Summary of Material

The themes of these chapters and article establish Lonergan as a thinker of the first magnitude.

“Self and Identity”: Overview.

Usually speak of identity in terms of membership in one or another human grouping: gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, economic class, religion, etc.

Foundational identity involves being a knower, chooser, and lover.

Basic, self-appropriated, transcultural identity is the standard for critiquing the other identities (ethnic, cultural, religious, etc.)

How Lonergan’s sense of identity as “unity or whole” differs from contemporary use of the term identity.

By identity, Lonergan means intelligible unity; in contemporary usage identity is about value.
Chapter 11, §5: Meaning of identity in self-appropriation goes beyond the meaning in self-affirmation — adding the affirmation of the value of the activities of knowing and choosing to the affirmation of their facticity.

All affirmation of identity entails alignment with groups and with the value of being a member of that group.

Knowing, choosing, and loving also makes us parts of a community — namely, the community of being and the community of human history, of the human race.

Self-appropriation is the standard by which we can discern the pros and cons of other identities.

Chapter 11, §6: Identity as Knower.

“Why is Doing That Knowing?”

Why does knowing result from the performance of certain immanent activities?

What does “immanent” mean here? Opposite of “transcendent.”

• Lonergan’s 3 questions:
  – What am I doing when I am knowing?
  – Why is doing that knowing?
  – What do I know when I do that?
Chapter 11, §§ 7, 8, 9

Knowing-as-Looking vs. Knowing as Self-Transcendence.

The problem of immanence vs. transcendence.

One way of thinking about the problem is how to get from the inside of consciousness outside to the real world.

Naïve realism thinks knowing is a single act that gives immediate access to reality.

The idealist critiques the naïve realists’ account of knowing as immediate contact, but still retains their account of reality, and thus concludes that human knowing knows only appearances, not reality.

Immanence and the “bridge problem”: If ‘reality is out there’ and ‘consciousness is in here,’ then they cannot connect.

“The Notion of Knowing.”

Lonergan’s second question, then, is actually the question about immanence and transcendence.

How does this problem relate to Lonergan’s distinction between ‘body’ and ‘thing’?
How the sense of an ‘in here’ versus an ‘out there’ arises:

— from the biologically extroverted consciousness.

— from comparing knowing to the bodily-oriented sense of looking.

Introspection is seen as ‘taking a look’ inside oneself rather than outside at the world.

The problem of bridging inside and outside results.

But if we call into question the assumption that knowing must be a single activity modelled on looking, then we have a new point of departure: What, then, is knowing, really?

Or, once again, why should the activities appropriated in the first half of *Insight* yield knowledge?

A confusion about the distinction between internal & external experience:

External = sensory experiences, *vs.* internal = experience, consciousness of one’s own activities.

The boundary of the skin as dividing most primordial notion of external/internal experience.

The resulting significance of touch and of the skin, both biologically and culturally.
But in Lonergan’s sense, ‘external’ is not outside the skin, but sense experiences in general.

Experiences of body’s muscles and organs are ‘external’ despite being ‘inside your skin’.

Lonergan’s senses of internal and external are metaphorical; acts of consciousness are not literally inside one’s skin.

Internal experiences are of one’s own conscious or intentional acts. They do not involve the presence of another object; one doesn’t look at oneself as an object.

Present, not by being attended to, but by attending; being present to ourselves in and during our experiential, intelligent, and rational activities.

We are not present in the bio-chemical activities our bodies perform, but we are present in — have internal experience of — our conscious ones.

Student question about consciousness as not ‘taking a look back’ at the dynamism, but … how else to state what consciousness is?

— Meaning of Lonergan’s use of the opposition of non-English terms:

\[ \text{noêma vs. noësis;} \]
\[ \text{intentio intenta vs. intentio intendens;} \]
\[ \text{pensée pensée vs. pensée pensante} \]
— Discussion of thought, not as object, but as activity; ‘thought-thinked vs. thought-thinking.’

— Internal experience has to do with the activities, not their objects.

— Remarkable fact that there are occurrences in the world which are accompanied by and constituted by self-presence.

— Lonergan emphasizes the dynamism and openness of thinking. Discussion of human patterning experience versus biological patterning.

Lonergan would prefer “differentiate” where other 20th century philosophers would use “deconstruct” or “destroy” in relation to object-centered, knowing-as-looking centered philosophies.

Student question: Is knowing anything more than an internal experience?

— Discussion of why question should be phrased differently.
Question about animal knowledge; same structure but confined to biological pattern?

— Various kinds of animal knowing are the subject matter for animal biologists;

— Lonergan lumps many different kinds of animal under the general heading of “biological pattern of experience”;

— In general animal knowing is the use of sensations of vibrations to detect entities located in the outer world.

— Animal knowing probably does not have the three-levelled structure, but this is disputed.

— Animal knowing is different from dramatic, religious, philosophical, patterning of animal knowing.

Is the goal to become present in the performance of your activities?

— You are already present to your activities.

Discussion of above question:
The exercises done in this class so far have been aimed at awakening our awareness to the experience of insight we’ve always had.

Aimed at re-duplicating the structure — heightening the experiencing of our conscious activities on all three levels; understanding that experiencing; critically assessing, correcting, and judging our understanding of that experiencing.

Habermas and the end of philosophy of consciousness; there is no self-presence that is unmediated by language.

How language and insights into one’s experiences heighten experiences already being experienced.

Our intelligence always mediates our experience of what is given.

The aim is not to become conscious of our activities, but to better understand our consciousness, our experiencing, of those activities.
Insight and Beyond

Class 16, Part One: January 27th 2010

“Why is Doing that Knowing?”

(Insight, Chapter 12: “The Notion of Being”
and
Chapter 13: “The Notion of Objectivity”
and
“Cognitional Structure”)

The themes of these chapters and article establish Lonergan as a thinker of the first magnitude.

“Self and Identity”: Overview.

Usually speak of identity in terms of membership in one or another human grouping: gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, economic class, religion, etc.

Foundational identity involves being a knower, chooser, and lover.

Basic, self-appropriated, transcultural identity is the standard for critiquing the other identities (ethnic, cultural, religious, etc.)

How Lonergan’s sense of identity as “unity or whole” differs from contemporary use of the term identity.

By identity, Lonergan means intelligible unity; in contemporary usage identity is about value.
Welcome to the second session, the second class of *Insight and Beyond* for this second semester. Today we’re going to talk about chapter twelve, “The Notion of Being”, and chapter thirteen, “The Notion of Objectivity”, and what I somewhat facetiously called the “Cliff Notes” in Lonergan’s article “Cognitional Structure”.

*In a very important way, I think this is the heart of the great achievement of Lonergan as a thinker. These two chapters establish him, I think, as a thinker of the first magnitude.*

And so we need to take some time to see what he’s up to, and why he thought of himself as having something special to offer to contemporary philosophy; why, as we’ll see later on in the semester, why those accomplishments were important to the task that he set himself of bringing about a major development in Theology; why his accounts of Being and Objectivity are important for the tasks of religious thinking as well as what you might call extra-religious philosophical thinking.

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**Self and Identity**

“Who am I, really and truly?

Each of us has many different identities …

As well as these more personal and social identities, each of us shares with every other person a human identity that is our most comprehensive and foundational one.

To discover and appropriate this human identity has been the goal of a philosophical quest in Western history …”

*(Joseph Flanagan, *The Quest for Self-Knowledge*, p. 3).*
And to situate that I want to recall this remark that I read from Father Flanagan’s book last week [Joseph Flanagan, _The Quest for Self-Knowledge_, p. 3], where Father Flanagan makes the point about the fact that when we ask about identity, we frequently answer in terms of our identity as a member of something, as a member of a family, as a member of a class, as a member of a gender, as a member of a race or an ethnicity, as a member of a nation or a member of a culture. So we have, as he says, many identities.

> “Who am I, really and truly? Each of us has many different identities: we identify ourselves by our family name for example, and we have cultural and ethnic identities, as we recognise ourselves as Japanese, or French-Canadian, or German-American, and so forth. _As well as these more personal and social identities, each of us shares with every other person a human identity that is our most comprehensive and foundational one._ To discover and appropriate this human identity has been the goal of a philosophical quest in Western history since philosophy’s early beginnings among the Greek scholars.”

And then he makes the strong assertion that we all have a basic human identity, a foundational human identity. And to continue on from what he said last time, from what I quoted him as saying last time — I just want to follow up on that:

> “Our foundational identity is that of a concrete, contingent knower, chooser, lover. Our present, actual cultural identity may be in tune or out of tune with our own basic transcendent identity.”

_(Joseph Flanagan, _The Quest for Self-Knowledge_, p. 12)._

Self-appropriation provides “a transcultural, normative foundation for critically evaluating his or her present cultural identity.”

_(Joseph Flanagan, _The Quest for Self-Knowledge_, p. 10)._

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1 Joseph Flanagan, _The Quest for Self-Knowledge_, p. 3, emphasis added.
Self and Identity

“Our foundational identity is that of a concrete, contingent knower, chooser, lover. Our present, actual cultural identity may be in tune or out of tune with our own basic transcendent identity.”

(Joseph Flanagan, The Quest for Self-Knowledge, p. 12).

Self-appropriation provides “a transcultural, normative foundation for critically evaluating his or her present cultural identity.”

(Joseph Flanagan, The Quest for Self-Knowledge, p. 10).

So Father Flanagan makes the strong claim that the foundational identity is our identity of a concrete contingent knower, chooser, lover. And that our actual present cultural identity, and personal identity, our ethnic identities, our gender identities, our sexual orientation identities, that those are identities that may be coherent with, that may be in conformity with, and harmonious with, our basic identity, or not; and that our basic identity provides a standard by which we can criticise those other identities, provides a standard by which we can criticise our cultural identities as authentic or inauthentic, our family identities, our political identities, our religious identities as authentic or inauthentic; or what is more likely the case as we’ll begin to see next week, whether there is some mixture of authentic and inauthentic identities. And that self-appropriation provides us with a transcultural normative foundation for evaluating our present cultural, personal, and other identities, the other ways in which we identify ourselves by saying what group we belong to.
Now, as an aside, one thing that is not explicit in anything that we have done so far but that we will come back to later on in the semester, is that the word ‘identity’ carries more with it than what we talked about last week. Lonergan’s invitation to self-affirmation, to affirm yourself as a unity-identity-whole characterized in this — what father Flanagan is calling this foundational way, this basic human way; that when Lonergan uses that phrase ‘the unity-identity-whole’, he is referring very specifically to what he talked about back in chapter eight [“Things” (CWL 3, pp. 270-295)] about the intelligible unity. And that is an important contribution to the discussion.

But it’s not the way that we ordinarily use the word ‘identity’, at least not in contemporary discussions. When we use the word ‘identity’ in contemporary discussions, it has the implication of value. *When we say that my identity is with my ethnicity or my race or my gender, always what’s behind that kind of conversation is our histories of devaluation and denigration of people who belong to that group.* So the strong positive affirmation that came late in the Civil Rights Movement in the sixties, particularly from Malcolm X,² but no less so from Martin Luther King Junior³ — it’s just that he wasn’t as known for it — was the affirmation of “black as beautiful”, the affirmation of the value of being a member of a race that had been discriminated against and told in many explicit and many implicit ways that there was no value to being that kind of identity. Likewise, somewhat later, in the second

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² Malcolm X (1925–1965), born Malcolm Little, was an American Muslim minister and a human rights activist. To his admirers he was a courageous advocate for the rights of blacks, a man who indicted white America in the harshest terms for its crimes against black Americans; detractors accused him of preaching racism and violence. He has been called one of the greatest and most influential African Americans in history.

³ Martin Luther King, Jr. (1929–1968) was an American Baptist minister, activist, humanitarian, and leader in the African-American Civil Rights Movement. He is best known for his role in the advancement of civil rights using nonviolent civil disobedience based on his Christian beliefs. King became a civil rights activist early in his career. He led the 1955 Montgomery Bus Boycott and helped found the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in 1957, serving as its first president. With the SCLC, King led an unsuccessful 1962 struggle against segregation in Albany, Georgia (the Albany Movement), and helped organize the 1963 nonviolent protests in Birmingham, Alabama. King also helped to organize the 1963 March on Washington, where he delivered his famous "I Have a Dream" speech. There, he established his reputation as one of the greatest orators in American history.
wave of feminism,\(^4\) women began to assert that their identity as women is a good thing to be; it’s good to have that identity, over against history, second-class treatment, and degradation, sometimes more subtle and sometimes not so. And likewise, we are of course now in arrow land,\(^5\) sexual orientation. People are beginning to affirm their sexual orientations as identities meaning their strength; they’re affirming the value of being, of having a certain sexual orientation over against a history of devaluing, particularly of homosexual sexual orientations.

So when we use the word ‘identity’ now, we are using it in a slightly different way than Lonergan is using it when he says “By a self I mean a unity-identity-whole characterized by such and such acts.”

Chapter 11, §5: Meaning of identity in self-appropriation goes beyond the meaning in self-affirmation — adding the affirmation of the value of the activities of knowing and choosing to the affirmation of their facticity.

\(^4\) Second-wave feminism is a period of feminist activity that first began in the early 1960s in the United States, and eventually spread throughout the Western world and beyond. In the United States the movement lasted through the early 1980s. It later became a worldwide movement that was strong in Europe and parts of Asia, such as Turkey and Israel, where it began in the 1980s, and it began at other times in other countries. Whereas first-wave feminism focused mainly on suffrage and overturning legal obstacles to gender equality (i.e., voting rights, property rights), second-wave feminism broadened the debate to a wide range of issues: sexuality, family, the workplace, reproductive rights, de facto inequalities, and official legal inequalities. At a time when mainstream women were making job gains in the professions, the military, the media, and sports in large part because of second-wave feminist advocacy, second-wave feminism also drew attention to domestic violence and marital rape issues, establishment of rape crisis and battered women’s shelters, and changes in custody and divorce law. Its major effort was the attempted passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the United States Constitution, in which they were defeated by anti-feminists led by Phyllis Schlafly, who argued as an anti-ERA view that the ERA meant women would be drafted into the military. Many historians view the second-wave feminist era in America as ending in the early 1980s with the intra-feminism disputes of the feminist sex wars over issues such as sexuality and pornography, which ushered in the era of third-wave feminism in the early 1990s.

\(^5\) This expression, its reference and its meaning are uncertain to this transcriber.
As we will see towards the end of the semester, there is a meaning of identity in self-appropriation that is parallel to and goes beyond the meaning of identity in self-affirmation. So if self-affirmation is an affirming of ourselves as a ‘concrete-intelligible-unity-whole’, self-appropriation is going to be an affirming of ourselves characterized as performing those activities as profoundly valuable. So that’s jumping ahead: that’s just telling you where we’re going, and how this relates to Father Flanagan’s strong statement here about our basic identity as knowers, choosers and lovers. What we’ve been focusing on up to now of course has been our intelligible unity characterized by the activities that Lonergan calls ‘knowing’. The choosing and the loving are going to be under discussion later on in the semester.

All affirmation of identity entails alignment with groups and with the value of being a member of that group.

Knowing, choosing, and loving also makes us parts of a community — namely, the community of being and the community of human history, of the human race.

Self-appropriation is the standard by which we can discern the pros and cons of other identities.

One other observation, again something we can come back to: Just as affirming one’s identity in the sense of affirming the value — affirming identity as value — just as affirming one’s identity as a member of a race, or an ethnicity, or a nationality, or for that matter of a university over against other universities, that university identity peaks particularly in the sports arena — whenever you’re affirming an identity, you’re saying that it is a good thing to be, to have that identity! You are also placing yourself in a group, you’re identifying with others in that group, and saying that to be part of that group is a good thing. Now what’s implicit in Father Flanagan’s remarks here is that to affirm yourself as a knower and a chooser and a lover is to also place yourself in something, and by doing so, in the fullest sense of self-appropriation, to affirm the value of being part of that something.

And we get a taste of that something today, although not in the most obvious way: we’re going to make the association, or the connection, that I’ve just suggested: by being a knower and a chooser and a lover you make yourself be a part of the community of being,
and that it’s a good thing to be a part of the community of being. And you make yourself be a part of the community of the human race. You make yourself be a part of human history by your knowing and your choosing and your loving. And by affirming the value of being a knower and a chooser and a lover, you implicitly affirm the value of human history.

And as we’ll see by being a lover, and by affirming the value of being a lover, you implicitly affirm yourself as being part of a community that’s grander than the community of the natural and human historical worlds. So that’s a glimpse of what’s ahead.

But what Father Flanagan is saying here, as a commentator on Lonergan’s work and a developer of Lonergan’s work, is that self-appropriation gives us a standard by means of which we can be critical of the positives and the negatives in the other identities, the other partial identities, the other lesser than the totality of being, the totality of human history identities, that are also quite valuable to us. Okay?

**Self and Identity**

“Our foundational identity is that of a concrete, contingent knower, chooser, lover. Our present, actual cultural identity may be in tune or out of tune with our own basic transcendent identity.”


Self-appropriation provides “a transcultural, normative foundation for critically evaluating his or her present cultural identity.”

(Joseph Flanagan, *The Quest for Self-Knowledge*, p. 10).

Chapter 11, §6: Identity as Knower.

“Why is Doing That Knowing?”

Why does knowing result from the performance of certain immanent activities?
What does “immanent” mean here? Opposite of “transcendent.”

Lonergan’s 3 questions:
— What am I doing when I am knowing?
— Why is doing that knowing?
— What do I know when I do that?

So Father Flanagan’s remark that our basic identity is as knowers and choosers and lovers — we’re going to leave the choosing and loving to later on.

Identity as Knower

“By ‘self-affirmation of the knower’ is meant that the self as affirmed is characterized by such occurrences as sensing, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned, and affirming.” (CWL 3, p. 343).

“It is not that an individual performing the listed acts really does know, but merely that I perform them and that by ‘knowing’ I mean no more than such performance.” (CWL 3, p. 343).

What we saw last week was that Lonergan is going to say what he means by a knower.

“By ‘self-affirmation as a knower’ is meant that the self as affirmed is characterized by such occurrences
as sensing, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned and affirming. (CWL 3, p. 343).

What’s left off there, of course, is the activities that have to do with our identities as choosers, our identities as lovers. But for the moment, what it means to be a knower is to perform those activities. And he says that by knowing, I mean no more than the performance of such activities.

“It is not that an individual performing the listed acts really does know, but merely that I perform them and that by ‘knowing’ I mean no more than such performance.” (CWL 3, p. 343).

And in the email to you folks — I hope everybody got it since I was — I didn’t know that there were going to be some additional people in the class today — but in the email to you folks, among the things I asked you to think about in preparation for today’s classes is that remark that Lonergan makes in the article, “Cognitional Structure.”

“At this point one may ask why knowing should result from the performance of such immanent activities as experiencing, understanding and judging.” (CWL 4, Collection, “Cognitional Structure,” p. 211).

Now, what does he mean by immanent activities? Why is the word ‘immanent’ there? … What’s the counterpoint to ‘immanent’? Immanence and what?
Students: Transcendence.

Pat: Okay. So, immanent and transcendent. What does he mean by ‘immanent’? … Okay. So we’re going to explore that!

When he raises that question, why knowing should result from the performance of such activities, that’s an early version of something he does later on. We’ll see it in Method in Theology and we’ll see it in some of his other writings. Periodically he would say that his philosophy — at least his philosophy that had to do with cognition — consisted in three questions, trying to answer three questions:

— What am I doing when I am knowing?
— Why is doing that knowing? and
— What do I know when I do that?

(Method in Theology, p. 25; cf. also A Second Collection, “Philosophy and Theology", p. 203).

Lonergan’s 3 Questions

What am I doing when I am knowing?
Why is doing that knowing?
What do I know when I do that?

(Method in Theology, p. 25; A Second Collection, “Philosophy and Theology", p. 203).

The first half of the book (CWL 3, Part One: Insight as Activity, pp. 25-340) at least presents itself as exercises in answering the question: What am I doing? What activities am I performing? We explored that in a number of ways; and there were exercises where you became familiar with the different activities, activities that Lonergan thought, and I think, people generally don’t have any awareness of. As you start to talk about them, people start to become more aware of them, start to understand what Lonergan means by an insight and
what he doesn’t mean by an insight, start especially to become aware of the normal\(^6\) activity of inquiring, and of the inquiring that goes on beyond having insights. And so on!

So the first half of the book presents itself as a set of exercises, as he says, in coming to answer the first question. I spent some time last semester saying why I think that there is a good deal more than that going on in that first half\(^7\): particularly why he begins with science and mathematics, what he’s up to there. But at least a good deal of the attention of Part One is making people familiar with the activities of those three levels of consciousness.

What we’re doing in this period, with embarking upon chapter twelve “The Notion of Being” and chapter thirteen “The Notion of Objectivity” and the chapters beyond, is exploring how he answers the question: Why is doing that knowing? Why should the performance of such immanent activities result in knowing? And What do I know when I do that? is what he is going to develop in the chapters on metaphysics, although there’s already part of an answer in what we’re going to look at today.

Chapter 11, §§ 7, 8, 9

Knowing-as-Looking vs. Knowing as Self-Transcendence.

The problem of immanence vs. transcendence.

One way of thinking about the problem is how to get from the inside of consciousness outside to the real world.

Naïve realism thinks knowing is a single act that gives immediate access to reality.

The idealist critiques the naïve realists’ account of knowing as immediate contact, but still retains their

\(^6\) Pat may, or may not, have used the adjective ‘normative’ at this point.

\(^7\) Pat uses the term ‘chapter’ here.
account of reality, and thus concludes that human knowing knows only appearances, not reality.

Immanence and the “bridge problem”: If ‘reality is out there’ and ‘consciousness is in here,’ then they cannot connect.

Knowing-as-Looking vs. Self-Transcendence
Philip McShane

Well, this is an illustration that I got from Professor Philip McShane, whose a long-time Lonergan scholar. I went looking for the source: he’s written quite a number of books, and in looking for the source, I thought I knew where it was, but it wasn’t there; but it’s in one of his books.

Immanence versus Transcendence; it’s a theme that comes up in the article “Cognitional Structure” in several ways; it’s a theme that comes up in the chapters that we’ve read from Insight, implicitly, in several ways. But one way of thinking about the Immanence-Transcendence is: if knowing is taking a look! Now in the article “Cognitional Structure”, as you know, Lonergan’s complaint is that most philosophers — and the ones that he spends some time talking about are the quote-unquote “naïve realists” and the quote-unquote “idealists”, sometimes called “critical idealists”. And then there’s the “relativist” and the “positivist” and the “empiricist”, who get a little bit of print. But really he’s concerned about the “naïve realist” and the “idealist”. And then coming in on the white horse is the “critical realist”, who is none other than Lonergan!

[Some class amusement]

And hopefully you! … I thought that he would like to bring you into the Promised Land.

And as he says, one of the — The difficulty with most philosophers, and with Jack and Jill, the person in the street, is that they have a tendency to think of knowing as being a single activity, and therefore objectivity being a single sort of thing modelled on whatever they think knowing is; and that commonly knowing is thought of on the model of looking. And so if you
have knowing as looking, then you have the problem of immanence and transcendence, if you’re not a naïve realist. *He says of the naïve realist, at least the naïve realist knows that he or she knows something. But the account that they give of how they know and why they know is very, very, vulnerable to the criticisms of the critical idealist, who would be Kant in particular, but not only!* Already you see in Descartes, and before Descartes, in the movements of scepticism, some concerns about whether or not people can really know what they claim to know.

And one of the more interesting comments in here — *As he’s going through, and giving this really caricature of naïve realism, which is, to a large extent, the philosophical context that he was educated in! So he’s thinking his way out of what he’s characterizing as naïve realism. And he’s also critical of the tradition of modern philosophy which has reacted against naïve realism; which would fall, sort of, under the heading of idealism. But one of the more interesting things he says is on page 216 in the article “Cognitional Structure”, and it is this: “The idealist is not impressed.” (CWL 4, Collection, p. 216). And he goes on to say why the idealist is not impressed. And he feels that it is important to make this distinction between appearance and reality; which of course it’s not new with Kant, or with modern critical idealism. That is a distinction that is already much in evidence in the work of Plato. So he says that the naïve realist has overlooked the distinction between appearance and reality. And then he says a couple of things about that, and then he comes up with this statement: By reality the idealist means what is meant by Jack and Jill and by naïve realists.

*The idealist is not impressed. He feels that the distinction between appearance and reality has been overlooked. By appearance he does not mean any illusion or hallucination. He means precisely what Jack or Jill really does see: the shape of an outstretched hand, its colour, the lines that mark it, its position out there in front of the head. He is willing to add what Jack and Jill do not see: the feelings inside the hand and the conjunction in ordinary experience of the feelings with the visible object. All of that is not reality but appearance. And by reality he means what is meant by Jack, Jill, and the naïve realist. Such is his thesis.* (CWL 4, Collection, “Cognitional Structure”, p. 216).
So in other words, Lonergan is saying that though the idealist is critical of the account of knowing of naïve realism, he or she nevertheless accepts the account of reality. And for that reason, he or she concludes that human knowing knows only appearances, and not realities. The naïve realist is really convinced that intuition knows reality; the critical realist is really convinced that you can’t know reality! Why? Because reality is what the naïve realist meant, but the naïve realist’s way of saying that he or she knows it, is not capable of reaching the objective of reality.

Immanence and transcendence then: as he says, it’s the bridge problem! How do you bridge from the in-here to the out-there? Reality is out-there!

The X-Files TV drama series\(^8\) began with that, and that was at the end of every episode. The series bizarrely involved looking for whether or not there were aliens that were present on earth but that this was kept secret by the FBI, and so on. They used always say that “reality is out-there.” I’ve been in Faculty Seminars, particularly with people in the natural sciences, and very very frequently they’ll say that “reality is out-there!” If reality is out-there but my consciousness is in-here [Pat illustrates with hand gestures], then I’ve got the problem of immanence and transcendence. If my consciousness is in-here, that’s immanence. That’s inside! Bewusstseinhalte is the German term: but it literally translates to “the contents of consciousness.” But what’s — It’s like — yeah, that saying about Las Vegas: “What goes on in consciousness, stays in consciousness!”

[Class amusement]

That’s the problem of immanence. How do you then get outside of consciousness? — and transcend to the reality that’s outside consciousness? That’s the immanence and transcendence problem. Okay?

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\(^8\) The X-Files was an American science-fiction television drama series that originally aired from 1993 to 2002 on Fox, spanning nine seasons, with 202 episodes and a feature film of the same name, before returning with a second film in 2008 and a six-episode tenth season in 2016. The series revolves around FBI special agents Fox Mulder (David Duchovny) and Dana Scully (Gillian Anderson) who investigate X-Files: marginalized, unsolved cases involving paranormal phenomena. Mulder believes in the existence of aliens and the paranormal, while Scully, a medical doctor and a sceptic, is assigned to make scientific analyses of Mulder’s discoveries to debunk his work and thus return him to mainstream cases. Early in the series, both agents become pawns in a larger conflict and come to trust only each other and a very few select people. They develop a close relationship which begins as a platonic friendship, but becomes a romance by the end of the series.
So let’s get back to our theme.

Lonergan’s 3 Questions

What am I doing when I am knowing?
Why is doing that knowing?
What do I know when I do that?

(Method in Theology, p. 25; A Second Collection, “Philosophy and Theology”, p. 203).

So, the second question then. “Why is doing that knowing? (Method in Theology, p. 25). Lonergan’s second question is the question about immanence and transcendence. How do we transcend from what’s in our consciousness to the realities that are outside our consciousness?

Let me pause there. … And on the basis perhaps not so much of what you read for today, but on something we did back when we were reading chapter eight on bodies and things [“Things” (CWL 3, pp. 270-295)]: what do you think Lonergan might have to say about that way of posing the question about immanence and transcendence? Posing the question of immanence and transcendence is: my consciousness is in-here and reality is out-there? … In terms of the distinction between body and thing, what would Lonergan have to say? … Jonathan?

Jonathan: To use the language of in-here and out-there to describe that problem is to use your imagination to treat both of those ideas spatially —

Pat: Good!

Jonathan: — which, if knowing is taking a look would be appropriate, you know, looking into the theatre of the mind. But if knowing is not taking a look but a structure of activities, then that would be — it would be an inappropriate way of talking about that!

Pat: Okay! Very good! So in-here and out-there: what’s out-there is the already-out-there-now kind of reality. So the tendency to construe the question about human knowing, to construe epistemology, in terms of the immanence-transcendence as an in-here
out-there spatial issue, derives from the biologically inherited criterion of reality, that works

very effectively for evolutionary purposes. Remember in chapter eight, bodies are what are the objects of biologically extroverted consciousness, where animal consciousness is taking the advantage of its special power to sense objects that are at a distance from itself, in a way that plants can’t. And so, as Lonergan says, extroversion is the special feature of the biological pattern of experience. It’s the special advantage that animals have evolutionarily, towards survival.

But where does in-here come from that? If reality is already-out-there, where does in-here come in, when we’re asking the question about why should such immanent activities produce knowing? Why should they be called ‘knowing’? … Jeff?

Jeff: Could it be that looking is only the first step of the three-step process we’re talking about, because it’s the experience? Then you have to understand what you’re looking at and make a correct judgment about that?

Pat: Sure! That’s right! That’s from Lonergan’s point of view. But he’s back with, on the one hand, the naïve realist, on the other hand the idealist, both of whom are dealing with the immanence-transcendence problem. The naïve realist is going to say: “Well, your looking just reaches right out to the way things are”, or that “things impinge upon your working and impress upon you their reality”. And the idealist is going to say: “Well no, that doesn’t work, because there’s so much structuring that goes on in our conscious activity, so much mediating of our experience that we don’t have immediate contact with the external reality; so therefore all you have is appearances”. But one way or the other, they’re accepting this criterion of reality that is the reality of the out-there; but immanence is not out-there, immanence is in-here [Pat makes relevant spatial gestures] — where does immanence, conceived in that way, come from?

Student: From the data of consciousness?

Pat: Okay. But “the data of consciousness” is Lonergan’s way of talking about it. Why would ‘in-here’ be the category that might be used by the naïve realist? … Tim?
Tim: Well now, I was going to say: does the idealist think that the perceptions we’re having — they’re still using taking a look that’s taking a look at perception. [final words uncertain].

Pat: Right, right! So all that discussion we had last week, and that recurs again this week in “Cognitional Structure” when Lonergan is criticising introspection. *Introspection is, well, if I know anything about myself, if I have any knowledge of these constructive activities that my consciousness is involved in, it must be by taking a look. And it’s obviously not taking a look out-there, so it must be taking a look in-here!* [Pat makes appropriate gestures]. *And since in-here is a box that’s closed off from out-there, I’ve got this bridge problem.*

Naïve realism, so to speak, either — In another article Lonergan wrote called “Metaphysics as Horizon” (*CWL 4 Collection*, pp. 188-204), he makes a distinction between what you might call “naïve-naïve realism” in which the issue just doesn’t come up, and “dogmatic naïve realism” in which the response to the idealist critique is: “Yes, I do! [assertively]; I do too know reality by taking a look, and that’s all there is to it!! [even more dogmatically asserted]. And there are such people around!

[Class amusement hinting at recognition]

So the immanence-transcendence — In other words, what I’m trying to do here is to show you the implications of what Lonergan does in this article on “Cognitional Structure”. *In “Cognitional Structure”* his theme over and over again is: if you think that knowing is but one activity — and the one activity that people usually think it is, is taking a look — then all kinds of things are going to happen. And one of the things that is going to happen is that you fall into the set of assumptions that come out of body reality oriented notions of reality, and you apply them to self-knowledge! Okay? So you start to think of it as in-here, and the minute you start to think of in here and out-there; and now suddenly *you’ve got the bridge problem.*

*But what if that was wrong from the beginning? What if that was the wrong way of thinking about knowing and reality? What if that was buying a merely animal patterning of our experiences as the one and only realistic patterning of experience for no particularly*
good reason? If you call that into question, then you open up his first question: what really are we doing when we’re knowing?

But the big question here is why should that be called knowing?

A confusion about the distinction between internal &
external experience:

External = sensory experiences, vs. internal =
experience, consciousness of one’s own activities.
The boundary of the skin as dividing most primordial
notion of external/internal experience.
The resulting significance of touch and of the skin,
both biologically and culturally.
But in Lonergan’s sense, ‘external’ is not outside the
skin, but sense experiences in general.
Experiences of body’s muscles and organs are
’external’ despite being ‘inside your skin’.
Lonergan’s senses of internal and external are
metaphorical; acts of consciousness are not literally
inside one’s skin.
Internal experiences are of one’s own conscious or
intentional acts.
They do not involve the presence of another object;
one doesn’t look at oneself as an object.
Present, not by being attended to, but by attending;
being present to ourselves in and during our
experiential, intelligent, and rational activities.
We are not present in the bio-chemical activities our bodies perform, but we are present in — have internal experience of — our conscious ones.

Because it came up in conversations prior to Christmas, I wanted to draw attention — I wanted to talk about this. One of you in particular was confused about this language of internal and external experience. Since this was a very smart person who was confused about this, I thought it might be worth making sure that we’re all on the same page. So if you have the copy of “Cognitional Structure” with you — This is on page 209. Now Lonergan, at this point, is walking through what he means by “a dynamic structure”, and that human cognition is a dynamic structure and what he means by that. In fact, it’s what he calls “a formally dynamic structure.” But when he gets to “fourthly” … No, when he gets to “fifthly”, he says:

“Fifthly, then, experience commonly is divided into external and internal. External experience is of sights and sounds, of odours and tastes, of the hot and cold, hard and soft, rough and smooth, wet and dry. **Internal experience is of oneself and one’s apprehensive and appetitive activities.**” (CWL 4, Collection, “Cognitional Structure,” p. 209, emphases added).

There was a confusion about what’s external and internal. **One meaning of external and internal is settled by our skin.** I think I mentioned this when we were talking about chapter eight [“Things” (CWL 3, pp. 270-295)]. The boundaries of our skin settle what’s internal and external. It’s a — There are many layers of meaningfulness to touch; and one of the most fundamental layers of meaningfulness of touch is just pure biological evolutionarily rooted: anything that touches you has the potential of causing a wound in you.

And then there are other layers of meaning that build upon that. But that’s one of the reasons why touch is both a very profound act of intimacy or expression of intimacy, and also a very, very, profound sign of aggression. “Don’t touch me; you don’t know me that well!” **So our skin is the limit of the internal and the external, for all kinds of reasons, that begin in a pure animal survival mode, but build upon that in all kinds of ways.**
Strictly then, following a spatial metaphor, internal is what is contained in the container of our skin. Our skin is our wrapper! Those of you who know anything about the biology of this, I think it’s pretty interesting; I mentioned I think before: if we didn’t have our skin we’d all be dead, because oxygen is so poisonous and so acidic; and our skin is a very — our skin isn’t just like saran wrap; it’s a very complicated organic structure that does all kinds of things.
And one of those things it does is protects us from being corroded away by oxygen, so that if you were a piece of metal out in the oxygen, you would get rusty, you don’t get rusty, you get skinned!!

[Some quiet amusement in class]

So skin is a very, very important organic, as well as cultural, and personally significant boundary. And ‘internal’ in one sense means everything that is inside your skin. So your lungs, your heart, your liver, your ribs, your vertebrae, and so on, that’s what’s internal! And by association you might think that internal experience means the experiences of your body. When you’re hungry and your stomach growls, when you’re ill and you’ve got aches and pains in your head, and in your muscles, and in your nasal passages, and so on: those are internal experiences. If you can feel your heart beating, that’s an internal experience.

All the experiences that are the experiences of your body, its musculature, its organic processes, those are internal in one sense. But they’re not the sense that Lonergan means here! What he means when he’s talking about ‘internal’ is purely metaphorical. What we’ve been talking about is literal, literally, physically, inside your skin, internal to you in the sense of being inside your skin. And there are a lot of things that Lonergan counts actually as external experiences that happen inside your skin.

So, if you have a toothache, that’s from Lonergan’s point of view what falls within the category of external experiences. It’s experience from sensation; it’s telling you not about what’s in the realm outside of your skin; but it’s still talking about what’s in the realm of physical space. Internal experiences, when he talks about them here, are the experiences of yourself acting consciously. Or in this article, he uses the word ‘intentional’ frequently rather than ‘conscious’. So at the bottom of page 209, he says: okay, in order to get to what the metaphor ‘internal’ is all about, we have to advert to three meanings of presence. We talked about this last week. We talked about it a little bit earlier in the first semester.

“Fifthly, then, experience commonly is divided into external and internal. External experience is of sights and sounds, odours and tastes, of the hot and cold, hard and soft, rough and smooth, wet and dry.
Internal experience is of oneself and one’s apprehensive and
appetitive activities. Still, if the meaning of the distinction is clear, the usage of the adjectives, internal and external, calls for explanation. Strictly, only spatial objects are internal or external and, while external experience may be of spatial objects, it itself is not a spatial object and, still less, is internal experience. Accordingly, we must ask what is the original datum that has been expressed by a spatial metaphor; and to that end we draw attention to different modes of presence.

There is *material presence*, in which no knowing is involved, and such is the presence of the statue in the courtyard. There is *intentional presence*, in which knowing is involved, and it is of two quite distinct kinds. There is the *presence of the object to the subject*, of the spectacle to the spectator; there is also the *presence of the subject to himself*, and this is not the presence of another object dividing his attention, of another spectacle distracting the spectator. *It is presence in, as it were, another dimension, presence concomitant and correlative and opposite to the presence of the object. Objects are present by being attended to; but subjects are present as subjects, not by being attended to, but by attending.* As the parade of objects marches by, spectators do not have to slip into the parade to become present to themselves; they have to be present to themselves for anything to be present to them; and *they are present to themselves by the same watching that, as it were, at its other pole makes the parade present to them.* *(CWL 4, Collection, “Cognitional Structure”, pp. 209-210, emphases added).*
“There is *material presence*, in which no knowing is involved, and such is the presence of the statue in the courtyard. There is *intentional presence*, in which knowing is involved, and it is of two quite distinct kinds. (*CWL* 4, “Cognitional Structure”, p. 209, emphases added).

And it’s the presence of the second kind, the intentional presence of the second kind, or the third kind of presence, is what he really means by internal experiences. So reading from page 210: So this “*is not the presence of another object dividing his attention.*” (*CWL* 4, “Cognitional Structure”, p. 210). That’s hinting at something we talked about last week. To be conscious, or now he’s using the language of “intentional presence of the second kind”, to be conscious is not to be regarding oneself as though one were taking a look at oneself. It’s not to be regarding one’s immanent activities as though one were taking a look at those activities. It is rather something different:

> *It is presence in, as it were, another dimension, presence concomitant and correlative and opposite to the presence of the object.*

Objects are present by being attended to; but subjects are present as subjects, not by being attended to, but by attending. (*CWL* 4, “Cognitional Structure”, p. 210, emphases added).

And then, later on, he’s going to say that we are present to ourselves as seeing by performing the seeing. We are not present to ourselves as seeing by taking a look at our seeing, by introspecting and observing ourselves as seeing. We are present to ourselves, we are conscious of ourselves as seeing, by seeing. And later on he says: that the only we you can be present to yourself intelligently, is by intelligently inquiring, intelligently bringing yourself to act in coming to insights, and in formulating those insights. The only way you can be present to yourself rationally is by taking on the responsibility for reflecting on your insights, and seeking to determine whether or not they are correct.

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9 Pat says ‘subject’ rather than the correct term, ‘object’, at this point, an unintended slip.
I have been attempting to describe the subject’s presence to himself. But the reader, if he tries to find himself as subject, to reach back and, as it were, uncover his subjectivity, cannot succeed. *Any such effort is introspecting, attending to the subject; and what is found is, not the subject as subject, but only the subject as object; it is the subject as subject that does the finding.* To heighten one’s presence to oneself, one does not introspect; one raises the level of one’s activity. *If one sleeps and dreams one is present to oneself as the frightened dreamer. If one wakes, one becomes present to oneself, not as moved but as moving, not as felt but as feeling, not as seen but as seeing.* If one is puzzled and wonders and inquires, the empirical subject becomes an intellectual subject as well. *If one reflects and considers the evidence, the empirical and intellectual subject becomes a rational subject, an incarnate reasonableness.* If one deliberates and chooses, one has moved to the level of the rationally conscious, free, responsible subject that by his choices makes himself what he is to be and his world what it is to be. (CWL 4, “Cognitional Structure”, p. 210, emphases added).

So we are conscious to ourselves, by being present in those activities; it’s the experience of being present in my activities that is what he means by internal experiencing! *Internal experiencing is the experiencing that accompanies my performing these activities!*
There are certain activities that as a being I perform that I am not conscious of, one of which is the transformation that adenosine diphosphate and adenosine triphosphate\(^\text{10}\) — that is something that you are all performing right now, but you’re not consciously present to yourself as performing that activity. *You are present, hopefully, to listening to what I have to say. And you are present to thinking about what I have to say, which is to say wondering if you’ve got the meanings right, and trying to understand it, and so on.*

You are present to yourself in those ways. That is what he means by internal experience, not the experiences of what goes on inside your skin, and is available to you as the objects of your sensations about your internal organisms. Okay?

Student question about consciousness as not ‘taking a look back’ at the dynamism, but … how else to state what consciousness is?

— Meaning of Lonergan’s use of the opposition of non-English terms:

\begin{itemize}
  \item *noëma vs. noësis;*
  \item *intentio intenta vs. intentio intendens;*
  \item *pensée pensée vs. pensée pensante*
\end{itemize}

— Discussion of thought, not as object, but as activity; ‘*thought-thinked vs. thought-thinking.*’

— Internal experience has to do with the activities, not their objects.

\(\text{10 Adenosine diphosphate (ADP)}\) is an important organic compound in metabolism and is essential to the flow of energy in living cells. *Adenosine triphosphate (ATP)* is a nucleoside triphosphate used in cells as a coenzyme often called the “molecular unit of currency” of intracellular energy transfer.
— Remarkable fact that there are occurrences in the world which are accompanied by and constituted by self-presence.

— Lonergan emphasizes the dynamism and openness of thinking. Discussion of human patterning experience versus biological patterning.

Lonergan would prefer “differentiate” where other 20th century philosophers would use “deconstruct” or “destroy” in relation to object-centered, knowing-as-looking centered philosophies.

Pat: Matt?

Matt: Way back in the first or second class, when we were going through that Understanding and Being text, there was that one diagram where you had — I mean the two lines in it, and one side was judgments, concepts and words, and it went backwards there pointing to the dynamism. Do you remember that?

Pat: Yes. Okay.

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11 CWL 5, Understanding and Being, p. 15.
Matt: I’m wondering if this notion, when we speak of consciousness as, not the taking a look back, but instead, becoming aware … you know … not even becoming aware of the data, right? It’s not —

Pat: It’s not becoming aware —

Matt: It’s not becoming aware, but it’s the act of thinking, the act of inquiring. There’s a contemporaneous … I don’t even know how to say it without using ‘being aware’, but —

Pat: That’s right! It’s hard to say it!

Matt: It is!

Pat: That’s terribly important, that it’s hard to say that. And the reason it’s hard to say it is because we are so caught up in knowing as taking a look! And any time we try to talk about what we’re doing —

Matt: I just did that there!

Pat: And I just did it myself. Whenever we try to talk about that, we’re so historically, and philosophically, and so to speak, by virtue of also having a biological patterning of our experience, we’re so deeply rooted in thinking of knowing as taking a look, that to even talk about what he means by consciousness, what he means by internal experience, is very, very, difficult to do.

Matt: Which is why I was wondering if on p. 211 on this “Cognitional Structure”, when he makes this — he does this verbal, this semantic thing, of not using the passive participle, but the present active participle; so when he says *intentio intendens* and not *intentio intenta*, so to say, the intending intention, we’re trying to get from the perspective of the kind of outward movement, or, if we could use that analogous language, but the — Instead of trying to look back and see myself —

Pat: That’s right!

Matt: — trying for a vantage point, instead of just becoming or appropriating or attuned to the outward dynamic of my —

Pat: Well, again, you’re falling into the outer — but you’re doing better when you’re talking active!

Matt: Okay.
Pat: So you know, the three word — He goes from one language to another quickly there.

\[ noêma \text{ vs. } noësis; \]
\[ intentio intenta \text{ vs. } intentio intendens; \]
\[ pensée pensée \text{ vs. pensée pensante.} \]

Besides the \textit{noêma} or \textit{intentio intenta} or \textit{pensée pensée} illustrated by the lower contexts \( P, Q, R, \ldots \) and by the upper context that is Gödel’s theorem, there also is the \textit{noësis} or \textit{intentio intendens} or \textit{pensée pensante} that is constituted by the very activity of inquiring and reflecting, understanding and affirming, asking further questions and reaching further answers. \textit{(CWL 3, p. 19).}

For the sake of you who were wondering what all those foreign words were all doing in one sentence there: \textit{pensée pensée} and \textit{pensée pensante}, \textit{intentio intenta} and \textit{intentio intendens}, \textit{noêma} and \textit{noësis}; they’re all shifts from — you can’t really do it in English, that’s why he didn’t do it in English, and presumably why he repeated it in three languages there.

\textbf{Pat writes on blackboard:}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|}
\hline
Thought ‘Thinks’
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|}
\hline
Thought Thinking
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

It would be as if you could do it in English: if you could do it in English, it would be thought ‘thinks’ versus thought thinking.

So if we were to say that grammatically correctly in English, we would say thought thought, which was what \textit{pensée pensée} does; but to emphasize: \textit{it’s the object completed, so to speak, as opposed to the activity that’s doing the thinking, and his emphasis is on that internal experience! It has to do with the active, and not the}
finished, not the object of thinking; and the consciousness that internal experience doesn’t have to do with the object of some activity; it has to do with the activity itself. And this remarkable phenomenon that there are in the world certain activities which are accompanied by, to which there is concomitant with, ingredient in, and is a self-presence. And the word ‘presence’ is the problematic.

So Lonergan is dealing with the same kind of problem that many of the twentieth-century philosophers are dealing with: the big concern of Heidegger, of Derrida, of Nietzsche, of deconstruction, destruction of the history of metaphysics, of the genealogy, and so on, is — Lonergan is not always dealing with exactly the same things as they do, but there’s a spirit of: we’re caught in an inheritance of language and in the historicity of thinking that gets in the way, and so he’s struggling with that sense.

So it’s not the outward orientation; it’s the activity. So he likes to use the word ‘dynamism’, as opposed to ‘outwardness’. He uses the word ‘openness’ and that already has got a little bit of the spatial directedness built into it. So he’s struggling with the language as much as Matt is.

Matt: So — Sorry, if I could just say one more thing. I was trying to think of this same idea in terms of the relation between body and thing.

Pat: Yes!

Matt: And so essentially this whole dynamism that we’re speaking of here, is what is at play when we speak of thing, and that there’s — Because I had a question and tried to say, okay, but this body can be a thing for me too, and I was trying to connect those two together, and trying to see how there’s — like, try to say: well, is there a correspondence to the body out there; but that still has that same language; and we’re trying to completely deconstruct that spatial representation, and think of it in an entirely new way; the thing and all those nine activities.

Pat: That’s right! That’s right!
Matt: Okay. Thank you!
Pat: It’s a little bit short of “completely deconstruct”, because for Lonergan it’s differentiated. Lonergan’s word where destruction and deconstruction and genealogy are used by the great “masters of suspicion”, as Paul Ricoeur called them. Lonergan’s big word is ‘differentiate’! And the reason for that is his hope — and I think his own achievement — I would say I hope that he achieved that — that what has been differentiated can be reintegrated in a new way; that doesn’t have to be just destroyed. And I wouldn’t necessarily say that I think Derrida or Heidegger or Nietzsche want only to destroy, but that’s their language. Lonergan doesn’t pick up that language. But what functions in Lonergan’s terminology the way those terms function in the hermeneutics of suspicion is ‘differentiation’.

So it’s important to very strongly and firmly differentiate the biological patterning of our experience and it’s concomitant patterning of our notion of reality, from the human patterning of experience and notion of reality, for the sake of then going back to another kind of integration. If you haven’t made that differentiation, one or the other is going to dominate in an inappropriate way.

Student question: Is knowing anything more than an internal experience?

— Discussion of why question should be phrased differently.

Pat: Ian, you had a question?

Ian: I guess I was trying to ask, then, is knowing anything other than an internal experience?

Pat: Ah, part of what we’ve been doing here is to point out that in the ordinary sense of internal that’s implicit in the way that you ask that, it’s a misleading question. It’s a question that’s based on a very subtle assumption that needs to be gotten beyond! Lonergan’s answer is that — well, Lonergan’s answer is: Well, if you have to put it in those terms, then the answer is yes! That knowing is more than just internal experience! But part of what I’ve been trying to do here is to just get us to see that even the way in which
the question is framed has bought into something which Lonergan has been trying to draw us out of! I’m going to go back and look at that, and at what real cognitional transcendence is for Lonergan.

Question about animal knowledge; same structure but confined to biological pattern?

— Various kinds of animal knowing are the subject matter for animal biologists;

— Lonergan lumps many different kinds of animal under the general heading of “biological pattern of experience”;

— In general animal knowing is the use of sensations of vibrations to detect entities located in the outer world.

— Animal knowing probably does not have the three-levelled structure, but this is disputed.

— Animal knowing is different from dramatic, religious, philosophical, patterning of animal knowing.

Pat: Greg?

Greg: So how do we characterize animal knowing? Is that — Would he make a case for the same structure but confined to biological patterning, or is it fundamentally different? Can we know if it’s fundamentally different?

Pat: Well, there’s a couple of questions there. My first reaction is that there are lots of different kinds of animal knowing. The animal knowing of say, a snail, is very different then the animal knowing of a sand-piper. And it really is the work of biologists, particularly biologists who study animal behaviour, to begin to sort out the different kinds of animal knowing that there are. That said, Lonergan has lumped them all together into one big category, because it’s the category that we inherit by our animal existence that causes a
distortion, a series of distortions, in all kinds of places. Animal knowing is the use of senses

where there’s a sense of — Animal knowing is the use of vibrations for the sake of either avoiding threats or dealing with advantages in evolutionary survival and reproduction.

Greg: Uh, huh!

Pat: And that’s a very broad way — Vibrations can be the vibrations of light, or obviously it can be the vibrations of air for sound; they can be the vibrations of water, so that animals can respond to those. There are animals that can detect the direction that prey is in by the vibrations in water, by the vibrations in the ground. So anything that vibrates can be — Life can evolve in such a way as to take advantage of those vibrations. That would be animal knowing. But the important thing is that those vibrations are signs of things from afar, that are not in immediate contact with one’s skin, which includes all the varied vital organs of feeding, and reproducing, and staying alive, and so on. Okay?

And do they have those three levels that Lonergan talks about? I would say no! But I have a very good friend — I think I told you about my friend who is a primatologist — and we have these discussions back and forth about whether or not chimpanzees and elephants, and so on, have insights and judgments, and so on. I think the answer is no! He doesn’t come round and say yes, but he thinks they are not given enough credit, and perhaps there is some truth to that.

So — But at the very least, the biological patterning of experience is different than the intellectual, dramatic, practical, artistic, aesthetic, philosophical, religious, patternings of experience. So they are very different!

Is that a help?

Greg: Yeh!

Is the goal to become present in the performance of your activities?
— You are already present to your activities.

Discussion of above question:

The exercises done in this class so far have been aimed at awakening our awareness to the experience of insight we’ve always had.

Aimed at re-duplicating the structure — heightening the experiencing of our conscious activities on all three levels; understanding that experiencing; critically assessing, correcting, and judging our understanding of that experiencing.

Habermas and the end of philosophy of consciousness; there is no self-presence that is unmediated by language.

How language and insights into one’s experiences heighten experiences already being experienced.

Our intelligence always mediates our experience of what is given.

The aim is not to become conscious of our activities, but to better understand our consciousness, our experiencing, of those activities.

Pat: Matt?

Matt: I was just trying to figure out a way to talk about this. Would you say that the goal is to become present in the performance?
Pat: No, because — I now have to be careful because I promised I was not going to say flat out “no” to anybody, but —

[Loud class laughter]

Lonergan’s position on this is that you are already present! It isn’t to become present! The other Matt was saying it a moment ago. It isn’t to become present — You already are present! You are present in the room in that material sense, but you are also listening, thinking, coming up with an interesting question, and you are present already in the doing of those. You don’t have to become present! You have to become intelligently present if you’ve been sort of just, you know, daydreaming; and suddenly somebody says something that: “What was that?” And then you become — You go on from being empirically present or experientially present to being intelligently present because you’re starting to wonder. And as you’re getting insights, you’re beginning to be intelligently present to yourself. But you don’t say: “Okay, I’m going to become intelligently present, you know, look around and then I’m going to figure out how to make myself intelligently present to answer yes or no to some question. It doesn’t work that way. The intelligent presence comes with the asking of your questions. Okay? … Does that make sense?

Matt: Yeah. I get that we’re always already present to ourselves —

Pat: That’s right!

Matt: Although it was not a surprise, but a semi-discovery when I read that in “Self-Appropriation” originally [from CWL 5, Understanding and Being], that form of presence. And then, even though I always already was present; I wasn’t in any way aware of it. I wasn’t —

Pat: That’s right! Okay!

Let me — Understand, I’ll come to this at the end of the class, but since this has come up in a couple different ways: What exactly are we doing? Or what have we been doing for the last fifteen weeks in this class? If you haven’t been becoming conscious of your activities that you weren’t conscious of, what have you been doing?

[Some amusement]

What you have been doing is reduplicating the structure, as he says. You did not have to have the experiences before you could start this class! You already were having the experiences! What have you been doing? What have these guided exercises been all about?
Primarily they’ve been about, first and foremost, making you be puzzled about the experiences that you’ve had all your life, or at least since the time you — You certainly were having insights by the time you were three months old! You certainly were starting to form some judgments of a certain kind by the time you were twelve or so, probably earlier than that! So what have we been doing in this class? We’ve been understanding the experiences that we’ve been having all our lives! And by that understanding we are able to experience them in a more heightened fashion.

One of the things I was going to say towards the end of the class was Lonergan’s implicit response to remarks that I mentioned last week: Jürgen Habermas making a declaration about the end of the philosophy of consciousness.\(^ {12} \) Regarding consciousness, as Habermas understood it, he’s quite right! There is no more philosophy of consciousness as he understood consciousness! But he understood consciousness in the way that Lonergan was being critical of. Paul Ricoeur in his book on “Oneself as Another”\(^ {13} \) begins with some reflections from Nietzsche on the naïveté of thinking that we have an immediate presence to ourselves that is not mediated by language. And Nietzsche is quite right about that.

You folks have been mediating your experiences of yourselves as sensitive, as intelligent, as reflective, making judgments. You’ve been mediating that by language. The language has been supplied by Lonergan, and by me, and by each other. What that has been doing is, little by little, accumulating insights about your experiences. Now the curious thing about insights into your experiences is that it heightens your experiences. When you have insights —

For example, if — for most of you at least — if you saw Hebrew letters, you might be able to say: “I think those are Hebrew letters!” And that would be about as far as it would go. Or if you’re familiar with Hebrew letters, maybe Arabic letters, or Persian letters, or Hindu letters, Hindi letters. You might be able to say, I know generally speaking what language those are. And you’d probably have a hard time distinguishing one from another. But once you’ve learn that language, you know the difference between those letters, and you

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\(^ {12} \) Pat made the following remark in Class fifteen: “When Jürgen Habermas said that the project of a philosophy of consciousness is ended, I think he did not mean consciousness as Lonergan means it.” (Byrne on Insight, 15, pp. 75-76).

have been able to notice and separate them out; and you could even get to the point where you say: “Oh, that’s just a smudge on the page, that’s not a letter!” But you wouldn’t necessarily know that. So you’re able to notice things better!

This is something that you do in the Philosophy of Science class. I think I mentioned this back when we were doing that section on “The Canons of Empirical Method, The Canon of Selection”, where I gave you some exercises on the optical illusions. One of the classes in Philosophy of Science that we had: one of the nursing students came in a section and showed a slide, and she asked the half of the class that was not nursing students: “What do you see?” And it was a sketch that would have been from an ultra-sound of a baby about to be born. And the students said they noticed the baby [indecipherable words]. Then she asked the nursing students: “What do you see?” And every one of them said: “That baby is in distress.” So you could say everybody saw the same things, but in some sense they didn’t, because the intelligence mediates our experiencing. Our experience of the given — Lonergan talks about the objectivity of the given. There is an objectivity to the given, but it is always mediated.

And so what we’ve been doing is being able to isolate, separate, distinguish, our experiences from one another, because of our insights into our experiences. So that’s basically what I would say we have been doing. We haven’t actually had anyone become conscious of ourselves performing those activities in the sense in which Lonergan means. We have always been conscious in that sense of them. What we become is intelligently conscious of them. We understand better, and by understanding better, our experiencing is experienced in a differentiated and a heightened way. But we didn’t cause the experiences to happen by doing the self-appropriation exercises. Okay? … Matt?

Matt: So just to know if I’ve got this right? You would say then that what we’ve been doing is to understand the performance of which we have always been present?

Pat: Yeah!

Matt: Okay!

Pat: We’ve come to better understand the presence, the experience, of ourselves as performing these activities; and one of the results of better understanding is a crisper, more nuanced, more differentiated, clearer experiencing, as would be the case of somebody who gets trained in scientific or medical observation. Okay.
Lonergan’s answer to “Why is doing that knowing?” is found in what he calls “the epistemological theorem.”

The epistemological theorem:

Knowledge is intrinsically objective, that objectivity is the intrinsic relation of knowing and being, and that being and reality are identical.

Hence, knowledge in the proper sense (the cognitional structure sense) is knowledge of reality.

The Notion of Knowing:

‘Notion’ as ‘an anticipation’; ‘notion of knowing’ is an anticipation about what knowledge is.

Everyone has some sort of anticipation, notion, that knowing is
about reality.

But not everyone can say in a definitive way what knowing is or how it is related to reality, or even what reality is.

Clarifications of Lonergan’s terminology about cognitional structure.

Knowing is a *structure*: What are the kinds of structures?

1. Structures that are wholes just as collections.
2. Structured wholes whose parts are just material.
3. Structured wholes whose parts are activities but the structure is not itself changing (“materially dynamic”).
4. Structured wholes whose parts are activities and which also change their own structures by performing those activities (“formally dynamic”).

In a formally dynamic structure, both parts and whole are activities. The result is a self-modifying, self-constituted whole that changes itself by performing its activities.

Why, then, does the formally dynamic, cognitional structure that we have been studying yield knowledge of reality?

**Chapter 12: The Notion of Being**

Lonergan’s answer to Why Doing *That* is Knowing, is:

Because the objectivity of human knowing rests on an *unrestricted intention* and an *unconditioned result*.

Hence, the results of performing those activities are not *restricted* to
Chapter twelve ("The Notion of Being") is an exploration of the unrestricted intention.
The unconditioned result is a judgment grounded in a grasp of the virtually unconditioned.

The two combined grounds the answer as to why performance of the immanent activities is knowledge in the proper sense.

“The dynamic structure of human knowing intends being.” (Cognitional Structure, 211).

What exactly is this intention of being, this notion of being.

(Reference to a handout about Lonergan’s several ways of articulating a second-order definition of being.)

What is the distinction between ‘being’ and the ‘notion of being’?

Being is what our notion aims at. But what is the notion itself?

The notion of being is the anticipation of being, which takes the form of inquiry about, and desire for, being. It’s not a concept of being, but a desire to know being that is the notion.

Series of Student Questions.

Question about whether being remains a notion, uncontainable by any set of finite judgments.

— Being is not the complete set of correct judgments; our knowledge of being would consist in the complete set of correct judgments.

— Our desire and inquiry are inexhaustible so that indeed no finite set of judgments will not be equal to what we desire – i.e., complete knowledge of being.
Question confirming that the notion of being is the *eros* of the mind, the pure desire and reasonable anticipation to know.

— Subsequent discussion of the immediate anticipation of being; the pure desire to know everything about everything, which is even prior to our ability to articulate any questions.

— Built upon this immediate anticipation of being, are all mediated ideas or assertions about being.

Question whether the *eros* for being can be of different intensity in different people?

— Not a different natural, inherent intensity of desire to know being, but there are differences in the intensity in ways the desire is appropriated.

— Discussion of how the notion of being is naturally present in all, but is indeed appropriated differently. How people choose to cooperate with the unrestricted desire to know, or not.

Question about what ‘intending being’ implies. Does this mean we can never know the totality of being? Would we have to be God to know being?

— Discussion of how both finite reality and transcendent reality (God) can be intended. Discussion of human dynamism and our desire to know and intention of being.
The Intention of Being, Notion of Being (resumed).

A desire to know everything about everything.

Why should this intention be called an ‘intention of being’?

The intention of being is the “originating drive of knowing.”

By our inquiry, we go beyond data to intelligibility, then beyond intelligibility to truth, and through truth to being.

The very notion of knowing implies reality is more than what I know, that being is beyond the humanly known.

Example of trying to defend a solipsistic position – and failing.

Even the solipsistic philosophy betrays a notion of being that goes beyond what it knows.

This notion of being conforms to our expectations about being insofar as the latter includes all that is known and remains to be known.

Not only do we have a desire manifest in our inquiring; in addition that desire is unrestricted.

This claim is of the utmost importance in all of Lonergan’s philosophy (and theology).

The dynamic inquiry must be unrestricted to attain objectivity.

The invulnerability of insights (as grounds of virtually unconditioned judgments) depends on the unrestrictedness of the notion of being.
If there were realities about which we could not ask, then the criterion of “no further pertinent questions” would be irrelevant to the objectivity of knowing.

§3 The ideals of knowing (produced by history of philosophy and science) versus the spontaneous ideal, notion of knowing (the pure and unrestricted desire to know).

The spontaneous notion of being is invariant and common to all. Developmentally delayed humans do have a spontaneous, unrestricted notion of being, even though they do not always come up with insights as fast as others.

Lonergan counters objections to the notion of being as unrestricted desire to know.

Efforts to establish that the notion is not all-inclusive turn out to suppose that very unrestrictedness.

Lonergan’s several variations, or corollaries, to his basic second-order definition of being as the “objective of the unrestricted desire to know.” (See handout.)

— Being known in the totality of true judgments.
— A judgment is an incremental knowing of being, but is not yet the totality of judgments that amounts to knowing being.

Why is the totality of being said to be known in the totality of corrected judgments?
The *shift* in the way the second order definition is formulated:

— What's intended by all questioning → what is known in the totality of all judgments.

Why are these formulations equivalent?

Student response reveals the reason why the dynamic orientation of cognitional structure is indeed directed towards being – why it is properly called a “notion of being”:

The very structure of our knowing is oriented towards ‘is’

The primordial meaning of ‘is’ is our anticipation of “Yes, it *is.*”

A correct judgment confirms ‘isness’.

The totality of correct judgments would affirm the totality of ‘isness,’ the totality of being.

The dynamic structure of knowing is oriented towards being because it is oriented by all the questions about what is; it is oriented towards the totality of judgments about what is, what we have known or may know.

Student question about whether the definition of ‘is’ is atemporal.

— Indeed. It refers to what was, or is not yet, as well as to the immediate present.
Knowing is intrinsically objective and not restricted to the immanence of consciousness, because our unrestricted desire asks about everything about everything, including whether our understanding is of an appearance or a reality.

Our asking whether there is anything beyond our consciousness shows the orientation of our consciousness to what transcends it.

Objectivity is not knowing ‘what's outside my consciousness’ but knowing ‘what is’.

A final question to consider: *In self-affirmation, am I knowing myself as subject or as object?*

**End of Class 16**
Insight and Beyond

Class 16, Part Two: January 27th 2010

The Notions of Knowing, of Being, of Objectivity and
“Cognitional Structure”

(Insight, Chapter 12 and Chapter 13)

Lonergan’s 3 Questions

What am I doing when I am knowing?

Why is doing that knowing?

What do I know when I do that?

(Method in Theology, p. 25; A Second Collection, “Philosophy and Theology”, p. 203).

Lonergan’s answer to “Why is doing that knowing?” is found in what he calls “the epistemological theorem.”

The epistemological theorem:

Knowledge is intrinsically objective, that objectivity is the intrinsic relation of knowing and being, and that being and reality are identical.
Hence, knowledge in the proper sense (the cognitional structure sense) is knowledge of reality.

The Notion of Knowing:

‘Notion’ as ‘an anticipation’; ‘notion of knowing’ is an anticipation about what knowledge is.

Everyone has some sort of anticipation, notion, that knowing is about reality.

But not everyone can say in a definitive way what knowing is or how it is related to reality, or even what reality is.

### Lonergan’s 3 Questions

- **What am I doing when I am knowing?**
- **Why is doing that knowing?**
- **What do I know when I do that?**

*Method in Theology*, p. 25.  

Okay. So turning back to Lonergan’s three questions, this is his answer to why doing those immanent activities is knowing, what he calls “the epistemological theorem.”
“The Notion of Knowing”

“This brings us to the epistemological theorem, namely, that knowledge in the proper sense is knowledge of reality, or, more fully, that knowledge is intrinsically objective, that objectivity is the intrinsic relation of knowing to being, and that being and reality are identical.”

(“Cognitional Structure”, p. 211).

“This brings us to the epistemological theorem, namely, that knowledge in the proper sense is knowledge of reality, or, more fully, that knowledge is intrinsically objective, that objectivity is the intrinsic relation of knowing to being, and that being and reality are identical.” (CWL 4, Collection, “Cognitional Structure”, p. 211).

Let’s just focus on the first of those. I have up here, on the slide that is the title of that slide, “The Notion of Knowing.” Now, we’ve talked about Lonergan’s use of the term ‘notion’ previously. It comes back in chapters twelve and thirteen, chapter twelve “The Notion of Being” and chapter thirteen “The Notion of Objectivity”. Notice it’s the notion of being and the notion of objectivity.
“The Notion of Knowing”

“This brings us to the epistemological theorem, namely, that knowledge in the proper sense is knowledge of reality, (“Cognitive Structure”, p. 211).

And what Lonergan means by a notion, as distinct from an idea or a concept, is an anticipation. So there is in us a notion of knowing. What he calls in the section on “Self-Appropriation” [taken from CWL 5, Understanding and Being] that we read again last week, what he calls the ideal of knowing, the implicit ideal of knowing, which the explicit ideals of knowing never successfully capture! The language in Insight is of notion. But he never actually uses the phrase “the notion of knowing” in Insight, although he uses the phrases the notion of thing, the notion of judgment, the notion of being, the notion of objectivity, the notion of God; he uses the word ‘notion’ quite a bit! So it’s an anticipation.

And I want to focus on this:

“This brings us to the epistemological theorem, namely, that knowledge in the proper sense is knowledge of reality (CWL 4, Collection, “Cognitive Structure”, p. 211).
We have a notion about knowing, about knowledge, that if it doesn’t have to do with reality, then somehow it’s not really knowledge.

And you find this already in Plato’s Dialogues, when Socrates is asking his interlocutors: “Do you agree that there’s such a thing as belief?” and “Do you agree that there is such a thing as knowledge, epistêmê?” And then he explores the difference between believing and knowing, over and over again in the Dialogue.

Where is that coming from? Well, you could make the argument that any person that Socrates would have been talking with was brought up in Athens or in Hellas, and learned the Greek language and had these linguistic distinctions, and that they are all socially constructed, and so on. I don’t want to get into that debate now! But I think that there is something else! You can still ask the question: “Well, why did those linguistic elements come about?” And people can say ‘evolution’, and they can say it’s maybe structuralism. But let’s put those debates aside for the moment and say: that when Socrates is saying to his interlocutors: “Do you agree that there is such a thing as a distinction between believing and knowing? It’s clear that they don’t know how to answer: “Well, what is knowing?” That leads to their aporias14 all the time. That’s why they are so befuddled, and why sometimes they get a little bit upset with Socrates and start to feel insulted and abused by him, and get very — in some cases — very aggressive towards him for making them look silly in front of others, because they can’t answer the question about what knowing is! But people still have a notion of what knowing is, and somehow that notion is about reality.

So knowing, in the proper sense has to do with cognition of reality. So we have this notion of knowing. And what Lonergan is going to do is to try to tease out the locus of our notion of knowing! What is our notion of knowing? And the answer to that is the performance of our structured structure of cognition, now the performance of these activities in this structured relatedness, this dynamically structured relatedness.

14 Aporia: 1. Rhetoric. the expression of a simulated or real doubt, as about where to begin or what to do or say. 2. Logic, Philosophy. a difficulty encountered in establishing the theoretical truth of a proposition, created by the presence of evidence both for and against it.
Clarifications of Lonergan’s terminology about cognitional structure.

Knowing is a *structure*: What are the kinds of structures?

1. Structures that are wholes just as collections.
2. Structured wholes whose parts are just material.
3. Structured wholes whose parts are activities but the structure is not itself changing (“materially dynamic”).
4. Structured wholes whose parts are activities and which also change their own structures by performing those activities (“formally dynamic”).

In a formally dynamic structure, both parts and whole are activities.

The result is a self-modifying, self-constituted whole that changes itself by performing its activities.

Why, then, does the formally dynamic, cognitional structure that we have been studying yield knowledge of reality?

Okay. Time now to turn off the terminology, just because this is one of the denser of Lonergan’s articles. In the extent to which I can get rid of barriers that are purely terminological, that I think will help. If you go back to page 206 in “Cognitional Structure” — Remember the big issue here is to emphasize that in many different ways, *the root of all evils is that people don’t know that their knowing is a structure*. This is a big deal for him.
Well, what kind of structures are there? Well, first of all there are wholes, as he says, that are just collections. The chairs in this room are not a structure; they are just a collection of stuff. When we looked at the coincidental aggregates of gas molecules back in the first semester, that’s a container wholeness, but it’s not a structured wholeness. So there are structural wholes; they might be merely material structures, like the material parts of a building are put together into a structure. But then he says, but the parts themselves can be activities, and then you’ve got the dynamic structure. The dynamism here has to do with the fact that the parts of the whole are not things, material things, but they are actually activities. So a materially dynamic whole — that is the self. The self has a lot of chemical reactions going on within it at every second; and it’s an assembly of those chemical reactions into patterns that are structured. But what he is most interested in is something that he calls a formally dynamic structure, which means that the parts are activities, and the whole itself is an activity. The whole is not just composed of activities, but it’s actively doing something, it’s actively going somewhere. It’s self-modifying. It’s self-assembling. It’s self-constituting. It’s self-transcending.

A whole, then, has parts. The whole is related to each of the parts, and each of the parts is related to the other parts and to the whole.

Not every whole is a structure. When one thinks of a whole, there may come to mind some conventional quantity or arbitrary collection whose parts are determined by an equally conventional or arbitrary division. In such a case, e.g., a gallon of milk, the closed set of relations between whole and parts will be a no less arbitrary jumble of arithmetic ratios. But it may also happen that the whole one thinks of is some highly organized product of nature or art. Then the set of internal relations is of the greatest significance. Each part is what it is in virtue of its functional relations to other parts; there is no part that is not determined by the exigences of other parts; and the whole possesses a certain inevitability in its unity, so
that the removal of any part would destroy the whole, and the addition of

any further part would be ludicrous. Such a whole is a structure.

The parts of a whole may be things, bricks, timbers, glass, rubber, chrome. But the parts may also be activities, as in a song, a dance, a chorus, a symphony, a drama. Such a whole is dynamic materially. But dynamism may not be restricted to the parts. The whole itself may be self-assembling, self-constituting; then it is formally dynamic. It is a [formally] dynamic structure. (CWL 4, Collection, “Cognitional Structure”, pp. 205-206, emphases and an insertion added).

So the language about formally dynamic — why he got into the materially dynamic and formally dynamic, and turning around with that a little bit: he’s getting at the point that our — the structure underlying, is not just a structure of activities, but it’s a structure that changes itself by performing those activities.

So knowledge in the proper sense of knowledge as knowledge of reality — we can still ask the question: Why is that kind of structure that we’ve become familiar with over the last semester and another week, why is that structure knowledge of reality? So I emphasize this! We have a notion of knowing! The notion of knowing is that knowing has to do with reality. But his epistemological theorem as stated thus far has not told us why doing those things in that formally dynamically structured way is going to give us knowledge of reality!

So he is going to expand on that:

“... more fully, that knowledge is intrinsically objective, that objectivity is the intrinsic relation of knowing to being, and that being and reality are
identical.” (CWL 4, Collection, “Cognitional Structure”, p. 211).
“The Notion of Knowing”

“This brings us to the epistemological theorem, namely,
that knowledge in the proper sense is
knowledge of reality,
or, more fully, that knowledge is intrinsically
objective,
that objectivity is the intrinsic relation of
knowing to being,
and that being and reality are identical.”

(“Cognitionanl Structure”, p. 211).

Lonergan’s answer to Why Doing That is Knowing, is:

Because the objectivity of human knowing rests on an
unrestricted intention and an unconditioned result.

Hence, the results of performing those activities are
not restricted to Bewusstseinsinhalte.

Chapter twelve (“The Notion of Being”) is an
exploration of the unrestricted intention.
The unconditioned result is a judgment grounded in a grasp of the virtually unconditioned.

The two combined grounds the answer as to why performance of the immanent activities is knowledge in the proper sense.

Why Doing That is Knowing.

“The objectivity of human knowing, then, rests upon an unrestricted intention and an unconditioned result.

Because the intention is unrestricted, it is not restricted to the immanent content of knowing, to *Bewusstseinsinhalte.*” (Cognitional Structure” 213).

The reason why doing those activities — *From Lonergan’s point of view, the reason why doing those activities is knowledge in the proper sense of knowledge of reality, he says, is because:*

“the objectivity of human knowing … rests upon an unrestricted intention and an unconditioned result. Because the intention is unrestricted, it is not restricted to the immanent content of knowing, to *Bewusstseinsinhalte.*” (CWL 4, Collection, “Cognitional Structure”, p. 213).

*Bewusstseinsinhalte* is German for “the contents of consciousness.”
“The Notion of Knowing”

“This brings us to the epistemological theorem, namely,
that knowledge in the proper sense is
knowledge of reality,
or, more fully, that knowledge is intrinsically
objective,
that objectivity is the intrinsic relation of
knowing to being,
and that being and reality are identical.”

(“Cognitional Structure”, p. 211).

So now, that’s his answer:

Why Doing That is Knowing.

“The objectivity of human knowing, then, rests
upon an unrestricted intention and an
unconditioned result.
Because the intention is unrestricted, it is not
restricted to the immanent content of knowing,
to Bewusstseinsinhalte.” (Cognitional Structure”
213).
Knowledge in the proper sense is properly applied to the formally dynamic structure of activities, because of an unrestricted intention and an unconditioned result!

Now, what he does in chapter twelve is to explore the unrestricted intention. That’s what chapter twelve is about: (CWL 3, chapter 12: The Notion of Being, pp. 372-398). The Notion of Being is about the unrestricted intention. The unconditioned result is the grasp of the virtually unconditioned; and judgment is founded upon the grasp of the virtually unconditioned.

And if you put those two things together, the unrestricted intention and an unconditioned result, that is his answer to why it is that performing those activities is knowing!

Or, as somebody said a minute ago, “Do those immanent activities really lead to knowledge of reality?” and Lonergan’s answer is this! [Ian had asked the following question: “Is knowing anything other than an internal experience?” (See above page 38 of this transcription)].

“The dynamic structure of human knowing intends being.” (Cognitional Structure, 211).

What exactly is this intention of being, this notion of being.

(Reference to a handout about Lonergan’s several ways of articulating a second-order definition of being.)

What is the distinction between ‘being’ and the ‘notion of being’?

Being is what our notion aims at. But what is the notion itself?
The notion of being is the anticipation of being, which takes the form of inquiry about, and desire for, being. It’s not a concept of being, but a desire to know being that is the notion.

Intention of Being
Notion of Being

“Accordingly, the dynamic structure of human knowing intends being.” (Cognitional Structure, p. 211).

“Being, then, is the objective of the pure desire to know. By the desire to know is meant the dynamic orientation manifested in questions for intelligence and for reflection.” (Insight, p. 372).

The “desire to know everything about everything.” (Insight, p. 375).

In the article “Cognitional Structure”, Lonergan uses the phrase ‘intention’, the intention of being, and the intention of consciousness; in Insight, he uses the phrase the notion of being. What exactly is this intention or notion of being? … Tim:

Tim: The totality of all true judgments.

Pat: Ahm, you sort of mixed apples and oranges together. I passed out this sheet with a number of different passages from Insight, where Lonergan talks about what defines being. He does something very interesting at the beginning of chapter twelve: and he says this is a second order definition of being. Now I want to come back and reflect on that.
He gives not one, but arguably about eight definitions, second order definitions, of being. So you kind of mixed together part of the definition of being, and part of what being is. But I’m asking about the notion, which is different than either of those things. What is the notion of being? … Sean?

Sean: That it’s the object of all of our intelligent inquiry?

Pat: No! Okay. You’ve told me what being is. You’ve told me that it is the object of — Notice that in the passage on the slide he uses the word ‘objective’, rather than ‘object’. By doing that, he leaves open the question of the unity of being. If you were to say that being is the object of our knowing, there would be an implication of a unity. All that is being said is that being is where our knowing is heading. Okay? But what you told me about was being, not the notion of being! … Matt?

Matt: Is being the objective of the pure desire to know?

Pat: I’m not asking about being. I’m asking about the notion of being.

Matt: But is it the objective of the pure desire to know?

Pat: Being is the objective of the pure desire to know. What’s the notion of being? …

Student: It’s the anticipation of the —

Pat: That’s right!! It’s the anticipation of being! And how do we anticipate being?

Student: By asking questions about it.

Pat: By asking questions about it. We anticipate being by inquiring. We anticipate being by desiring. The word ‘desire’ is not on that slide a couple of times by accident! Professor Byrne thought that was an important word!

I didn’t underline it, because I was wanting to draw your attention to it, by asking about it. We desire to know being! Our notion of being is in our anticipating, in our desiring, in our inquiring! So before we have anything like an idea or a concept of being, we desire, and our desiring is our notion of being. We don’t have a concept of being, we have a desire for being. We have a desire to know being. Okay?
Series of Student Questions.

Question about whether being remains a notion, uncontainable by any set of finite judgments.

— Being is not the complete set of correct judgments; our knowledge of being would consist in the complete set of correct judgments.

— Our desire and inquiry are inexhaustible so that indeed no finite set of judgments will not be equal to what we desire – i.e., complete knowledge of being.

Pat: Greg?

Greg: Would it be fair to say that, for Lonergan, as regards a first order definition, being will remain a notion for until — like — until the hereafter, let’s say? I mean — because what would constitute being as an object would be the complete set of judgments about being, right? — which is outside the scope of presumably what we will come to know, not what we can know, here on our journey\textsuperscript{15} as human beings?

Pat: Ah, yes. Now, the tricky thing in that is: you said what would constitute being is the complete set of judgments. What would constitute knowledge of being would be the complete set of judgments. Importantly, being is not what we judge that to be. We judge it to be because it’s being! So — but the gist of what you’re getting at is quite right: that because of the inexhaustibility of our desire, of our inquiry, whatever assembly of judgments and insights we muster in our lifetime will never be equal to the total knowledge of being, will never be equal to what we really desire! We desire more than we know.

\textsuperscript{15} Word indecipherable.
Question confirming that the notion of being is the *eros* of the mind, the pure desire and reasonable anticipation to know.

— Subsequent discussion of the immediate anticipation of being; the pure desire to know everything about everything, which is even prior to our ability to articulate any questions.

— Built upon this immediate anticipation of being, are all mediated ideas or assertions about being.

There was somebody else there had a question? [name inaudible].

Student: So the notion of being is the *eros* of the mind, the pure desire to know?

Pat: That’s right!

Student: A desire that intends to know everything about everything!

Pat: That’s right!

Student: It is the intelligent, reasonable anticipation of all there is to be known?

Pat: That’s right! That’s right! And by intelligent and reasonable anticipation, what we mean is the desire, the inquiry. There are what you might call kind of second mediated anticipations that being will be the material, that being will be [word indecipherable], that being will be intelligible. Those are anticipations that are built upon insights or oversights that we have had a long while. Before we have any of those mediated anticipations about being, we have an immediate anticipation about being, we generate inquiry. It’s in the formally dynamic structure that is driven by our desire to know.

Student: So we consider before we can articulate a question?
Pat: Yes, Yes. It’s what back in chapter one he throws out this idea of the pure question, before we put the questions into words! And by putting our questions into words, we sometimes skew them, or direct them, or narrow them, or focus them. Prior to the formulation of question, there is pure question, which is the notion of being, the desire that wants to know everything about everything!

But what we are trying to get at is something different. Where does the ‘Why?’ come from? What does it reveal or represent? Already we had occasion to speak of the psychological tension that had its release in the joy of discovery. It is that tension, that drive, that desire to understand, that constitutes the primordial ‘Why?’ Name it what you please — alertness of mind, intellectual curiosity, the spirit of inquiry, active intelligence, the drive to know. Under any name, it remains the same; and is, I trust, very familiar to you.

This primordial drive, then, is the pure question. It is prior to any insights, any concepts, any words; for insights, concepts, words have to do with answers, and before we look for answers we want them; such wanting is the pure question.

On the other hand, though the pure question is prior to insights, concepts, and words, it presupposes experiences and images. Just as insight is into the concretely given or imagined, so the pure question is about the concretely given or imagined. It is the wonder which Aristotle claimed to be the beginning of all science and philosophy. But no one just wonders. We wonder about something. (CWL 3, Insight, p. 34, emphases added).

Question whether the eros for being can be of different intensity in different people?
— Not a different natural, inherent intensity of desire to know being, but there are differences in the intensity in ways the desire is appropriated.

— Discussion of how the notion of being is naturally present in all, but is indeed appropriated differently. How people choose to cooperate with the unrestricted desire to know, or not.

Pat: Elizabeth?

Elizabeth: Is the notion or anticipation of being something that can be different — sort of a different intensity in different people, maybe depending on how much they really feel like they’re bothered to learn about being, or —

Pat: — Oh, that’s a really good question! At some time I was going to draw attention to a passage where Lonergan talks about that. Yeah, that’s quite right! It’s of a different intensity. It isn’t a different natural intensity; it’s a different appropriated intensity! As we saw when we were looking at the chapters on common sense (chapter six: “Common Sense and Its Subject” and chapter seven: “Common Sense as Object”) there are personal and social biases: and the basic characteristic of a bias is an interference in the dynamism of self-correction. So people, to the extent to which any of us is subject to a bias, it interferes with our spontaneous dynamic questioning. And self-appropriation is actually a matter of holding back something that’s very spontaneous. So yeah! People have been — It’s not because some people have the inquiry gene and some people don’t.

Elizabeth: Uh, huh!

Pat: We’ll see when we get to chapter fifteen (“Elements of Metaphysics”), that Lonergan has some remarks on genuineness. In Insight, he is using the

16 This word is not certain: ‘holding’ is a surmise.
word ‘genuineness’; after *Insight* he will shift to the more commonly used term ‘authenticity’. But he will talk in chapter fifteen about *the genuineness or the authenticity of the simple and honest soul*; and then about the authenticity or genuineness that has to be won back: what Paul Ricoeur called second naiveté. *That there’s a mediated re-appropriation of the spontaneous inquiry that is our desire for being.* Okay? So yes, some people have greater and lesser intensities, but it’s not a matter of whether they are naturally endowed with this desire to know. It’s a matter of whether or not they have ... I would say, have chosen or decided to cooperate with it to a greater or lesser extent.

**Question about what ‘intending being’ implies.**

Does this mean we can never know the totality of being? Would we have to be God to know being?

— Discussion of how both finite reality and transcendent reality (God) can be intended. **Discussion of human dynamism and our desire to know and intention of being.**

**Student:** The first thing that occurred to me about the dynamic structure of human knowing and being — I hope I’m not like talking, and slowing things, in a way that’s completely wrong, but — If we’re intending being, is it, I think, is that in some ways presuming that we can never know the totality of knowledge, and so by being is almost like an identity to transcendence, to total knowledge, which would be God, unlimited being, transcendent being?

**Pat:** Ah, there’s — He is going to ask — Okay ... The layout of the book is — He’s going to ask *what is it that we can intend, and to some extent know? That is finite reality!* And the definition that he’s given here includes finite reality. And then he’s going to ask whether or not there is anything to reality beyond finite reality. And his answer is going to be yes, there is! And his answer is *that there is not only finite reality but transcendent reality; and it’s a reality that people commonly call ‘God’.*

So where your question is heading is right; but it shouldn’t be — how do I want to say this — you shouldn’t think that what he’s done here is to say that the only thing that our
intention of being is intending is God. Our intention of being is intending everything that is; all of being.

Student: They are one and the same?

Pat: Not quite! Not quite! There is a subtle distinction here. So not all of being is God. But our intending includes all of being, including the divine reality as well. But importantly, he doesn’t — He hasn’t built into these statements, the — In other words, there isn’t the implicit — that the conclusion of a God is not implicit in what he’s saying here. What he’s focusing on is our dynamism, our desire to know, and making a claim about it as intending knowing of being. Okay? … Hopefully, it will become — As we explore our way through this a little bit more, hopefully the answer to your question will become a little clearer. Okay?

Okay! Other questions?

The Intention of Being, Notion of Being (resumed).

A desire to know everything about everything.

Why should this intention be called an ‘intention of being’?

The intention of being is the “originating drive of knowing.”

By our inquiry, we go beyond data to intelligibility, then beyond intelligibility to truth, and through truth to being.

The very notion of knowing implies reality is more than what I know, that being is beyond the humanly known.

Example of trying to defend a solipsistic position — and failing.
Even the solipsistic philosophy betrays a notion of being that goes beyond what it knows.

This notion of being conforms to our expectations about being insofar as the latter includes all that is known and remains to be known.

Intention of Being

Notion of Being

“Accordingly, the dynamic structure of human knowing intends being.” (Cognitional Structure, p. 211).

“Being, then, is the objective of the pure desire to know. By the desire to know is meant the dynamic orientation manifested in questions for intelligence and for reflection.” (Insight, p. 372).

The “desire to know everything about everything.” (Insight, p. 375).

So “the dynamic structure of human knowing intends being.” (Cognitional Structure, p. 211). “Being, then, is the objective of the pure desire to know. By the desire to know is meant the dynamic orientation manifested in questions for intelligence and for reflection.” (Insight, p. 372). It’s a “desire to know everything about everything.” (Insight, p. 375).
The focus is on the desiring and its orientation. Now, just as we could say: Why should the performance of those activities in that formally dynamic structure be called knowing, we can say: *Why should this intention be called an intention of being?* Okay? It looks like Lonergan is doing things by stipulation. It looks like Lonergan is doing things by definition. He’s not, but it sure looks that way at times!!

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**Intention of Being**

**Notion of Being**

The intention of Being, “is the originating drive of human knowing.

Consciously, intelligently, rationally it goes beyond:

- beyond data to intelligibility;
- beyond intelligibility to truth

And through truth to being;

and beyond known truth and being to the truth and being still to be known.”

* (Cognitional Structure, p. 211).

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So to say that, in the beginning of chapter eleven (“Self-affirmation of the Knower”): and by knowing, I mean, no more than the performance of experiencing, of inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, marshalling and weighing the evidence, grasping the virtually unconditioned, and judging; and by knowing, I mean no more than that
(CWL 3, p. 343), you want to say: “All right, Lonergan, where do you get off?”17 “Where do you get off defining knowing that way? That's just your definition of knowing!

[Subdued amusement in class]

Intention of Being
Notion of Being

“Accordingly, the dynamic structure of human knowing intends being.” (Cognitional Structure, p. 211).

“Being, then, is the objective of the pure desire to know. By the desire to know is meant the dynamic orientation manifested in questions for intelligence and for reflection.” (Insight, p. 372).

The “desire to know everything about everything.” (Insight, p. 375).

Even if I say — as I have to admit I find it difficult not to say — even if I say I do indeed perform those activities, where do you get off calling that knowing? Because, as we saw, the notion that people have of knowing is that it’s got something to do with cognition of reality. Where do you get off telling me that performing those activities gives me cognition of reality?

17 “Where do you get off?” An internet search suggests that this idiom, unknown to the transcriber, is used in challenging a person who has said or done something offensive, as an equivalent of the expression, "how dare you?" For example: “Where do you get off saying such a thing?”
And so his answer is: Because those activities are constituted and underpinned by an intending of being, and by being I mean reality! To which the response of the resident sceptic would be: “Where do you get off saying that that intending is an intending of being?”

So that’s how we’re proceeding here! Why is doing that knowing? Doing that is knowing because those activities are what they are in response to this intention of being! But why is that an intention of being? You know, why isn’t that an intention of marshmallow fluff or something? Why is it an intention of being?

Okay. And so now, he’s going to turn and start to talk about that.

Intention of Being
Notion of Being

The intention of Being, “is the originating drive of human knowing.
Consciously, intelligently, rationally it goes beyond:
beyond data to intelligibility;
beyond intelligibility to truth
And through truth to being;
and beyond known truth and being to the truth and being still to be known.”

(Cognitional Structure, p. 211).

This intention of Being, “is the originating drive of human knowing.” (Cognitional Structure, p. 211). Okay. So for a moment let’s grant that. And hopefully by your own self-appropriation, you can grant that there is this recurring pattern of inquiry that goes beyond, as he says here: “Consciously, intelligently, rationally it goes beyond” (Cognitional Structure, p. 211). That’s its dynamism. It’s dynamism is to go beyond! It goes beyond
data, “beyond data to intelligibility.” It goes “beyond intelligibility to truth” (Cognitional Structure, p. 211). Truth in the sense of judgments, affirmed or denied, on the basis of the sufficiency of evidence known in the grasp of the virtually unconditioned. That’s what truth means here.

There’s going to be a section on truth later on, in chapter seventeen (CWL 3, Metaphysics as Dialectic). For the moment, he throws in the word ‘truth’ without having told us what he means by truth. But for here — Well, actually he has, because he wrote “Cognitional Structure” before he wrote Insight. Beyond intelligibility to truth. “And through truth to being” (Cognitional Structure, p. 211).

He has that phrase: “Beyond images and shadows into truth.” And I thought it was Plato, but it’s actually … Does anyone know where it comes from? … John Henry Cardinal Newman. It’s the epitaph — it’s on the gravestone. “Beyond images and shadows into truth.” And Lonergan, as I think I mentioned at the beginning of last semester, one of the big influences on him was Newman. And that’s one of the things quoted that he took from Newman: is that by our intention we go beyond, by our dynamism, by our inquiry, we go beyond data, we go beyond images, we go beyond shadows for intelligibility, and even there is not enough: we go beyond the intelligible to truth, and by truth to being.

“And beyond known truth and being to the truth and being still to be known.” (Cognitional Structure, p. 211). Beyond known truth and known being, to truth and being still to be known. Now why did I put that last phrase up there? … In part because our sense of reality, our notion of reality, until we get caught up in the complexities and the difficulties of contemporary thought and contemporary philosophy, our notion of reality is: it’s not real just because I know it, that there’s more to reality than what I know.

That reality — this was expressed a moment ago — There’s more to reality than what I know. That although you can find people who hold a solipsistic position, and hold it with a

18 Insight was first published in 1957, having been largely written as far back as 1953 (see CWL 3, Insight, “Editor’s Preface,” pp. xviii-xxii), whereas the essay “Cognitional Structure” first appeared in “Spirit of Inquiry”: Studies in Honour of Bernard Lonergan (Chicago: Saint Xavier College, a special issue of Continuum, 1964 (see CWL 4, Collection, “Editorial Notes”, p. 300). It is possible of course that earlier drafts of “Cognitional Structure” predate 1957, or even 1953.
certain amount of sophistication, it’s a little hard for most of us, until we’ve gotten led down on the path of a solipsistic philosophy, it’s a little hard for most of us to think that all there is to reality is what I’m thinking! If I think it, it’s there! And if I don’t think it, it’s not there! If I think it, it is, and if I don’t think, it’s not.

Somehow or other our notion of reality, and our notion of knowing, is that there is more to reality than what I happen to know! Lonergan is saying that that is derived from the fact that our inquiry is unrestricted. That it goes beyond! That by the very fact of being dynamically constituted by this intention manifest in our questions, that we already have a notion that there’s more to what is than what we happen to know!

I have to share with you this story. There was a student who defended his dissertation here at Boston College many years ago, when I was a real rookie faculty member. And I ended up as the second reader on this affair. It was about four hundred pages long —

[Some gasps of amazement]

— Well, that’s not uncommon for a doctoral dissertation … sorry to say!

[Laughter]

So the dissertation was about four hundred pages long, and it was a very elaborate staking out of solipsism, in which Einstein’s relativity theory was playing a role, and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems¹⁹ was playing a role — it was a very sophisticated engagement with some of the great intellectual transformations of the twentieth century. And it was all solipsistic!

And although I found myself in complete disagreement, I had to at some point say: “Okay. This person has done a credible job of defending his position. Because the fact that I don’t agree with it — in fact I don’t agree with it because I think it is just wrong! — is not a good enough reason for me to not agree to pass on the dissertation. So he got his defence. I didn’t direct it. I was the second reader. And the director of this was of equal mind as me:

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¹⁹ Gödel's incompleteness theorems are two theorems of mathematical logic that demonstrate the inherent limitations of any formal axiomatic system of a certain expressive power. These results, published by Kurt Gödel in 1931, are important both in mathematical logic and in the philosophy of mathematics. The theorems are widely, but not universally, interpreted as showing that Hilbert’s program to find a complete and consistent set of axioms for all mathematics is impossible.
we didn’t agree with it, but we were all — But you don’t always approve of a dissertation just because you agree with it or with what it’s about.

We get to the defence. It filled up with the Professors, and other graduate students, and everything. And one after another, people tried to just prove to this person that his solipsistic position was untenable. And one person in particular said — He started off by saying: “I feel like I’m in the Coliseum with one of those gladiators with the net and the pitchfork! And I don’t know whether I’m getting a jab of the pitchfork, or have the net thrown over me, as he was defending.” And he finally said: “Do you mean to tell me that you are making up the questions that I am asking you here at this defence?” And the consistent answer would have been: “Yes!” And the candidate didn’t answer that way. He kind of played for insurance [sentence unclear]. But even the fact that he didn’t say: “Yes, I’m making you up asking these questions that I that I haven’t thought of yet, indicates that he still had enough of a notion of being, that there is more to it than he and his solipsistic philosophy knew!

[student amusement]

So there’s more to being than we know! And where do we get that notion from? According to Lonergan, we don’t get that notion from having a concept, or a system, or a theory of being! We get it from an anticipation that we know has not yet been fulfilled by what we have known so far.

So part of the answer to the challenge to Lonergan: “How can you justify calling this dynamism that we have the notion of being? Part of the answer is: It fits the bill of one of the things that we have, that we notionally expect to be the case about being.

Intention of Being.

Notion of Being

“At any time the objective includes both all that is known and all that remain unknown, for it is the goal of the immanent dynamism of cognitional process, and that dynamism both

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underlies actual attainment and heads beyond it with ever further questions.” (CWL 3, p. 373).

“Being, then, is (1) all that is known, and (2) all that remains to be known.” (CWL 3, p. 374).

And he repeats something similar in Insight. That by being is meant both everything I come to know, and everything that remains to be known. Everything that human beings have come to know, and everything that the human race remains to know, that remains ahead. So the objective, being as the objective of this desire includes everything that the desire desires; and it desires to know all that is known and also all that is not yet known.

**Intention of Being.**

**Notion of Being**

The intention of being, “This intrinsic relation of the dynamic structure of human knowing to being and so to reality primarily is not pensée pensée but pensée pensante, not intentio intenta but intentio intendens, not noema but noesis. It is the originating drive of human knowing.” (CWL 4, Collection, “Cognitional Structure”, p. 211).

Okay. We talked about this already. So the intention of being is the “intrinsic relation of the dynamic structure of human knowing to being. … It is the originating drive of human knowing.” (“Cognitional Structure”, p. 211).

Not only do we have a desire manifest in our
inquiring; in addition that desire is *unrestricted*.

This claim is of the *utmost* importance in all of Lonergan’s philosophy (and theology).

The dynamic inquiry must be unrestricted to attain objectivity.
The invulnerability of insights (as grounds of virtually unconditioned judgments) depends on the unrestrictedness of the notion of being.

If there were realities about which we could not ask, then the criterion of “no further pertinent questions” would be irrelevant to the objectivity of knowing.

Unrestricted Intention & Notion

“Accordingly, the dynamic structure of human knowing intends being. That intention is unrestricted, for there is nothing that we cannot at least question. The same intention is comprehensive, for questioning probes every aspect of everything; its ultimate goal is the universe in its full concreteness.” (CWL 4, Collection, “Cognitive Structure”, p. 211).

The “desire to know everything about everything.” (CWL 3, Insight, p. 375).

The second move here is that the intention is unrestricted! And I am firmly convinced that Lonergan is right about this. And if I thought he was wrong, I would just stop teaching Lonergan altogether, and I would start proselytizing against Lonergan, and saying: “You’re wasting your time reading him!” If Lonergan is wrong about our dynamic inquiry as being unrestricted, then his philosophy is built on sand! This unrestrictedness is so dreadfully important about his philosophy: it’s absolutely essential to his account of objectivity. If our inquiry is not unrestricted, then there are realities about which we cannot ask! And the criterion of the infallibility of judgment, the invulnerability of a judgement,
excuse me, the invulnerability of insight, the criterion of the invulnerability of an insight, is meaningless! An insight is correct if there are no further pertinent questions!

You remember Lonergan saying it’s not just because no further questions occur to me, because they might not occur to me because of my bias, or because of the lack of my appropriated intensity, as Elizabeth was saying. The criterion of the correctness of insights as virtually unconditioned depends profoundly upon the fact that there isn’t anything you can’t ask about. If there are things that constitutionally human beings, as human beings, cannot ask about, then there are modifications, corrections, reversals, disclaimers, about our virtually unconditioned judgments that we have no access to by our inquiry, or by any other part of our cognitional structure; and therefore we can’t know what is!

So it’s crucial for Lonergan’s project that we not only have an intention that’s manifest in our questions, but that that intention is unrestricted, and has no limits whatsoever!

The ideals of knowing (produced by history of philosophy and science) versus the spontaneous ideal, notion of knowing (the pure and unrestricted desire to know).

The spontaneous notion of being is invariant and common to all.

Developmentally delayed humans do have a spontaneous, unrestricted notion of being, even though they do not always come up with insights as fast as others.

And, I said I was going to refer to the section in Insight where Lonergan takes up this issue of the unconditioned-ness, which is so central to his philosophical project. And so if you take a look on page 377. So in section three, entitled “A Spontaneous Notion”, he again comes to this theme that we talked about way back at the beginning of the first semester: the
distinction between the ideal of knowing, or the ideals of knowing, that are the products of certain developments in cultures and in the history of philosophy and in the history of science versus the spontaneous notion, or if you like the spontaneous ideal of knowing.

A distinction has to be drawn between the spontaneously operative notion and, on the other hand, theoretical accounts of its genesis and content. The spontaneously operative notion is invariant; it is common to all men; it functions in the same manner no matter what theoretical account of it a man may come to accept. (CWL 3, p. 377)

“A distinction has to be drawn between the spontaneously operative notion” the pure and unrestricted desire to know, “and, on the other hand, theoretical accounts of its genesis and content. The spontaneously operative notion is invariant; it is common to all” human beings. (CWL 3, p. 377, emphases added).

That’s why Father Flanagan says that we all have a common identity. Every human being desires to know unrestrictedly! And this is the case for people that we classify as having mental retardation of various kinds. Anyone who’s ever worked with people who are learning challenged, knows that there’s no limit to their questions. They are not as quick at getting certain kinds of insights as quote unquote normal people are; but they’re absolutely normal in their capacity to inquire, that foundational ground of their place in the identity — their identity with other human beings in the human race.

And that spontaneous notion “functions in the same manner no matter what theoretical account of it a” person “may come to accept.” (CWL 3, p. 377). It functions in this dynamic, self-correcting, self-assembling, self-modifying, fashion that we talked about.

Skipping on to the next paragraph:

“On the supposition of our analysis of cognitional process, it is easy enough to conclude that the spontaneously operative notion of being has to be placed
in the pure desire to know.” (CWL 3, p. 377, emphasis added).

And so when I was asking you before: What’s the notion? The notion is the desire, the desire that is the dynamism that is manifest, makes itself present so to speak, in our finite questions, but is not exhausted by any of those finite questions!

Lonergan counters objections to the notion of being as unrestricted desire to know.

Efforts to establish that the notion is not all-inclusive turn out to suppose that very unrestrictedness.

Okay. So let’s go back to page 375:

One may wonder just how all-inclusive being is. That wonder may be formulated in a variety of manners. But no matter how it is formulated, no matter whether it can be formulated, it can serve only to show how all-inclusive being is. (CWL 3, p. 375, emphases added).

He’s also showing how unrestricted our desire to know is.

For the wonder is inquiry. It is the desire to know. Anything it can discover or invent, by that very fact is included in the notion of being. Hence the effort to establish that being is not all-inclusive must be self-defeating; for at the root of all that can be affirmed, at the root of all that can be conceived, is the pure desire to know; and it is the pure desire, underlying all judgment and formulation, underlying all questioning and all desire to question, that defines its all-inclusive objective.

Nonetheless, it may not be amiss to illustrate this principle concretely. It will be said that there is much
we do not know. No doubt, our ignorance is great, but we know that fact by raising questions that we do not answer; and being is defined not only by the answers we give but also by the questions we ask. (CWL 3, p. 375, emphasis added).

So there he is responding to the claim that: “Well, your definition of being as the objective of this pure desire is deficient, because you haven’t included everything!” And he’s saying, “Well, I didn’t say that I included everything in the first order definition, because that way I gave you a direct definition of being; I gave it in a second order definition of being as that which is defined by its intrinsic relation to the orientation of inquiry.

Next, it will be said that there is much it would be futile for us to try to learn. No doubt, the proximately fruitful field of inquiry is restricted. But we know that fact by distinguishing between the questions we can hope soon to answer and those that as yet we are not prepared to tackle; and being is defined, not only by the questions we can hope to answer, but also by the questions whose answer we have to postpone. (CWL 3, p. 375, emphasis added).

So in other words, what he’s saying is that that kind of objection to the definition already presupposes the unrestrictedness of desire, because there are questions that you have to set aside; and that means that there are questions that you are already aware of, that have been manifestations of this desire.

Thirdly, it will be objected by many that they have no desire to know everything about everything. But how do they know that they do not already know everything about everything? It is because so many questions can be asked. Why do they not effectively will to know everything about everything? Because it is so troublesome to reach even a few answers that they
are completely disheartened by the prospect of answering all the questions they could ask. (CWL 3, p. 375, emphasis added).

So Elizabeth’s question earlier about: do some people have the intensity, and some people have given up the hope, and some people given up the enthusiasm for it — That does not mean that they don’t have an unrestricted desire to know; in fact it presupposes that they do! Otherwise they would have no way of knowing that they don’t already know everything — or they would have no way of knowing how daunting the task is.

“The attack may be made from the opposite flank. The trouble is that the definition of being is too inclusive. Questions can be meaningless, illusory, incoherent, illegitimate. Trying to answer them does not lead to knowledge of anything. Now, no doubt, there are mistaken questions that lead nowhere. But mistaken questions are formulated questions. Being has been defined, not as the objective of formulated questions, but as the objective of the pure desire to know.” (CWL 3, pp. 375-376).

So questions can arise, and they can met by, among other things, the inverse insights, which recognize that the way in which the question has been formulated has a built-in assumption that needs to be corrected.

Lonergan’s several variations, or corollaries, to his basic second-order definition of being as the “objective of the unrestricted desire to know.” (See handout.)

— Being known in the totality of true judgments.
—A judgment is an incremental knowing of being, but is not yet the totality of judgments that amounts to knowing
Why is the totality of being said to be known in the totality of corrected judgments?

The shift in the way the second order definition is formulated:

— What's intended by all questioning → what is known in the totality of all judgments.

Why are these formulations equivalent?

**Why a Notion of Being?**

“since a complete increment of knowing occurs only in judgment, being is what is to be known by the totality of true judgments.” (*CWL* 3, p. 374, emphasis added).

“Judging is a complete increment in knowing; if correct, it is a knowing of being; but it is not yet knowing being, for that is attained only through the totality of correct judgments.” (*CWL* 3, p. 378, emphases added).

“It [i.e., that complete totality] is the complete set of answers to the complete set of questions.” (*CWL* 3, p. 374, emphasis added).
Now take a look at the handout that I gave you! So these are several of the ways in which Lonergan gives a variation on the theme of his definition of being; his basic second order definition of being is as follows:

Being is the objective of the pure and unrestricted desire to know.

But that definition has a variety of consequences. And one of the consequences is the one that’s about a third of the way down the page of the handout; it’s the one I have up on the slide.

“Since a complete increment of knowing occurs only in judgment, being is what is to be known by\(^{20}\) the totality of true judgments.” (CWL 3, p. 374, emphasis added).

“Judging is a complete increment in knowing; if correct, it is a knowing of being; but it is not yet knowing being, for that is attained only through the totality of correct judgments.” (CWL 3, p. 378, emphases added).

Notice, I’ve emphasized there “a knowing of being” as opposed to “knowing being”, because to know being would be to have the answers to all questions. So every judgment is a knowing of being, but it is not yet knowing being! “It is not yet knowing being, for that is attained only through the totality of correct judgments.” (CWL 3, p. 378, emphases added).

Now, let’s dwell on that for a moment. Because the intention of being, because the notion of being, is manifest in the totality, is the objective of the totality of all questions for intelligence and reasonableness, or questions of the what? Why? Where? How? When? Who? kind, and questions of the Is it so? kind. Among the questions that have to be answered are the Is it so? questions. And the proper answers to those are in judgments! Why is the totality of being, then, properly said to be known in the totality of all correct judgments — all

\(^{20}\) Pat uses the preposition ‘in’ rather than Lonergan’s ‘by’ at this point; note that ‘in’ also replaces ‘by’ in the slide.
judgments that have been corrected by the dynamic self-correcting process? Why is being to be known in the totality of correct judgments? …

Student: Can that ever happen? I mean, if it’s unrestricted desire to know, and if the questions themselves are unrestricted, then in what sense could you reach a totality?

Pat: Well, notice what he’s doing! This is just another second order definition, right? He gave a first order definition which has built into it an assumption “that there’s a dynamic orientation”; which is something that perhaps is no longer as problematic!

We’ve talked a little bit about whether or not that dynamic orientation is unrestricted. I want to go back to that again.

But now what he’s done is to shift to another second order definition, which he’s claimed is equivalent to the first. So if the first order definition — If the first of the second order definitions is:

\[
\text{being is what’s intended in all questions for intelligence and reasonableness,}
\]

the second version of that is:

\[
\text{being is what is to be known in the totality of all correct judgments. Okay?}
\]

So whether or not it’s possible is not the point. The point is that these are equivalent formulations of an anticipation:

\[
\text{On the one hand, the anticipation refers us directly to the dynamism and the desire of our inquiry;}
\]

\[
\text{on the other hand, the anticipation refers us to activities that are attained in so far as we follow through on that that process, that dynamic process, okay?}
\]

So all he is doing is saying that

by being I mean, what’s intended in all questioning,
by being I mean what would be known in the totality of all judgments, where they do come from.\textsuperscript{21}

Well, why is that an equivalent? …

Student response reveals the reason why the dynamic orientation of cognitional structure is indeed directed towards being – why it is properly called a “notion of being”:

The very structure of our knowing is oriented towards ‘is’

The primordial meaning of ‘is’ is our anticipation of “Yes, it \emph{is}.”

A correct judgment confirms ‘isness’.

The totality of correct judgments would affirm the totality of ‘isness,’ the totality of being.

The dynamic structure of knowing is oriented towards being because it is oriented by all the questions about what is; it is oriented towards the totality of judgments about what is, what we have known or may know.

\begin{small}
\textbf{Why a Notion of Being?}

\textbf{“since a complete increment of knowing occurs only in judgment, being is what is to be known}

\end{small}

\textsuperscript{21} Perhaps Pat’s phrase, which seems to be “where they do come from,” refers back to “that dynamic process” four lines earlier.
by the totality of true judgments.” (CWL 3, p. 374, emphasis added).

“Judging is a complete increment in knowing; if correct, it is a knowing of being; but it is not yet knowing being, for that is attained only through the totality of correct judgments.” (CWL 3, p. 378, emphases added).

“It [i.e., that complete totality] is the complete set of answers to the complete set of questions.” (CWL 3, p. 374, emphasis added).

So to repeat the point, notice that all he is doing is saying that by being I mean, what’s intended in all questioning, by being I mean what would be known in the totality of all judgments, where they do come from.

Well, why is that an equivalent? … Matt?

Matt: Well, the first thing that I thought of when I read this quote was that — the canon of complete explanation — that all data are to be explained. And as far as questions for intelligence, we could do that, but then, once we go to the level of judgment, we have to answer the question Is it so?! Right. And so every time we make a judgement we are saying Yes, and by saying Yes, that’s the increment.

Pat: And we’re saying yes, yes to what?

Matt: Yes, it is so! Yes it is!

Pat: Yes it is! That’s right! So, in other words, what Matt just brought out is that in the very structure of our knowing, there’s an orientation towards ‘is’! And the primordial meaning of ‘is’ is our anticipation of saying, Yes, it is! When we make an affirmative correct judgment we are affirming ‘isness.’ We are affirming something about being, something about what is! The totality of correct judgments, and the totality of affirmations about what is, the totality of ‘isness,’ and our unrestricted desire, is oriented towards the totality of what is!
What we learn by the — This is a kind of the amazing thing about what Lonergan is pointing to\textsuperscript{22} here. By recognising that every Is it so? question has a direct borrowed content; its direct borrowed content is the intelligibility about which it asks Is it so? The ‘it’ that’s being asked about is the intelligibility grasped in some insight; because insights are situated in this dynamic structure, a dynamic structure that’s never satisfied with just insights, but has the dynamic orientation to go beyond the intelligibility grasped in insights to ask about their ‘isness.’

*That means that to say* — the totality of questions — *to say that being is what’s to be known in the answers to the totality of questions equivalently is to say it’s what’s to be known in the totality of judgments*, because the judgments implicitly include all the insights.

But what he’s doing here is emphasizing that in judging we’re affirming ‘isness.’ And this is really — if you put together the various pieces that I’ve kept bouncing around here for the last half-hour or so — we have a notion of knowing: our notion of knowing is that it’s cognition of what really is; our dynamic structure is oriented towards being, because it’s oriented towards the totality of judgments about what is; and it’s oriented not just for what we have known or what we may know in our life-time, but in the totality of ‘isnesses’ that we may never ourselves know. So being is about the totality of what is.

*So where does he get off saying that the dynamic orientation of our cognitional structure is the notion of being? That comes from the fact that that notion, that orientation, leads us inevitably to all the questions about what is, about ‘isness.’ And it heads us in the direction of knowing everything about everything that is, all that is, all the isnesses of what is. Okay?*

*So that’s why it’s a notion of being. And it’s important that that be unrestricted, because otherwise there might be beings, or real dimensions of beings, about which we cannot ask; and therefore our inquiring intention is short of the fullness of all that is! Okay?*

**Student question about whether the definition of ‘is’ is atemporal.**

\textsuperscript{22} Sound uncertain: transcriber’s conjecture.
— Indeed. It refers to what was, or is not yet, as well as to the immediate present.

All right! Let me stop there and see if people have questions. There are puzzled looks on people’s faces. … But that’s why it’s a notion of being! … Matt?

Matt: Is his definition of ‘is’ there, is it atemporal, or is it —

Pat: Yes, that’s right! Good point! Yes, it’s atemporal! It’s not just in the immediate present of isness.

Matt: It’s not like, what was, or what is now, or —

Pat: It includes what was, and what is to be!

Matt: Okay!

Pat: Yeah! That’s a very good point! And so — and he actually, in a later article, he talks about that. That it’s, so to speak, isness is with a time frame, added on. So it’s not just what is now present, but always — it includes all of time. True affirmations are true affirmations about what was and what is not yet, as well. Ahm, okay.

Knowing is intrinsically objective and not restricted to the immanence of consciousness, because our unrestricted desire asks about everything about everything, including whether our understanding is of an appearance or a reality.

Our asking whether there is anything beyond our consciousness shows the orientation of our consciousness to what transcends it.

Objectivity is not knowing ‘what's outside my
Let me just join where we started with this last observation. Knowing is intrinsically objective! Knowing is not just restricted to the immanence of consciousness, because first of all, our unrestricted intention asks about everything about everything! As he says in the article on “Cognitional Structure”, it isn’t just appearances that we ask about, we ask about whether or not the appearances are real.

We may not be able to answer all, or perhaps even very many of those questions, but our intention of what is is the standard by means of which we can adjudicate on whether or not our knowledge is of what is or is not.
Why a Notion of Being?

“since a complete increment of knowing occurs only in judgment, being is what is to be known by the totality of true judgments.” (CWL 3, p. 374, emphasis added).

“Judging is a complete increment in knowing; if correct, it is a knowing of being; but it is not yet knowing being, for that is attained only through the totality of correct judgments.” (CWL 3, p. 378, emphases added).

“It [i.e., that complete totality] is the complete set of answers to the complete set of questions.” (CWL 3, p. 374, emphasis added).

But the intrinsic character of our human knowing is its orientation towards being.

The intrinsic objectivity of human cognitional activity is its intentionality. Nor need this intentionality be inferred, for it is the dominant content of the dynamic structure that assembles and unites several activities into a single knowing of a single object. Human intelligence actively greets every content of experience with the perplexity, the wonder, the drive, the intention, that may be thematised by (but does not consist in) such questions as What is it? Why is it so? Inquiry through insight issues forth in thought that, when scrutinized, becomes formulated in definitions, postulates, suppositions, hypotheses, theories.
Thought in turn is actively greeted by human rationality with a reflective exigence that, when thematised, is expressed in such questions as, Is that so? Are you certain? All marshalling and weighing of evidence, all judging and doubting, are efforts to say of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not. Accordingly, the dynamic structure of human knowing intends being. That intention is unrestricted, for there is nothing that we cannot at least question. The same intention is comprehensive, for questioning probes every aspect of everything; its ultimate goal is the universe in its full concreteness. Being in that sense is identical with reality: as apart from being there is nothing, so apart from reality there is nothing; as being embraces the concrete totality of everything, so too does reality. (CWL 4, Collection, “Cognitional Structure,” p. 211).

Objectivity

Objectivity of the already-out-there-now
Vs.
Objectivity of human knowing

The intrinsic character of our human knowing is its orientation towards being. It’s not confined to the immanent, interior, internal, experiences of our consciousness, because our questioning can and does ask whether there is anything beyond that. And that, by its very
self, shows that our consciousness is oriented towards whatever is not confined relative to just our own subjectivity.
It also rests on an unconditioned result. So whether or not we ever do know any beings depends on whether or not we have ever made — grasped a virtually unconditioned, and made a judgment on the basis of that! When we do we have known something objectively as the way it is. So objectivity properly phrased is not the problem of how do I get from inside the immanence of my consciousness to transcend to the outside of the tree that’s out there.

Knowing-as-Looking vs. Self-Transcendence
Philip McShane

Objectivity of human consciousness has to do with whether or not we know the way things actually are! The inside and outside is eliminated from the proper reformulation of objectivity. Objectivity is not How do I know what’s outside of my consciousness?! Objectivity is How do I know what is?! And I know what is because I reached a virtually unconditioned under the strict regulation of my unrestricted — that the demands of my unrestricted desire to know places upon me before I affirm or deny something in a judgment. Okay?

Intrinsic objectivity then is that we can know, not everything about everything that is, but something about the somethings that are. And when we grasp a virtually unconditioned in that way, we have objective knowledge. Okay? Okay! Any questions? … Okay!
A final question to consider: *In self-affirmation, am I knowing myself as subject or as object?*

So there are a couple of things about the division of objectivity into three parts that we may have time to go over, and I’ll do that at the beginning of class next week. And I want to return to the question, and I’ll remind you: the question about when you affirm yourself in self-affirmation, are you knowing yourself as subject or as object? The self-affirmation of yourself as subject, subject as subject or subject as object? — the distinction that he draws there in “Cognitional Structure”.

And to make the question perhaps a little simpler: remember we said last week, *Self-affirmation is not affirming the totality of yourself; it’s not knowledge of everything about yourself. There is some fundamental way in which, for all of us, we remain as a mystery to ourselves. There are always going to be dimensions of ourselves, realities about ourselves, that are going to lie beyond our own self-knowledge. So self-affirmation is not the same as complete self-knowledge. But it is knowledge of oneself as a knower. It’s knowledge of oneself as a being who in fact is constituted by this dynamic structure that we talked about so much today. That said, are you affirming yourself as a knower as subject, or affirming yourself as a knower as object? Is your knowledge of yourself as a knower really about you, or is it about you as object?*

So hopefully we’ll begin talking a little bit about that tripartite distinction of objectivity that Lonergan develops in chapter thirteen, “*The Notion of Objectivity*” *(CWL 3, pp. 399-409)*; and look at this question about whether or not self-affirmation is of the subject as subject. And then we’ll start talking about chapter fourteen on “*The Method of Metaphysics*”. So for next time, do read chapter fourteen, “*The Method of Metaphysics*” *(CWL 3, pp. 410-455).*

**End of Class 16**