

Insight and Beyond

Class 19, Part One: February 17th 2010

“The Integral Heuristic Structure of Proportionate Being: What is it?”

(*Insight*, Chapter 15: “*Elements of Metaphysics*”)

Summary of Material

Review of the Notion of Metaphysics as Heuristic and Dialectical.

Radical openness of Lonergan’s notion of metaphysics.

Illustration of this notion with the statement: “There is a gene for everything.”

Metaphysics asks what can be known here and now about the future explanation of the whole of proportionate being.

Student question about knowing the whole of proportionate being versus knowing all of being.

- Distinction between what can be known of being through the totality of possible human experience, understanding and judgment, versus knowing what is to be known as the totality of answers to all questions for intelligence and reasonableness.

- In other words, this leaves open whether there may be questions about realities for which there are no correlative elements of direct human experience.
- Elaboration. Data on religious experience, for example, has to do with human's experiences of themselves, but not experiences of God as such.

The difference between an *integral* heuristic structure and a heuristic structure.

The definition of proportionate being as 'that which is to be known' through the totality of human experience is a heuristic structure, but not the integral heuristic structure.

What, then, is missing from the definition of proportionate being?

It is *an* heuristic structure; why is it not *the integral* heuristic structure?

What is included in this notion of an integral heuristic structure of proportionate being?

Class discussion of what is included: empirical science; commonsense; indirect knowledge of other's direct experiences; what is to be known about all *possible* human experiences (for example, I *ask* about what a hockey game is, even if I don't play).

What is included is knowledge from all fields, *purged* of biases and counterpositions.

Discussion of knowing about realities of which one has direct as well as indirect experiences, and the implications for an objective historical science.

Additional things included in the definition of proportionate being: perfect circle and other nonimaginable realities referenced by explanatory definitions.

Relations among what is known by different people out of their different experiences; the relations among the sciences, and among science and commonsense are also included under the integral structure of proportionate being.

Student question about how we can know when the whole of proportionate being is known.

- Can only know when all of proportionate being is known, is when there are no further pertinent questions.
- The point is, something can be said about the structure of the whole, even without knowing everything about proportionate being.
- Lonergan is not too subtly rebuking Kant's position that noumenal reality is an unknowable, inaccessible regulative idea.

Again, why isn't the definition of proportionate being a complete account of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being?

- Student question for clarification of what this question is asking about, and response.
- Student suggestion that what is missing from the definition but is intended in the integral heuristic structure are the noetic dimensions — the noetic self as a knower and performer (over and above sense perception). But those dimensions *are* intended in the definition, since there are also the experiences of the data of consciousness, and all that is to be understood and affirmed about those (e.g., “self-affirmation” and “reduplication of the structure”).
- The subject-object division takes place within proportionate being, and thus the knowing self and the self's knowing are parts of proportionate being.
- “Somehow finality is left out.”
- Suggestion that the problem is that the definition of proportionate being is vulnerable to change.

Student question about whether if a person knew everything about everything about proportionate being, would they still not be God?

- This hypothetical person would not be a metaphysician, would not be doing metaphysics, which asks about what can be known about the whole *prior* to knowing everything about proportionate being.
- But such a hypothetical person would still not be God, because there are things still not known to such a person.

Metaphysics is as rich as possible an account we can give about the whole prior to complete knowledge of all of proportionate being.

Lonergan is implying that the definition of proportionate being does not yet achieve the full richness that is possible for such an account.

Further discussion of what is missing from definition of proportionate being:

- Higher viewpoints, inquiry about inquiry itself (related to finality), inverse insights, certain heuristic notions (classical, statistical, genetic, dialectical) — none of these are *explicitly* mentioned in the definition of proportionate being. So the definition does not explicitly include their implications for filling out the integral structure.
- Also missing: The “Notion” of a Thing and what it means to understand a thing.
- Likewise, explanatory genera and species.

Chapter fifteen is where Lonergan lays out the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being, though he never explicitly tells the reader that is what he is doing in this chapter.

The various grounds of the four heuristic methods — classical, statistical, dialectical, and genetic — and the argument that there are four and only four.

Elaboration of how the four heuristic structures (classical, statistical, genetic, dialectical) interact.

Lonergan claims that these four methods, once integrated with one another, are able to comprehend the totality of proportionate being —

- A claim he will later expand and modify so as to more adequately give an account of the integral heuristic structure required to anticipate the knowing of all human reality. (See *Method and Theology*, which could have been called “Method of Human Studies”).

Student request for an example of a dialectical phenomenon that is not directly intelligible.

- Discussion of the financial crisis: how credit must be grounded in intelligible expectations of future results. How unintelligent and unreasonable were the expectations of the housing market banks to take a different approach to risk, and the results.
- Ignoring questions and insights creates unintelligible transitions from one system to another.

The Four Basic Kinds of Scientific Heuristic Methods:

The combination of the first two methods (classical and statistical) gives emergent probability, *a limited kind of* integral heuristic structure, because it integrates two other heuristic structures.

Moreover, these two methods constitute the worldview or the metaphysics consistent with these practices of modern science.

Adding the final two methods will give a still fuller integral heuristic structure of proportionate being (i.e., a *generalized* emergent probability).

Clarification of heuristic method in relation to heuristic notion:
“Methods are heuristic notions put on their feet.”

Finality.

The generalized emergent probability situates things in their emergent order, i.e. within finality.

One does not really know a thing, until one knows where it sits in finality.

Definition of finality: “upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism towards an ever fuller realization of being.”

Diagram of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being:
from the big bang through systematic processes, developmental processes, and dialectical processes.

The whole is dynamic, it is a structured dynamic of stages and components.

Student question about the differences between finality, emergent probability and integral heuristic structure.

– Finality is the most fundamental aspect of the real.

- The integral heuristic structure of proportionate being is the anticipation of what it would be to know finality.
- Emergent probability is a subset or partial fulfillment of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being; it is partial insofar as it cannot fully account for life and development.
- Hence needs to be complemented by a generalized emergent probability that incorporates genetic (and dialectical) methods.
- Discussion of generalized emergent probability and its incorporation of the latter.

The Two Big Points of Chapter Fifteen:

- (1) The whole in proportionate being is finality.
- (2) The implications of (1) for self-appropriation.

Finality is upwardly directed but not deterministic; not a nice straight line of progress; it includes dead ends and blind alleys.

Difference between finality and some common ideas about final causality.

Finality is not a pull exerted by the future on the present (this is actually efficient causality); this is one of the counterpositions Lonergan had to contend with.

Finality is what is being realized by present motion in its fullness.

Lonergan does not explicitly deal with what he thinks is the proper understanding of final causality until Chapter 19.

The final cause (properly understood) of a growing child is his or her *whole life*, i.e. the whole series of their acts over their lifetime or in history.

But to talk about finality, don't we need to know how things will turn out?

Is the final cause of the acorn to be an oak? Or to be dinner for a squirrel?

The final cause of the acorn, or of the whole universe, has to do with its *internal dynamics*, not the end product.

End of Part One.

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Review of the Notion of Metaphysics as Heuristic and Dialectical.

Radical openness of Lonergan’s notion of metaphysics.

Illustration of this notion with the statement: “There is a gene for everything.”

Metaphysics asks what can be known here and now about the future explanation of the whole of proportionate being.

Welcome to our “Insight and Beyond” class. I have to confess that this is my favourite chapter (*CWL* 3, chapter fifteen, “**Elements of Metaphysics**”, pp. 456-511).

[Loud unbelieving class laughter].

But it’s obviously a very very complicated and intricate chapter! So we’ll do what we can to give an overview and give it some of the highlights and the details; and I do invite your questions or comments as we go along and give you anything that perhaps we don’t get to cover.

So I just wanted to remind us where we ended last time. Remember we were talking about metaphysics as dialectical. And that *one of the things that Lonergan understands by metaphysics is that it’s about the whole in knowing, but not the whole of knowing!* And I’ve

been suggesting that *Lonergan's metaphysics is more radically open than a great many other*

claims or positions about what the whole is, what the whole of reality is, what the whole of truth is, what the whole of the good is, what the whole of justice is. That Lonergan's metaphysics is a more radically open one because it depends upon our appropriated, unrestricted inquiry. And so that's what distinguishes his metaphysics from just about anyone else's, whether it's an explicit or an implicit idea of metaphysics.

An Illustration

There is a gene for everything.

I left you with a quandary: the question about whether there's a gene for everything. I'm not going to jump into that right away. Hopefully, we will have time to come back to it as we work our way through this chapter on the "**Elements of Metaphysics**" (CWL 3, pp. 456-511). But I suggested in the email to you to think about what is a gene after all? And when people make the claim that there is a gene for everything, they're making it as a claim that knowing genetics, knowing the genetics of the synthesis of proteins in cells in accordance with the codes of DNA in chromosomes, they're suggesting that that explains everything! There's a book, I think called "The God Gene", so religion is explained by genes. And Richard Dawkins more recently, in his book *The God Delusion*¹ argues that! People will argue that there is a philosophy gene, that there is an artistic gene, and so on and so forth. And so the quest is that if you can explain everything if you can identify the genes that are responsible for why things are the way they are, and why they behave the way they do.

So I just wanted that as an illustration to try and make a little more concrete the very very generic sorts of things we were talking about in metaphysics last week; and we're going to be very generic again this week, up to a point. But that is a way of thinking about how do

¹ Richard Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, (London: Black Swan; New Ed with additions) 2007.

you make this concrete, the dialectical engagement using the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being with claims that, for example, genes explain everything.

Metaphysics as Heuristic

“Metaphysics has been conceived as the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being. It envisages an indefinitely remote future date when the whole domain of proportionate being will be understood. It asks what can be known here and now of that future explanation. It answers that, though full explanation may never be reached, at least the structure of that explanatory knowledge can be known at once.” (CWL 3, p. 456).

Now we talked about the notion of metaphysics as heuristic, Lonergan's approach to metaphysics as heuristic last week. This is how one of the opening sentences — This is a couple of the opening sentences from chapter fifteen, “**Elements of Metaphysics**” (CWL 3, pp. 456-511), in which he rearticulates this, but with a certain kind of emphasis.

“Metaphysics has been conceived as the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being.” (CWL 3, p. 456).

Well earlier on he said that metaphysics is conceived as the conception, affirmation, and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being. So this is obviously an abbreviation of what he means. And that heuristic structure

“envisages an indefinitely remote future date when the whole domain of proportionate being will be understood.” (CWL 3, p. 456).

Now that sounds like something he says in chapter fourteen, “*The Method of Metaphysics*” (CWL 3, pp. 410-455), but I think it helps us to give a better sense of what he is

talking about. So “a future date when the whole domain of proportionate being” (CWL 3,

p. 456) is understood would be knowledge of the whole of proportionate being. *And that’s not metaphysics!* That’s the achievements of the human — the human race’s achievement of knowledge. It asks, ‘it’ now being metaphysics as he conceives it, “**It asks what can be known here and now of that future explanation.**” (CWL 3, p. 456). So this side of knowing everything about everything, what can be said about the structure of the whole of proportionate being? And metaphysics

“answers that, though full explanation may never be reached, at least *the structure of that explanatory knowledge can be known at once.*” (CWL 3, p. 456, emphasis added).

And so that’s putting in other terms something of what we saw last week. But it situates it now with that notion that: *Suppose there were a time when humans had successfully understood everything that there is to understand about proportionate being, had asked and answered all the questions about the total possible range of human experience. What can we say here and now, based on self-appropriation, about that?*

Student question about knowing the whole of proportionate being versus knowing all of being.

— Distinction between what can be known of being through the totality of possible human experience, understanding and judgment, versus knowing what is to be known as the totality of answers to all questions for intelligence and reasonableness.

— In other words, this leaves open whether there may be questions about realities for which there are no correlative elements of direct human experience.

— Elaboration. Data on religious experience, for example, has to do with human's experiences of themselves, but not experiences of God as such.

Pat: Greg, did you have a question?

Greg: Yeah. I guess I'm just wondering what does it mean to claim that we would know the whole of proportionate being, and yet not know all of being?

Pat: Oh, *remember he introduces that distinction about **proportionate being**, what is to be known through the totality of possible human experiencing, understanding, and judging. But **being** is defined as what is to be known through the totality of answers to questions for intelligence and reasonableness.*

Greg: So that it would be the human, the qualifier 'human' between the two definitions?

Pat: Well, *it's possible experience, let's say possible human experience. So it is — There may in fact be some domains or some instances or some parts of the totality of being which lie beyond human experience. Proportionate being is everything that can be known that originates in human experiencing; that there are possibly beings or regions of being or a domain of being or a sphere of being — whatever metaphor you want to use for it — that doesn't have any experiential component. So Lonergan is leaving open the question. And as he says back in chapter chapter fourteen, "The Method of Metaphysics" (CWL 3, pp. 410-455), we can at least ask the question about whether there is anything beyond the realm of what can be experienced, understood, and judged by means of human cognitional structure. And so that is an example of a question that questions about being that is not just proportionate being, since being is what's to be known by the totality of answers to the totality of questions that arise from the unrestricted desire to know, that's a question that falls within the definition of being, but not within the definition of proportionate being. And if you ask, is there anything more, is there more to being than that, you're asking a question that goes beyond proportionate being. The answer might be 'No', and then proportionate being is all that there is. But, at the very least, the two definitions are not coterminous. And that's really what he's getting at. And he's leaving open the question about whether there is anything more to being, anything more to reality, than the reality that's accessible to human beings. Okay?*

Greg: Uh, uh.

Pat: I think I mentioned last week: his answer is not ‘No!’ but ‘Yes!’ There is more to reality than that, and, in the first instance, it has to do with the reality of God. One of the Lonergan sound-bites was: “There are no data on God!” That’s going to sound puzzling, and maybe counterfactual to some of you, but we’ll see what he might mean by that.

When we get to this part of the course, when Lonergan gives his account of religious experience, which is not to be found in the book *Insight* — He talks about *mystery* in *Insight*, but he doesn’t talk about religious experience in *Insight*. He didn’t have the clarity about what might be the right way of talking about religious experience in *Insight* that he gained later on. And religious experience, you might say, people might say, is an experience of God. So it would seem to be the case that there are data on God.

But Lonergan is going to argue that religious experience is data on human subjects. It’s about experiences that human subjects have. Now, what kind of experience that is, and how it relates to all the other kinds of experiences that human beings have, we’re going to have to defer that. But just to stay with Greg’s question here a little bit: For Lonergan, religious experience is not about God; it’s about human beings. The argument that there is a Transcendent Being who is the source of the religious experience is a further set of questions and explorations; and he is going to make that argument. But at the very least, the data of religious experience is data of human beings who are experiencing in a specifically religious way. It’s not data on God! That’s jumping ahead; that’s because you asked the question; those are things that are methodically explored in a different way. I’m just jumping ahead for the sake of clarification.

Okay. Other questions? ... All right!

The difference between an *integral* heuristic structure
and a heuristic structure.

The definition of proportionate being as ‘that which is
to be known’ through the totality of human experience
is a heuristic structure, but not the integral heuristic
structure.

What, then, is missing from the definition of proportionate being?

It is *an* heuristic structure; why is it not *the integral* heuristic structure?

What is included in this notion of an integral heuristic structure of proportionate being?

Class discussion of what is included: empirical science; commonsense; indirect knowledge of other's direct experiences; what is to be known about all *possible* human experiences (for example, I *ask* about what a hockey game is, even if I don't play).

What is included is knowledge from all fields, *purged* of biases and counterpositions.

Discussion of knowing about realities of which one has direct as well as indirect experiences, and the implications for an objective historical science.

Metaphysics as Heuristic

A heuristic structure is an ordered set of heuristic notions ...

“an integral heuristic structure is an ordered set of all heuristic notions ...

“the definition of proportionate being ... is an instance of a heuristic structure;

**but is not an instance of an integral heuristic structure,
for it does not exhaust the resources of the human mind in anticipating what it is to know.”** (*CWL 3*, p. 417, emphases added).

So we saw how he begins chapter fifteen (*CWL 3*, “**Elements of Metaphysics**”, pp. 456-511) with a slightly different variation on this idea of: What’s the difference between *the totality of knowledge of proportionate being*, and what it is that metaphysics as *an integral heuristic structure* is about. So I wanted to just recall for us what he means by an *integral heuristic structure*; and that *a heuristic structure* — we talked about classical and statistical heuristic structure earlier in the course, and as I mentioned last week — “**A heuristic structure is an ordered set of heuristic notions.**” (*CWL 3*, p. 417). And remember *notions are the anticipations of how questions are going to be answered what kinds of activities are going to lead to those answers*. And then “**an integral heuristic structure is an ordered set of all heuristic notions.**” (*CWL 3*, p. 417, emphasis added).

Metaphysics as Heuristic

**“Accordingly, the definition [of proportionate being] is an instance of a heuristic structure;
but it is not an instance of an integral heuristic structure,
for it does not exhaust the resources of the human mind in anticipating what it is to know.”** (*CWL 3*, p. 417, emphases added).

And then he says, for example, you might think of *the definition of proportionate being*. And the definition of proportionate being we just talked about; *it is “that which is to*

be known” — so it’s a notion, it’s an anticipation — “through the totality of possible human experience, understanding and affirmative judgment.” And as he says, *that’s an example of a heuristic structure, because it’s an ordered set of operations, noetic activities; and we’re talking about what’s to be known through the structured relationships of those activities. So it’s an example of a heuristic structure.* But it is not an instance of the *integral* heuristic structure, for “**it does not exhaust the resources of the human mind in anticipating what it is to know**” (CWL 3, p. 417), what the human mind is capable of knowing.

“Accordingly, the definition [of proportionate being] is an instance of a heuristic structure; but it is not an instance of an integral heuristic structure, for it does not exhaust the resources of the human mind in anticipating what it is to know.” (CWL 3, p. 417, emphasis added).

Right! So we ended up more or less last week with this, and with that question to think about a gene! So what’s missing? ... The definition of proportionate being is: “That which is to be known through possible human experience, understanding, and judging; and the totality of those “**does not exhaust the resources of the human mind in anticipating ...**” (CWL 3, p. 417).

Okay. Let’s go back for a moment. Tell me, what does Lonergan seem to be *including* in the definition of proportionate being? We talked about what’s not included, the Divine Transcendent, at least on Lonergan’s account. *What is included? What is to be known through human experiencing, understanding and judging, human experiencing, understanding and reasonable affirmation?* ... Matt?

Matt: Well, empirical science and common sense.

Apt: Sure! Everything that comes from empirical science and common sense, purged now of its counterpositions, of the affirmations that are made not on the basis of a reasonable, virtually unconditioned; made not on the basis of self-correcting understanding but on the basis of extrascientific opinions that arise from what he calls the polymorphism of human consciousness. So yes! Everything that’s derived from what he calls **reoriented common sense** and **reoriented science**, in which the biases have been reversed. So everything left! ... Maggie?

Maggie: Can't we ask questions about things that we haven't necessarily had experience of? So —

Pat: — Very good! Very good!

Maggie: — questioning extends beyond empirical data. Like, we can ask a further question without having to first have an experience of something.

Pat: Okay. *Well, give me an example. Because we already saw that there is one kind of question we can ask that takes us totally outside the realm of proportionate being. But you're quite right, that proportionate being includes what we haven't had an experience of. So give me an example of what you had in mind, but it can't be God, because we've already said that that is not within his purview of what he means by proportionate being.*

Maggie: I guess maybe something that someone else has done, like, Sam may have played in a hockey game, but I've never played in a hockey game, but I can ask a little like what is it like to play in a hockey game.

Pat: Excellent! Excellent! That's a very very good example. And it's a big part of what he's — That's why I keep using the word 'possible'! He doesn't always use that word; he throws it out a couple of times, "possible human experiencing". So proportionate being doesn't just include what I have understood about experiences that I happen to have had. It includes understanding and correctly affirming what is to be understood about all human experiences that ever have happened.

We talked a little bit — Well, this is one of the reasons why the chapter on "**Space and Time**" (*CWL* 3, chapter five, pp. 163-195) is stuck in. We saw some of the reasons why it is where it is. But remember, one of the things about Lonergan's account of space and time is that it's an ordered — *it's an intelligible ordering of extensions and durations, and it always begins with the concrete extensions and durations of my experiencing.* And to those I relate possible experiences, for example, where you live [last three words conjectural because inaudible]. So my reference frame, whether it's a personal reference frame, or a public reference frame, or a special reference frame, is always rooted in the actual experiences that I have had; but *the reference frame allows me to relate experiences that I haven't had, that are not immediate to me, including experiences that other people have had. And so the integral structure of proportionate being includes those as well.*

Would somebody give me another example of what's included here? So Sam playing hockey. You see, how do I want to say this? ... Those of us who've never played hockey — you might say you can't really know what it's like to play hockey. But remember, *really knowing means asking and answering all the further pertinent questions. And in Maggie's conversation with Samantha, she might be able to get to the point where she understands what she doesn't directly experience.* Now that seems like a stretch! But for the moment, remember it's a matter of knowing, and knowing, if you like, by extension or by extrapolation, is a possibility.

There's a great deal of our knowing that we think of as immediate and direct, which in fact is by extrapolation, is by going from what we have experienced by a series of accumulated insights, to what we haven't directly understood.

And as we'll see when we get to chapter seventeen, (CWL 3, “**Metaphysics as Dialectic**,” pp. 553-617), *that's Lonergan's argument about the possibility of an objective historical science.* We can understand without experiencing a great deal about other cultures, cultures that are past and in fact extinct, because we're not limited to immediate experience of those. *We are dependent upon our own experience, but by our questioning and by our insights and by our judgments, we can build from the limits of our experiencing to expand our understanding to incorporate experiences that we have not directly had.*

Additional things included in the definition of proportionate being: perfect circle and other nonimaginable realities referenced by explanatory definitions.

Relations among what is known by different people out of their different experiences; the relations among the sciences, and among science and commonsense are

also included under the integral structure of
proportionate being.

So besides hockey-playing, what else would be included? We've got everything from science, everything from common sense, hockey-playing.

[Class amusement].

What else? ...

Metaphysics as Heuristic

A heuristic structure is an ordered set of heuristic notions ...

“an integral heuristic structure is an ordered set of all heuristic notions ...

“the definition of proportionate being ... is an instance of a heuristic structure;

but is not an instance of an integral heuristic structure,

for it does not exhaust the resources of the human mind in anticipating what it is to know.” (CWL 3, p. 417, emphases added).

All right. ... Jeff?

Jeff: Ah, I was just thinking about back to the very beginning of the book *Insight*, when we were talking about an *explanatory versus descriptive definition*. So in the case of the circle we made it clear that you we could never actually experience a circle, but we could get a close approximation in our minds of it. So could we add that?

Pat: That's a really good example. *Anything that has to do with explanatory!* ... Remember in the opening pages of the **"Introduction"** to *Insight*, Lonergan says *that it took the development of twentieth century science of an unimaginable space-time and unimaginable sub-atomic processes to bring the realization that reality is not that of a body*. He uses that word there. He says that Augustine discovers this. Augustine narrates that discovery in the *Confessions*, that there is more to reality than body. At that point of course we don't know what Lonergan means by body. It is in fact a term that Augustine uses. But we don't know what Lonergan means by it until we get to chapter eight (*CWL* 3, **"Things"**, pp. 270-295).

"For the present enterprise is concerned to unravel an ambiguity and to eliminate an ambivalence. St. Augustine of Hippo narrates that it took him years to make the discovery that the name 'real' might have a different connotation from the name 'body'. Or, to bring the point nearer home, one might say that it has taken modern science four centuries to make the discovery that the objects of its inquiry need not be imaginable entities moving through imaginable processes in an imaginable space-time. The fact that a Plato attempted to communicate through his dialogues, the fact that an Augustine eventually learnt from the writers whom, rather generically, he refers to as Platonists, has lost its antique flavor and its apparent irrelevance to the modern mind. Even before Einstein and Heisenberg it was clear enough that the world described by scientists was strangely different from the world depicted by artists and inhabited by men of common sense. But it was left to

twentieth-century physicists to envisage the possibility that the objects of their science were to be reached only by severing the umbilical cord that tied them to the maternal imagination of man.” (CWL 3, p. 15).

So circle is a good example. *In fact, if the planets did in fact move in circles, or if there is any celestial body or any other moving body that actually moves in a circle, we actually couldn't perceive the circle, but we can understand beyond our perceptions the reality of the circle. Because our knowledge isn't limited to what we can see, we can understand beyond that! It's a good example. And in fact, what astronomers, what astrophysicists do now is to understand what they can't*

see, even though those motions are known not to be circular. They are known to be complex deviations from elliptical paths. But no more than a circle can you imagine an ellipse; and no more than an ellipse can you imagine the deviated path from an ellipse.

So that's another good example. Okay! ... Yeah, Tim?

Tim: Suppose I say, like, I can ask all the further pertinent questions, our science, our common sense, and have a notion of proportionate being; but yet going back to what you said about a further question; **a further question** would be the order and the relation between sciences and common sense. So that would sort of, I think that further question of how to integrate them would be —

Pat: Good!

Tim: — where you could go from there.

Pat: Good! Any person's scientific knowledge, any person's common sense knowledge, is rooted in their experiencing. The aggregate of all human knowledge is rooted in that aggregate of human experiencing. But *the question of what's the relationship among them has not really been anybody's experience; and yet we can ask about that, and*

that is really what he's getting at by this integral structure, this whole in proportionate being without it being the whole of proportionate being. Good. Okay.

Student question about how we can know when the whole of proportionate being is known.

— Can only know when all of proportionate being is known, is when there are no further pertinent questions.

— The point is, something can be said about the structure of the whole, even without knowing everything about proportionate being.

— Lonergan is not too subtly rebuking Kant's position that noumenal reality is an unknowable, inaccessible regulative idea.

Metaphysics as Heuristic

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for it does not exhaust the resources of the human mind in anticipating what it is to know.” (CWL 3, p. 417, emphases added).

Pat: Perhaps I'll ... Yeah, Greg?

Greg: If this is something that it doesn't seem like — maybe I'm wrong here — but it doesn't seem like a single human mind could ever grasp the totality of — How do we know when we've reached the whole of proportionate being?

Pat: *Well, that's a really good question! And the straightforward answer is: "When there are no further pertinent questions to be raised about human experiencing!" The difficulties that may reside in a multiplicity of human minds so that each and every human being may still have further pertinent questions. When I think of it, I think that well okay, we've gotten to the point now where — which people think we're at now, which of course we aren't, which is — you could really have a conversation about: "I don't know about this. Who knows about this? Who can tell me the answer to this?" But how will we know we've got there? That's a pretty good question: I don't have a really good answer for it!*

So ... But Lonergan's point here is actually not an interest in how will we know when we've got there. *His interest here is by way of contrast; by way of contrast, that you can extrapolate to what it would be like to have answered all those questions, even though we know right now that we haven't answered all those questions; and yet to make the strong affirmation that even lacking the full knowledge of everything that's to be known by human experiencing, we can still say something about the whole, without knowing the whole structure of proportionate being. And so that's really what he's getting at here; it's more the emphasis than — he frankly doesn't seem particularly concerned with how we'll know when the human race gets to the totality of all human knowing.*

There's a not too subtle rebuke of Kant here. So for Kant, the noumenal is a regulative idea. *For Lonergan, you can talk about the regulative ideal, and you can still have knowledge of what Kant would want to say is noumenal reality, and indeed you can have knowledge of the wholeness of the realm of human knowing, short of reaching the regulative idea. So he's kind of throwing out the regulative ideal, and saying that, i.e., the regulative ideal, is not something you have to get to before you can say something about something. You don't have to know everything about everything in order to be able to say something about something! So it's more the contrary. But nevertheless, that's a very good question!*

Again, why isn't the definition of proportionate being a complete account of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being?

— Student question for clarification of what this question is asking about, and response.

— Student suggestion that what is missing from the definition but is intended in the integral heuristic structure are the noetic dimensions — the noetic self as a knower and performer (over and above sense perception). But those dimensions *are* intended in the definition, since there are also the experiences of the data of consciousness, and

all that is to be understood and affirmed about those (e.g., “self-affirmation” and “reduplication of the structure”).

— The subject-object division takes place within proportionate being, and thus the knowing self and the self's knowing are parts of proportionate being.

— “Somehow finality is left out.”

— Suggestion that the problem is that the definition of proportionate being is vulnerable to change.

Okay. So I wanted to have us pause there for a moment, so that we can expand on our examples of what's being held in his account of proportionate being, or at least his heuristic anticipation of proportionate being; so that we can then take up the question of: Well, what's missing, if the definition of what's to be known through experiencing, understanding, and rational affirmation **“does not exhaust the resources of the human mind in anticipating what it is to know”** (*CWL* 3, p. 417)? So there is something unfinished about the integral heuristic structure, if that's all he's saying about it. What's missing? What is missing? Remember **“a heuristic structure is an ordered set of heuristic notions.”** *An* or *the* **“integral heuristic structure is an ordered set of all heuristic notions** (*CWL* 3, p. 417, emphasis added).

Pat: So what's missing? What is missing? ... Matt?

Matt: May I ask a question first for clarification?

Pat: Sure!

Matt: Just to be clear about what we've just been talking about. All those things we talked about that were — about, circles, and hockey, and those things that are not

—

they don't begin in experience but maybe arise from experience, as I think kind of Kant says [previous six words uncertain, since not clearly audible]. Those all pertain to proportionate being even though they're not fundamentally experiential in their beginning?

Pat: Yes!

What's Missing?

What heuristic notions are missing?

Classical, Statistical, Genetic,
Dialectical

‘Notion’ of the Thing

Explanatory Genera and Species

Matt: Okay. So all those things that we talked pertain to proportionate being, but explicit metaphysics has something more and that's the question: What's missing? There's something more than all the things we just talked about?

Pat: Ah, no! Let's go back again to the “Metaphysics as Heuristic” slide?

Matt: Okay.

Pat: So he's talking about the structure, the integral heuristic structure.

Matt: Okay.

Pat: He gives the illustration of “**the definition of proportionate being.**” (*CWL* 3, p. 417). Now what we did is to explore what falls under the purview of the definition of —

Matt: — of the definition of metaphysics?

Pat: — of proportionate being!!

Matt: Of proportionate being. Okay.

Pat: So we explored, just to expand our — so this doesn't just sit there as an abstract statement, we were filling it out a little bit to get an enriched sense of what he means by **“the definition of proportionate being”** (*CWL* 3, p. 417). We got all those things included in! Now —

Matt: — It's just a lot to hold together.

[Class laughter]

Pat: [With a smile:] I know. I know. It is complicated, that's why we're going through it carefully!

So we've got this definition of proportionate being. We've thought about what is envisioned by the definition of proportionate being.

Metaphysics as Heuristic

A heuristic structure is an ordered set of heuristic notions ...

“an integral heuristic structure is an ordered set of all heuristic notions ...

“the definition of proportionate being ... is an instance of a heuristic structure;

but is not an instance of an integral heuristic structure,

for it does not exhaust the resources of the human mind in anticipating what it is to know.” (*CWL* 3, p. 417, emphases added).

But what Lonergan is saying is that the definition of proportionate being is itself not an adequate account of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being. Okay? So the definition of proportionate being does not fully flesh out what the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being would be.

Remember why we want to worry about this: we want to worry about this so that we can reverse the counterpositions and promote the positions, develop the positions. Okay? Got it? ...

So what we're asking about is not what's left out of proportionate being; but what, that needs to be incorporated into the account of the integral heuristic structure, is not incorporated in just the definition of proportionate being. Okay?

Matt: Okay! All right!

Pat: Good!

What's Missing?

What heuristic notions are missing?

Classical, Statistical, Genetic,
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Pat: James?

James: The question, that, you know, proportionate being means what is to be known would be the noematic dimension?

Pat: That's right!

James: What's missing is the noetic; like on the one hand, there would be the structure of human knowing in general; and yet again there is my self-affirmation of my own knowing.

Pat: Okay. So James is contending that what's missing is the noetic side: that the definition of proportionate being takes in the noematic side: what's known in experiencing, and what's known in inquiring and understanding, what known in reflecting and grasping the virtually unconditioned and affirming. But the noetic side is left out. Is that — Elizabeth is shaking her head. Is that true?

Elizabeth: I don't know. It's sort of — because of participation, it's sometimes on the other side. Just in — I don't know — In our reading for today about finality, we were — I don't know!

Pat: — So somehow or other finality is left out.

[Class laughter]

That is definitely part of the answer! Okay. We'll have to figure out why finality is left out.

But is it true that the definition of proportionate being leaves out the noetic side? First, you can already tell from the intonation, and the body language, that Professor Byrne is asking a rhetorical question. Okay. ... So Maggie?

Maggie: Could it be that it fails to look after the definition of proportionate being is ... all things that change dynamic in and of itself, and so we might think that we have a proper understanding of proportionate being but — [Maggie's contribution not fully or clearly picked up in the recording].

Pat: Okay. I want — Let's hang on to Maggie's comment. So I want to stay with James's comment for a moment. The suggestion is that that the definition of proportionate being leaves out the noetic. ... What's the title of chapter eleven?

[Several students search their texts and simultaneously respond with largely correct suggestions]

Pat: **“Self-affirmation of the Knower”** (CWL 3, pp. 343-371). *And in self-affirmation, what's being affirmed? The self as a knower; which means from Lonergan's point of view, an exercise for a performer of those noetic activities. So there is a knowledge. Remember this business about the reduplication of the structure that he talks about in the*

article “Cognitional Structure”. *So there is a knowledge based on human experiencing, understanding, and affirming, of human experiencing, understanding, and affirming.*

And the tricky thing, of course, is we have this category that’s been floating around since, I think, chapter two (*CWL 3, “Heuristic Structures of Empirical Method”*, pp. 57-92) of the data of consciousness. *Lonergan’s account of experiencing is broader than sense experiencing. It’s broader even than sense experiencing, enriched with affectivity, and emotion, and conation, and so on. That in addition to sense experiencing there is also the experiencing that is the experiencing of performing these activities, and that is Lonergan’s meaning of the word ‘consciousness’. Consciousness is the experiencing and the performing, and self-affirmation is the understanding and affirming of the data of consciousness. So the noetic side is in fact envisioned; and so in fact we’re enriching what’s meant by proportionate being. So proportionate being includes you folks, and all your conscious activity! That’s part of proportionate being!*

Now let’s step back for a moment, because I had a conversation early this week with someone in the class, and struggling with some of these ideas about objectivity and being, and whether or not affirming what we understand is really knowing reality, or not. And that, as I suggested a couple of weeks ago, *that is the crucial question for Lonergan in the book Insight. And to* the extent to which we either explicitly or subtly tend to think that realities are objects, we’re going to tend to think that what we do in our consciousness is not part of being. But James’s question has helped us to see that what we do consciously is in fact part of being, and it’s part of proportionate being! So you don’t have this division of the subject on the one side and being on the other side. As he says at one point in chapter thirteen (*CWL 3, “The Notion of Objectivity”*, pp. 399-409):

being is prior to the division between subject and object. The distinction between subject and object takes place within being; it’s not the subject over against being. The subject is part of being.

And as Elizabeth pointed out, this notion of finality is a prolongation of the finality of the natural universe into the finality of human consciousness. So we’re beginning to see why we spent a lot of time worrying about the natural universe and its evolution; emergent probability is going to start to come together again. All right! So those are some possibilities as to what makes —

Student question about whether if a person knew everything about everything about proportionate being, would they still not be God?

– This hypothetical person would not be a metaphysician, would not be doing metaphysics, which asks about what can be known about the whole *prior* to knowing everything about proportionate being.

– But such a hypothetical person would still not be God, because there are things still not known to such a person.

Pat: Jeff?

Jeff: Ah, I'm not even sure if this is totally related. It might sound crazy! But I'm just wondering: If you've got a person who somehow could know everything about everything, and so they in a sense fulfill this idea of an integral heuristic structure because they have the knowledge of every individual being —

Pat: — I'm putting a little pause there, but go ahead. Finish your comment, okay.

Jeff: Okay. Then, like, once it gets to that totality of knowledge, they still wouldn't be God? And does that create a problem in Lonergan's eyes? Or something to that effect.

Pat: Okay. The pause was about: that the person you just described is not the metaphysician! *A metaphysician is interested in what can I know about the whole prior to knowing everything about proportionate being. So the question here is about what exactly is it that we can know here and now about the structure of proportionate being, and as rich an account as we can give, not an impoverished account! He doesn't quite say this, but the implication is that simply the definition of proportionate being is too thin a definition of what we can know about the whole, short of knowing the whole.* Okay. So I want to make that distinction, because what Lonergan is talking about here is not the person who knows everything about everything.

I think the simple answer to: Would a person who knows everything about proportionate being be God or not, the answer is “would not be God!”; because there are things that such a person would not know, if there ever were such a person!

[Class amusement]

God, on the other hand, knows all that plus more ... in Lonergan’s account!

Metaphysics is as rich as possible an account we can give about the whole prior to complete knowledge of all of proportionate being.

Lonergan is implying that the definition of proportionate being does not yet achieve the full richness that is possible for such an account.

Further discussion of what is missing from definition of proportionate being:

- Higher viewpoints, inquiry about inquiry itself (related to finality), inverse insights, certain heuristic notions (classical, statistical, genetic, dialectical) — none of these are *explicitly* mentioned in the definition of proportionate being. So the definition does not explicitly include their implications for filling out the integral structure.
- Also missing: The “Notion” of a Thing and what it means to understand a thing.
- Likewise, explanatory genera and species.

Pat: Tim?

Tim: So it's missing the further pertinent question, in the sense that proportionate being is what is experienced, understood, actually affirmed, further question, which leads to a higher viewpoint in the sense of how they —

Pat: — Ah, so there's one thing that's missing, right? *Among the resources of human understanding are higher viewpoints! And there's no explicit mention of higher viewpoints in the definition of proportionate being. The definition of proportionate being is open to higher viewpoints, but there's no explicit incorporation of higher viewpoints; and the capacity to have higher viewpoints is one of the resources of the human mind. Good! Good point! So that's one of the things that's missing. What else is missing?*

Metaphysics as Heuristic

A heuristic structure is an ordered set of heuristic notions ...

“an integral heuristic structure is an ordered set of all heuristic notions ...

“the definition of proportionate being ... is an instance of a heuristic structure;

but is not an instance of an integral heuristic structure,

for it does not exhaust the resources of the human mind in anticipating what it is to know.” (CWL 3, p. 417, emphases added).

Jeff: But would not higher viewpoints be contained implicitly?

Pat: *They're contained implicitly, but remember this is explicit metaphysics.*
We go — We have this latent, problematic, and explicit metaphysics. And remember what he says is the integral heuristic structure: it's the ordered set of *all* heuristic notions, *all* that you can anticipate about what it is to know proportionate being. And *sure; everything that's*

missing is implicit; but it's not made explicit! And therefore you don't have an integration of all the kinds of anticipations that we can know about by having undergone self-appropriation. Okay? ... Matt?

Matt: Does it have anything to do with the fact that proportionate being can inquire as to being? So that —

Pat: — Good!

Matt: — So that it can inquire outside of itself and that would be an integral gesture of integration?

Pat: Right. Good. And that actually connects with what Elizabeth was saying earlier; that is a question about finality! *So that to inquire about inquiring is to inquire about the dynamism of human inquiry, which Lonergan is going to argue has an implication for the dynamism of proportionate being as well.* So good! That's another thing that's not explicitly incorporated. What else is missing?

What's Missing?

What heuristic notions are missing?

Classical, Statistical, Genetic,
Dialectical

'Notion' of the Thing

~~Explanatory Genera and Species~~

Jonathan: So if higher viewpoints are excluded explicitly, then inverse insights as well?

Pat: Right! So the resources of human understanding that have to do with inverse insights and all that follows structurally, so to speak, from the facticity of inverse insights. What else is missing? *Ordered set of all heuristic notions!* What heuristic notions are missing? Lonergan doesn't explicitly talk about the "notion of higher

viewpoints”, or the “notion of inverse insights”. But nevertheless what people have done is to say, since Lonergan

by ‘notion’ means what’s to be known by a certain kind of activity, we began by identifying some of those notions. But Lonergan identifies some notions that we haven’t talked about!

...

Metaphysics as Heuristic

A heuristic structure is an ordered set of heuristic notions ...

“an integral heuristic structure is an ordered set of all heuristic notions ...

“the definition of proportionate being ... is an instance of a heuristic structure; but is not an instance of an integral heuristic structure,

for it does not exhaust the resources of the human mind in anticipating what it is to know.” (CWL 3, p. 417, emphases added).

Pat: Shabith?

Shabith: Is it development?

Pat: Ahm, jumping ahead. Yes, that’s right! ... Awnhill?

Awnhill: Classical and statistical heuristic structures.

Pat: Yeah. Boy! [Large smile] Why that was on many, many, weeks ago.

[Class laughter]

The first place that the word ‘notion’ gets used is in the context of classical and statistical heuristic notions. And there’s no explicit mention of them in the definition of proportionate being. Yes, it’s implicit, just as inverse insights and higher viewpoints are implicit, but it’s not explicit.

What’s Missing?

What heuristic notions are missing?

Classical, Statistical, Genetic,
Dialectical

‘Notion’ of the Thing

Explanatory Genera and Species

Pat: So what heuristic notions are in this? Classical, statistical, genetic, which we are going to talk about today, and dialectical, which has been talked about but it hasn’t — and in the first place that *dialectic as a method* is introduced is there at the beginning of chapter fourteen, “**The Method of Metaphysics**” (*CWL* 3, pp. 410-455). *Dialectic as a process* was discussed back in chapters six “**Common Sense and Its Subject**” (*CWL* 3, pp. 196-231) and seven “**Common Sense as Object**” (*CWL* 3, pp. 232-269) about common sense. What happens when *not only intelligibility but unintelligibility gets introduced as a principle of change*? And so Lonergan is describing them as dialectical processes; and although he doesn’t say it, he is using a dialectical method to characterize those processes. So he’s kind of identifying in this book four heuristic notions, and four heuristic methods, and they’re not explicitly mentioned in just the definition of proportionate being! So those are some resources that the human mind has for anticipating how it’s going to go about doing its knowing.

Remember chapter eight is called “The Notion of a Thing”.² And in introducing the notion of a thing, Lonergan makes the distinction between the kinds of insights that he has been talking about up through chapter seven “**Common Sense as Object**” (CWL 3, pp. 232-269), and a different kind of insight that he’s going to talk about in chapter eight, “**Things**” (CWL 3, pp. 270-295). And most of what he has to say about “things” is anticipatory: what it would be to know the unity-identity-whole in a multiplicity of data, as distinct from what it would be

to know some data in relationship, in intelligible relationship to other data. And most of what he has to say about a thing is not by giving us a definition of the intelligible unity of a thing, or telling us what the intelligible unity of this thing or that thing is, but to talk about it in an anticipatory way. He doesn’t draw a big, huge, attention to it; more of less that it’s operative. So another one of the notions that is a resource of the human mind to know is the anticipation of thing, and the distinction between what it means to understand things, as opposed to what it means to understand any of the processes associated with the quest for statistical and genetic and dialectical methods.

Also *explanatory genera and species* which goes to what somebody said about higher viewpoints, where it was said that higher viewpoints are not incorporated there. *Higher viewpoints are the keys to understanding this distinction between explanatory genera and species.* I use that phrase here because that’s the phrase that he uses in chapter fifteen, “**Elements of Metaphysics**” (CWL 3, pp. 456-511) to characterize part of what the integral heuristic structure is.

Chapter fifteen is where Lonergan lays out the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being, though he never explicitly tells the reader that is what he is doing in this chapter.

² Chapter eight in fact is called “**Things**” (CWL 3, pp. 270-295), but it’s first section is entitled “The General Notion of the Thing” (CWL 3, pp. 270-275).

The various grounds of the four heuristic methods — classical, statistical, dialectical, and genetic — and the argument that there are four and only four.

Elaboration of how the four heuristic structures (classical, statistical, genetic, dialectical) interact.

Loneragan claims that these four methods, once integrated with one another, are able to comprehend the totality of proportionate being —
— A claim he will later expand and modify so as to more adequately give an account of the integral heuristic structure required to anticipate the knowing of all human reality. (See *Method and Theology*, which could have been called “Method of Human Studies”).

Integral Heuristic Structure

**“the anticipation of a constant system to be discovered grounds classical method;
the anticipation of an intelligibly related sequence of systems grounds genetic method;
the anticipation that data will not conform to system grounds statistical method;
and the anticipation that the relations between the successive stages of changing system will not be directly intelligible grounds dialectical method”**
(*CWL 3*, p. 509).

So I just wanted to draw our attention to a remark that comes at the end of chapter fifteen, “**Elements of Metaphysics**” (*CWL 3*, pp. 456-511), where — and remember he never really says, “Oh, by the way, here is the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being!” And for many years, as I said last week, I kind of floundered around, saying: “Okay, so what is it? What is it?” *Well, it is pretty much the contents, or a great deal of the*

contents, of chapter fifteen, “**Elements of Metaphysics**” (CWL 3, pp. 456-511). In chapter fifteen, what he’s doing is laying out the integral heuristic structure, even though he doesn’t tell us that that is what he is doing. And it’s deceiving, because the chapter is entitled the “**Elements of Metaphysics**” (CWL 3, pp. 456-511), and we’re sort of looking for, okay, what puts the elements together, and he never quite tells you what puts the elements together in any explicit fashion. But nevertheless, there it is.

And here’s a big clue at the end of chapter fifteen. [Pat reads from the slide:] “**The anticipation**” — so there is that word, notion; the notion “**of a constant system to be discovered grounds classical method.**” (CWL 3, p. 509). Now classical method — it’s a little bit of a fudge — *classical method of course has to do with the search for correlation; and its paradigmatic instance of the kinds of functional relationships that is the work of modern physics, and then it’s expansion into the kind of correlated relationships that are characteristic of physics, of comparative anatomy, of structural linguistics, of economic theory, and so on. But at least for the moment, the key underlying thing is that you have to have classical method to do a scientific investigation of systems, as Lonergan understands them. So “the anticipation of constant system to be discovered grounds classical method.”* (CWL 3, p. 509).

“*The anticipation of an intelligibly related sequence of systems grounds genetic method.*” (CWL 3, p. 509, emphasis added). Underline the word ‘sequence’ there. *So it isn’t just systems, but intelligibly related systems. And as we’ll see, it’s a very special kind of intelligible relationship among systems: the stages of development. The stages of development are not just haphazard. There is an intelligible link of one stage to another; and that’s what he means by **development**. And the notion of development is the notion that grounds the activities and exercises of genetic method.*

So we haven’t gotten that far. But this is probably — as I’ve said, we’ve got *the systems; anticipation of systems grounds classical method; the anticipation of intelligibly related sequence of systems grounds genetic method.* “**The anticipation that data will not conform to system grounds statistical method.**” (CWL 3, p. 509). There’s that inverse insight that somebody talked about before.

“**And the anticipation that the relations between the successive stages of changing system will not be directly intelligible grounds dialectical method**” (CWL 3, p. 509). So for example, when an economy collapses, there’s not really any intelligibility to it,

or ultimately there's some fundamental failure of intelligibility; that you go from a prosperous economy to a panic³ would be one example of it. But when a banking system collapses, a family collapses, a government collapses, not through an intelligible transition, but through a series of activities in which people act in a panic fashion, those would be examples of dialectical processes. *And the anticipation that not all changes from one system to another are going to be intelligible, that anticipation is to basis of dialectical method.*

Then he goes on to say: Okay, that's all! — Those are the alternatives!! Data either is or isn't systematic, and if it's systematic the transition from one system to another either is or isn't intelligible. And so that is exhaustive of the totality of heuristic methods, scientific heuristic methods.

Integral Heuristic Structure

“the anticipation of a constant system to be discovered grounds classical method;

the anticipation of an intelligibly related sequence of systems grounds genetic method;

the anticipation that data will not conform to system grounds statistical method;

and the anticipation that the relations between the successive stages of changing system will not be directly intelligible grounds dialectical method”

(CWL 3, p. 509).

³ Pat's word here is not clearly audible to the transcriber. There is no precise definition of an economic collapse. The term has been used to describe a broad range of bad economic conditions, ranging from a severe, prolonged depression with high bankruptcy rates and high unemployment (such as the Great Depression of the 1930s), to a breakdown in normal commerce caused by hyperinflation (such as in Weimar Germany in the 1920s), or even an economically caused sharp rise in the death rate and perhaps even a decline in population (such as in countries of the former USSR in the 1990s). Often *economic collapse* is accompanied by social chaos, civil unrest and sometimes a breakdown of law and order. An example of an economic collapse is the Great Depression.

What we're going to see is: after *Insight*, Lonergan discovered the need, not so much to revise that strong claim; so *the strong claim is that those four methods are capable of comprehending the totality of proportionate being. So it's a strong claim! He never really goes back on that! What he does recognize is that there are crucial places in which you have to flesh out the details of some of those heuristics. So when we get to — when he makes a transition from Insight to Method in Theology, the account of the good, and the account of meaning, make demands upon him to expand the structure in which human reality is going to be known. So you get a structure in Method in Theology — it's called Method in Theology, but really it can, quite legitimately be called "The Method of Human Studies." And I don't say "Human Sciences", I say "Human Studies", because it includes both historical and interpretative methods as well as what might be called the more scientific approaches of something like economics or political science, and that sort of thing. So he realizes the need to expand this skeletal —*

So you could almost say that, just as he said a moment ago that the definition of proportionate being doesn't exhaust the resources of the human mind in knowing proportionate being, and so you have to supplement it with the notion of the thing, the four scientific methods, higher viewpoints, and their consequences for explanatory genera — *you could say that after Insight, he recognized that even that didn't exhaust all of the resources of the human mind in knowing, especially the realm of the human. And so it needed to be further supplemented and situated in a more complicated integral heuristic structure.*

Student request for an example of a dialectical phenomenon that is not directly intelligible.

– Discussion of the financial crisis: how credit must be grounded in intelligible expectations of future results. How unintelligent and unreasonable were the expectations of the housing market banks to take a different approach to risk, and the results.

– Ignoring questions and insights creates unintelligible transitions from one system to another.

Pat: Okay. Somebody had a question there? Yeah, Chakrit?

Chakrit: Could you give an example of the last — something that’s not directly intelligible, in dialectical method?

Pat: Well, I did give an example. The crises in economics! People going along thinking everything is just fine, and then suddenly everything falls apart. The crisis that occurred about two years ago [2008-2009] was a financial crisis. Banks no longer would lend other banks money. Credit dried up. People — You know, why is that important? Why do we care? As long as people can go to the bank, and pay cash **drawing** on your checking account, why do you care about that? *The real reason why is: businesses need some credit in order to bridge the difference between hiring you to do a job, and getting the money back to pay you for the job you just did. Any kind of economic activity in a sophisticated economy requires credit. Credit is the intelligent expectation that the present functioning will yield the money that’s required to put that process in play. Economies are very future oriented, and economies are good when they are intelligently future oriented. And what happened in our economy was the development of investing in credit schemes that were unintelligible. We now know they were unintelligible. Alan Greenspan⁴ comes out and says: “We thought we understood this, but we didn’t! We thought we understood what we were doing but we didn’t!”* So that particular phenomenon is a good example of a dialectical process.

⁴ **Alan Greenspan** (1926 -) was an American economist who served as Chairman of the Federal Reserve of the United States from 1987 to 2006. First appointed Federal Reserve chairman by President Ronald Reagan in August 1987, he was reappointed at successive four-year intervals until retiring on January 31, 2006, after the second-longest tenure in the position. Democratic leaders of Congress criticized him for politicizing his office because of his support for Social Security privatization and tax cuts, which they felt would increase the deficit. The easy-money policies of the Fed during Greenspan’s tenure have been suggested by some to be a leading cause of the dotcom bubble and subprime mortgage crisis, which occurred within a year of his departure from the Fed, and have, said the *Wall Street Journal*, “tarnished his reputation.” Yale economist Robert Shiller argues that “once stocks fell, real estate became the primary outlet for the speculative frenzy that the stock market had unleashed”.

What is a little more subtle is that the unintelligibility wasn't just at the last five seconds before Lehman Brothers went into virtual collapse.⁵ It was something that had been building up for fifteen or more years. Really, really, smart people were saying that the housing bubble was going to burst; and it didn't burst, so people started believing that it really wasn't going to burst. But *really smart people knew that there was something seriously wrong; and it continued to be seriously wrong for fifteen years. The dialectical process is an accumulation of unintelligibilities*, until you get to what people who study dynamic system series call "a bifurcation". Things are going along, and you're going along, and you're going along, and it seems the same processes, the same today as it was fifteen years ago; and then all of a sudden: Keboom!! *You get this dramatic rupture in the way in which human systems are performing. So that would be an example!*

Chakrit: Okay. So it was not directly intelligible was why the value for example of like particular derivatives and assets were inflated above their actual underlying price?

Pat: Right! Or any reasonable expectation of payment, of repayment. Among the things that happened in the economic crisis of say twenty-four months ago was that — This isn't the whole story but it's a little bit of the story: why were banks, twenty, let's say — Fifty years ago, banks were the most conservative institutions in existence. They were known for being almost excessively conservative! And they were conservative in the sense of they didn't take a risk unless they thought there was a reasonable expectation of repayment. And so lots of people who had good ideas weren't able to get credit to develop

⁵ **Lehman Brothers** was a global financial services firm. Before declaring bankruptcy in 2008, Lehman was the fourth-largest investment bank in the United States (behind Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch), doing business in investment banking, equity and fixed-income sales and trading (especially U.S. Treasury securities), research, investment management, private equity, and private banking. Lehman was operational for 158 years from its founding in 1850 until 2008. On September 15, 2008, the firm filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection following the massive exodus of most of its clients, drastic losses in its stock, and devaluation of assets by credit rating agencies, largely sparked by Lehman's involvement in the subprime mortgage crisis and subsequent allegations of negligence and malfeasance. Lehman's bankruptcy filing is the largest in US history, and is thought to have played a major role in the unfolding of the late-2000s global financial crisis.

those good ideas. This itself was a problem! Now, a lot of good innovative ideas never got implemented because they were deemed too risky.

By the time you get to, let's say, five years ago, you walk into a bank — This has been well documented — You walk into a bank, and you say,

“I want a hundred thousand dollars — or let's say, five hundred thousand dollars to buy this house!”

And the person who is the Loan Officer says to you:

“Do you have a job?”

You say:

“Yeah”!

“How much do you make?”

“I make a hundred thousand dollars a year.”

“Okay!”

That's it!!

You know, there's a fairly famous story about a guy who was a loan officer, who kept saying: “You know, I just couldn't believe it! They took one, after another, after another, cautionary check out of the process! You didn't have to call to see if the person was actually employed; you didn't have to check out what their salary was; you didn't have to check and see if there was a house out there that they were going to buy! They were just —

[Class amusement]

How did this come to happen? How did this come to happen? Well, it's a complicated story! Part of it had to do with the inflation, but part of it had to do with the fact that the banking industry really didn't care if you went into default. They sort of wanted you to buy the house. They did want you to do that! But they didn't really care if you went into default, because they knew the housing market was going to inflate, and if they took the house back from you because you defaulted, they knew they could sell it for more than the money they loaned you for it. They were counting on the inflation of the housing market continuing on indefinitely.

That was not an intelligent expectation! There were lots of other unintelligent expectations!
But that was one of them!

[Class amusement]

There was a whole, complicated, weaving together, of such things. That's what Lonergan means by a dialectical process.

Chakrit: Right. Thank you!

Pat: *Dialectical processes are uniquely human! Electrons and [word unclear to transcriber] and protozoans don't have insights, and don't have failures of insights. They act intelligibly, but they don't act intelligently! They don't have to generate the intelligible relations according to which they act. And they don't have to decide to act according to the intelligible relations! They just do! But human beings are autonomous. They are self-lawgiving! And the fundamental element to self-lawgiving is having insights. And when people don't have the insights, or have the insights and don't act on them, they inaugurate unintelligible transitions from one system to another.*

The Four Basic Kinds of Scientific Heuristic Methods:

The combination of the first two methods (classical and statistical) gives emergent probability, *a limited kind of integral heuristic structure*, because it integrates two other heuristic structures.

Moreover, these two methods constitute the worldview or the metaphysics consistent with these practices of modern science.

Adding the final two methods will give a still fuller integral heuristic structure of proportionate being (i.e., *a generalized emergent probability*).

Clarification of heuristic method in relation to heuristic notion: "Methods are heuristic notions put on their feet."

Pat: Jonathan?

Jonathan: You know, it's a hail of buckshots; so I'll wait for the break!

Pat: Okay.

Four Basic Kinds of Scientific Heuristic Methods

Classical:

Discovering systematic processes among data

Statistical:

**Discovering ideal frequencies (probabilities) among
data**

Genetic:

**Discovering intelligible sequences of developmental
transformations of systems**

Dialectical:

Discovering roots of conflicts in human affairs

(CWL 3, p. 509)

Pat: Okay. So this is something we actually saw back in the first semester. It's just a recapitulation, but we are now in a better position to think about what these four kinds of scientific heuristic methods are. We, as we saw, classical and systematic processes — statistical would be more precise, doesn't just anticipate unintelligible relations among data; it anticipates a certain kind of intelligibility that would be a kind of higher viewpoint with regard to randomness, and that intelligibility would be what Lonergan means by

probability. And so it's the combination of the intelligibility of correlations and systems and the intelligibility of probability that gives us — what? ... When you combine classical methods and statistical methods, classical correlations and the intelligibility of probabilities, you get an integral — an integration that is called? ... *the emergent probability!* *So emergent probability is a kind of integral heuristic structure, because it integrates two other heuristic structures.*

So classical and statistical anticipate things, but they don't anticipate what happens when you combine them; and that's what emergent probability is! *Emergent probability, after all, is not a theory; it's a heuristic anticipation.* Lonergan's claim in chapter four of *Insight* (CWL 3, pp. 126-162: “**The Complementarity of Classical and Statistical Investigations**”), is that *this is the world-view, which is to say, this is the metaphysics which comes out of the practices of modern science, classical and statistical.*

So, as you might expect, since he didn't yet incorporate two of the other methods, we're going to get an enriched account that's going to supplement, or if you like, supervene emergent probability. *At one point he uses the phrase, “generalized emergent probability”;* *he says that the field within which development operates is “generalized emergent probability”!* *So you could kind of think of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being as being the kind of generalized emergent probability, which now incorporates the four methods and not just two. And it also is going to incorporate the higher viewpoints and the correlate higher genera and species; and it's going to incorporate the notion of a thing, at the very least. Okay?*

Jonathan: The methods then are sort of heuristic notions put on their feet?

Pat: Yeah. Yeah! A heuristic notion is an anticipation, and it gets to be a structured heuristic notion, in the sense that the anticipation says, okay in order to get there you have to not only on the one hand you have to have a sequence of acts, and it becomes method when you have some things that tell you how you go about getting to those activities. So that scissors metaphor is putting the heuristic notions on their feet: observe the data, graph it, tabulate it, count the instances, use higher mathematics to close the scissors! That's putting a series of operations together that lead you from anticipation to knowing how to bring about the activities that will satisfy those anticipations. Good! It's a good metaphor! Putting the heuristic notions on their feet! Okay. Any questions about this much?

Finality.

The generalized emergent probability situates things in their emergent order, i.e. within finality.

One does not really know a thing, until one knows where it sits in finality.

Definition of finality: “upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism towards an ever fuller realization of being.”

Diagram of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being: from the big bang through systematic processes, developmental processes, and dialectical processes.

The whole is dynamic, it is a structured dynamic of stages and components.

Metaphysics as Heuristic

“However, the use of the methods has a basic condition ... To link intelligibly the individual data with the general structures, there is needed a further and distinct type of understanding that grasps concrete unities, identities, wholes.

Whence it follows that the general structures are concerned with the properties of things, where properties and things are what is to be known by

understanding the same data by different but complementary procedures.” (*CWL* 3, p. 510).

Okay. Now this [slide displays](#) where he says, okay, but even the four heuristic methods do not exhaust all the resources of human understanding in anticipating what it is to know how it is to come to know; and to keep thinking that the interest of this here is the further distinct understanding that grasps concrete unities-identities-wholes. So I'm just repeating what I sketched out a moment ago about — Here's the textual support for it. *So the general structure, or if you like, the general heuristic structure, is concerned with the properties of things, where properties and things are what is to be known by understanding the same data, but by different and complementary procedures.*


Now, what he doesn't say explicitly here, but it is implied; it's implied — It's said a little more explicitly back in chapter eight (*CWL 3*, “**Things**”, pp. 270-295) when Lonergan talks about things in emergent probability. *So it's one matter to understand the unity-identity-wholes of things; it's another thing to integrate that understanding with the achievements of the other heuristic notions. So what Lonergan is saying here is that the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being is going to situate things in their emergent order; an emergent order that is given its structural character by the four methods. Or to put it another way, you don't really know a thing until you know where it sits within finality. Finality is the biggest name for generalized emergent probability.*

Finality

“Thirdly, there is the principle of finality. The underlying manifold is an upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism towards ever fuller realization of being.” (*CWL 3*, p. 477).

So this is the first redaction that defines finality. It's in fact in the section of chapter fifteen (*CWL 3*, “**Elements of Metaphysics**”, pp. 456-511, at pp. 476-484) on “development”. You don't get a nice clear sentence about the definition of finality until you get there, so this is the one I've pulled out. He builds up to it in stages, back in the section where he talks about “potency and finality” (*CWL 3*, “**Elements of Metaphysics**”, pp. 456-511, at pp. 470-476). “**The underlying manifold**” — So “underlying manifold” means the ‘manyness’, or the aggregation, or the collection, of things and events — “**is an upwardly**

but indeterminately directed dynamism towards an ever fuller realization of being.” (CWL 3, p. 477). That’s what he means by ‘finality’: an “**upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism towards an ever fuller realization of being.**” (CWL 3, p. 477).



So you can think of *the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being* as looking something like this: the most elementary level, time-wise, would be *purely nonsystematic processes*, the first seconds of the Big Bang when there is nothing but *random flux of radiation*. But as we know, gradually, out of the random flux of radiation, there emerges *elementary particles*, the elementary particles initially interact with one another in nonsystematic processes. Out of those nonsystematic interactions, there gradually emerge *stars*; out of the stars there emerge cycles of fusion and radiation that give rise to *higher elements*. They’re set up in nonsystematic fashion spewing out into space, which then, in nonsystematic combinations, give rise to the kinds of chemical compositions of planets, which give rise to *life forms*; which give rise to specifically *neurological life forms*. The

earliest life forms don't have *nervous systems*; the latter ones do; but they add to their systems *life systems of*

perception that complement yet go beyond their living. *And then finally the emergence of the human.* And once you have human beings, you then have the possibility of also *dialectical processes.*

So the integral heuristic structure is something like this [Pat gestures towards the slide]: a set of terms and relations, connected with one another, that gives us a sense about the whole. And this doesn't exhaust everything. There's some further technicalities in there that have to do specifically with *potency, form* and *act*, which we'll talk about. But in a sense you can think of this: this is what Lonergan is saying.

Why is he doing this? *If you're saying: Is it real? And what can we say about the whole that is to be known by human experiencing, understanding and judging? He is making a very strong statement that the most important thing that we can know about it is that's it's dynamic! The whole is dynamic, and its dynamism has these structural stages and components to it!*

Student question about the differences between finality, emergent probability and integral heuristic structure.

— Finality is the most fundamental aspect of the real.

— The integral heuristic structure of proportionate being is the anticipation of what it would be to know finality.

— Emergent probability is a subset or partial fulfillment of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being; it is partial insofar as it cannot fully account for life and development.

— Hence needs to be complemented by a generalized emergent probability that incorporates genetic (and dialectical) methods.

— Discussion of generalized emergent probability and its incorporation of the latter.

Pat: Matt?

Matt: Ahm, I just want to see if — I don't want to collapse the differences between *finality* and *emergent probability* and the *integral heuristic structure of proportionate being*, because they all seem to be at play here. Is there a way that you can situate them better —

Pat: Okay. *I think the simplest way to put it is: finality, as Lonergan says, is an aspect of the real. And it is the most fundamental aspect of the real! The integral heuristic structure of proportionate being is the anticipation of what it would be to know finality! ... And there was something else that you said? Finality?*

Matt: Emergent probability.

Pat: Emergent probability. *Emergent probability, strictly speaking, in the way that Lonergan uses the term, is a subset, or a partial fulfillment of the integral heuristic structure. There's more to the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being than is spelled out by emergent probability.* He spells it out in a great deal more detail in chapter four (*CWL 3, "The Complementarity of Classical and Statistical Investigations"* pp. 126-162) than he does here in chapter fifteen (*CWL 3, "Elements of Metaphysics"*, pp. 456-511).

But emergent probability is missing something very crucial — a couple of things that are very crucial. Among the things that are missing and that are very crucial is it really

gives you a very crude, and in fact, almost inaccurate, picture of our universe, because it barely makes room for life. Almost all life is developmental; almost all life — actually this doesn't quite work — but a great deal of life is multi-cellular. And any organism that's multi-cellular goes from a single cell to an integrated set of multiple cells. The transition from single cell to an integrated set of multiple cells is what Lonergan means by 'development'. There's no real place for that in the simple account of emergent probability. Emergent probability remember is when schemes of recurrence set the conditions for the emergence of other schemes of recurrence. And you can shoe-horn development in there, but you miss some very important things, some things that ultimately cannot be adequately understood in those terms alone.

A “generalized emergent probability” is when developmental beings set the conditions for the emergence of other emergent — other developmental beings. So evolution, as *Darwin* was interested in it, is just barely fitting into emergent probability. *You've got a basic framework; but until you put into that framework the fact that the condition for the possibility of the emergence of a more sophisticated development of being is the being that emerged out of, and in fact the environment of other developmental beings that are the conditions for their development.* So a simple example is: birds need seeds to eat in order that they can develop; and if you get seeds then they would be able to feed the seeds to their young, so that their young can develop; which means that plants have to develop to the point where they become seed-bearing and seed-producing. *So the development of a baby bird is depending upon the development of plants. That's a much richer sense of emergent probability than you get in chapter four (CWL 3, “**The Complementarity of Classical and Statistical Investigations**” pp. 126-162).*

And from one point of view, you could say that if he really wanted to do this in a straightforward fashion, he should have had a section on classical heuristic method, then one on statistical heuristic method, and then one on genetic method, and then give us an account of Generalized Emergent Probability. But he tells us in chapter fifteen (CWL 3, “**Elements of Metaphysics**”, pp. 456-511) that he didn't do that because there are so many counterpositions about finality. *And he felt he needed to get some clarity of a dialectical method of metaphysics to get the counterpositions about development out of the way, before he could talk about genetic method.* I think there is a value in trying to do it the other way: to say this is what classical, statistical, and genetic methods are, and here's what emergent probability in a generalized fashion is; so that you've got all the natural sciences in before

you get into the complex metaphysical issues. He had good reasons why he approached it this way!

So to go back to your question [Matt's question], *emergent probability is a simplified version of finality!* And *the difference between finality and the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being is that finality is the aspect of reality, but the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being is needed in order to give some anticipation, and to study, so to speak.* Okay?

Matt: So then would emergent probability, in the generalized sense, be the mechanism under which you could put or posit development?

Pat: Ah, not exactly! Generalized emergent probability is the heuristic structure for studying it, the whole realm which includes developments as well as other natural processes. Okay.

The Two Big Points of Chapter Fifteen:

- (1) The whole in proportionate being is finality.
- (2) The implications of (1) for self-appropriation.

So this is that noetic-noematic distinction. *Finality is the noematic; the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being is the noetic; the structured noetic, and the structured noematic. The structured noematic, the big term for it is finality, the finality of the universe. That, it turns out, is his big conclusion!*

There are two big conclusions in this chapter (CWL 3, chapter fifteen “**Elements of Metaphysics**”, pp. 456-511). I’ll get to that in a second after the break. *The two big conclusions in this chapter are number one: that the most fundamental thing that you can say about the whole of being, the whole in being, without talking about the whole of being, is: the whole in proportionate being is its finality, its dynamism, its upward but indeterminate directedness, its “**upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism towards an ever fuller realization of being.**” (CWL 3, p. 477). And then the second big thing that is going on here in chapter fifteen is: What does that mean for self-appropriation?*

Finality is upwardly directed but not deterministic; not a nice straight line of progress; it includes dead ends and blind alleys.

Difference between finality and some common ideas about final causality.

Finality is not a pull exerted by the future on the present (this is actually efficient causality); this is one of the counterpositions Lonergan had to contend with.

Finality is what is being realized by present motion in its fullness.

Lonergan does not explicitly deal with what he thinks is the proper understanding of final causality until Chapter 19.

The final cause (properly understood) of a growing child is his or her *whole life*, i.e. the whole series of their acts over their lifetime or in history.

But to talk about finality, don't we need to know how things will turn out?

Is the final cause of the acorn to be an oak? Or to be dinner for a squirrel?

The final cause of the acorn, or of the whole universe, has to do with its *internal dynamics*, not the end product.

Humanity and Finality

“Intellectual development rests upon the dominance of a detached and disinterested desire to know.

It reveals to a man a universe of being in which he is but an item, and a universal order in which his desires and fears, his delight and anguish are but infinitesimal components in the history of mankind.


It invites man to become intelligent and reasonable not only in his knowing but also in his living, to guide his actions by referring them, not as an animal to a habitat, but as an intelligent being to the intelligible context of some universal order that is or is to be.” (*CWL* 3, p. 498).

“Intellectual development rests upon the dominance of a detached and disinterested desire to know.

It reveals to [human beings] a universe of being in which [each] is but an item, and a universal order in which desires and fears, delight and anguish are but infinitesimal components in the history of [humankind].

It invites a [human being] to become intelligent and reasonable not only in his [or her] knowing but also in his [or her living], to guide his [or her] actions by referring them, not as an animal to a habitat, but as an intelligent being to the intelligible context of some universal order that is or is to be.” (CWL 3, p. 498).

So what Lonergan is doing here in chapter fifteen (CWL 3, “Elements of Metaphysics”, pp. 456-511) is laying out what the realm of proportionate being is about, in some holistic sense, which is to say finality, upwardly but indeterminately directed — I’ll pick that up in a minute. I’m actually back on this earlier slide — I was going to do a little zigzag, but I ran out of time.



Finality looks here in this slide like a nice, straightforward, vertical movement, but in fact of course it's not! Concretely, as he says of finality, it includes a lot of dead ends and blind alleys; that's not irrelevant to finality. The whole of finality includes the emergences of things, and schemes, and developments, that in the end don't lead anywhere! But nevertheless, that is part of this upwardly but indeterminately directed — The universe has indeterminateness in it! That's one of the things that separates, at least a certain understanding of final causality, from finality. Among the objections, he mentions for example, Kant's objection, Spinoza's objection, and I forget who else, ah, to finality. He's got on page —

[Pat looks for a passage in the book *Insight*]

So this goes back to Matt's question.

“I have been indicating a parallel between incomplete knowing heading towards fuller knowing and an incomplete universe heading towards fuller being.”
(*CWL 3*, p. 471).

Now **“incomplete knowing heading towards fuller knowing”** is the noetic side; and the **“incomplete universe heading towards fuller being”** is the noematic side. *He is making a very strong argument here that metaphysically you can know that the universe is moving, though in an indeterminate fashion, “towards fuller being”. It isn't just a random set of events. There is an upwardly but indeterminately structured wholeness to the universe.*

“And now I propose” — this is actually on page 471 —
“And now I propose to employ the name ‘finality’ to denote the objective member” — or if you like, the noematic member — **of the parallel. Against such usage, perhaps, there will be complaints. The imaginative will contend that finality refers to a pull exerted by the future on the present.”** (*CWL 3*, p. 471).

That's the counterposition that he felt he had to be ready to deal with before he could talk about development and genetic method. That's one traditional account of final causality. As John Herman Randal says in his book on Aristotle,⁶ that's not final causality. That's efficient

⁶ J. H. Randal, *Aristotle* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).

causality! So in other words, when people think of human beings as operating towards

something that they don't have, they tend to think of that as final causality. If you get up in the middle of the afternoon and you want to get a drink of soda, the idea of soda is conceived of as the final cause of your action of getting up and going to the refrigerator. *But it's not! The idea is actually an efficient cause!* And final causality as Aristotle, and really good Aristotelian scholars like Randal understood it, means something rather different. And what it means is not all that obvious. But if you think that that is what final causality is, then you get these kinds of responses:

“Abstract deductivists will argue with Scotus⁷ that finality should denote a necessary property of every possible world. Concrete deductivists will argue with Spinoza⁸ that finality is just a mistake.” (CWL 3, p. 471).

So Spinoza — I can remember interviewing a candidate for a faculty position at BC one time, and he had done his dissertation on Spinoza, a very interesting guy. We ultimately didn't hire him, but he was certainly a very interesting teacher-scholar. But he had this line and he said: “Spinoza put the final nail on the coffin of final causality!” *Well, Spinoza put the final nail in the coffin of causality conceived of as a pull of the future by the future on the present.* Spinoza is more subtle than that! But certainly I think that's part of what this fellow was saying, namely that *causality is always from the past into the future, and never from the future into the present.* *Well, Lonergan agrees with that.* Lonergan is not talking about a finalistic pull of the future on the present. That isn't what Lonergan means by finality!

“Kantians will contend that finality is not a law of nature but a maxim of thought, that it does not reveal

⁷ John Duns Scotus (1270-1308), surnamed *Doctor Subtilis*, was the founder and leader of the Scotist School, which had its chief representatives among the Franciscans.

⁸ **Baruch Spinoza** (1632–1677) was a Dutch philosopher of Sephardi/Portuguese origin. By laying the groundwork for the 18th-century Enlightenment and modern biblical criticism, including modern conceptions of the self and the universe, he came to be considered one of the great rationalists of 17th-century philosophy.

a constituent of things, but regulates and orders our knowledge of them.” (CWL 3, p. 471).

Well, he’s telegraphing his position: *finality is an aspect of the real! Why? Because the real is what we know by making unconditioned affirmative judgments*, not by what — as he goes back — not by what you can imagine about some kind of a vitalistic force sitting inside of things and pushing them along with the future pulling on them; these sorts of things. *So he’s thinking of finality in distinction from final causality*. He’s actually not going to talk about final causality in its full sense until chapter nineteen (CWL 3, “**General Transcendent Knowledge**”, pp. 657-708).

But for the moment, let’s just get a certain kind of clarity. *In my humble opinion, the proper understanding of final causality is what is realized in its fullness by present motion*. And the tendency is to think that the final cause of, let’s say, a child eating his or her dinner is the adult that they grow up to. Well, that’s not the final cause! The final cause is their life! What’s realized by activity is a whole life, a [lifetime](#).⁹ And the tendency is to think that what’s realized by what I’m doing now, is what will come in the future. *I think the fuller adequate meaning of final causality is the totality that’s realized by the whole series of activities throughout a person’s lifetime, or throughout the lifetime of the history of the universe! That’s what the final cause is! That’s what all the tending is for!* It’s not for some end-state, but it’s for the totality that’s realized by all that tending.

But finality, you see — And then the difficulty is, in order to talk about finality it would seem that you need to know where things are going to end up, *but you don’t know where they’re going to end up!* People talk about the final cause. This is part one of the debates in discussion of stem-cell research for example, that the final cause of an acorn is to be an oak tree. And there’s an obvious objection to that, which is that sometimes the final cause of an acorn is to be dinner for a squirrel. And that’s a perfectly legitimate answer, and objection!

⁹ Last word here unclear.

So *what's the final cause of the acorn? It's the part it plays in the drama of cosmic history! That's its final cause!* And it would seem like you can't talk about the tending or the striving of the universe, of natural processes, without knowing how the universe ends up. *And we don't know how the universe ends up!*

But *what Lonergan is talking about here by finality is not to specify it in terms of the end product, the story of the universe, but to specify it in terms of its internal dynamics: what gives rise to what?* That's why he's interested in this integral heuristic structure of proportionate being [Pat gestures to the slide], so that *he can make the strong claim, that consistent with modern natural science is a notion of finality as an aspect of the real which is affirmable, without getting into the very, very, vulnerable, and very easily attacked notions of finality that Spinoza, for example, and Descartes, and so on, were able to set up, and where they successfully opened them to attack. Finality is what is being realized by present motion in its fullness.*¹⁰

Okay. All right! Let's take a break, and we'll come back.

End of Part One.

¹⁰ This sentence is inserted by the transcriber from Pat's Outline.

Insight and Beyond

Class 19, Part Two: February 17th 2010

“The Elements of Metaphysics”

(*Insight*, Chapter 15: “*Elements of Metaphysics*”)

Summary of Material

Finality as both upward and indeterminate.

What makes the universe of proportionate being indeterminately directed is the nonsystematic.

What makes it upwardly directed is that systematicity arises from non-systematicity.

The final end of the universe is a unknown. To know finality — to know the dynamically structured wholeness of the universe — does not rule out that even a total collapse of the universe might occur.

Metaphysics cannot guarantee that there is any point to our efforts to improve the human condition.

Student question about “incomplete universe heading towards fuller being” and what that means. Is a human a fuller or higher being than a tree, for instance? Is a tree or a human being moving towards being a fuller being? There is a saying, “The glory of God is man fully alive.” Is that fuller living an example of fuller being?

- Discussion of the relation of the individual to the universe.
- In terms of the natural theology language of chapter 19, the glory of God is manifest in the development of the universe, and the development of each human being is within that universal development.
- But, in chapter fifteen, fuller being is not conceived of in relation to God; fuller being here does not mean heading towards God. Rather, it is a statement that every instance of emergence is an instance of fuller being.
- The uniqueness of Lonergan’s account of emergence.
- Discussion of potency as the metaphysical condition for the possibility of the real emergence of new being.

Further Student questions:

Question about the relation of human intelligence to finality.

Finality being the objective parallel to the dynamism of human intelligence as the subjective component.

- Indeed, finality becomes conscious in human intelligence. The unrestricted desire to know is finality that previously operated unconsciously now operates consciously.
- Using one's intelligence is participating in the finality of the universe; being unintelligent is fighting against finality.

Student question: If the universe were to devolve or collapse, would it still be 'fuller' being? i.e., since a series of new facts and conditions would be born?

- Discussion of Lonergan's optimism and the real possibility of collapse.
- In his bold statement about 'fuller being' slips in an element of optimism that is not yet warranted strictly within the terms of chapter fifteen.

Question about whether fuller being can be understood in terms of intelligibility?

- Indeed, what makes the move towards fuller being is more actual intelligibility.

Question about whether we might, even by going against what is normative, ultimately be participating in finality?

- Discussion of the concordance, and/or conflict, between human efforts and the intelligibility of the universe. Lonergan's optimism is based on the fact that new things set conditions for further emergences. But the reverse can also come about, as seen with the anaerobic bacteria.

Humanity and Finality.

Reveals a universe in which humans and our desires and fears are not at center stage.

Why metaphysics needs to be done in an *explanatory* way.

Explanation is a *disinterested* way of seeking to understand how everything relates to everything else, as opposed to common sense (which is always egocentric).

Self-appropriation is appropriating oneself as a participant in the finality of the universe.

Not as an animal in a habitat, but as an intelligent participant in an intelligible order.

Raises for us the challenge of relating oneself to the intelligible whole, and living as citizens of the entire universe.

The *seeming* non-grandeur of human life, over against the *true* grandeur of human life.

Living without pretense and guile (example of Billy Budd) as a way of living authentically.

The romanticized ideal of authenticity ('genuineness') vs. real authenticity.

Thus, filling out finality as integral heuristic structure is the first aspect of chapter fifteen; the second part is Human Development.

These sections reveal why Lonergan thought same method used for metaphysics would also serve for ethics.

Simply taking on the challenge of being a metaphysician would reveal to oneself the challenge of living in fidelity to being a participant in the finality of proportionate being.

Discussion of agenda for the following week: review the sections on potency and act, explanatory genera and species, development and genetic method.

Insight and Beyond

Class 19, Part Two: February 17th 2010

“The Elements of Metaphysics”

(*Insight*, Chapter 15: “*Elements of Metaphysics*”)

Finality as both upward and indeterminate.

What makes the universe of proportionate being indeterminately directed is the nonsystematic.

What makes it upwardly directed is that systematicity arises from non-systematicity.

The final end of the universe is a unknown. To know finality — to know the dynamically structured wholeness of the universe — does not rule out that even a total collapse of the universe might occur.

Metaphysics cannot guarantee that there is any point to our efforts to improve the human condition.

Finality

“Thirdly, there is the principle of finality. The underlying manifold is an upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism towards ever fuller realization of being.” (*CWL* 3, p. 477).

Right, before we proceed, *I just want to underscore this business about finality, as Lonergan understands it, as being both upwardly and indeterminate: “an upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism towards ever fuller realization of being.”* (CWL 3, p. 477). *And the indeterminate comes from the strong affirmation that reality, proportionate being, includes the nonsystematic. And remember, one of the characteristics of nonsystematic is that exact predictions are not possible. Exact predictions are possible only insofar as systems are systematic, because then the relationships among data — and remember data include the data of differences in place and time — the relationships among data are so organized in an intelligible fashion that data on one stage are related to data on other stages such that you can have a simple formula for them. And a nonsystematic process, because it is by definition the negation of that, the intelligible relations among data don’t form a simple coherent set. They form what he calls a “coincidental aggregate”. It’s just a coincidence that these data are all here at this time together, but they don’t have a pattern of connectedness amongst them that we find in a systematic process. So the fact that the universe, or the proportionate being, has this nonsystematic character that is shot through the universe makes it indeterminate!*

What makes it upwardly directed is simply the fact that, sooner or later, some of the nonsystematic processes aggregate in such a way as to set the conditions for the emergence of a scheme of recurrence; or in the larger context, set the conditions for the emergence of developmental sequences! So it’s awkward, because out of pure nonsystematicity there arises systematicity! And the systematicity sets the conditions for further systematicity. And the further systematicity sets the conditions for the rise of developments. And the earlier developments set the conditions for the rise of more complex developments. And woven in there is that when the emergences become sufficiently rich, you have the emergence of systems that are actually higher in generic order than everything that preceded them. So chemical orders emerge out of merely physical orders; and life orders, biological orders, emerge out of purely physical and chemical orders; and so on!

So *upwardly directed* because emergences build upon systematic and then developmental things that emerge out of nonsystematic. So upwardly in that sense. But nevertheless, always *indeterminate*, which is to say *we don’t know where the universe is going!*

And one of the subtle implications of chapter fifteen (CWL 3, “**Elements of Metaphysics**”, pp. 456-511) is that *we don’t know with any confidence, as metaphysicians,*

whether or not it will work out! We don't know — that comment about the fact that

breakdowns and calamities and catastrophes are part of finality¹¹ — we don't know, as metaphysicians, whether or not that is the whole of the story.

Jonathan: And “not working out” would mean a decay into the nonsystematic?

Pat: Yeah! A collapse back into the nonsystematic. And there certainly are scenarios, particularly by people who do cosmology, work in astrophysics and cosmology, there are scenarios where our universe can just collapse back into another black hole. There is nothing in Lonergan's account of finality that speaks against that! All it does is to affirm an upwardly but indeterminately directed process, which is capable of total collapse. So any confidence that we have that the universe is ultimately going to lead to some final, good, systematic, or developmental wholeness, is not assured by the account of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being *alone!*

And as we'll see, one of the big questions that Lonergan poses early on in *Method in Theology*, is: Why bother? But remember, metaphysics is the implementation of the heuristic structure so as to develop positions and reverse¹² counterpositions. But what if that's a huge colossal waste of time? *Each of you in your own lives does that!* Ah, you work hard to understand; that *involves* exactly the development of positions. You help other people to understand, and that's an example of developing positions. You do your best to correct your own life, and to correct the bad behaviours of your friends. You work in various ways to overcome injustice and poverty and discrimination. That's reversing counterpositions. But what if it's all pointless? *Metaphysics doesn't give you any confidence that that's going to pay off. That's one of the further questions beyond proportionate being!* Is there any point to reversing the counterpositions? Is there any point to being a metaphysician? Is there any point to being *one who is* practicing self-appropriation? That's a separate and further question! Okay?

¹¹ Pat's precise page reference is unclear to the transcriber; he may be referring back to *CWL* 3, p. 150, but perhaps there is something in the current chapter fifteen.

¹² Pat uses the verb 'promote' at this point, but that is surely a *lapsus linguae*.

Student question about “incomplete universe heading towards fuller being” and what that means. Is a human a fuller or higher being than a tree, for instance? Is a tree or a human being moving towards being a fuller being? There is a saying, “The glory of God is man fully alive.” Is that fuller living an example of fuller being?

— Discussion of the relation of the individual to the universe.

— In terms of the natural theology language of chapter 19, the glory of God is manifest in the development of the universe, and the development of each human being is within that universal development.

— But, in chapter fifteen, fuller being is not conceived of in relation to God; fuller being here does not mean heading towards God. Rather, it is a statement that every instance of emergence is an instance of fuller being.

— The uniqueness of Lonergan’s account of emergence.

— Discussion of potency as the metaphysical condition for the possibility of the real emergence of new being.

there would be a dynamism, kind of in the thing of the tree, or in the human person, that's moving towards a fuller being. And that struck me as a — I had a hard time trying to grasp what this would mean, because I guess — This sentence —

“The underlying manifold is an upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism towards ever fuller realization of being.” (CWL 3, p. 477).

— This sentence made me become more aware of how much I'm in the counterposition of me kind of moving around in a static world. And I'm wondering if just by kind of saying some of these things, that that's obviously like that this is the right way to try to appropriate this, or try to think about this, or if there's something wrong to say, or if I'm not thinking in the right way, about what the notion of fuller being would be?

Pat: Well, you didn't actually tell me what you're thinking about the meaning of fuller being.

Matt: Well, I guess —

Pat: The worrying about it, and the wondering about it, is a really good thing!

Matt: Okay!

Pat: But I don't know how you're thinking about it.

Matt: Ahm, well, I guess what I was thinking about, in particular in relation to me as a person, when he talked a lot about my human development: imagine the final cause of a baby eating is not the adult that some day it will be; but that it's in a sense its being a human being. Or I'm being human when I'm acting or when I'm thinking, or when I'm making judgments. In a sense I'm being more human as a judger, than I would be if I were sort of hiding from unwanted insights, or living in the dramatic bias sort of that we talked about last semester. So I mean, there's a lot of religious language in here, but the thing that was in my mind was kind of, I guess, by analogy that “The glory of God is man fully alive”, as a way to think about that. When I'm alive, when I'm self-appropriating, then that's a fuller sense of being than one of just hanging around.

Pat: Okay. That helps me understand a little bit more about how you're thinking about it.

Matt: Okay!

Pat: The use of theological language, which Lonergan does use in chapter nineteen (*CWL* 3, “**General Transcendent Knowledge**”, pp. 657-708), although *it’s what you might call Natural Theology; it’s a version or a species of Natural Theology*. It’s not the Theology that takes certain claims as inspired and revelatory, and it’s a different meaning of Theology, which we will talk about when we get to *Method in Theology*. *The kind of Theology that Lonergan does in chapter nineteen (CWL 3, “General Transcendent Knowledge”, pp. 657-708), and again in chapter twenty (CWL 3, “Special Transcendent Knowledge”, pp. 709-751), he understands to be within the realm of what follows from self-affirmation, without the introduction of the further issues that have to do with revelation.*

So that said, in chapter nineteen (*CWL* 3, “**General Transcendent Knowledge**”, pp. 657-708), strictly within the bounds that he understands to be Natural Theology, he will say — he doesn’t actually use this language, but to adopt your language — “*The glory of God is manifested in the development of the universe!*” *And the development of Matt Sanders is part of that! It’s an intrinsic and indispensable part of that! But to fully understand the glory of God manifested in Matt Sanders is to fully understand the glory of Matt Sanders manifest in the upward but indeterminately directedness of the universe.*

Matt: So there would be a correspondence between say the beholding — maybe if we — I don’t know — like the aesthetic, the intrinsic beauty of a tree, or of nature, or something like that, at the same time, both in and of itself, because it’s part of the universe, but also in my —

Pat: Sure!

Matt: — recognizing of it —

Pat: Sure!

Matt: — And affirming that beauty.

Pat: Right!

Matt: Both of those things would be — because it’s all part of proportionate being, all of that would be part of the fullness — would be full of being.

Pat: Right! Okay! You're beholding of the beauty of the tree is what it is in all of its glory; and it's also something grander because it's part of something grander!

Matt: Okay!

Pat: Two quick further comments:

One is — You introduced the language of “the glory of God”, which actually does fit within the context of his Natural Theology, which is jumping way ahead. *Importantly in chapter fifteen (CWL 3, “Elements of Metaphysics”, pp. 456-511), he is not invoking anything about the glory of God. This business about the fullness, or the fuller being, has nothing to do with being fuller because it's ordained towards God. That will be something that he will give a kind of an affirmation to, in its own good time. But the claim here that the universe is heading towards fuller being, does not depend upon that claim. And though a hermeneutics of suspicion will say he sneaked that in here, in an illegitimate way. I don't think that's true!*

What he means here by *the universe heading towards fuller being* means quite simply: *a taking the position on being deadly seriously: that whatever intelligibility is is being, or is a part of being, is real! And every time a new scheme of recurrence occurs, a new intelligibility is! There is more being than there was before it emerged.* So the key to Lonergan's account of the fuller being goes all the way back to his account of emergence in chapter four (CWL 3, “**The Complementarity of Classical and Statistical Investigations**”, pp. 126-162)!

Matt: Okay!

Pat: He has, as far as I can tell, a very unique account of emergence! *When the conditions are given, because the parts of the universe are related to one another as the classical correlations do really relate them, something new will come into being when a new scheme of recurrence, and particularly when new things, begin to operate in these new schemes of recurrence. That's fuller being because there is an intelligible organization of what he calls 'potency', that didn't exist before! And it's just that there's more potency,*

form, and act, than there was before! And what he's arguing here is that there is an intrinsicness to what he means by *potency, that is the metaphysical condition for the possibility of emergence, real emergence.* And *real emergence means the coming into being of beings that were not!* And remember that *fuller being has to do with the fuller being of the universe, of the evolving universe.* And *the universe has just gotten more being to it than it had at an earlier stage.* That's all he means by *fuller being!* That it may have to do with the manifestations in some fashion of a *transcendently fuller being is something that he certainly would agree with, but he's not arguing it here, and he's not presupposing it here.* Okay?

Matt: Yeah. That's great. Thank you.

Pat: Okay!

Further Student questions:

Question about the relation of human intelligence to finality. Finality being the objective parallel to the dynamism of human intelligence as the subjective component.

— Indeed, finality becomes conscious in human intelligence. The unrestricted desire to know is finality that previously operated unconsciously now operates consciously.

— Using one's intelligence is participating in the finality of the universe; being unintelligent is fighting against finality.

Pat: I think Tim, and then Elizabeth, and then Amish.

Tim: Ah, kind of a real quick clarification. I was kind of stuck on by that passage too, and I was confused when he talks about the two parallels between finality being the objective parallel and the integral heuristic structure being supposedly subjective, if that would be the right word for it.

“I have been indicating a parallel between incomplete knowing heading towards fuller knowing and an incomplete universe heading towards fuller being, and now I propose to employ the name ‘finality’ to denote the objective member of the parallel.” (CWL 3, p. 471).

[Pat’s summary outline of Tim’s query is as follows: “Question about the relation of human intelligence to finality. Finality being the objective parallel to the dynamism of human intelligence as the subjective component.]

But I was just wondering, it seems like intelligence ultimately emerges out of finality. And so is it — I was confused by the setting up sort of the parallels, since — would — if human intelligence is something that emerges out of finality, would it be correct to say that our intelligence is finality making of itself in some way?

Pat: That’s exactly what he does say. *It’s finality become conscious!* I should have put that on a slide, but I didn’t. But *it’s in that section, that finality becomes conscious in humans. So the unrestricted desire to know is the finality of emergent probability that now operates consciously as opposed to unconsciously. The unrestricted desire to know is the unrestricted finality of the universe.*

Tim: So my use of intelligence in effect — so yeah, I guess — I just wanted to —

Pat: *Your use of intelligence is your participation in the finality of the universe. And your being unintelligent is you fighting against the finality of the universe.* That’s right. ... I don’t know if that’s your insight. It gave me the excuse for saying it!

**Student question: If the universe were to devolve or collapse, would it still be ‘fuller’ being? i.e., since a series of new facts and conditions would be born?
— Discussion of Lonergan’s optimism and the real possibility of collapse.**

— In his bold statement about ‘fuller being’ slips in an element of optimism that is not yet warranted strictly within the terms of chapter fifteen.

Pat: Elizabeth?

Elizabeth: Okay. So he talks about “**an incomplete universe heading towards fuller being.**” (CWL 3, p. 471). So if the universe were to somehow disintegrate into a less systematic, or finally into a totally unsystematic, it would still be fuller, because that development is a series of facts? If that’s the story?

Pat: Ahm, there is — I mean, that’s a good question! There is a bit of a fudge there.

Elizabeth: Yes!

Pat: Lonergan is expressing an optimism; that *insofar as there is emergence, there is fuller being in the sense in which he methodically, and philosophically grounded, can mean it here. But this is open to the possibility that collapse is ultimate and complete. The integral heuristic structure is open to that possibility. Everything he has to say about potency, form, and act, is open to that possibility. So you’re getting a certain kind of hopefulness here that’s not completely legitimate. That there is a movement towards fuller being is testifying to the facts of the evolution of the universe for the last fifteen billion years. That it will continue to be an emergence towards fuller being is not guaranteed!* But it’s a good question!

Elizabeth: But later he says “**finality is an affirmation of fact and fact pertains not to the future but to the present and to the past.**” (CWL 3, p. 472). So it seems to me that finality could — if it pertains to the past, then wouldn’t it — *It seems to me that his notion of wholeness is very devoid of any like evaluative, or like, sense of value.*

Pat: *I think that’s right! At this point it isn’t a value term. It’s an ontological thing. I think that’s right!* But that said, remember that finality is the emergence of schemes of recurrence according to the probabilities of the conditions that are going to lead to emergences of schemes of recurrence, and now, as we’ll see, of developmental sequences; but it’s quite possible that the emergences of the schemes lead to the destruction of the atmosphere and the devolution of life. That’s a possibility! *There’s nothing in what he says here that ensures that only ever further being comes about! It’s what’s to be known*

through the critically reoriented sciences and common sense. And the outcomes of science: in fact, there are really good scientific theories of how the universe might collapse! And they're not based on counterpositions. The problem is we don't have the data to decide one way or the other. The odd thing, in terms of the general relativistic cosmologies as we know, the data that's available is that the universe is right at this cusp, that it might be continuously expanding, accelerating its expanding, or just about to start to collapse. And we don't have enough data to decide which way it's going! There's nothing counter-positional about that!

So if the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being, under its big banner, is finality — I mean that it anticipates finality, it wants to know about finality; if the sciences say: "No, where we're headed for is collapse!", *that's part of what he means by finality!* He's sneaking some hopefulness in here, that is not legitimately there! It's okay up till now, because we have had a universe that's gotten to have more and more beings in it, so to speak. It's gotten to be richer in being! But there's no guarantee from anything that he says in chapter fifteen (*CWL* 3, "**Elements of Metaphysics**", pp. 456-511) that that will continue indefinitely! Okay?

Elizabeth: Thank you.

Question about whether fuller being can be understood in terms of intelligibility?

– Indeed, what makes the move towards fuller being is more actual intelligibility.

Question about whether we might, even by going against what is normative, ultimately be participating in finality?

— Discussion of the concordance, and/or conflict, between human efforts and the intelligibility of the universe. Lonergan's optimism is based on the fact that new things set conditions for further emergences. But the reverse can also come about, as seen with the anaerobic bacteria.

Pat: Amish?

Amish: So is the fuller being to be understood in terms of intelligibility, new layers so to speak of intelligibility —

Pat: That's right!

Amish: — emerging and enriching the other ones.

Pat: That's right! Exactly! That's well put! What makes for the finality of the universe to be a movement towards fuller being is there's more intelligibility. More importantly, there's more *actual intelligibility*, not just possible, but *actual* intelligibility! That is the fuller being. That's right! ... Shabith?

Shabith: Ah, you were saying before that operating intelligently is participating in finality. I was just wondering, you know, going back to dialectical and systematic methods, particularly dialectical, in the way that, you know, there should be treated successive stages, that there is something that's not directly intelligible; could apply to, for example, human development that could be irrational, when we go against the normative process. Isn't it possible then that in actually going against what is normative, we are participating then in finality? That being unreasonable, that that's —

Pat: Yeah. I mean, that is a possibility within this. *Since finality does in fact include dialectical processes, it's quite possible that it's going to be human beings that lead to the end of the universe!*

Shabith: Right.

Pat: And that's the worry we have about the planet: we haven't yet gotten to be powerful enough or stupid enough to undo the whole universe!

Shabith: Yeah. Okay. ... So Ideally, normally, by operating intelligently, we're, you know, participating in this upward movement —

Pat: That's right!

Shabith: — it could very well be the other way round too.

Pat: That's right. ... Matt?

Matt: So just to come off that: so all that we can really say is that being, I guess, develops in the form that it grows as it goes, but it could grow towards a finality that is

base, or a finality that is upwards, that is the indeterminate part; but that it grows as we continue on, that's just a question of the direction in which we're —

Pat: Yeah. He's got this optimism about it being upwardly, because when new things happen, they set the conditions for the possibility of still further emergences. But, just as the anaerobic bacteria destroy themselves by creating an oxygenated environment in which they couldn't survive — that's perfectly consistent with finality as he understands it. And when you take a lot of intelligibility out of existence, that's not greater being! It is a movement of finality! So there's an optimism here that is being sneaked in, that exceeds what he can really affirm on the basis of what he really means by this integral heuristic structure.

All right! Well, in the interests of time, let's move on!

Humanity and Finality.

Reveals a universe in which humans and our desires
and fears are not at center stage.

Why metaphysics needs to be done in an *explanatory*
way.

Explanation is a *disinterested* way of seeking to
understand how everything relates to everything else,
as opposed to common sense (which is always
egocentric).

Self-appropriation is appropriating oneself as a
participant in the finality of the universe.

Not as an animal in a habitat, but as an intelligent
participant in an intelligible order.

Raises for us the challenge of relating oneself to the
intelligible whole, and living as citizens of the entire
universe.

The *seeming* non-grandeur of human life, over against
the *true* grandeur of human life.

Living without pretense and guile (example of Billy
Budd) as a way of living authentically.

The romanticized ideal of authenticity ('genuineness')
vs. real authenticity.

Thus, filling out finality as integral heuristic structure
is the first aspect of chapter fifteen; the second part is
Human Development.

These sections reveal why Lonergan thought same
method used for metaphysics would also serve for
ethics.

Simply taking on the challenge of being a
metaphysician would reveal to oneself the challenge of
living in fidelity to being a participant in the finality of
proportionate being.

Humanity and Finality

**"Intellectual development rests upon the
dominance of a detached and disinterested
desire to know."**

**It reveals to [human beings] a universe of
being in which [each] is but an item, and a
universal order in which desires and fears,
delight and anguish, are but infinitesimal
components in the history of humankind.**

It invites [humans] to become intelligent and reasonable not only in his [or her] knowing but also in his [or her] living, to guide his [or her] actions by referring them, not as an animal to a habitat, but as an intelligent being to the intelligible context of some universal order that is or is to be.” (*CWL* 3, p. 498).

Ah, this is on page 498:¹³ **“Intellectual development rests upon the dominance of a detached and disinterested desire to know.”** (*CWL* 3, p. 498). And that means, at some point, it’s going to reveal to human beings **“a universe of being** (*CWL* 3, p. 498) —” So whenever he uses — He uses the word ‘universe’ somewhat fluidly. *Usually, by ‘universe’ he means proportionate being, and by proportionate being he means the finite universe. Sometimes he means all of being. Here he means the universe of proportionate being, the universe as we know it, with all its physical events, all its chemical events, all its biological organisms, and their interactions, all human events, all human relationships, all human institutions, human history, and so on.* So it reveals a universe of proportionate being in which each of us **“is but an item, and a universal order in which desires and fears, delight and anguish, are but infinitesimal components in the history of humankind.”** (*CWL* 3, p. 498).

So if you take seriously your intellectual development — and Lonergan talks at the very beginning — we’re not going to get to that today — At the very beginning of the chapter we’re on, chapter fifteen (*CWL* 3, **“Elements of Metaphysics”**, pp. 456-511), when he defines potency, form and act, he says that metaphysics, explicit metaphysics, the integral

¹³ Pat indicates p. 497, as does the relevant slide, but in fact this material is on page 498.

heuristic structure of proportionate being, needs to be done in an explanatory fashion. I'll just read the passage to you:

“Accordingly let us introduce the terms ‘potency,’ ‘form,’ and ‘act.’” These are the elements of metaphysics. **“‘Potency’ denotes the component of proportionate being to be known in fully explanatory knowledge by an intellectually patterned experience of the empirical residue.”** (*CWL* 3, p. 457).

Now, that's a mouthful, and we'll have to come back and look at that in each of its parts.

But I want to emphasize this business: “**in fully explanatory knowledge.**” Why “fully explanatory knowledge”? Well, one of the things that we’ll have to deal with is the tension between what seemingly gets left out if you insist on fully explanatory knowledge, and you leave out the descriptive knowledge. But why “fully explanatory knowledge”? Because remember what Lonergan at least means by ‘explanation’ is understanding how everything relates to everything. “Fully explanatory knowledge” is to leave out no conditionality, to prescind from nothing that is to be understood about how things and how data in the universe are related to one another! And they can be related to one another in four ways; classically, statistically, genetically or dialectically. So the emphasis there on potency as having to do with the explanatory, means, to explore the intelligibility of the universe in **all** its dimensions.

If you do that, you lose your privileged place in the universe, which is what common sense does. Common sense descriptive knowledge relates everything to me, to my needs, and my interests, and my concerns.

But if I appropriate myself as a participant in the finality of the universe, if the most fundamental way in which I am to be characterized, if my most fundamental identity as we were talking about a couple of weeks ago, if my most fundamental identity is constituted by my conscious participation in the finality of the universe by my unrestricted desire to know, or my unrestricted questioning, then I can’t help but discover that I am just an infinitesimal part in the fifteen billion years, and the ten to the fiftieth power events of the universe. That not born in New York City¹⁴ one of the eight billion people, and only going along like that. This is just overwhelming! That this is where this leads!

¹⁴ Possible reference to the song “Down and Out in New Your City”, sung by James Brown, and others. It includes the following lines: “I was born in New York City on a Monday, It seems I was out shinin’ shoes ’bout two to noon, All the fat cats, in the bad hats doing me a real big favor, Got the fat cats, in the bad hats laying it on real good, Here’s a dime boy, give me a shine boy.”

But it invites us

“to become intelligent and reasonable, not only in our knowing but also in our living, to guide our actions by referring to them, not as animals in habitats, not as self-interested beings in a liberal or a socialist state, but as an intelligent being to the intelligible context” of the intelligible order of finality. (*CWL 3*, p. 498).

So our intelligent thrust for self-appropriation, and taking seriously what’s involved in explanation as Lonergan understands it, raises for us a new challenge of living; to live as citizens of the universe! It’s tough enough to live as a citizen of Boston College, as a citizen of the State of Massachusetts, as a citizen of the United States, as a citizen of the world; to live as citizens of the universe of history of fifteen billion years; to take responsibility, to participate in, and to make our contribution to the story of the universe; even though it ain’t much, even though it’s infinitesimal. So you have this odd tension between the seeming non-grandeur of it, as opposed to the true grandeur of what it means to live an authentic human life.

Human Development & Genuineness [Authenticity]

“The genuineness of which we think when we speak of a simple and honest soul is the happy fruit of a life in which illusion and pretense have had no place.”

“But there is another genuineness that has to be won back through a self-scrutiny that expels illusion and pretense; and as this enterprise is difficult and its issue doubtful, we do not think of its successful outcome when we cast about for an obvious illustration of genuineness.” (*CWL 3*, p. 500).

This is a few pages later: and *he says this raises the question of genuineness*. It comes sort of out of the blue, but *there is a transition: He raises the question of genuineness*, and he says: there is “**the genuineness of ... a simple and honest soul**” ... in which “**pretense**” has “**no place.**” (*CWL* 3, p. 500).

Some people talked — There was an interesting article, I think by Rollo May¹⁵ — I remember it was quite a number of years ago — about *Billy Budd, Sailor*,¹⁶ Herman Melville’s¹⁷ story about Billy Budd, **exploring** whether or not Billy Budd was really all as innocent as he was portrayed: is he really the Christ-like figure as he’s portrayed in that novel? And Rollo May raises some interesting questions about whether or not that’s true! But let’s say Billy Budd is the example of a person who has no pretense or guile. It turns out that precisely because of that — those of you who aren’t familiar with the novel — precisely because of that, this vile person, **the ship’s master-at-arms John Claggart**, hates him, with deep, deep, passion, more than he hates anybody else; because of his very innocence! I won’t tell you the rest because I’d ruin the story. But Rollo May raises the question about

¹⁵ **Rollo May** (1909–1994) was an American existential psychologist and author of the influential book *Love and Will* (1969). He is often associated with humanistic psychology, and existentialist philosophy, and, alongside Viktor Frankl, was a major proponent of existential psychotherapy. The philosopher and theologian Paul Tillich was a close friend who had a significant influence on his work. As well as *Love and Will*, May’s works also include *The Meaning of Anxiety* (1950, revised 1977) and, titled in honour of Tillich’s *The Courage to Be*, *The Courage to Create* (1975).

¹⁶ ***Billy Budd Sailor*** is the final novel by American writer Herman Melville, first published posthumously in London in 1924 as edited by Raymond M. Weaver, a professor at Columbia University, and then other versions followed. Melville had begun writing the original work in November 1888, but left it unfinished at his death in 1891. It was acclaimed by British critics as a masterpiece when published in London, and quickly took its place among the canon of significant works in the United States. Note that Pat erroneously attributes this novel to Nathaniel Hawthorne; the transcriber has substituted the correct name above.

¹⁷ **Herman Melville** (1819–1891) was an American novelist, short story writer, and poet of the American Renaissance period. His best known works include *Typee* (1846), a romantic account of his experiences in Polynesian life, and his whaling novel *Moby-Dick* (1851). His writing draws on his experience at sea as a common sailor, exploration of literature and philosophy, and engagement in the contradictions of American society in a period of rapid change. In 1867 his oldest child, Malcolm, died at home from a self-inflicted gunshot. In 1886, his second son, Stanwix, died and Melville retired. The novella *Billy Budd, Sailor*, left unfinished at his death, was published in 1924.

whether he's really without pretense and guile, or whether it's just something that is beyond his recognition; and so he has his own pretense and guile.

Loneragan is saying: whatever might be true of Billy Budd or other such people, that ain't most of us. *For most of us there's another genuineness, that has to be won back through self-scrutiny, through self-appropriation.* And one of the key transitional elements in self-appropriation is: that I'm not the universe; that I'm a player in the universe; and that no matter how powerful I am, I, as Shakespeare has it, I have my brief moment on the stage of the universe's finality.¹⁸ And how I react to that — People without guile perhaps can be thought of as people who don't recognize that that's up. You get to a certain point when you realize that that's what's up! *The challenge of genuineness becomes much deeper and much more profound. And it's self-scrutiny that has to expel illusion and pretense.* It's not as though we never had it! We've got it! It's a permanent part of our being. As he says in *Method in Theology*, in this life authenticity is largely a matter of withdrawal from inauthenticity.

“Human authenticity is never some pure and serene and secure possession. It is ever a withdrawal from unauthenticity.” (*MiT*, p. 110).

That's what he's talking about: *the withdrawal from inauthenticity with full knowledge of the infinitesimal finitude of me and what I do in the grand order of proportionate being.*

“But there is another genuineness that has to be won back through a self-scrutiny that expels illusion and pretense; and as this enterprise is difficult and its issue doubtful, we do not think of its successful outcome when we cast about for an obvious illustration of genuineness.” (*CWL 3*, p. 500).

¹⁸ “Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player,
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.”

(*Macbeth*, Act 5, scene 5.)

That is, this enterprise, *the “self-scrutiny that expels illusion and pretense is difficult and its issue doubtful, we do not think of its successful outcome when we cast about for an obvious illustration of genuineness.”* (CWL 3, p. 500, emphases added). So in other words, people who are working hard to improve upon their states of pretense and illusion, for Lonergan, those are the really genuine authentic people! Truly! But they don’t look that way, because they’re not without pretense and guile; *and because there is this kind of romantic ideal of authenticity, and then there is the more difficult ideal of authenticity.*

Insight: A Study of Human Understanding
Chapter 15: “Elements of Metaphysics”

So in the book, in the chapter, chapter fifteen (CWL 3, “**Elements of Metaphysics**”, pp. 456-511), those are *the two parts of what Lonergan is doing. He’s filling out this integral heuristic structure that he’s going to call finality! Finality is simply the “upwardly but indeterminately”* (CWL 3, p. 477) *directedness of proportionate being, which can be fleshed out and given further generic and structural characterization in the ways that he does!* And that’s part — That’s Act One of chapter fifteen (CWL 3, “**Elements of Metaphysics**”, pp. 456-511)! *Act Two of chapter fifteen* (CWL 3, “**Elements of Metaphysics**”, pp. 456-511) *is human development. And human development sets up these really dramatic moments.*

One of the reasons why I love this chapter is some of the greatest minds in all of *Insight* are in here; one of them is this one about fellow beings — That whole page there, page 471 — *All of the things that he says about the dynamic correspondence between human knowing and the being that is so known.* There is just marvelous stuff in there, and then it leads up to this part about human genuineness, and a great challenge!

As we will see, this is how Lonergan thought he was going to do Ethics in *Insight*; this is the jumping off point for the chapter on Ethics. It’s why he didn’t think he needed —

Well, I shouldn't say it that way! It's how he thought he could work out Ethics, before he discovered what he calls *the independent notion of value, which is a fourth level of consciousness and a fourth set of operations that aren't treated in any full sense any place in Insight*. So this is where he thought Ethics was going to be a jumping off point. *It turns out that there is an awful*

lot of what he does by putting this into play here, and what he has to say in chapter eighteen (CWL 3, "The Possibility of Ethics", pp. 618 – 656) that still is to be retained in this broader sense of Ethics that comes after the publication of Insight. But nevertheless, that's where it is. That's why you don't need a method — or he didn't think you needed a method of Ethics that was different from the method of Metaphysics. It's why he thought that simply being a metaphysician, you would come to the realization of who you are in the grand order of proportionate being, and that that would have profound consequences for how such a self-appropriated person would live.

**Discussion of agenda for the following week: review
the sections on potency and act, explanatory genera
and species, development and genetic method.**

Okay! Let me stop there and see if people have questions.

[No question posed]

Okay. Well, maybe some questions — So I have a question for you. This is — Ah, what should we do next week, is the question.

My plan was that this was going to take the first thirty minutes, but as you know, I do that all the time! And there's a few more slides after this, that go into some of the details! And so the question is — I think if we spend — I think to do a fair — to do justice to chapter fifteen (CWL 3, "Elements of Metaphysics", pp. 456-511), we would really need another class. Do we do justice to fifteen or do we go on to sixteen? It's your call!

If we go on with chapter fifteen, I have to do a variety — already a week behind, I'll be two weeks behind, so there ought to be some other kind of readjustment down the line, as to how we integrate some of the post-*Insight* material into the class. I have some ideas as to

how we could do that. But what's your preference? To finish chapter fifteen in some depth, or do you want to go on to sixteen? ...

Student: Justice!

[Class amusement]

Another student: Same here!

Pat: Justice? To do justice, I said we'd have to finish chapter fifteen, okay! All right! So what I would ask you to do is to go back over this chapter in the light of today's class. We will focus on two of the very difficult technical parts; actually three: the section on "Potency, Form, and Act", the section on "Explanatory Genera and Species", and the sections on "The Notion of Development", and **that on** "Genetic Method". So, if you would go back over those. And we will get back to the gene that's actually sitting on one of the earlier slides in the next class. All right! So I'll see you next week.

End of Class Nineteen