, pp. 232-269), with the phenomenon of human history as cyclical. *And human history as cyclical wouldn't be such a impressing, urgent, problem were it not for the fact that the cycle includes swings of decay, and decline, and degeneration, and the loss and the undermining and the corruption of human achievements.* And so Lonergan's concern, coming especially from his readings of Toynbee, among others, was: Why do human achievements decay? Why don't they just keep progressing? And as we say last week, in understanding — *in attempting to give an account of the dynamics, not only of human progress, but also of human decline, it would put him in a position to offer a philosophy that would be useful and helpful to dealing with the problem of human decay.*



As we saw last week also, by reading *CWL 10, Topics in Education*, where he's in effect jumping way ahead in his own, what you might call, continuous development through the text of *Insight*, he jumps ahead to talk about *redemption*! He doesn't do that in Chapter Seven; he leaves that really until Chapter Twenty (*CWL 3, "Special Transcendent Knowledge" pp. 709-751*), for a variety of reasons, in the book *Insight*. But he throws it in, in *Topics in Education*, because he's giving lectures to a group of Catholic educators, where he can presume a certain shared set of understandings that he does not want to presume in the development of the book *Insight*. So what we get in Chapter Seven, "Common Sense as Object" (*CWL 3, pp. 232-269*) is really *progress and decline*. And having spelled out progress and decline, the kind of problem is the kinds of things necessary.

### Problem of Historical Cycles: Why do Human Achievements Decay?

The effects of group bias:

- How it interacts with the self-correcting cycle of intelligence;
- How it twists the social order so the latter no longer conforms to a coherent set of ideas; they lack intelligible connectedness with one another.

*So Lonergan's concern is: Why human achievements decay?* And in an earlier section where he is talking about group bias (*CWL 3, pp. 247-250*), which we discussed briefly last week, he talks about *what happens to human achievements and to human history because of group bias*.

Remember, group biases are those things like sexism, and racism, and ethnocentrism, and all the "isms", in which, what is from one point of view a spontaneously good thing — *the intersubjective identification of groups of people with one another* — doesn't just reside as something unqualifiedly good, but it also interacts with another kind of briefing [word uncertain], namely the self-correcting cycle of intelligence and its product, which is a distinct kind of product, which is what he calls *the good of order*; the way in which people cooperate, based not only on their fellow-



*feelings* for one another, but also with their understandings of what it would be like for another person, to — if their actions follow, people can understand what the consequences of their actions are, even if the consequences are consequences for people for whom they have no feeling, have no familiarity.<sup>2</sup>

So the good of order is concerned with the ordering of human interaction and human cooperation based primarily on intelligence, which can transcend the limits of intersubjectivity. But then, intersubjectivity *can interfere* with the development of intelligence.

So that's where he talks about what he is going to call the *Shorter Cycle of Decline*, the shorter cycle of decline, that's due to group bias. And he characterizes the products of group bias: *group bias is quite simply, you do for your friends what you don't do for people you don't know, and you don't have any particular bond of affection for.*

And as he says, when group bias is operative, and group bias is operative just all the time,

**“the course of development has been twisted. The social order that has been realized does not correspond to any coherently developed set of practical ideas.”** (*CWL 3*, p. 249).

And it's that word 'coherent' that is the crucial word! We're going to see that again next semester when Lonergan, in Chapter Nineteen (*CWL 3*, “[General Transcendent Knowledge](#)” pp. 657-708) deals with the problem of evil. “[Not] coherently” here means unintelligible! **“The social order that has been realized does not correspond to any completely intelligible developed set of practical ideas.”** (*CWL 3*, p. 249). When the social order that has been realized does not correspond to a completely intelligible developed set of ideas, there is a lack of intelligible connectedness among the ideas that are put in place.

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<sup>2</sup> Transcriber is unsure of the correct punctuation, and hence the correct interpretation, of this paragraph.

Dialectical development — interference of two principles, which in doing so, modify each other.

Only a fraction of ideas, those associated with power, are left remaining.

Biases develop and become more complex in response to intelligible normativity.

Produces the social surd: mutilated remains of ideas, a mixture of rational and irrational (as in “real numbers” which are syntheses of rational to irrational numbers.

Interactions are a combination of rational and irrational actions and responses which interfere with one another.

Thus Lonergan’s aim is to account for irrationality in society (as a deviation from the normative self-correcting intelligence).

Yet group bias tends to create the principle for its own reversal.

When the injustices of group bias grow, reform or revolutionary groups use their commonsense techniques and methods to replace the biased groups.

And one of the things that’s typical of *the dialectical development*, as Lonergan understands it, is that it is, as he says: *it’s two opposed principles, and the operation of one modifies the operation of the other.*

Biases can’t stand still! Biases have to keep updating themselves! They have to keep rationalizing; they need new developments to counter new arguments, to figure out new strategies for keeping people on the outside on the outside, and protecting their own games at the expense of those on the outside. So a bias has to keep developing in order to maintain

itself. And so the principle of the dialectic is going to be altered by the circumstances, as a group tries to, not simply solve the problems of how to live together in a good way, but how to protect [their](#) biases as well!

There is a self-modification, and as he says, that self-modification produces a twisted social order that is lacking an intelligible coherence (*CWL 3*, p. 249).

**“It represents the fraction of ideas that were made operative by their conjunction with power, the mutilated remnants of once excellent schemes.”** (*CWL 3*, p. 249).

It represents only the fraction of ideas that remain operative by their conjunction with power, the mutilated remnants of one’s excellent schemes is what remains. And as he says, “Let’s call this mutilated remnant the social surd.”

**“Let us name this residue the social surd.”** (*CWL 3*, p. 255).

It’s a combination of intelligible and unintelligible elements ‘smushed’ together. He has in mind the mathematical metaphor of irrational numbers. Irrational numbers are numbers like two plus the square root of two  $[2+\sqrt{2}]$ . Or actually, excuse me, the real numbers are something like the combination of two plus the square root of two  $[2+\sqrt{2}]$ . *Two is a completely rational number, the square root of two  $[\sqrt{2}]$  is an irrational number.*<sup>3</sup> And what we saw in Chapter One [*CWL 2*, “Elements”, §3, [Higher Viewpoints](#), pp. 37-43] is that, from Lonergan’s point of view, there is no particular reason for calling the square root of two an irrational number in some absolute sense. *It’s irrational relative to the kind of ordering that is the ordering of rational numbers. But in an absolute sense it’s not irrational because we can have higher viewpoints.*

The difficulty is on the human scene: there is no simple higher viewpoint. When you have this mutilated remains, the social surd, you have the irrational dimensions: people’s flight from the pursuit of self-correcting understanding in combination with the pursuit of understanding; and the efforts of those who are trying to understand things get interfered with by the efforts of those who are trying to flee from understanding, particularly in this case because of the bias. *And so the interactions of people become this social surd, this*

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<sup>3</sup> Adding the irrational numbers to the rational numbers gives one the set of real numbers,  $R$ .  $R = \{-1, 0, 1, \sqrt{2}, e, \pi, 4.94, \dots\}$ .

*combination of rational actions, irrational responses and irrational responses to the irrational responses. And so you get this increasing problem, that he calls the social surd.*

*So he's concerned with the social surd; and what he's been doing is trying to give an account of the development of irrationality in society, as it relates to the development, the normative development, of human self-correcting intelligence.*

### **Problem of Historical Cycles**

**“Still, this process of aberration creates the principles for its own reversal.” (CWL 3, p. 249).**

**“But the general bias of common sense prevents it from being effective in realizing ideas, however appropriate and reasonable, that suppose a long view.” (CWL 3, p. 253).**

But then he has this to say; this is still in the section on group bias. *Group bias has a tendency to generate a process that creates the principles for its own reversal.*

**“Still, this process of aberration creates the principles for its own reversal. When a concrete situation first yields a new idea and demands its realization, it is unlikely that the idea will occur to anyone outside the group specialized in dealing situations of that type. But when some ideas of a coherent set have been realized, or when they are realized in a partial manner, or when their realization does not attain its proper generality, or when it is not complemented with a needed retinue of improvements and adjustments, then there is no need to call upon experts and specialists to discover whether anything has gone wrong, nor even to hit upon a roughly accurate account of what can be done. The sins**

**of**

**group**

**bias may be secret and almost unconscious. But what originally was a neglected possibility, in time becomes a grotesquely distorted reality. Few may grasp the initial possibilities, but the ultimate concrete distortions are exposed to the inspection of the multitude.” (CWL 3, pp. 249-250).**

And then he goes on to talk about how there will arise reform groups and revolutionary groups: his point being that because bias is a modifying phenomenon, because the dialectic of the distorted communal life where group biases are discriminating not only against people as people, but against ideas that will improve the condition of everyone, that sooner or later everybody starts — larger and larger numbers of people begin to feel the effects; and the rationalizations for the group in power, that is living out of its group biases, identification, and its resonating affection for the in-group members, those come to be less and less acceptable. And they generate therefore common sense reactions of: “We’re not going to take this any more! We’re going to vote you out of office, and if we can’t vote you out of office, we’ll organize violent groups to throw you out of office!” That’s all common sense. That’s the way common sense operates.

So Lonergan’s point here is, not that group bias is a good thing, nor that we shouldn’t be worried about these things; *his point is that common sense has techniques and methods that are known throughout history for overcoming the increasingly distorted oversights and injustices that come from group bias. Common sense, with its specialization on the concrete and the particular and the immediate is well capable of generating a correction to the group biases.*

**Yet common sense cannot correct general bias.**

**The latter limits the effectiveness of common sense,  
for it is only adapted to deal with concrete, short term  
results.**

**Examples of how general bias resists challenging,  
longer-term views:**

**Rachel Carson’s *The Silent Spring* warned against  
environmental hazards;**

Machiavelli's political thought emphasized the principle of power over intelligence;

The cultural and political chaos that arises in the absence of a critical philosophy and/or adequate theology.

Quote on the social consequences of the collapse of the medieval synthesis in philosophy and theology  
(*CWL 3, Insight, 256*).

Lonergan firmly held that a coherent socio-political order requires a critical philosophy and a sound theology.

*The difficulty, as he says, is the general bias.* General bias of common sense prevents it, it namely common sense, from being effective in realizing ideas however appropriate and reasonable that suppose the long view.

**The general bias of common sense prevents it from being effective in realizing ideas, however appropriate and reasonable, that suppose a long view. (*CWL 3, p. 253*).**

So what he's been saying in the previous quotation there (pp. 16-17 above, is that however bad the effects of group bias<sup>4</sup> are, at least eventually common sense will figure out ways of dealing with it, because the problem becomes so widespread that lots of people are affected, and they will by their common sense figure out ways of drawing together and opposing the entrenched distorted realities of the group bias.

**"Still, this process of aberration creates the principles for its own reversal." (*CWL 3, p. 249*).**

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<sup>4</sup> Pat refers to "general bias" at this point, but probably meant to say "group bias."

But general bias can't call on common sense to correct the problems that come from general bias; because general bias by its nature is concerned with the immediate and the short term. General bias is concerned with what will show palpable outcomes.

And I mentioned a couple of these examples last time; but just to repeat them: when people like Paul Erlich and Rachel Carson were first presenting their arguments about the consequences to the environment of certain of our industrial ways of producing things, they didn't get any kind of hearing! Why? Because — Rachel Carson wrote a book, a very — what became a very influential book eventually, called *The Silent Spring*. And *The Silent Spring* was about why there would be no birds singing in the spring! And the answer to why there would be no birds singing in the spring is because pesticides were eventually getting into a variety of ecological systems, and they would eventually work their way into things like the eggshells of birds and into the birds circulatory systems, and so on. And birds would just stop singing!

And I was at the time in High School, and a girl I was dating her mother was reading it, and she was talking about it. And I just thought it was ridiculous, and I told her, with all the wisdom of a sixteen year old, that I thought that this was ridiculous! “The birds sang last spring! The birds sing this spring! That can't possibly be!” And of course, Rachel Carson was quite right! This is an example of the Byrne general bias operating against the Rachel Carson longer view that is informed by her scientific thinking. And we've had many other kinds of instances of that. There are still debates, both scientific, but also arguably group bias arguments, against taking measures to be able to go with a warning on other environmental issues. So the physical natural environment can be destroyed by common sense, which is indifferent to the concerns of the long term, because, “Well, it's been working fine so far! I don't see that this is going to happen! You say it will happen, but it will take thirty years to happen!” People will say: “Show me! Prove it to me!” That's what common sense wants. So that's one example.

Another example is the *much more difficult example of political thought*, which we'll see in a moment. *Loneragan is referring very very specifically to the development of modern political thought, and its reliance on the principle of power rather than the principle of intelligence*. Because intelligence just seems to always lose in the short run, and power always seems to win in the short run. So it seems better to found your political principles on

something like Machiavelli's<sup>5</sup> counsel that those who try to be virtuous in every way will come to ruin, and a great many who are not virtuous will *not*; so it's better to learn how to be not virtuous. I mentioned that last week.

The third one — I can't remember if I mentioned last week or not — is really one of Lonergan's great concerns. And it's the concern of what happens when you don't have *a good philosophy and a good theology, or a sufficiently critical philosophy and a sufficiently critical theology*. There's this passage where he talks about the loss of the medieval synthesis. It's a really stunning — You know, you can see — Lonergan was really inspired when he was writing this passage. So this is on pages 256-257 in the Toronto [edition](#):

**The medieval synthesis through the conflict of church and state shattered into the several religions of the Reformation. The wars of religion provided the evidence that man has to live not by revelation but by reason. (CWL 3, p. 256).**

And that of course goes back, among other things, to Hobbes.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> **Niccolò Machiavelli** (1469 – 1527) was an Italian historian, politician, diplomat, philosopher, humanist, and writer based in Florence during the Renaissance. Heralded as one of the founders of modern political science, and more specifically political ethics, he was for many years an official in the Florentine Republic, with responsibilities in diplomatic and military affairs. He also wrote comedies, carnival songs, and poetry. His personal correspondence is renowned in the Italian language.

<sup>6</sup> **Thomas Hobbes** (1588 – 1679), was an English philosopher, best known today for his work on political philosophy. His 1651 book *Leviathan* established social contract theory, the foundation of most later Western political philosophy. Though on rational grounds a champion of absolutism for the sovereign, Hobbes also developed some of the fundamentals of European liberal thought: the right of the individual; the natural equality of all men; the artificial character of the political order (which led to the later distinction between civil society and the state); the view that all legitimate political power must be 'representative' and based on the consent of the people; and a liberal interpretation of law which leaves people free to do whatever the law does not explicitly forbid.

Hobbes was one of the founders of modern political philosophy and political science. His understanding of humans as being matter and motion, obeying the same physical laws as other matter and motion, remains influential; and his account of human nature as self-interested cooperation, and of political communities as being based upon a "social contract" remains one of the major topics of political philosophy. In addition to political philosophy, Hobbes also contributed to a diverse array of other fields, including history, geometry, the physics of gases, theology, ethics, and general philosophy.

It goes back also to Locke.<sup>7</sup> Lonergan writes as follows:

**The disagreement of reason's representatives made it clear that, while each must follow the dictates of reason as he sees them, he also must practice the virtue of tolerance to the equally reasonable views and actions of others. (CWL 3, p. 256).**

Locke's *Letter concerning Tolerance* is arguably the central document of modern liberalism.<sup>8</sup>

**The helplessness of tolerance to provide coherent solutions to social problems called forth the totalitarian, who takes the narrow and complacent practicality of common sense and elevates it to the role of a complete and exclusive viewpoint. On the totalitarian view every type of intellectual independence, whether personal, cultural, scientific, philosophic, or religious, has no better basis than**

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<sup>7</sup> **John Locke** (1632 – 1704) was an English philosopher and physician regarded as one of the most influential of Enlightenment thinkers and known as the “Father of Classical Liberalism”. Considered one of the first of the British empiricists, following the tradition of Francis Bacon, he is equally important to social contract theory. His work greatly affected the development of epistemology and political philosophy. His writings influenced Voltaire and Rousseau, many Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, as well as the American revolutionaries. His contributions to classical republicanism and liberal theory are reflected in the United States Declaration of Independence.

Locke's theory of mind is often cited as the origin of modern conceptions of identity and the self, figuring prominently in the work of later philosophers such as Hume, Rousseau, and Kant. Locke was the first to define the self through a continuity of *consciousness*. He postulated that, at birth, the mind was a blank slate or *tabula rasa*. Contrary to Cartesian philosophy based on pre-existing concepts, he maintained that we are born without innate ideas, and that knowledge is instead determined only by experience derived from sense perception.

<sup>8</sup> *A Letter Concerning Toleration* by John Locke was originally published in 1689. Its initial publication was in Latin, though it was immediately translated into other languages. Locke's work appeared amidst a fear that Catholicism might be taking over England, and responds to the problem of religion and government by proposing religious toleration as the answer. This 'letter' is addressed to an anonymous “Honored Sir”: this was actually Locke's close friend Philipp van Limborch, who published it without Locke's knowledge.

**nonconscious myth. The time has come for the conscious myth that will secure man's total subordination to the requirements of reality. Reality is the economic development, the military equipment, and the political dominance of the all-inclusive state. Its ends justify all means. Its means include not merely every technique of indoctrination and propaganda, every tactic of economic and diplomatic pressure, every device for breaking down the moral conscience and exploiting the secret affects of civilized man, but also the terrorism of a political police, of prisons and torture, of concentration camps, of transported or extirpated minorities, and of total war. The succession of less comprehensive viewpoints has been a succession of adaptations of theory to practice. In the limit, practice becomes a theoretically unified whole, and theory is reduced to the status of a myth that lingers on to represent the frustrated aspirations of detached and disinterested intelligence. (CWL 3, pp. 256-257).**

That is all because of bad theology [affirmed with a smile]! That's a little hard to believe, isn't it? And he doesn't say it explicitly here, but he did say at other times: "What happens when you sit on the lid for four hundred years? You get an explosion," he said. So his — What he meant by that — four hundred years was a little short — What he meant was the loss of *what he discovered in Aquinas*. He thought that there was a real loss of the genius of Aquinas; and the theology that developed from that could have met some of the issues that he's describing in this thumbnail sketch of the longer cycle of decline!

So, most of us in the room, I suspect, are great believers in the scientific ideas that have helped us to see the long range consequences of our industrial practices that they might have on the natural environment. Some of us perhaps are a bit concerned that institutions in the world right now, political and economic institutions, are resting on rather shaky grounds; and that we go from a series of crises to palliatives to crises to palliatives, and we need to do something at a deeper level in terms of political and economic theory! Perhaps not that many

of us in this room really think that having a more ample philosophy and theology would really have an effect on the long term and the history. But that is what Lonergan thought; and that is what he committed himself to in his career!

Student question about when decline is mistakenly perceived as progress, and whether this is due to bias.

– Overall, yes. General bias is the series of small accommodations of people saying, “I don’t see any *immediately* bad consequences that will come of *X*.” But the longer cycle is so gradual, and it also gradually changes people’s commonsense habits of mind and heart. So they find acceptable certain outcomes that the early generation would have found abhorrent — but the earlier generation could not foresee that *X* would lead to such outcomes.

– For instance, people initially opposed the notion of enlightened self-interest as a principle of economic behavior, versus the common good mediated by a sovereign power; yet this is an idea that we all now accept. But we struggle with the consequences. For Lonergan, the problem is to discern the intelligible from the unintelligible (since common sense is a mixture of both).

Pat: Alan?

Alan: In that list of things that I assume he thinks are all part of the cycle of decline, many people would see a lot of that as progress – the earlier stuff, but certainly not the later. Is that due to bias, that they actually see it as progress?

Pat: The global and shoot-from-the-hip answer would be that Lonergan would say “Yes! It’s due to general bias!” But remember, general bias is a matter of — How

do I want to say this — “I don’t see anything wrong with that! What’s wrong with that!” And so when people don’t see anything wrong with X, and everybody more or less thinks that “Well, sure, what’s wrong with that?” and they undertake that policy. Before too long people don’t really see — They become acclimated to that way of behaving!

There’s a lot in that passage that is disputable! His characterization of the Reform Movement is certainly shoot-from-the-hip; *there is* over generalization as well, it’s a much more complex phenomenon; but — how do I want to —

There is very strong opposition at the time of the development of the notion of “enlightened self-interest” as being the proper principle for economic behaviour. That was not the way of thinking! And Locke in particular, as well as Adam Smith, but especially Locke, writes very, very, effectively and vigorously against the notion of the common good as mediated by a sovereign, a king. *And he really makes that* — how to say it? — *he makes that stick!* “Oh, we all live that way now!” It’s very difficult to even think of how we could not live that way!” *That is*, in terms of enlightened self-interest as a principle for economic behaviour. And yet we struggle against lots of the consequences of not being able to think about a *common good*. So that would be sort of one example.

So what he is getting at there is *that when achievements of a theoretical kind that foresee long-term consequences don’t make sense to people of common sense, gradually common sense operates in such a way as to generate habits of mind and heart that people don’t really see what was wrong with it.* ... Does that — I’m trying to give a more concrete example! Does that make sense?

Alan: Yeah. I guess I was thinking when people necessarily don’t see anything wrong with it, but *actually praise it!*

Pat: Oh, sure! Sure! That, you know, becomes customary! This is what our common sense is! But for Lonergan, of course, and this goes back to the passage that Jeff<sup>9</sup> brought up a little bit earlier. *For Lonergan the problem is to learn how to discern the difference between the intelligible and the unintelligible, because common sense comes to us packaged as a combination of common sense and common nonsense*, as he says. And you

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<sup>9</sup> See reference on p. 10 above.

sort of get used to this as just the way things are! *And it takes rather a significant intellectual as well as affective development to get some distance from it. Okay? ...*

Student question as to whether group bias can pose as a seeming defence against general bias (a kind of academic elitism).

– Discussion on how common sense cannot account for every new strange situation. In our inventory of insights, we also need insights that relate to the long term, the invariant, to matters that transcend the immediate. Rather than an elite intellectual class, therefore, Lonergan advocates a widespread form of education that cultivates theoretical thinking in combination with practical thinking.

Pat: Jonathan?

Jonathan: So it seems that — I'm following the sense of the sort of you uncover these group biases, but then a general bias will prevent you from attending to certain long-term solutions and ideas. But couldn't it also go the other direction, such that in a seeming defence against general bias, you actually have a masking of a group bias, something that someone would call sort of "academic elitism," or something like that?

Pat: Sure!

Jonathan: Then really what you have is a small group of the powerful asserting their own way of doing things, and saying we're defending against this sort of common sense way of thinking. Maybe it would work that way, as well, wouldn't it?

Pat: Ahm, sure! It's quite possible that it can work that way; it is quite possible that it *has* worked that way!

The thing to do, though, is to go back to Lonergan's characterisation<sup>10</sup> of the process of common sense. The process of common sense is that at any given moment we have an inventory, an accumulation of insights; some I have, some you have; a lot of our insights actually overlap, and we'll be able to carry on a conversation in the English language, and so

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<sup>10</sup> Pat actually said 'characteristic' at this point. Is your transcriber missing something in altering this?

on. But as a community we have a fairly significant inventory of common sense insights, and yet *even that inventory is never enough to make the unusual, strange, novel, things that we encounter day in and day out. And so we always have to add at least one more insight to the accumulation of our insights.*

Jonathan: Uh, uh!

Pat: What Lonergan is getting at here is that in our inventory, in our quiver of accumulated insights, we really do need to have insights that are insights into the long term; which means insights into the invariant, those things that transcend the specificity and the limitations of the immediate, and of this particular brand of common sense. So can an elitist theoretical class develop? Sure! That however is really not what he has in mind. What he has in mind is — this comes up in some of his other writings — is a kind of education that is a very very wide democratic education, in which everybody, or nearly everybody, learns to think theoretically as well as common sense. So it isn't just a matter of there being a class that uses the long-term and then imposes its role on millions of people, which is bound to be — exactly what you foresee — another kind of distorted, twisted dialectic. Okay?

Jonathan: Uh, uh!

Pat: So that's really what he's getting at. *But his concern is the problem of educating human beings to realize that we need, not only common sense methods and ideas, but also theoretical in combination;* because some of what they do in the present is going to be tied intelligibly to consequences that are many years and perhaps many miles down the road. Okay?

### The Problem of Historical Cycles, continued.

How general bias combines with group bias to erode human achievements:

- The short cycle of group bias, (e.g., the cycles of alternating predominance of political parties);
- The longer cycle of general bias.

Okay. Let me — I'm a little concerned that we're going to do what we've always done —

[Class laughter]

— and not get to the material that I've prepared, and so — This is stuff that I — Maybe we can come back to this question; but I mean, let me forge ahead so that we can make the transition to Chapter Eight on “Things” (*CWL 3*, pp. 270-295).

### **Problem of Historical Cycles**

**“This general bias of common sense combines with group bias to account for certain features of the distorted dialectic of community ...”** (*CWL 3*, p. 251).

**“Accordingly, there arises a distinction between the shorter cycle, due to group bias, and the longer cycle, originated by the general bias of common sense.”** (*CWL 3*, p. 252).

**“The longer cycle is characterized by the neglect of ideas to which all groups are rendered indifferent by the general bias of common sense.”** (*CWL 3*, p. 252).

*And so his account of why human achievements decay is: they don't decay just for group bias reasons; they decay because of the way in which general bias can reinforce group bias; and in particular, the way in which group bias of the out-group, instead of completely correcting everything that was done by the previous in-group, corrects only the most immediate and palpable things but tends to reinforce the general bias that was also operating in itself.*

You can more or less chart a certain kind of swing in the political office-holders in the United States: there's always a period of Republican dominance, and then there's a period of Democratic dominance, and there's a period of Republican dominance, and then there's a period of Democratic dominance. And lo and behold, it doesn't seem to make any bit of difference about what our economy does! There's a tendency that when the economy is swinging down whoever is in, gets bumped out. But there's a sort of a way in which the methods of political self-correction — Okay, the Democrats have been in long enough, let's get them out; okay, the Republicans have been in long enough, let's get them out; and meantime the economy seems to go sailing along through its prosperous and then its devastating period without anybody seeming to know what to do about it!

That's an example of what he would mean. That we have a very very good system of checks and balances that prevents certain kinds of group biases from being entrenched in our political processes. But there are lots of other things that that system is not very well adapted to solving. And so that's why he's concerned with the general bias, and what he calls the shorter cycle and the longer cycle.

We only saw just the simple up and downs of a curve last time. But if you think of a curve that goes up and has like ripples going up with the signs sort of a way imposed upon a cubic wave like we saw [Pat gestures an up and down motion with this hand]. You could be in a ten-year up that's like this [Pat gestures a larger up, but with a clear down then emerging] where you get a ten-year up when you're actually on the way down and not know it; because that's not what common sense is capable of seeing.

## Cosmopolis

### What is Cosmopolis?

- It is defined heuristically as an  $X$  that answers the problem of the longer cycle of decline.
- It discovers, approves, and teaches the insights beneficial to the long term.
- It makes operative the timely and fruitful ideas that are otherwise inoperative.

- Lonergan very much has in mind the ideas about political power that led to WWII.
- It combats the idea that only ideas backed by force can be operative.

### **Cosmopolis**

**“Cosmopolis is concerned to make operative the timely and fruitful ideas that otherwise are inoperative.**

**So far from employing power or pressure or force, it has to witness to the possibility of ideas being operative without such backing. Unless it can provide that witness, then it is useless.**

**For at the root of the general bias of common sense and at the permanent source of the longer cycle of decline, there stands the notion that only ideas backed by some sort of force can be operative.” (CWL 3, p. 264)**

So now we come to Cosmopolis! Cosmopolis, what is it? Well, as he says, *cosmopolis is an X*. Remember the first time he uses the algebraic metaphor: *that you can talk about something by saying how you anticipate it to be!* The whole of his account of modern science, natural science *as heuristic* rested upon an account of modern science as being organized by, and oriented by, anticipations; anticipations by what he calls — the anticipation of finding classical intelligibilities, the anticipation of finding probability

intelligibilities; and you organize your operations around that! And now he's coming back to another X.

*What is cosmopolis? Cosmopolis is the X that meets the problem of the longer cycle of decline. It's a back way (sotto voce)!*

*So you can define cosmopolis as that which meets the longer cycle of decline; and obviously one of the characteristics of the cosmopolis is to discover, and to teach, and to give hearing to, and to improve the insights that have to do with the long-term. That's the fundamental feature of cosmopolis.*

But the way that he follows up on that is really interesting! There isn't really anything so obvious, I think, in what he has said before, that makes these next two sentences follow from the definition of cosmopolis.

**So far from employing power or pressure or force, it has to witness to the possibility of ideas being operative without such backing. Unless it can provide that witness, then it is useless. For at the root of the general bias of common sense and at the permanent source of the longer cycle of decline, there stands the notion that only ideas backed by some sort of force can be operative. (CWL 3, p. 264).**

Remember the book was actually written in 1953-1954. The first edition was published in 1957 and then there was a second edition that came out towards the end of 1958, with a couple of small changes, having to do with the statistical methods. The book was written nine years after the end of the Second World War. Lonergan had to flee from Rome because of the rise of the Fascist Party in Italy; and he saw from afar the devastation of the Second World War with those totalitarian forces that he was talking about. Those weren't so distant in his memory! They were very personal; he was very aware! He saw them on the rise when

he was in Italy, when he was in Europe! And he was particularly concerned about the horror and the violence and evil that came about in that period.

So when he's talking about the importance of ideas and insights that respect and take seriously the intelligibility of the long-term, he is already thinking that the rise of the World War and its violence was the outcome of the neglect of those insights.

And that — So he goes on to say that

**“cosmopolis is concerned to make operative the timely and fruitful ideas that otherwise are inoperative.”**

*(CWL 3, p. 264).*

He is saying that really what cosmopolis is concerned with is making operative the long-term — he doesn't use the term “long-term” there — but the context makes clear that when he's talking about “**timely and fruitful ideas**” he's talking about timely and fruitful ideas that presuppose the long-term about ecological, the natural environment, the economic environment, the social and political environment, the religious environment. Those are the ideas that he thinks it's the responsibility of the cosmopolis to take seriously and to do what it can to make the society take seriously.

**So far from employing power or pressure or force, it has to witness to the possibility of ideas being operative without such backing. Unless it can provide that witness, then it is useless. For at the root of the general bias of common sense and at the permanent source of the longer cycle of decline, there stands the notion that only ideas backed by some sort of force can be operative.”** *(CWL 3, p. 264).*

That comes in as an explicit quote-unquote theoretical principle, as I said, with Machiavelli and Hobbes and Locke; and it gets developed in various kinds of ways through the political thought of modernity; and it gets in some sense enshrined in Marx, for whom

violence becomes a creative force; and of course in [the](#) fascisms of, particularly of Nazi Germany, who had their theoreticians as well; not as well-known now as Marx's. And so that's really what he's talking about.

Cultural products, in addition to philosophy and science, are needed to help reverse decline.

Philosophy can only sway a pure intelligence, which human beings are not.

A philosophy of self-appropriation is needed to understand the basic dynamics of history, and to distinguish between the intelligible and unintelligible — appropriating oneself as intelligent as the basis for this distinction.

### **Cosmopolis**

**“Cosmopolis is concerned to make operative the timely and fruitful ideas that otherwise are inoperative.” (CWL 3, p. 264).**

**“Now if men are to meet the challenge set by major decline and its longer cycle, it will be through their culture that they do so. Were man a pure intelligence, the products of philosophy and human science would be enough to sway him.” (CWL 3, p. 261).**

Cosmopolis is concerned **“to make operative the timely and fruitful ideas that otherwise are inoperative.” (CWL 3, p. 264).** **“Now if [humans] —”**

So cosmopolis is defined as making those ideas operative, and if humans

**are to meet the challenge set by major decline and its longer cycle, it will be through their culture that they do so. Were [human beings] a pure intelligence, the products of philosophy and human science would be enough to sway [them].”** (*CWL 3*, p. 261).

Now I paused there in the quote; I’ll go back and finish reading the quotation. But I wanted to draw attention to what he says there, because it almost looks like he is skipping over it, and it’s important that we not think he is skipping over it! **“Were [human beings] a pure intelligence, the products of philosophy and human science would be enough to sway [them].”** (*CWL 3*, p. 261).

But *he does think that philosophy and human science are essential to the cosmopolis; a philosophy that does two things. In particular, as he says, a philosophy that first of all thinks historically, and that means a philosophy that has a theoretical understanding of what history is; which from his point of view means a philosophy that understands the sources of progress and decline.* But what is responsible for human decay? That’s why he wants a philosophy that understands that! And *he wants human sciences* that are concerned with those as well; so human sciences that take the different fields of human endeavour, fields like economics and politics and religion, and *that take seriously the task of understanding the cyclical phenomena in those areas.*

And so what’s the role of philosophy? We’re going to see that a little bit more when we get to Chapter Fourteen (*CWL 3*, pp. 410-455, “*The Method of Metaphysics*”).

*The importance of the radical distinction between intelligibility and unintelligibility sets up the importance and the placement of Chapter 8 in Insight.*



Because human beings are not only pure intelligences,  
but “compounds in tension,”

Self-appropriation is essential as a grounding for the  
human sciences.

Humans are marked by affectivity and  
intersubjectivity, and this interferes with their  
intellectual functioning.

The importance of the nonintellectual, cultural aspect  
of learning.

Culture’s role is to cultivate, not repress affectivity, in  
accordance with the self-correcting process of insight.

*But he is implying here that a philosophy of self-  
appropriation is really what’s needed! And one of the  
reasons that it’s really needed is that a philosophy of self-  
appropriation is needed to really understand the  
difference between intelligibility and unintelligibility!*

Because unintelligibility can just mean: “I don’t understand it!” And that’s a great weapon  
of common sense: “I don’t understand it! It doesn’t make any sense to me! Therefore it’s  
unintelligible! Well, all right, therefore to you, it’s unintelligible!!”

*But in and of itself, is it unintelligible? How do you  
know — how do you distinguish between the intelligible  
and the unintelligible? That’s what self-appropriation  
is really all about: taking possession of oneself as  
intelligent, and beginning to discover the difference  
between intelligibility and unintelligibility.*

Now that sets up, I think, what he’s doing in Chapter Eight (*CWL 3*, pp. 270-295, “*Things*”).

Let me just finish that quote, and then I’m going to go back to the approach I made  
earlier. The quotation begins on the bottom of p. 261 and continues over to the top of p. 262:

**“Were man a pure intelligence, the products of philosophy and human science would be enough to sway him. But as the dialectic in the individual and in society reveals, man is a compound-in-tension of intelligence and intersubjectivity, and it is only through the parallel compound of a culture that his tendencies to aberration can be offset proximately and effectively. (CWL 3, pp. 261-262).**

So what he’s saying there — and he could have really laid it out in a different way that makes it a little bit easier to see — what he’s saying there is *you need a philosophy of self-appropriation that is brought into the work of doing human sciences by the human scientists who have become self-appropriated. Because it makes a big difference how you do human science if you are a self-appropriated person, or if you are not!* And again, as I said, we’ll see that a little bit more when we get to Chapter Fourteen (CWL 3, pp. 410-455, “The Method of Metaphysics”).next semester.

But even then the products of philosophy, and the products of human sciences, need to take into account the human beings as they are, as they live, in all their glory and all their wretchedness, *that* have permanent sources of affectivity and intersubjectivity that are going to interfere with the development of their intelligences.

*And so in addition to intellectual learning you have to have cultural learning.* He doesn’t really say very much about what that means here; and unfortunately in most of *Insight* he doesn’t say very much about it! By the time he gets to writing *Method in Theology*,<sup>11</sup> he’s got a much better idea of what the work of culture is! *And the work of culture is the cultivating of affectivity; and cultivating affectivity in ways that cooperate with, rather than interfere with, the normative self-correcting development of intelligence.*

So Lonergan has this kind of interesting approach, an approach in which he was kind of still struggling with here, I think, in *Insight*; and he hadn’t really thought through what the role of affectivity, of feelings, are in human consciousness. *But he’s kind of feeling his way towards the notion that what culture is supposed to do is, not to repress feelings, but to*

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<sup>11</sup> Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972).

*cultivate feelings. And that the norm for the cultivation of feelings is this norm of the self-correcting*

*process, which is responsible for progress, when it's not interfered with, and for the dissemination of good ideas and better ways of living, and better ways of cooperating and mutual assistance, and better ways of organizing than we have right now! And it's the biases that are interfering with that. And so you need something that deals with the affectivity to make it the partner of, rather than the enemy of, intellectual development.*

Question about whether Lonergan contradicts himself  
in a certain passage (quote from p 267).

– Discussion of how Cosmopolis is indeed capable of  
reversing decline, exploration of culture versus  
compromise (the latter reinforces decline).

Question about how the secular movement of the 18th  
century would be viewed by Lonergan.

– Lonergan would see secularism as a phenomenon of  
general bias, as a doctrine that reality is purely  
immanent and naturalistic. Yet a way of thinking  
about transcendence is needed to reverse the longer  
cycle of decline.

All right. So, Jeff, this is where there's some free time to ask your question again.  
What page is that on?

Jeff: Ah, it's two-forty-two in mine, so it's probably about two-sixty five or  
so. It's right above 'Conclusion.' It's a paragraph.

Pat: Okay. So this would be on page 266-267.

Jeff: I want to just — Do you want me to read it?

Pat: Yeah.

Jeff: Yeah. Okay.

Jeff reads from *Insight* (CWL 3, pp. 266-267):

Finally it would be unfair not to stress the chief characteristic of cosmopolis. It is not easy. It is not a dissemination of sweetness and light, where sweetness means sweet to me, and light means light to me. Were that so, cosmopolis would be superfluous. Every scotosis puts forth a plausible, ingenious, adaptive, untiring resistance. The general bias of common sense is no exception. It is by moving with that bias rather than against it, by differing from it slightly rather than opposing it thoroughly, that one has the best prospect of selling books and newspapers, entertainment and education. Moreover, this is only the superficial difficulty. Beneath it lies the almost insoluble problem of settling clearly and exactly what the general bias is. It is not a culture but only a compromise that results from taking the highest common factor of an aggregate of cultures. It is not a compromise that will check and reverse the longer cycle of decline. Nor is it unbiased intelligence that yields a welter of conflicting opinions. Cosmopolis is not Babel, yet how can we break from Babel? This is the problem. So far from solving it in this chapter, we do not hope to reach a full solution in this volume. But at least, two allies can be acknowledged. On the one hand, there is common sense, and in its judgments, which as yet have not been treated, common sense tends to be profoundly sane. On the other hand, there is dialectical analysis; the refusal of insight betrays itself; the Babel of our day is the cumulative product of a series of refusals to understand; and dialectical analysis can discover and

**expose both the series of past refusals and the tactics of contemporary resistance to enlightenment. (CWL 3, pp. 266-267).**

Pat: Okay. So then your' question was about: "it's not a reversal." **"It is not a compromise that will check and reverse the longer cycle of decline"** (CWL 3, p. 267). Right?

Jeff: Yeah, just — he seems to almost contradict himself.

Pat: Yeah. Well, the key word in the passage that you've read is 'compromise.' **"It is not a culture but only a *compromise* that results from taking the highest common factor of an aggregate of cultures."** (CWL 3, p. 267). And if you put back to the beginning of that paragraph — The first sentence is:

**Finally it would be unfair not to stress the chief characteristic of cosmopolis. It is not easy. It is not a dissemination of sweetness and light, where sweetness means sweet to me, and light means light to me. Were that so, cosmopolis would be superfluous. Every scotosis puts forth a plausible, ingenious, adaptive, untiring resistance. The general bias of common sense is no exception. It is by moving with that bias rather than against it, by differing from it slightly rather than opposing it thoroughly, that one has the best prospect of selling books and newspapers, entertainment and education. (CWL 3, p. 266).**

So what's he saying there? That's not a strategy for cosmopolis, right?

Jeff: No.

Pat: That's the work of a person who is trying to figure out how to get their books sold, how to get their articles published, and trying to figure out what the client will accept. Even if they have some kind of criticism of the culture, they recognise that just going down onto the Boston Common and holding up a sign saying "The End is Near!" is not going to get anywhere!

[Class amusement]

So there's a certain kind of common sense that's involved, but that's the common sense — *That's what he means by 'compromise.' It's by trying to, you know, trying to use something like common sense to differ just a little bit from a process of decline!* And that's only, as he says, “**the superficial difficulty**” (CWL 3, p. 266).

**Beneath it lies the almost insoluble problem of settling clearly and exactly what the general bias is. It is not a culture but only a compromise that results from taking the highest common factor of an aggregate of cultures.** (CWL 3, pp. 266-267).

*So he's using the word 'culture' there in a very positive sense, a normative sense: that culture is that which respects the things that stand against the decline. But a compromise is what reinforces the decline. And so, when he says, that's not going to reverse it, what he's talking about is the compromise. He's not talking about cosmopolis then. He's not talking about this normative sense of culture that he means there. Does that make some sense? ... He's really not contradicting himself. But the way he talks, it's a subtle form of writing! And you have to see exactly what it is he's saying will not do the reversal. “It is not a compromise that will check and reverse the longer cycle of decline.” (CWL 3, pp. 267). He thinks that cosmopolis will do the reversal!*

But cosmopolis right now is a big X with just a couple of characteristics. And he has planted the seeds for us to say: “Uhm, even a self-appropriated philosophy and a human science grounded on it isn't going to be enough! *I wonder what's left to come!!*” And he's not going to tell us that until we get to the end of Chapter Eighteen (CWL 3, pp. 618-656, “The Possibility of Ethics”). ...

[Some murmurs of anticipation in class]

Okay? Does that answer your question?

Jeff: Yeah. Thanks.

Pat: Okay. I'm about ready to make the transition to Chapter Eight (CWL 3, pp. 270-295, “Things”). If people have questions? ... Okay. We'll take maybe just a couple of minutes for questions, then we're going to take a break and come back and we will spend the rest of the class on Chapter Eight. ... Byron?

Byron: How does the secular movement coming out of the eighteenth century fit into these categories, for —

Pat: Ah, you probably know a lot more about the secular movement in the eighteenth century than I do, so can you tell me about it?

Byron: Well, I mean like, is secularism like a group bias; or how does it affect the culture? Because I know it — or does it have anything to do with bias?

Pat: Ahm, I think it would be fair to say that Lonergan would regard secularism — at least the way I understand secularism — as a phenomenon of general bias. And we're going to see that as it places itself in a stricter way in Chapter Eight (*CWL* 3, pp. 270-295, "Things"). Secularism takes a pretty strong stance on certain things, one of them being the unreality of the transcendent, at least in the traditional meaning of the word 'transcendence.' *And so, underlying secularism is an attitude about the reality of transcendence; maybe if not that, then certainly some positions with regard to the benevolence of transcendence. So to put it in sort of colloquial terms, secularism is immanent naturalism: there isn't any transcendent reality; but if there is a transcendent reality, it's probably not a good thing. And it's especially not a good thing if people believe in this transcendent reality: look at all the evil that's been done in the name of religions.*

Now, what Lonergan would say is that there are larger ideas that require the longer view to think through those issues. *That's one of the reasons that he thinks the loss of an intellectually acute theology is a very serious cultural and social loss.* Does that make some sense?

Byron: Yes.

Pat: As far as I understand, secularism is a big complicated thing! I know enough to know that! *But for Lonergan, as we will see when we get towards the end of this work, he going to make a strong argument about the intrinsic need for a knowledge — a kind of knowledge — of transcendence; and attitudes that incorporate knowledge of transcendence into daily living, but that's absolutely indispensable to solving the longer cycle of decline.* But he's not going to say that here, because that's getting too far ahead of the game from a philosophical point of view.

Question as to whether it is ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’  
to vaccinate a child; in light of Kantian reasoning  
versus economic risk assessment.

– ‘Rational’ is behaving in accordance with the  
unrestricted desire to know, leaving no question aside  
unanswered. ‘Irrationality’ is anything that interferes  
with the self-correcting process driven by the  
unrestricted desire. Extended discussion of rationality  
and common sense. Usually by “rational” people  
mean “commonsensical,” but common sense is not  
identical with fidelity to the pure unrestricted desire of  
questioning. Discussion of common sense as  
intellectual and commonsense belief, and of disease as  
a nonsystematic process.

Okay? ... Mike?

Mike: I had a general question about the uses of the terms ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ vis-à-vis their application to human behaviour. And these are terms that I thought I once knew, but seem to have slipped into total amorphousness. And just to give you a concrete example: I got into an argument, a rather heated argument, with my brother, about whether we ought to get our children vaccinated. And he was making the argument — he’s an economist — and he was making the argument, essentially a free-rider argument, that it’s quite rational to not get his children vaccinated. And I was making, I suppose an argument I believe in, but I suppose it was a Kantian argument, which is that it is a contradiction in conception and fundamentally irrational to not get your child vaccinated and then expect to enjoy the protection that comes with vaccination, because vaccination is offered in principle that

everybody needs to be vaccinated. And so — but he was making the counterargument that it's fundamentally rational to not get your child vaccinated when there are serious risks, and you can sort of free ride!<sup>12</sup> And my question, I guess for Lonergan, for you, for anybody who claims to know what rationality means: which is rational?

[Murmurs of class enjoyment]

Pat: All right then. Family!!1

[Loud class laughter]

Mike: And I used to think that I was so secure: now, that's rational! But he says that's irrational behaviour! But this was an incident where I thought that the Kantian sort of position that you can't not get your child vaccinated and then expect to enjoy the protection that comes with vaccination, because it requires that everybody be vaccinated. So that's my question, as to how to classify human behaviour.

Pat: Okay. Well, that's a complicated question! But the example is a very good one. And it goes back to what Lonergan means by the concrete. There's lots of stuff operating in what may seem like a very simple question.

**Rational**, as I would mean it, and I think rational as Lonergan would mean it — He actually at one point says something like this in *Method in Theology*. *Rational, as Lonergan would mean it, I think, and certainly as I would mean it, it behaving in accordance with the unrestricted desire to know, and letting no question be shoved aside without adequate answer. That would be the fundamental meaning of rationality.*

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<sup>12</sup> In economics, the **free rider problem** occurs when those who benefit from resources, goods, or services do not pay for them, which results in an under-provision of those goods or services.<sup>[1]</sup> The free rider problem is the question of how to limit free riding and its negative effects in these situations. The free rider problem may occur when property rights are not clearly defined and imposed.

What we've talked about is the questions for intelligence. Next week we're going to talk about the next level of questions, about what Lonergan calls the next level of consciousness that has to do with judgment and reflective understanding. So far what we've talked about is the self-correcting process on that first level of questions as it mediates between the first and the second levels of consciousness.

*So irrationality is anything that interferes with the demands that arise from the further questions. And that's what the biases do: By definition, that is for Lonergan what the meaning of bias is: any phenomenon that interferes with the self-correcting process that's brought to life by questioning.*

Now what did you and your brother mean? Well, you can talk — I won't — well, it's near enough; but it seems to me at least your brother was talking a different meaning of rationality. He was talking common sense. *Common sense, in so far as it's normative, is a version of rationality. It's a kind of rationality!* Common sense — When Lonergan starts the first section on Common Sense in Chapter Six, [the section](#) entitled “Common Sense as Intellectual” (*CWL* 3, pp. 196-204), what he's putting forward is that common sense, in its intellectual character, is in harmony with the self-correcting process of questioning and insight and further questions and further insights, and the actions that are put into effect on the basis of the insights which give rise to further questions and the insights which improve and correct the initial actions! That's perfectly rational!

What makes common sense so effective is the way in which it limits the infinity of questions that could occur to us by asking about the insights that are going to make an immediate palpable difference. So far as you don't get into problems with the general bias, it's a perfectly rational thing.

*But even without the general bias, common sense is not rational. What we call common sense is just the way we do it!* And the way you do it is a little different from the way your brother does it, although there is some overlap. I am sure that he's in conversation with people who think just like him; which means they have the same kinds of arguments, the same kinds of insights, and, Lonergan would say, the same kinds of further pertinent questions that they're not entertaining with the seriousness that they deserve to be entertained.

Mike: So the question that he would — If he were to ask the question about himself, what if everybody chose the path I am about to choose: that would cease to be a common sense question now. That would be — He is not asking that question, clearly!

Pat: No, but the question he is asking is: what if *everybody but one* —

Mike: Okay.

Pat: — got the inoculations. That is the question he's asking!

Mike: Okay.

Pat: He's got the right answer to that, you see. If everybody else is inoculated, and he is not; or if everybody else is inoculated, and one of his children is not, they're safe!

Mike: Yeah. But he has three children.

Pat: Ah!!

Mike: He can't do it!!

[Loud Class Laughter]

Pat: So what — You're on the path! But in this instance, unfortunately, the real answer is going to get you into a much longer discussion.

Mike: Okay.

Pat: What is Lonergan bringing to the table that is different from Kant on this? ... I'll give you a hint: it's on your final exam question. ....

Greg: Nonsystematic processes?

Pat: Exactly! Very good Greg!! Now, *you're* off the hook. Somebody else tell me what this has to do with Mike's brother and the inoculation debate? ....

Mike: He could never have predicted that he's going to be able to be on the video?

Pat: Ah, that too probably. But ... Yeah, Jeff?

Jeff: It wouldn't be just like there's an ideal frequency: if everyone was getting vaccinated: they're just going to deviate from that nonsystematically kind of thing?

Pat:           Yeah.   *Basically disease is not a systematic process. The communication of disease is a nonsystematic process.* People do all kinds of things: they wash their hands, people who use paper towels to open the bathroom doors as they go out, and so on. *And they still get the 'flu!! The damn thing is so uncontrollably nonsystematic!!!*

[Class amusement]

*You can change the probabilities, but you can't eliminate the incidences!* And so, what your brother has — deep coordinate, so to speak — is the fact that, well first of all, not everybody else but him, or one of his children, is inoculated, and so the nonsystematicness of the disease persists!

Somebody actually asked me this back many many — it was about cancer — many weeks ago, and I keep forgetting to bring my bag. What kind of bodies we have, and what kinds of pathogens we encounter is a nonsystematic coincidence. I might be perfectly vulnerable to a certain pathogen, but just be completely lucky enough to be on the lower end of the Bell-curve and never run into it. And somebody else could be highly vulnerable to it, and just gets exposed to it. *It's a nonsystematic process!* So, the only thing that works is that if everybody else in fact got inoculated except for one person.<sup>13</sup> And he's got to figure out which one of his three kids may be the one to choose [final words uncertain].

But the fact of the matter is that *there's enough people out there that are not inoculated, plus the fact that viruses mutate*; and if everybody else out there is inoculated and the virus mutates, then they start passing around a mutated virus. So the question really is, you know, *what's the greater probability?* There is a small probability that people can

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<sup>13</sup> In practice, however, the administration of vaccines, etc., aims only at what has been termed “herd immunity,” i.e., the vaccination of a sufficient percentage of the relevant population to reduce the probabilities of widespread infection. The percentages aimed at can vary, and are calculated with reference to the disease in question.

have reactions to the vaccines.<sup>14</sup> Most of them have to do with egg allergies.<sup>15</sup> There's a small probability of that. And there's another probability of getting — say at the age twenty-one — and if you get it at the age of twenty one, there is a probability of dying from it. And so, *what are the probabilities?*

There's a — Yet one of the things — *And it's a fact that common sense, although Lonergan talks about it as intellectual, it involves a lot of belief. Common sense is overwhelmingly a matter of common sense believing. And he hasn't said anything about what kind of a thing believing is. And there's good believing, and there's bad believing! And it has nothing — Believing is a phenomenon that is not a specifically religious phenomenon. There is just ordinary common sense belief about things like inoculations that don't have any specific religious content to them. We tend to use the word 'belief' in association with values, and with religion; but in fact we do believing all the time. And common sense is having — is the patterns of believing that common sense believing has.*

And up to a certain point **in time**, human beings believed scientists. And then at other points they stopped believing scientists. Things in fact that happened between the nineteen-fifties and two thousand and nine **significantly** eroded the confidence that the American common sense has in science. It's a very complicated story, and I'm sure not all of it could be held up. But in fact that is what happened. You wouldn't have had the same kinds of very passionate arguments against inoculations that are going on right now if that particular — what Lonergan called “cycle of decline” — hadn't taken place! And why it took place — I could blame secularism for that, I could blame lots of things for that, but *it's the sort of thing that a person would have to do some serious intellectual investigation to really understand it.*  
*But*

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<sup>14</sup> Pat's word here was 'viruses', but this may be a slip of the tongue. The risk of serious reaction emerges in administering the vaccine to someone who has an egg allergy. See the following footnote.

<sup>15</sup> Egg allergy develops when the body's immune system becomes sensitized and overreacts to proteins in egg whites or yolks. When eggs are eaten, the body sees the protein as a foreign invader and sends out chemicals to defend against it. Those chemicals cause the symptoms of an allergic reaction. Experts estimate that as many as 2 percent of children are allergic to eggs. Fortunately, studies show that about 70 percent of children with an egg allergy will outgrow the condition by age 16. Still, the stakes are high: Children who are allergic to eggs can have reactions ranging from a mild rash to anaphylaxis, a life-threatening condition that impairs breathing and can send the body into shock. *Since some flu vaccines contain small egg derivatives, they are not administered to those with egg allergies.*

*here we are! People don't trust science any more — not to the degree that they used to. And that's part of what — And it becomes part of common sense not to trust science!*

And your brother can say, "I'm being perfectly rational!" because what he means by that is "I'm being commonsensical!" But *being commonsensical is not pure rationality! It's, as Lonergan says, a mixture of common sense and common nonsense.* Okay? ... All right!

Question about the lack of a higher viewpoint from  
which to perceive general bias.

– More precisely, it is common sense that cannot  
reverse the longer cycle of decline, being inherently  
committed to general bias. Further elaboration of  
what higher viewpoints are and how they relate to  
common sense.

Pat: Okay! ... Greg?

Greg: My question was about your comment that there was no higher viewpoint within which to resolve the problem of general bias. One has no human — So I was wondering if you meant *that* bias of itself impedes that higher viewpoint from manifesting itself, or *that* there simply isn't a higher viewpoint in the way that there is in other areas?

Pat: I hope I didn't say exactly what you have me saying!

[Class laughter]

We'll have to go back and look at the video tape, and — *If I said that I was wrong!* I'm not sure — what part — *What I wanted to say was that common sense does not have the capability of reversing the longer cycle of decline, because common sense is by definition committed to general bias! That's the sort of thing it is!* It isn't sort of a first approximation — People don't get up in the morning and say; "I think I'm going to try general bias today for a few months!" You know?

[Class laughter]

It's just that what common sense does is to specialize on the immediate; and it's really good at that! And it's good that it is! And going back to something that Jonathan said: If people only thought theoretical ideas, that would be completely — That wouldn't be good! *Because you have to also be able to figure out how to implement the the long-term ideas in very complicated, changing, concrete situations.* But what common sense does is to just specialize on the immediate to the neglect of the long-term. *And for that reason common sense doesn't have the ability to reverse itself!*

Greg:           So when we appeal to a higher viewpoint we're necessarily no longer speaking about or in common sense terms?

Pat:            Ah, well, it's a little bit complicated. *There are common sense higher viewpoints; but Lonergan is, in fact, when he talks about cosmopolis, and when he talks about the cultural component in addition to philosophy and human science, he's looking ahead to a certain kind of higher viewpoint: that's right! But it is a higher viewpoint beyond common sense.* And he has a remark in Chapter Seven (“Common Sense as Object” (CWL 3, pp. 232-269)) where he says that one of the things that common sense has to do is to learn to subordinate itself to the cosmopolis way of thinking. That doesn't mean all your [indecipherable expression] and all your common sense, and I'm going to rule you, what Jonathan said. *What it means is that each person has to learn to use their common sense in a larger arena, in a larger horizon. And that larger horizon is a horizon that he's getting at when he's talking about cosmopolis.*

Greg:           But can common sense discern the parameters of that horizon?

Pat:            No. No, there has to be some kind of movement up! Lonergan was a big fan of Plato, early on. And he saw very much the problem that the person who was dragged out of the cave has in coming back to the cave. And yet, like Plato, he — well it's my reading of Plato anyway — Lonergan didn't think that that absolves the philosopher from taking on the responsibility of making the effort to communicate to — in this case — to common sense.

All right! So, let's take a break.

[Recording stops abruptly at this point].

## **Insight & Beyond: Lecture 13, Part Two:**

### *Insight* Chapter 8: “Things”

Relation of Chapter 8 on “Things” to earlier concerns about the real, the intelligible, and the longer cycle of decline.

Animal vs. Human Realism.

Human realism is linked to what Lonergan means by “thing.”

Naive realism (an incoherent blend of animal and human realism) vs. critical realism (full development of human authenticity, as committed to the self-correcting cycle of inquiry).

Being human animals, not animal humans.

The tension between being an animal and being human.

Beginning to explore the implications of what we are doing when we are knowing.

Patterns of experience as the ground of this discussion.

Consciousness distinguishes animals from plants.

The animal (biological) way of *extroverted* patterning conscious experiencing is related to its benefits for survival, nourishment, reproduction.

Primary philosophical concern is the ways in which the biological patterning can interfere with the self-correcting process of inquiry, and its notion of the real.

Extroversion as the primary characteristic of biological patterning and *its* notion of the real.

“Body” as an object of biological patterning.

Animal biological patterning of consciousness as ‘already out there real’, does the following:

- *Already*: It finds the environment rather than creating it.
- *Out*: It is only aware of outer objects; is not aware of consciousness as the ground of its objects.
- It takes *that which is outside itself* as valuable (i.e., necessary to survival).
- *There and Now*: If not ‘there’ and ‘now,’ then has no biological usefulness.

‘Already out there now’ denotes the “right stuff,” the minimal criterion, of what may or may not be real to a biologically extroverted consciousness (a precondition for biological utility).

Example of wasps’ interests in whatever resembles a hole.

## Animal Realism and the Metaphysics of Presence

The ‘already out there now’ is ‘presence’; what is present is taken as the real.

In this respect, Lonergan shares in the criticism of the metaphysics of the presence.

Human realism is not limited to presence.

But because we are also animals, there is a tension in us inclined toward the metaphysics of presence, against which we must struggle.

Galileo, decadent Aristotelians, Descartes, and Kant accepting the criterion of the real as the ‘already out there now’.

The human criterion for the real is the intelligible (example of self-appropriation).

The animal notion of realism repeated interference in the history of philosophy.

Examples from Descartes (bodily extension as ‘out there’) and Kant (inner sense experience as ‘already now’).

Recall Chapter 5 on Space and Time: the reality of space and time is not limited to extensions and durations, but rather to the *intelligible ordering* of extensions and durations.

Thus Lonergan makes an unusually radical break with the presence, or ‘already out there now,’ as the meaning of being.

*Relation of Chapter 8 to the Issues of Chapter 7:*

What makes common sense vulnerable to general bias is its concern with the immediate, the here and now.

Metaphysics of Presence and General Bias.

Common sense is vulnerable to general bias because it privileges what is immediately and concretely present.

Realism of ‘already out there now’ connected to the vulnerability of our bodies to what is out there – outside our skins.

Student question: Is animal consciousness something to eliminate or to build upon?

– Lonergan wants not to do away with animal criteria of reality but to prevent it from interfering with the human ones, through a process of appropriating the former. It takes *that which is outside itself* as valuable (i.e., necessary to survival).

– Discussion of what human living is, in Aristotle and in Lonergan; in comparison with Nietzsche. It takes *that which is outside itself* as valuable (i.e., necessary to survival).

## Human Realism: 'Thing'

A 'thing' is an intelligible, concrete unity.

The 'general notion' of the thing as the *anticipation* of a certain kind of *understanding*.

Rarely do we grasp a thing in the full sense: that is, as the intelligible unity of all data in their concrete individuality and totality of aspects.

Intelligible unifications of spatially and temporally distinct data.

Exercise: Thing or Body?

Do the two sets of data (photographs) pertain to one thing or two; one body or two?

- Class Discussion. If one makes the assumption that the caterpillar transformed into the butterfly, one *assumes* that they are the *same* in some way.
- Such assumption based in the *notion* of the thing as not spatially and temporally distinct, visual data, but as intelligible.
- Sameness is not in the sensible data, but in the grasp of intelligibility.
- Unity and sameness don't *look like* anything – this is “the startling strangeness” about reality.

- The unity identity pole is not restricted to any particular space and time; nor does it have any appearance in and of itself. The larva and butterfly are each ‘bodily’ and ‘real’ relative to those biological consciousnesses to whom they are useful (predators and mates, respectively), and not to others. It takes *that which is outside itself* as valuable (i.e., necessary to survival).

Student question about the word ‘concrete’; is the periodic table of elements a ‘thing’?

- The intelligible unity of the table, as the expression of an abstract insight, is not a thing; but the concrete one hanging on the wall is a thing.
- Things can be “characterized” by their properties (i.e., conjugates) or by their places in schemes of recurrence, etc. But these intelligible characterizations are not identical with the full intelligible unity of things.
- Not only caterpillar-butterfly things, but pets as unique, complicated, intelligible unities.
- A good way of thinking about our concreteness as individual human beings is to ask, ‘What is our story?’ Our story formulates our intelligible unity. We may share things in common, but the story of our whole life is unique.

The “Ames Chair” Exercise. Different aspects of things are presented from different perspectives. In one perspective, all three of the things “look like” a chair; but data from a different perspective on two of the sets of things do not look like chairs look from those perspectives.

Disconcerting problems can arise from the reality of things as intelligible rather than as ‘already out there now’.

The Dialectic of Knowing and Reality: the two principles of biological patterning *vs.* the unrestricted desire to know pull in different directions.

The paradox of things being permanent in time, yet subject to change.

Change is not a ‘newly observed datum’; it is different sensible data while the intelligible unity remains the same.

This is what Lonergan will mean by “the notion of change” in Chapter 10.

Among the disconcerting problems that arise from the confusion of the two notions of reality:

Are atoms real? Mach argued they were only conveniences for calculating connections among the data on chemical reactions.

According to animal consciousness, they are not ‘present’ and thus are not real.

What about magnetism, evolution? What about love, friendship, and human identity? God?

Animal realism reduces the scope of the universe, human realism expands it.

Animal reality is a much-shrunken whole, compared to the whole of human knowing.

Exercise: Sketching Gasson Hall.

Note that people normally sketch the building from a ground view.

We *characterize* things in terms of *some* of their data, by some privileged profile.

When we “recognize” someone or something, this signals an insight, a grasp of intelligibility.

We tend to substitute this profile for the wholeness and reality of the thing.

Yet the reality of people and things is not reducible to presence, to any profile, let alone to the ‘already out there now’ data on a thing.

End of Part II.

## Lecture 13, Part Two

### *Insight* Chapter 8: “Things”

Relation of Chapter 8 on “Things” to earlier concerns about the real, the intelligible, and the longer cycle of decline.

Animal vs. Human Realism.

Human realism is linked to what Lonergan means by “thing.”

Naive realism (an incoherent blend of animal and human realism) vs. critical realism (full development of human authenticity, as committed to the self-correcting cycle of inquiry).

Being human animals, not animal humans.

The tension between being an animal and being human.

Beginning to explore the implications of what we are doing when we are knowing.

So we’re going to make the transition now from talking about the problem of the longer cycle of decline, and the need for cosmopolis, to what seems almost like the beginning of a new book on “Things.” But it’s not all that new a beginning after all, because in fact we saw an intimation of what he’s going to talk about in Chapter Eight on “Things” (*CWL 3*, pp. 270-295) all the way back in the “Introduction” (*CWL 3*, pp. 11-24): that passage that I read in perhaps the second class, about the “**startling strangeness**” — If you remember — a “**startling strangeness**” that there are two quite different kinds of realisms: “**an incoherent realism, half animal and half human**” (*CWL 3*, p. 22). I want to pause on that phrase, “half animal and half human”!

## Animal vs. Human Realism

“clear memory of its startling strangeness —  
that there are two quite different realisms ...  
an incoherent realism, half animal and  
half human, that poses as a halfway house  
between materialism and idealism ...  
and an intelligent and reasonable realism  
between which and materialism the halfway  
house is idealism” (CWL 3. p. 22).

*What we're going to see here is the animal realism that's going to be associated with his way of using the word 'body.' And the human realism that is associated with his way of using the word 'thing.'*

The “**incoherent realism**” as he calls it, is *some incoherent and inconsistent blending of animal realism and human realism*. And as he says, if you haven't had a clear memory of this other kind of realism which he sometimes calls **critical realism** — So:

### ***Naïve realism or incoherent realism***

*is this incoherent blending of animal realism and human realism.*

### ***Critical realism***

*is the realism of full human authenticity, which at this point in the development of the book means authentic appropriation of oneself as committed to, by one's very being, committed to the self-correcting cycle of understanding.*

And then we talked about this *left-wing realism*; that **Materialism**, which corresponds to *animal realism*, **Idealism**, **Naïve Realism** in the middle, and then you've got left-wing or **Critical Realism**, which will take us most of — well most of the beginning of next semester to kind of spell out what he's getting at there.

**Materialism Naïve Realism Idealism**

**Critical Realism**

But here we have the beginnings of his foray into talking, not just about what we're doing when we're knowing; but *the implications that it has, and the tensions that it introduces, because there's a real tension, there's a real challenge! There's a real — you might say — existential crisis involved in self-appropriation! It means to become fully human, and to be liberated from what is the vortex that draws us down that comes from our animality. It's not the same as saying that we stop being animals; it is saying that we become human animals and not animal humans.*

So we've already seen a hint of what he's going to be doing in Chapter Eight on “Things” (CWL 3, pp. 270-295), and that it has to do with more than just a definition of a new kind of insight, although it does; it has to do with a very fundamental problem of a tension in human beings as to: “Am I going to be an animal?” or “Am I going to be a human animal?”

Patterns of experience as the ground of this discussion.

Consciousness distinguishes animals from plants.

The animal (biological) way of *extroverted* patterning conscious experiencing is related to its benefits for survival, nourishment, reproduction.

Primary philosophical concern is the ways in which the biological patterning can interfere with the self-correcting process of inquiry, and its notion of the real.

Extroversion as the primary characteristic of biological patterning and *its* notion of the real.

And we also saw hints of things that he was doing in Chapter Six (CWL 3, “Common and its Subject,” pp. 196-231) when he was talking about the patternings of experiencing. What is it about that differentiates animals from plants? Consciousness! And what is consciousness? What does consciousness add to the evolutionary advantages that animals have over plants?

## **Animal Realism: ‘Body’**

**“It is as though the full-time business of living called forth consciousness as a part-time employee, occasionally to meet problems of malfunctioning, but regularly to deal rapidly, effectively and economically with the external situations in which sustenance is to be won and into which offspring are to be born,” (CWL 3. p. 207).**

**“Thus extroversion is a basic characteristic of the biological pattern of experience.” (CWL 3. p. 207).**

**“It is as though the full-time business of living called forth consciousness as a part-time employee ... (CWL 3. P. 207).**

Notice: Animality is in charge! Animality is doing the patterning of experiencing. We’re talking about animals, and we’re going to meet dolphins and such creatures, and after that a penguin.

[Some amusement]

*Animals don’t raise questions! They don’t have inquiries! They don’t have insights! This is just the animal patterning of experiencing. What Lonergan is going to be concerned with is the animal interference with the self-correcting intelligence.*

**“It is as though the full-time business of living called forth consciousness as a part-time employee —” (CWL 3. P. 207).**

Biological patterning of experiences.

**“— occasionally to meet problems of malfunctioning, but regularly to deal rapidly, effectively and economically with the external situations in which sustenance is to be won and into which offspring are to be born.**

**Thus extroversion is a basic characteristic of the biological pattern of experience.”** (CWL 3. p. 207).

*Extroversion is the fundamental characteristic of biological consciousness. And that's going to mean that extroversion is the horizon within which what counts as real and as worthwhile, and as real and as good, is set! If it isn't out there, it's not real! Extroversion is the animal patterning that introduces the animal criterion, the animal realism.*

### **Animal Realism: 'Body'**

**“Let us now characterize a 'body' as an  
*'already out there now real.'*”**

**'Already': biological consciousness does not create but finds its environment; it finds it as already constituted.**

**'Out' refers to the extroversion of a consciousness that is aware, not of its own ground, but of objects distinct from itself.”**  
(CWL 3, pp. 276-277).

“Body” as an object of biological patterning.

Animal biological patterning of consciousness as

‘already out there real’, does the following:

- *Already*: It finds the environment rather than creating it.
- *Out*: It is only aware of outer objects; is not aware of consciousness as the ground of its objects.
- It takes *that which is outside itself* as valuable (i.e., necessary to survival).
- *There and Now*: If not ‘there’ and ‘now,’ then has no biological usefulness.

‘Already out there now’ denotes the “right stuff,” the minimal criterion, of what may or may not be real to a biologically extroverted consciousness (a precondition for biological utility).

Example of wasps’ interests in whatever resembles a hole.

So now, I’m actually reversing the order of treatment, because first Lonergan introduces his account of what he means by ‘Thing’ and then goes on to talk about ‘Body; ’ and I thought [that](#) to make the link with what he’s done earlier, that it would be helpful to begin with his account of ‘Body’, and then go back and look at it by comparison with ‘Thing’.

**“Let us now characterize a ‘body’ as an ‘already out there now real.’”** (*CWL* 3, p. 276). Weird phrase! **“‘Already’: biological consciousness does not create but finds its environment.”** Notice that that’s very different from human beings. Human beings do create our social environments and our historical environments. So the tendency to think of

reality as **“already constituted”** comes from the fact that if it’s not already there, you can’t eat it, you can’t mate with it. Animals don’t produce new cultural artefacts that they can use in various ways. They simply take the environment as given. And so **‘already’!** **“‘Out’ refers to the extroversion of a consciousness that is aware, not of its own ground, but of objects distinct from itself.”** (CWL 3, pp. 276-277). *What he means by consciousness that is aware of its own ground is the sort of thing that self-appropriation is about!*

Where is the self that you are appropriating? Well, it does not appear to me! So where is it? ... Nobody is going to say that it’s in here [Pat indicates his right temple] — which is good! That’s probably because I’ve intimidated you!

[Student amusement]

But the tendency is to say: “my self is inside me.” But if you cut yourself open, to look for that self, what you will find is a liver, and some intestines, and lungs, and kidneys, and a heart, and a lot of blood. *But you won’t find a self!* And so *what’s already out there* becomes, sort of by inverse, well, *if it’s not-out there then it must be in-here. And if it’s neither out-there nor in-here, then it’s no place at all! And it isn’t at all, not for biological consciousness!!* Because biological consciousness is, by its very evolutionary advantage, inherent in extroversion. It’s going to regard as what’s biologically worthwhile as what can be seen or grasped or heard that is outside of itself. It’s not going to eat itself, at least for the most part. And sensate animals don’t mate with themselves. And they’re not their own predators.

### **Animal Realism: ‘Body’**

**“‘There’ and ‘now’ indicate the spatial and temporal determinations of extroverted consciousness.**

**‘Real,’ finally, is a subdivision within the field of the ‘already out there now’: part of that is mere appearance; but part is real;**

**And its reality consists in its relevance to biological success or failure, pleasure or pain.”**  
(*CWL 3*, p. 277).

*So ‘out’ is the great advantage that consciousness bestows upon animals over and above non-sensate living organisms.*

**“‘There’ and ‘now’ indicate the spatial and temporal determinations of extroverted consciousness.”** (*CWL 3*, p. 277).

If it’s ‘out’, it’s got to be *there*, and *now*. And if it’s not there now, then it’s not ‘out there.’ If it’s not there now out there, then it’s not real. It has no biological usefulness!

**‘Real,’ finally, is a subdivision within the field of the ‘already out there now’: part of that is mere appearance; but part is real.** (*CWL 3*, p. 277).

So the phrase ‘already out there now’ is what gets you in the door, as what could be real, but might not be real! [Loneragan](#) gives that example of the kitten who sees a picture of milk, and goes over to drink it and can’t do it, and then figures out:

“Oh, that’s not a real saucer of milk, that’s just an appearance of a saucer of milk. But at least I wasn’t animally crazy for going over and checking it out, because it had the basic stuff of reality, the already out there now.”

In the summer around my home, I see this species of wasps that are always hovering around, and anything that is about the size of the head of a nail — I think of about the size of a twelve point nail — they hover around; because they’re looking for some little hole [through which](#) they can get into my house and build a nest. And anything that’s got that shape — “well, that could be it!” But it turns out: “but naw, it’s just a black dot of grease on my garage door or on the sidewalk or something like that.” And so they go and check it out. But you see, it had the basic stuff, it had the right stuff to be real, to be biologically useful for the sake of building a nest and propagating the species, but no, that one turned out not to be! But it had the right material to be real, which is the already out there now that corresponds to biological extroversion.

*So the real for animal consciousness has to have ‘already out there nowness’, and some of it then is real, and some of it is not, so it’s a subdivision of ‘already out there nowness’. And what its reality consists in, as Lonergan says, is whether or not it is useful to biological purposiveness. But it can’t be useful to biological purposiveness if it doesn’t at least have the ‘already out there now’ criteria.*

**And its reality consists in its relevance to biological success or failure, pleasure or pain.** (CWL 3, p. 277).

### **Animal Realism and the Metaphysics of Presence**

The ‘already out there now’ is ‘presence’; what is present is taken as the real.

In this respect, Lonergan shares in the criticism of the metaphysics of the presence.

Human realism is not limited to presence.

But because we are also animals, there is a tension in us inclined toward the metaphysics of presence, against which we must struggle.

### **Animal Realism & Metaphysics of Presence**

*‘already out there now’ = ‘presence’ = real*

**Galileo, decadent Aristotelians, Descartes, Kant**  
(CWL 3, p. 277).

“thus: by ‘body,’ I understand all that is suitable for being bounded by some shape, for being enclosed in some place, and thus for filling up space.” (Descartes, *Second Meditation*)

“Reality, in the pure concept of understanding, is that which corresponds to a sensation in general; it is that, therefore, the concept of which points to being (in time).” (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*).

Now some of you are familiar with the postmodern criticisms of the Metaphysics of Presence. It begins — depending on where you want to begin — with Nietzsche or with Heidegger. And then Derrida accuses Heidegger of still harbouring the Metaphysics of Presence, and so on. The ‘already out there now’ can be translated as ‘presence,’ present in space, present in time. What’s real is what’s present! It’s real, because it’s ‘already out there now’. And if it’s not ‘already out there now,’ then it *can’t* be real! If it is ‘already out there now’, it might be illusory, but at least it’s ‘already out there now’!

Let me stop and dwell on that! Do people understand this connection? *Frankly, it took me a long time to get this. That Lonergan is on the side of the critics of the Metaphysics of Presence.* Now some of you perhaps don’t know really what that means. But among the things that, say, Heidegger is concerned with, is to deconstruct the preference for the real construed on the model of presence and confrontation over against the not yet and the no longer. That’s why his preoccupation is with a philosophy of time, of temporality. Because he wants to say that the meaning of being is not exhausted by the meaning of presence.

So Lonergan is in that arena! Although he seems not to have known anything about this, he was running very much along the same lines as the concerns of the people who were criticising, in the twentieth and now the twenty-first century, the serious implications of a metaphysics that’s fixated on a Metaphysics of Presence. *For Lonergan, the human realism is not limited to presence; it’s the animal realism that is! And what he’s arguing here is that because we are intelligent evolved organisms,*

*we have within us a tension that we have to negotiate  
between the realism that we inherit as animal organisms,  
and the realism that we inherit as self-transcending  
intelligent beings.*

Galileo, decadent Aristotelians, Descartes, and  
Kant accepting the criterion of the real as the  
'already out there now'.

The human criterion for the real is the intelligible  
(example of self-appropriation).

The animal notion of realism repeated interference in  
the history of philosophy.

Examples from Descartes (bodily extension as  
'out there'); and Kant (inner sense experience as  
'already now').

### **Animal Realism & Metaphysics of Presence**

*'already out there now'* = 'presence' = real

**Galileo, decadent Aristotelians, Descartes, Kant**  
(*CWL 3*, p. 277).

"thus: by 'body,' I understand all that is suitable  
for being bounded by some shape, for being  
enclosed in some place, and thus for filling up  
space." (Descartes, *Second Meditation*).

"Reality, in the pure concept of understanding, is  
that which corresponds to a sensation in general;  
it is that, therefore, the concept of which points to  
being (in time)." (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*).

Now Lonergan mentions specifically in this context, Galileo, decadent Aristotelians, Descartes, and Kant. So let me just read you that passage. The page in the Toronto edition, on the slide, is p. 277:

**For the point we wish to make is that not a few men mean by ‘thing’ or ‘body,’ not simply an intelligible unity grasped in data as individual, but also an ‘already out there now real’ which is as accessible to human animals as to kittens. When *Galileo* pronounced secondary qualities to be merely subjective, he meant that they were not ‘already out there now real.’ When the *decadent Aristotelians* and, generally, people that rely on good common sense insist that secondary qualities obviously *are* objective, they mean that they *are* ‘already out there now real.’ When *Descartes* maintained that material substance must be identical with spatial extension, his material substance was the ‘already out there now real.’ When *Kant* argued that primary and secondary qualities are merely phenomenal, he meant that for him the reality of the ‘already out there now real’ was mere appearance. *Our own position, as contained in the canon of parsimony, was that the real is the verified; it is what is to be known by the knowing constituted by experience and inquiry, insight and hypothesis, reflection and verification. Our present point is that, besides knowing in that rather complex sense, there is also ‘knowing’ in the elementary sense in which kittens know the ‘reality’ of milk. (CWL 3, p. 277, emphases added).***

He has actually put in that reference to verification: so that’s kind of looking ahead to Chapters Nine 9 (“The Notion of Judgment”) and Ten (“Reflective Understanding”) and to things that he’s going to be talking about in Chapters Twelve (“The Notion of Being”) and Thirteen (“The Notion of Objectivity”) in particular.

*But what he should have said there is that our criterion for the real is the intelligible, because for him the verified is always the verification of intelligibility. And intelligibility is not 'already out there now.' When you're self-appropriating, you're not self-appropriating a reality that is anywhere. The reality of yourself is not already out there anywhere; and yet it is real!*

So let me just plant that there, and pull it out a little bit more. But to just fill out — the reason I put this particular passage in the slide [presumably the references is to *CWL 3*, p. 277 in the slide. and also as read to class] and dwelled on it, is to show partly what Lonergan thinks is important to do as a philosopher. There are a variety of interferences to the development of intelligence, the self-correcting process of learning. And one of them is to the development of *philosophical* intelligence which, as we saw, is so important in the prospect of meeting the problem of the longer cycle of decline. And *what interferes in philosophy is the animal sense of realism; that what counts as real has to have presence. And if it doesn't have presence, then it's not real!*

And so here's Descartes, from the Second Meditation.

“Thus: by ‘body,’ I understand all that is suitable for being bounded by some shape, for being enclosed in some place, and thus for filling up space.” (Descartes, *Second Meditation*).

Out there! Body is out there! So Lonergan is not just sort of saying: “Well, I think maybe I'll call body ... Well, I don't know ... Let's call it the ‘already out there now’”. He is coming out of his studies of philosophy, and he's clearly read Kant, and Descartes, and Hobbes, and he's read more than his share of Decadent Aristotelians; and their way of doing a metaphysics that is, he thinks, grounded, not in human intelligence, but in animal extroversions. And here's Kant:

“Reality, in the pure concept of understanding, is that which corresponds to a sensation in general; it is that, therefore, the concept of which points to being (in time).” (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*).

Now what Kant is getting at there is that the concept of reality is something that the understanding has, but the understanding is primarily — it's the faculty of formation of concepts. And it's not so much the formation of concepts; the concepts should reside there from the get-go, eternally. And the concept of reality is the reality that pertains to any experience whatsoever, and that for Kant means either inner or outer experience. Outer experience is what we have through our sensations, and that also has the form of intuition. But we also have inner sensations, we have inner experiences. And those don't have the extroversion to them. But they have the 'nowness', 'already in now'. [undecipherable words]. 'Timeness'. So every experience has 'timeness' to it. It has the 'already in now'. So if you get really pushed up the wall, Kant is saying: "You can let go of the 'out' and the 'there', but you never let go of the 'now' or the 'already', because if you take those away, then it's not real."

**Recall Chapter 5 on Space and Time: the reality of space and time is not limited to extensions and durations, but rather to the *intelligible ordering of extensions and durations.***

**Thus Lonergan makes an unusually radical break with the presence, or 'already out there now,' as the meaning of being.**

Now the difficulty, of course, as we saw back in Chapter Five ("Space and Time" *CWL 3*, pp. 163-195): *why did Lonergan write Chapter Five on "Space and Time"? Because the reality of Space and Time is not limited to extensions and durations.*

*The reality of Space and Time has to do with the intelligible ordering of extensions and durations. Extensions and durations have the reality of the 'there' and the 'out' and of the 'already' and the 'now'. But the extensions and the durations don't have intelligibility in and of themselves. They are what is subject to intelligibility! So Space and Time have a reality that goes beyond animal consciousness and its privileging of a presence that is the meaning of being.*

What Lonergan is doing here is to say it looks that really, really, smart, important, admirable, and highly influential philosophers, did not make the break in the way that I, Lonergan, made the break —

[Class Laughter]

— from the ‘already out there now’! So it’s a really big deal!!

**Metaphysics of Presence  
& General Bias**

‘*already out there now*’ = ‘presence’ = real

**General Bias of Common Sense**

**Privileges**

**whatever makes an “*immediate palpable difference.*”**

*Relation of Chapter 8 to the Issues of Chapter 7:*

What makes common sense vulnerable to general bias  
is its concern with the immediate, the here and now.

Metaphysics of Presence and General Bias.

Common sense is vulnerable to general bias because it  
privileges what is immediately and concretely present.

Realism of ‘already out there now’ connected to the  
vulnerability of our bodies to what is out there —  
outside our skins.

And I just wanted to make the connection between the Metaphysics of Presence and what we just concluded. What is it about common sense that makes it vulnerable to the longer cycle of decline? *What makes it vulnerable to general bias? It’s the preference of immediacy, whatever makes an immediate palpable difference! The word ‘immediate’ can*

*mean different things, but in the context of common sense it means 'here and now.'* Common sense is not interested in what might happen in a hundred years; it's interested in what's going on here and now. So although Lonergan doesn't make the connection explicitly, it seems to me *that he's making an implicit connection between the preference for the immediate in the general bias of common sense, and the preference and privileging of a presence in the animal realism of 'the already out there now'.* Okay? ...

Now before we go on to talk about 'Thing', are there any questions on that?

[No question is raised]

### **Human Realism: 'Thing'**

**"By a thing is meant an *intelligible* concrete unity."** (CWL 3, p. 278, emphasis added).

**"The notion of a thing is grounded in an *insight* that grasps, not relations between data, but a unity, identity, whole in data; and this unity is grasped, not by considering data from any abstractive viewpoint, but by taking them in their concrete individuality and in the totality of their aspects."** (CWL 3, p. 271, emphasis added).

*So, animal extroversion, animal consciousness, is something we inherit! And we don't get to dispense with it. And even a self-appropriated person carries it with them (sic); they just have to be aware of the way in which it can invade otherwise intelligent ways of thinking and acting. One of the things about 'already out there newness' is just a — what do I want to say — the inviolability of our bodies. We, very naturally, as organic beings, protect what's inside from invasive forces from the outside, whether they be diseases or living beings that want to hurt us. That's something that's a very good natural inheritance, and it's part of the reason why it has such powerful emotions associated with it. Yet it does work in the*

opposite direction of the criterion of reality that is not limited to presence as specified by the biological [orientation](#). Okay.

**Student question: Is animal consciousness something to eliminate or to build upon?**

– Lonergan wants not to do away with animal criteria of reality but to prevent it from interfering with the human ones, through a process of appropriating the former. It takes *that which is outside itself* as valuable (i.e., necessary to survival).

– Discussion of what human living is, in Aristotle and in Lonergan; in comparison with Nietzsche. It takes *that which is outside itself* as valuable (i.e., necessary to survival).

Pat: Greg?

Greg: I think I was just going to ask: if this is the [kind of knowing](#) that is appropriate for animal intelligence or sensibility, is what Lonergan is going to do is build off that? Or, are we doing away with it, or are we adding to it?

Pat: *It's more a matter of distinguishing; because for him the problem is, not of doing away with the animal criterion of reality, the problem is that the animal criterion of reality subverts the human criterion of reality! So it's really a matter of appropriating, of decisively making one's own, what already is one's own, what is distinctively human! Okay?*

A kind of a connection here, a sort of little tangential link: When Aristotle comes in the *Nicomachean Ethics* to give the crucial definition of happiness that is going to inform his whole account of the ethical life, he asks: *how does a human being function? What is it that makes a human being function as a human being functions?* And he considers two forms of living, the plant form of living and the animal form of living; and without much argument, he just sort of says: Well, that's not human living! *What makes human living be human living? It's that when people behave, when they act, in ways that are specifically human, they invoke logos.* What Aristotle means by *logos* is actually a big story!

*But at the very least, what Lonergan means by logos is the self-correcting cycle of intelligence! But to be human is to act in accordance with logos. But what we do is we kind of move out! We act according to the criterion that is delivered to us by our intelligences; but if it gets a little sticky or it gets a little weird, then we collapse back to the criterion of animal realism. And so self-appropriation is to make your human realism fully your own! It doesn't mean you let go of the animal realism. But it means that you don't undermine the human realism with the animal realism. That's how he sees the real problem.*

Nietzsche of course has a very different take on this! But Nietzsche does mean something very different by 'reason' than Lonergan does. So there is a sort of a sense — Nietzsche is slippery: he almost never wants to be recorded saying anything that he can't contradict some place.

[Some student laughter]

*But there is this undertow that western civilization has lost its vitality by disrespecting its animality. There is some truth to that! But it has to do with his reaction against the accounts of reason that Lonergan himself is reacting against almost at the same focal points, so to speak. But because Lonergan has a different account of reason, he's not going to think that the answer to the decadence of western civilization is to go back to appropriate your animality! He means something different.*

Human Realism: 'Thing'

A 'thing' is an intelligible, concrete unity.

The 'general notion' of the thing as the *anticipation of a certain kind of understanding.*

Rarely do we grasp a thing in the full sense: that is, as the intelligible unity of all data in their concrete individuality and totality of aspects.

Intelligible unifications of spatially and temporally distinct data.

Okay. So

**“By a thing is meant an *intelligible* concrete unity.”**

(*CWL* 3, p. 278, emphasis added).

So I’ve underlined a couple of key terms here: *intelligible*. What characterizes *Thing* is intelligibility!

**“The notion of a thing is grounded in an *insight*”**

(emphasis added) —

— which of course is how we come to consciousness of intelligibilities — that grasps — okay, but now it’s a new kind of insight, that:

**“— grasps, not relations between data, but a unity, identity, whole in data; and this unity is grasped, not by considering data from any abstractive viewpoint, but by taking them in their concrete individuality and in the totality of their aspects.”** (*CWL* 3, p. 271).

Now that’s a mouthful!! But the thing I wanted to draw your attention to is the title of the first section of Chapter Eight, [which is](#) “The General Notion of the Thing” (*CWL* 3, pp. 270-275). A ‘notion’ means that Lonergan is talking about an anticipation! So he’s not talking about — He deliberately doesn’t use the word ‘concept.’ He’s not talking about the concept of a thing. Nor is he actually talking about the intelligible content of some insight! What he’s talking about is the anticipation of understanding.

Now since we may not have a chance to talk about this later on in this period: *I think it’s the case that we very seldom, if ever, understand things in the way that Lonergan talks about. What I mean is: if by ‘thing’ we mean what we will know when we understand the unity, identity, whole, in **all the data that pertains to something**, it’s quite possible that we don’t understand it!* There are Lonergan scholars who disagree with me on this, so take it for what it’s worth! But think about what’s involved. Now I’ll give you a concrete example in a moment. ***The key thing here of course is that the data are not all given at the same time, and are subject to change.*** So when we talk about understanding the intelligibility of data that change over time, the intellectual project becomes considerably bigger.

## Human Realism: 'Thing'

**“Thus, things are conceived as extended in space, permanent in time, and yet subject to change.”**

*(CWL 3, p. 271).*

**“It embraces in a concrete unity a totality of spatially and temporally distinct data.”** *(CWL 3, p. 273).*

*So Lonergan's talking about a notion of a thing. We can talk about things by means of our anticipations of what it would be like to understand everything about what they do now. Then he goes on to say:*

**“Thus, things are conceived as extended in space, permanent in time, and yet subject to change.”** *(CWL 3, p. 271).*

**“It [a thing] embraces in a concrete unity a totality of spatially and temporally distinct data.”** *(CWL 3, p. 273).*

### Exercise: Thing or Body?

**Do the two sets of data (photographs) pertain to one thing or two; one body or two?**

- **Class Discussion.** If one makes the assumption that the caterpillar transformed into the butterfly, one *assumes* that they are the *same* in some way.
- Such assumption based in the *notion* of the thing as not spatially and temporally distinct, visual data, but as intelligible.

- Sameness is not in the sensible data, but in the grasp of intelligibility.
- Unity and sameness don't *look like* anything – this is “the startling strangeness” about reality.
- The unity identity pole is not restricted to any particular space and time; nor does it have any appearance in and of itself. The larva and butterfly are each ‘bodily’ and ‘real’ relative to those biological consciousnesses to whom they are useful (predators and mates, respectively), and not to others. It takes *that which is outside itself* as valuable (i.e., necessary to survival).

### **Thing or Body?**

Picture of a caterpillar and of a butterfly

Okay. Are these bodies or things?

Jonathan: Yes!

[Laughter — Pat smiles broadly]

Pat: That's right! [*sotto voce*]. Why?

Jonathan: Ahm, so that I mean, they meet both Lonergan's definition of *thing* and also Descartes's definition of a *body*.

Pat: ‘They’? What's — When I asked are these *bodies or things*, I was asking about: Are these data different data on *the same thing*? Are they different data on *the same body*? And are they data on *two different things*? Are they data on *two different bodies*? What is your answer on that? ... Jeff?

Jeff: Well, I'm going to just assume that like the caterpillar became that specific butterfly, and so it's —

Pat: Ah, hah!

Jeff: But then, doing that, they would both occupy different times and durations, or extensions and durations —

Pat: Exactly. Very good!

Jeff: — Different bodies, but in terms of like the unity, identity, whole, if you understood everything that was to be understood, I guess, caterpillars morphing into butterflies, it would be one thing.

Pat: That's right! Very good! Very good! So ... Now, the first thing I want to draw attention to is the fact that Jeff started: I'm going to assume that that's the caterpillar that morphed into that butterfly. *Jeff was operating with the notion of a thing*, that the thing is not identical to its spatially organized data here and now, already now! So to say that I'm assuming that that's the caterpillar that morphed into that butterfly, is to say that there is something the same; but *what's the same is not what they look like*. It's not their data. Their data are different. They are temporally distinct; at least on this slide they are also spatially distinct.

*So, what does the insect look like? The answer is it doesn't look like anything! Those are data on a unity, identity, whole, which cannot be pictured. The unity, identity, whole, is not restricted to any particular place or time. It's not even extended through space and time. It is an intelligibility which is not localizing. Its data are localizable. And therefore because of its localizable data, it can be said to have been at places and times. But the unity identity whole, precisely as what we anticipate having insight in order to comprehend, is not spatial, it's not temporal, it doesn't have any appearance. It has appearances, but in and of itself it doesn't have appearance.*

*That's what Lonergan means back when he talks about this startling strangeness.*

**For the appropriation of one's own rational self-consciousness, which has been so stressed in this introduction, is not an end in itself but rather a beginning. It is a necessary beginning, for unless one breaks the duality in one's knowing, one doubts that understanding correctly is knowing. Under the pressure of that doubt, either one will sink into the bog of a knowing that is without understanding, or else one will cling to understanding but sacrifice knowing on the altar of an immanentism, an idealism, a relativism. From the horns of that dilemma one escapes only through the discovery — and one has not made it yet if one has no clear memory of its *startling strangeness* — that there are two quite different realisms, that there is an incoherent realism, half animal and half human, that poses as a halfway house between materialism and idealism, and on the other hand that there is an intelligent and reasonable realism between which and materialism the halfway house is idealism. (CWL 3, p. 22).**

*That's what Lonergan means back when he talks about this startling strangeness.* That there might be a reality which is not picturable, which doesn't share in the reality of 'the already out there now.' Jonathan said: "Both". And he answered from the point of view of Descartes. But Lonergan of course wants to argue not the one from the point of view of Descartes, but from the point of view of biological consciousness.

Now, I think that Monarch butterflies have no natural predators. Basically, no birds eat them. That's not true of all butterflies of course. I'm not so sure about the larva. Now, from the point of view of, let's say, of a bird that is evolved to eat Monarch butterfly larva, the larva is a body. It's already out there now, so it's got the right stuff to be potentially biologically valuable. [Pat begins to mimic the conscious process of this bird]: "And by God, that's a Monarch Larva! It looks real, all right! I'm just drooling to get my chops around one of those!"

[Amused class laughter]

But the butterfly itself, not the larva but the butterfly, is not real for any insectivore that I'm aware of. So it's got the right stuff: it's already out there now, but it's not real! You can't eat it! On the other hand, this is definitely very real to a Monarch butterfly of the opposite sex; because it will mate, and that's how the race gets propagated.

So the Monarch butterfly is a body relative to certain biologically extroverted consciousnesses, and not to others. And likewise the larva. But neither butterflies of the opposite sex, nor insectivorous birds are at all concerned about the intelligible unity identity whole of this. They just want to know if they can eat it or mate with it. Okay.

Student question about the word 'concrete'; is the  
periodic table of elements a 'thing'?

– The intelligible unity of the table, as the expression  
of an abstract insight, is not a thing; but the concrete  
one hanging on the wall is a thing.

– Things can be 'characterized' by their properties  
(i.e., conjugates) or by their places in schemes of  
recurrence, etc. But these intelligible characterizations  
are not identical with the full intelligible unity of  
things.

– Not only caterpillar-butterfly things, but pets as  
unique, complicated, intelligible unities.

– A good way of thinking about our concreteness as  
individual human beings is to ask, 'What is our story?'  
Our story formulates our intelligible unity. We may  
share things in common, but the story of our whole life  
is unique.

Pat: Okay. Any questions about that? ... Jonathan?

Jonathan: Sorry. I have a question about the word ‘concrete’ in the definition. Maybe an example would help. Is the Periodic Table of the Elements a thing?

Pat: Ah, the one hanging on the wall in the Chemistry Building in Room 107 is.

Jonathan: Okay. But that intelligible unity that is the Periodic Table always, because it’s abstract, is not a thing?

Pat: That’s right!

Jonathan: Okay.

Pat: Let’s see if can find a passage here where he talks about this, very quickly here. ... So this is on page 274:

[Pat reads from *Insight*.]

**Again, all existing things are particular —**

He doesn’t tell us too much about existence there.

**— But we may think of them in general, and then we abstract from their particularity. (CWL 3, p. 274).**

He says ‘particularity’, but it would be better to say: “from their concreteness.”

**One reaches the notion of the thing by grasping a unity in individual data; but once the notion is reached, one can think and speak both of things in general and of things of determinate kinds specified by their conjugates or properties. (CWL 3, p. 274).**

So the Periodic Table is a representation of a set of insights that grasps the intelligible relations of chemical elements to one another. Molecules are things that stand in relationships, intelligible relationships, to one another in accord with the scheme that’s represented in the Periodic Table. So in and of itself, except insofar as it’s a diagram on a board, it’s not a thing, but it’s ingredient in lots and lots of things. Okay?

Jonathan: Okay.

Pat: Elizabeth?

Elizabeth: Is it concrete? Even though it's not a thing?

Pat: The Periodic Table?

Elizabeth: Uh-huh.

Pat: Not in Lonergan's sense of 'concrete'! So don't think of maybe the butterfly and the caterpillar who you probably have not spent a lot of time getting to know. But think of your favourite cat, or perhaps the squirrel, or the raccoon, or the blue jay that visits your yard on a regular basis. It's not identical with every other blue jay or cat or gold fish or turtle or raccoon.

*There are different data that are very particular to those animals. And because there are some differences in their sensible data, there are some differences in their concrete intelligibilities! That's why I said it would take probably more understanding than we are capable of in this life to completely comprehend the total unity identity whole of any very complex thing!* Their intelligibility is probably unique: you have to probably get down to the level of things like hydrogen atoms to say their intelligibility is exactly the same as that intelligibility except that they are different things.

So 'concrete' in this case means all that goes in — Each of us has a different story! A good approximation to what kind of a thing *we* are, each of us as individual human beings, as individual selves, a good approximation is: what's our story? What story have we written? What story has been written in and through us? That's a way of talking about our concrete intelligible unity that is our thing-hood.

So there is something very distinct about me, not just because I'm in this place here and now, and Mike is in that place here and now, but because I have a different intelligible unity than Mike does. We share a lot in common, because I know Mike is very intelligent and has insights all the time, and he asks great questions, and sometimes I do the same. So we share that in common! But as far as saying what's the story about all the data that is the data on us from the time we were born, to the time that we skipped stones in the creek, till the time when we burned our legs on the muffler of our motorcycle. All of those put together into a story: that's what it means to talk about a *concrete* intelligible unity. Okay?

The “Ames Chair” Exercise. Different aspects of things are presented from different perspectives. In one perspective, all three of the things “look like” a chair; but data from a different perspective on two of the sets of things do not look like chairs look from those perspectives.

### **Six Perspectives of Ames Chair.**

Right! Okay. Another experiment! This is what’s called the Ames Chair Experiment. Some of you are perhaps familiar with it. But for those of you who aren’t, it takes a little bit of getting used to. *What you see on the bottom is the same as what you see on the top, except from a different angle.* Dr Ames did this experiment, and he set up these booths. You can kind of see the booth here, on the far left [Pat uses his pointer], where people could only look through a small hole at what was inside. And he very deliberately chose certain angles for people to view these objects. They all — in the three top frames there, they all look exactly the same; and so you would say: “I’m looking at a chair!”

### **First two vertical frames of Ames Chair.**

But the view that you see in the top frame here to is identical to what you see in the bottom frame here, but from a different perspective. So in other words, this is the same thing or things, seen from two different perspectives. That’s also the case here:

### **Second two vertical frames of Ames Chair.**

This takes a little bit — This sometimes can be disorienting! *This is what the lower assembly of objects looks like from one very unique, particular, well-chosen point of view.* You can see the different parts if you look at them from the right angle, which is sort of at this angle. [Pat demonstrates with an upward arm gesture of some 100-110 degrees]. They all fall into that visual alignment. But the difficulty is when you change the perspective —

### **First two vertical frames of Ames Chair again.**

— you don't get what you expect to see from that different perspective, if it really were a chair.

**Second two vertical frames of Ames Chair again.**

So this looks like a thing, but in fact it's things!

**Third two vertical frames of Ames Chair.**

And this one is likewise, if you look at it from — Remember when we were talking, a couple of weeks ago, about the transformations of objects, and how people will say “It's a circle!” even though what it looks to them like is an oval! *What's going on there is an intellectual organization of the appearances into a unity, identity. whole! We didn't have that language then, but that in fact is what's going on!* And what we're seeing here is the tendency for us to think whenever we see something that looks this, will always look like this from a different angle. But guess what?

**First two vertical frames of Ames Chair again.**

Guess what? It doesn't!!

**Six Perspectives of Ames Chair again.**

So what we tend to do then is to encounter what Lonergan calls “**the disconcerting problems**” (*CWL* 3, p. 276) that arise from this notion of a ‘thing’.

**Disconcerting problems can arise from the reality of things as intelligible rather than as ‘already out there now’.**

**The Dialectic of Knowing and Reality: the two principles of biological patterning vs. the**

unrestricted desire to know pull in different directions.

The paradox of things being permanent in time, yet subject to change.

Change is not a ‘newly observed datum’; it is different sensible data while the intelligible unity remains the same.

This is what Lonergan will mean by “the notion of change” in Chapter 10.

### **Dialectic of Knowing & Reality**

“... and indeed the reality, of things themselves give rise to disconcerting problems.” (CWL 3, p. 276).

“Our present point is that, besides knowing in that rather complex sense, there is also ‘knowing’ in the elementary sense in which kittens know the ‘reality’ of milk.” (CWL 3, p. 277).

We tend to encounter what Lonergan calls “**the disconcerting problems**” (CWL 3, p. 276) that arise from this notion of a ‘thing’. And as I said, this is what Lonergan calls a **dialectic**. A dialectic for him is *what arises* when we have two principles that are operating together and have a tendency to pull in different directions. And the result — if you don’t get a certain kind of clarification and reintegration — the result is simply a series of conflicts.

He says it gives rise to a — *The reality of things gives rise to a set of disconcerting problems!* And *besides our knowing in this complex sense, which we’re working on*

*appropriating in this course, there is also a kind of “quote-unquote” knowing in a more elementary sense which animals have when they know the reality of milk.*

**“Our present point is that, besides knowing in that rather complex sense, there is also ‘knowing’ in the elementary sense in which kittens know the ‘reality’ of milk.” (CWL 3, p. 277).**

And this knowing in a more elementary sense which animals have when they know the reality of milk we have if we’re in the biological pattern of experience.

### **Dialectic of Knowing & Reality**

**“... and indeed the reality, of things themselves give rise to disconcerting problems.” (CWL 3, p. 276).**

**“... permanent in time, and yet subject to change.” (CWL 3, p. 271).**

**“For a change is not just a newly observed datum.” (CWL 3, p. 272).**

**“If there is change, there has to be a concrete unity of concrete data extending over some interval of time, there has to be some difference between the data at the beginning and at the end of the interval, and this difference can be only partial, for otherwise there would occur not a change but an annihilation and a new creation.” (CWL 3, p. 272).**

And as I said, *one of the problems that arises is the disconcerting problem of things being permanent in time yet subject to change! How can something be permanent in time and yet subject to change? If it's permanent in time, then it doesn't change! And if it changes, then*

*it's not permanent in time! This is a chestnut that runs through the history of philosophy from the time of Heraclitus to the present.*

Now Lonergan's answer to this — and I don't mean it to be a simple answer, because it's a complicated answer, and it requires more than that. But he doesn't — *It seems to me a basic clarification about this: that the change is not simply a newly observed experience, sense experience, “a newly observed datum.” (CWL 3, p. 272). If there is change, there has to be some kind of unity with different data at different times. So there's kind of a simple answer that what is the same is the intelligible unity, and what is different is the data of the different times. But they're all data on one and the same intelligible unity! Are you getting a little disconcerted by that notion of a thing here?*

[Broad smile].

**“If there is change, there has to be a concrete unity of concrete data extending over some interval of time, there has to be some difference between the data at the beginning and at the end of the interval, and this difference can be only partial, for otherwise there would occur not a change but an annihilation and a new creation.” (CWL 3, p. 272).**

It wasn't a problem when we were talking about the butterfly; because Jeff very spontaneously said: “Well if that's the same ...” And what he was saying was: “If there is an intelligibility to be grasped in the different appearances at different times, then it's one and the same creature, even though it looks different at different times!” But when we get to stepping away from the concrete instances that our common sense is prepared to deal with and we start thinking in these more philosophical terms, it gets to be a little puzzling!

*But for Lonergan, the confusion is the confusion of taking as real what's here and now, which is not changing, versus the intelligibility which is neither here, nor now, nor there, nor then, but all the above, because it's not sensible but intelligible! So if there's change, there has to be a concrete unity of concrete data, over some interval of time; otherwise, what you would have is just annihilation and a new creation!*

### **Dialectic of Knowing & Reality**

**“For a change is not just a newly observed datum.” (CWL 3, p. 272).**

**“If there is change, there has to be a concrete unity of concrete data extending over some interval of time, there has to be some difference between the data at the beginning and at the end of the interval, and this difference can be only partial, for otherwise there would occur not a change but an annihilation and a new creation.” (CWL 3, p. 272).**

Now remember this when you read about the fellow who comes home and finds his apartment, [his house](#), dishevelled, in Chapter Ten (CWL 3, “Reflective Understanding”, pp. 304-340, at p. 306-308), [in your reading](#) for next week! *When Lonergan talks about the notion of “knowing change,” he’s going to presuppose that we have grappled to some extent with the fact that to be a thing is to be subject to change as sensible and yet permanent in time as intelligible!*

Among the disconcerting problems that arise from the confusion of the two notions of reality:

Are atoms real? Mach argued they were only conveniences for calculating connections among the data on chemical reactions.

According to animal consciousness, they are not 'present' and thus are not real.

What about magnetism, evolution? What about love, friendship, and human identity? God?

Animal realism reduces the scope of the universe, human realism expands it.

Animal reality is a much-shrunken whole, compared to the whole of human knowing.

### **Human Realism: 'Thing'**

**"indeed the reality, of things themselves give rise to disconcerting problems." (CWL 3, p. 276).**

**Are atoms real?**

**Is magnetism real?**

**Is evolution real?**

**Is love real?**

**Is human identity real?**

**Is God real?**

*Among the disconcerting things that arise from the notion of reality as being about the intelligibility rather than about the already out there now, are things like this [referring to current slide]: Are atoms real? Well, it turns out initially people didn't think atoms were real; they thought that they were conventional devices for doing chemical calculations. Two of the very famous scientists at the turn of the century, Ernst Mach<sup>16</sup> — for whom “Mach One” and “Mach Three” were named after because he did this important work in Aerodynamics — did not believe in the reality of atoms. In effect when John Dalton<sup>17</sup> introduced the atomic hypothesis, there weren't any pictures of them; people drew diagrams of them, but they were just little diagrams on a piece of paper; and Mach was a smart guy and he knew that; he knew that nobody had ever seen an atom; and so he didn't think they were real. The other outstanding scientist who denied the reality of atoms was a man by the name of Ostwald<sup>18</sup> who was a very famous chemist.*

When Einstein published his paper on Brownian motion, he made an argument from which he was able to calculate the size of the molecules in the substance, the sap, that he was using for observing what's called Brownian motion; he was able to calculate the size of the

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<sup>16</sup> **Ernst Mach** was born in Moravia. Despite his Catholic background, he later became an atheist and his theory and life is compared with Buddhism. Mach also became well known for his philosophy developed in close interplay with his science. Mach defended a type of phenomenism recognizing only sensations as real. This position seemed incompatible with the view of atoms and molecules as external, mind-independent things. He famously declared, after an 1897 lecture by Ludwig Boltzmann at the Imperial Academy of Science in Vienna: "I don't believe that atoms exist!" From about 1908 to 1911 Mach's reluctance to acknowledge the reality of atoms was criticized by Max Planck as being incompatible with physics.

<sup>17</sup> John Dalton (1766–1844) was an English chemist, physicist, and meteorologist. He is best known for his pioneering work in the development of modern atomic theory; and for his research into colour blindness, sometimes referred to as Daltonism, in his honour.

<sup>18</sup> Wilhelm Ostwald (1853–1932) was a Russian-German chemist. He received the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1909 for his work on catalysis, chemical equilibria and reaction velocities. Ostwald, along with two others, is usually credited with being the modern founders of the field of physical chemistry. The word ‘mole’, according to Gorin, was introduced into chemistry around 1900 by Ostwald. Ironically, Ostwald's development of the mole concept was directly related to his philosophical opposition to the atomic theory, against which he (along with Ernst Mach) was one of the last holdouts. He explained in a conversation with Arnold Sommerfeld that he was converted by Jean Perrin's experiments on Brownian Motion.

molecules that were in the sap.<sup>19</sup> And Ostwald immediately converted to atomism. It was like Paul on the road to Tarsus.

[Some amusement in class]

Oh, that's not the place: it was Paul on the road to Damascus! Paul was from Tarsus. So Ostwald immediately became an atomist. Mach to his dying day refused to believe in the reality of atoms. Why? Because they weren't already out there now. You couldn't see them! They were just interesting intellectual devices!

And so this is part of what Lonergan means by the kinds of “disconcerting problems” that the notion of the thing as real gives rise to. *Intelligibility just doesn't seem real: you can't touch it, you can't taste it, you can't see it! And how can it be real? Show me! Show me this thing that you're talking about! That's where the real — That's a demand from the point of view of the biological pattern of experience for its kind of reality over and above the human realism.*

Is magnetism real? Why wouldn't magnetism be real? Or, excuse me: why would that be a problem? You can see what the magnet does, but you can't see the magnetic field; all you can see is its effects!

Is evolution real? *Just so you all know, it's real! Some kind of evolution is real!!*

[Some class amusement]

But the big problem, and one of the reasons why people can have very strongly held opinions about evolution as not being real is because you can't see it happening! It doesn't happen in the here and now. It's something you can only understand! And understanding it correctly is not an easy thing to do! But you certainly can't see it happening!

Is love real? Show me the love!

[Pat shares in class amusement]

It's not already out there now! Is friendship real? Is human identity real? Or do we just remake ourselves every day as Madonna did!

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<sup>19</sup> Einstein's 1905 demonstration that the statistical fluctuations of atoms allowed measurement of their existence without direct individuated sensory evidence marked a turning point in the acceptance of atomic theory.

[Class amusement]

We just reinvent ourselves **at will**.

And there are some very, very, influential philosophers, that stem from David Hume, where the problem of human identity is a real problem precisely because you can't nail down human identity as something that's present! And therefore it's not real! They are part of the

major contemporary thinkers who hold for the non-existence, the non-reality, of human identity!

Is God real? God's not already out there now; or in here now!

*So there are a number of things from the realm of science, to the realm of human relations, to the realm of theological issues, where the getting through the basic front-door of the 'already out there now' is not satisfied. And so these are all discounted as unreal! The universe becomes smaller and smaller and smaller the more tenaciously you hold on to animal realism. And it becomes grander and grander and more full, the more you appropriate the human form of realism that's rooted in human self-understanding and discernment!*

That's why I said, back at the beginning of the class, that *for Lonergan, philosophy has to do with the question of the whole! His argument here is that you have a bigger reality that you dwell in if your realism is a human realism; and a much shrunken reality if you dwell in materialism as an animal, extroverted or out there now realism.*

**Exercise: Sketching Gasson Hall.**

**Note that people normally sketch the building from a ground view.**

**We characterize things in terms of *some* of their data, by some privileged profile.**

**When we "recognize" someone or something, this signals an insight, a grasp of intelligibility.**

We tend to substitute this profile for the wholeness and reality of the thing.

Yet the reality of people and things is not reducible to presence, to any profile, let alone to the 'already out there now' data on a thing.

**Exercise:**  
**Draw a sketch of Gasson Hall**

Okay! Sketch Gasson!! ....

[Great rustling of papers as class sets about the assigned task]

Okay, in the interests of time, I'll ask you to finish your sketches after the class is over!

[Some class laughter]

**Frontal view of Gasson Hall**

Pat: How many of you did your sketch something like that? ... [Pat with a broad smile:] Everybody should apologize for how bad an artist they are, and all that kind of stuff!

Student: Where is that viewpoint? Is that from the Library?

Some voices: Yeah. Yeah.

One student: Yeah, it's from the library, I think.

Pat: Yeah. Unfortunately, I could not find one that had Gasson Hall with the upper level redone! That's one that most of you probably did.

**Aerial photograph of Gasson Hall**

Pat: How many of you sketched it to look like that? ...

Student: Yeah.

Pat: Did you?

Student: Really. Like, I couldn't remember what it looked like, so I —

[Huge class laughter]

Pat: My point in doing this was that most people, I know, are going to — As a matter of fact, nearly everybody, sketches it from one of the ground views! And this is a —this is a bit scary; you can get these things, you can see cars there. You can actually do a little better than this just on publicly accessible GPS where you can see people standing next to their cars. It's scary to know that the ones that the military intelligence is using that they don't release. They can kind of see you [some unclear words].

[Continuing class laughter]

### **'Things' as Characterized**

**“all existing things are particular, but we may think of them in general, and then we abstract from their particularity. ... [but] one can think and speak both of things *in general* and of things of determinate kinds *specified* by their conjugates or properties.”** (CWL 3, p. 274, emphases added).

**“you have seen a sufficient number of profiles in order to be able to *recognize* it.”** (CWL 10, *Topics in Education*, 84, emphasis added).

But anyway, *my point in doing this exercise is that what we tend to do is to characterize things in terms of some of their data!* We characterize things by some profile, some privileged perspective, that we have about them. And that bleeds into this half-animal half-human realism that Lonergan talks about. Because the data that we tend to use to help us to recognize — and the word ‘recognize’ in this case means having an insight — *When we recognize someone or something that we see here and now as the same as what we had some memories about from the past; so we've got two sets of data, the data we remember and the data that are present here and now, already out there now; what we tend to do is to associate the intelligible unity identity wholeness with the privileged profile that is already out there now.*

We tend to say “I see you,” but we don’t see the person. What we see is some data on the person, just as we saw some data on the butterfly and the caterpillar. Those are indeed data on the person; they are profiles or characteristics of the person. They are not the person! I can’t see Bert, and Bert can’t see me; but we can understand each other, to some extent. *What there is about me that’s worth knowing, what there is about me that’s real, is not reducible to anything already out there now! There is more to reality than the already out there now!*

Now what Lonergan is going to argue is that in Philosophy, in Theology, in Human Science, there is a persistence to privilege some profile on the criterion of presence, of already out there now, and to regard as unreal whatever does not conform to that! And that this is distortion that works its way, in all kinds of insidious ways, into human thought and human culture and human science, and so on.

Okay. We’re going to have to stop there for today. And next week we’ll finish up with Chapters nine and ten, and we’ll have the final exams for me, at the beginning of class. They are due at the beginning of class, not at seven o’clock, at the beginning of class, okay?

All right! So have a good week; and good luck with your work on papers and exams and stuff!