

Insight and Beyond

Class 14, Part One: December 16th 2009

Judging

(*Insight*, Chapter 9: “The Notion of Judgment”)

Summary of Material

Introductory remarks about the importance of judgment in Lonergan.

— “The startling strangeness” of the fully human notion of reality reached by correct understanding.

— Animal vs. human realism.

— The source of our doubting that our understanding is *knowing*.

— Lonergan’s claim that “knowing is understanding correctly,” i.e. grasping intelligibility, which is not “already out there now.”

One of the reasons that Lonergan devotes the first chapters to science is to show that the reality of universe of natural science is intelligible, not “out there”.

Reality and unreality from the perspective of animal realism.

The reality of theoretical entities is intelligibility; that makes them “strange” because they are not ‘tangible’ for the animal extroverted sense; they do not partake in ‘already out there now’ expected by animal consciousness.

How real are quarks, electromagnetic waves, and other such entities?

Lonergan’s unique position on realism involves *understanding correctly*.

“Understanding correctly” is the topic of Chapters 9 and 10.

This entails appropriating our judgment and our reflective understanding.

The dichotomy of the two types of realism (animal and human) makes us doubt that understanding is really knowing.

This leads to two unsatisfactory options:

- Naïve realism claims that knowing is simple, based on observations. For it, understanding plays no significant role, it merely classifies those things taken as real by “taking a look”.
- Kantian Idealism stresses the constructive role played by consciousness. But it claims to only reach knowledge of appearances, not immediate knowledge of things.
- If consciousness is constitutive, our knowledge is limited to the objectivity of appearances.

Lonergan's cognitional structure as *one* single structure of knowing with the *three* basic levels of consciousness addressed in *Insight*:

1: Experiencing.

2: Insight.

3: Reflective insight and Judgment.

Each level has conscious activities proper to it.

After the book *Insight*, there are higher levels of consciousness that include Value Judging & Choosing (4th level), and religious consciousness (5th level); Lonergan also later speculates about a "0th level" of dreaming.

Lonergan's "intentionality analysis" is similar in some ways to a phenomenological analysis.

So Chapter 9 presents a kind of phenomenology of acts of judging.

The act of consciousness (*noesis*) can be distinguished from the object (*noema*) of consciousness (the latter is not already out there now).

Phenomenology studies the relation of constituting acts to constituted objects.

Since objects are constituted by activities of consciousness, phenomenology begins with the objects and works back to the constituting activities.

This has strong resemblances with self-appropriation.

The three approaches to the self-appropriation/phenomenology of judging in Chapter 9:

The first approach distinguishes two distinct mental attitudes with regard to a proposition.

— We can entertain a proposition as a possibility and ponder its meaning.

— Or we can judge the proposition as ‘being the case, being so’; we can *posit* it.

Self-appropriation of judging requires identifying propositions which are intended with this *second* type of mental attitude, attending to that positing, and understanding what sort of an activity it is.

Contrast between Kant and Aquinas on the meaning of “judgment.”

Judgment as entertaining a possibility and as synthesizing is done by understanding, not by judging, according to Lonergan.

Kant defines judgment in terms of *composition and division*, not in terms of the *act of positing*.

While Aquinas also uses composition and division to speak of judgment (*iudicare*), Lonergan was influenced by Aquinas’s second option in what he will mean by “judging.” He interprets judgment as the distinct mental attitude of positing (or denying); this involves a commitment to the proposition.

The second approach considers judgment in relation to the other activities surrounding it.

— In particular, judgment in relation to the very distinctive type of question, “Is it so?”

The third approach involves personal commitment.

— We have more control over our judgments than over sense experiences and insights.

— More dependent on sources other than ourselves in acts of seeing, or in having insights, than in judging.

— Thus we are more responsible for them. We can always defer judging with “I don’t know.”

Summary of Lonergan’s three approaches to the self-appropriation of judgment.

Elaboration of judgment as an answer to the question “Is it so?”

The activity of judging resolves the ‘Is it so?’ question and thus releases the tension, just as insight releases the tension of what/where/why/who questions.

Question about the relation of judgment and understanding in Kant and Lonergan.

— Lonergan's second level of consciousness corresponds to Kant's Understanding.

— Kant confines judgment to Understanding, but Lonergan sees it as a distinct activity on a distinct, higher level, the third level of consciousness.

— Thus Lonergan's version of judgment is more personal on the 3rd level, and even more so on the 4th level.

— Discussion of higher levels of consciousness and the construction of a life.

— Yet even the activities of the 3rd level of consciousness are also matters of self-transcendence.

Question about the meaning of 'positing' and the difference between *positing a judgment* and *judging*.

— Positing is committing, affirming a proposition as true.

— Positing a proposition is the same as judging a proposition.

— The ["borrowed"] content of a judgment is an intelligibility that comes from a direct insight and then is affirmed or denied in a judgment [and affirming or denying is the "proper" content of a judgment].

Question about whether insight into intelligibility avoids the problem of mediation.

— Judging *is* a second level of mediation.

— Kant denies the possibility of intellectual intuition. Lonergan agrees; but he spells out the kind of mediation involved in going from understanding to positing.

— Newman helped Lonergan to realize that reasoning toward positing is discursive, it is mediating; reason is not an unmediated intuitive connection with the real or the true.

Question: If we cannot yet judge whether the universe is systematic or non-systematic, is that because we have not yet had the insight, or because we do not yet have enough data?

— This is due to the lack of the virtually unconditioned; data are not the only conditions for grounding judgments; further discussion.

The Contents of Judgment: 3 Kinds:

— Proper content. Affirmation or denial is what judgment itself proper contributes to consciousness. This is the content that “supervenes” upon all the contents of prior conscious activities (e.g., intelligible contents of understanding, data contents of sensations, etc.).

— Direct borrowed content. This is borrowed from the relevant insight, from the “Is it so?” question that always arises from the prior, direct borrowed content.

— Indirect borrowed content. This is found in the reflective act linking question and answer.

In short, the insight comes first; then the answering of the “Is it so?” question (by a ‘Yes’ or a ‘No’).

How one’s answer depends not on a coin flip, but on reasonably affirming or denying the question.

How one *genuinely, reasonably* satisfies the tension in the “Is it so?” question is addressed in Ch. 10.

The indirect borrowed content which satisfies that tension comes in a “reflective act of understanding,” which grasps the *reasonableness of judging* (positing; affirming or denying).

The *context* of judgment: knowing is a dynamic structure.

Judgments are plural and we situate them in relation to one another.

All our prior judgments are the context of our new ones; all judgments must be brought into coherence with each other.

Question about the role of revelation and faith in judgment, particularly for the religious believer.

— Discussion of belief in general, not just religious belief.

— We affirm or deny beliefs on a basis different from that obtained in an act of reflective understanding (an “immanently generated” ground of judging).

— Believing is accepting something said by someone else as trustworthy.

— In believing, a value judgment about the source of the statement forms the ground for the reasonableness of believing.

— We need to understand the activity of judging before we can discuss believing in general and religious believing in particular.

End of Part I.

Insight & Beyond:

Class 14, Part One: December 16th 2009

Chapter 9

Judging

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Introductory remarks about the importance of judgment in Lonergan.

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— Animal vs. human realism.

— The source of our doubting that our understanding is *knowing*.

— Lonergan’s claim that “knowing is understanding correctly,” i.e. grasping intelligibility, which is not “already out there now.”

Insight and Beyond

Class 14, December 16, 2009

Chapter 9: “The Notion of Judgment”

&

Chapter 10: “Reflective Understanding”

So we’re going to talk about the last two Chapters of Part One of *Insight*, his chapters on Judgment (*CWL* 3, Chapter 9: “**The Notion of Judgment**” pp. 296-303), and Reflective Understanding (*CWL* 3, Chapter 10: “**Reflective Understanding**” pp. 304-340). The Chapter

on Judgment is one of the two shortest chapters in the whole book, which actually belies its importance in Lonergan's whole philosophical project. Arguably it's the most important and the most original of Lonergan's contributions, in my opinion, to the History of Philosophy, although he credits Aquinas with having given him the insights that he needed to sort out this particular way of thinking about judgment.

Animal vs. Human Realism

“clear memory of its startling strangeness — that there are two quite different realisms ...”(CWL 3, p. 22).

“unless one breaks the duality in one's knowing, one doubts that understanding correctly is knowing.

Under the pressure of that doubt, either one will sink into the bog of a knowing that is without understanding, or else one will cling to understanding but sacrifice knowing on the altar of an immanentism, an idealism, a relativism.” (CWL 3, p. 22).

And I want to begin by recalling something that we talked about last week, because this is a kind of a bridge between Chapter Eight (CWL 3, Chapter 8: “**Things**” pp. 270-295), and Chapters Nine and Ten: (“**The Notion of Judgment**” and “**Reflective Understanding**”). We talked last week, when we were talking about bodies and things, about the “startling strangeness” of a notion of reality that is different from the kind of reality that goes along with what Lonergan calls the notion of a body.

A body is what's known by extroverted consciousness; it's part of our evolutionary inheritance. It's one of the things that gives animals an advantage in "the struggle for life", as

Darwin called it, over plants, because animals unlike plants have the capacity to find opportunities for biological advantage outside of the limits of their membranes. By their senses, first the most primordial sense the sense of touch, which would include the sense of experiencing vibrations and the capacity to move in the direction of those vibrations as sensed. Those vibrations then develop in different directions, into sense of touch, and the sense of hearing, and the sense of sight, and so on. So the great advantage that animals have over plants is the development of consciousness which is primarily an extroverted consciousness for the sake of evolutionary advantage.

And so by the time human beings emerge, out of the three and a half billion year history of the evolution of life on the planet Earth — that very, very, brief moment — extroverted consciousness has been doing very well, thank you!!

[Some class laughter]

And surviving, and helping to survive, and improving; and so by the time that human beings emerge, why should they give up on the extroverted notion of reality?

And, as Lonergan says, one of the things that self-appropriation is going to bring to our awareness is *a different kind of realism* that is going to be received, when we really appropriate it, with a certain kind of "startling strangeness". And in that connection — and this is still back in the "Introduction" — in that connection Lonergan says:

"unless one breaks the duality in one's knowing, one doubts that understanding correctly is knowing. Under the pressure of that doubt, either one will sink into the bog of a knowing that is without understanding, or else one will cling to understanding but sacrifice knowing on the altar of an immanentism, an idealism, a relativism." (CWL 3, p. 22).

Lonergan says that unless one breaks from the duality in one's knowing, which is to say the duality between extroverted, animal, body, realism, and the fully human kind of realism, unless one breaks with that kind of dualism, one will doubt whether understanding correctly is knowing. And that is Lonergan's position: that knowing is understanding correctly!

From one point of view, that doesn't sound like very strange or Earth-shatteringly difficult. But if we recall now that what Lonergan, at least, means by understanding is grasping intelligibility, and that intelligibility comes in the act of understanding, and that intelligibility has neither shape nor colour nor timbre, nor resonance, nor texture, nor smell, nor sound! In other words, intelligibility is not and can never be 'already out there now'. Intelligibility cannot be sharing in the kind of realism that is the animal realism, that we inherit from our biological heritage.

And if understanding correctly is knowing, that means having correct intelligibility is knowledge of reality. And that should be strange! That would be experienced as strange. When we talked a little bit last week about the sorts of things that seem unreal from the point of view of the bodily oriented realism. Begin to get a feel for that!

One of the reasons that Lonergan devotes the first chapters to science is to show that the reality of the universe of natural science is intelligible, not "out there".

Reality and unreality from the perspective of animal realism.

The reality of theoretical entities is intelligibility; that makes them "strange" because they are not 'tangible' for the animal extroverted sense; they do not partake in 'already out there now' expected by animal consciousness.

How real are quarks, electromagnetic waves, and other such entities?

Lonergan's unique position on realism involves
understanding correctly.

“Understanding correctly” is the topic of
Chapters 9 and 10.

This entails appropriating our judgment and our
reflective understanding.

One of the reasons that Lonergan does this long build-up with modern science is in part, as I've tried to show, to set the stage of the kind of evolving universe, the emergently probable universe, that in fact we inhabit; but it's also to reveal that universe: that its character is fundamentally the character of intelligibility.

And the more one goes into scientific investigations, the more one begins to encounter *very strange entities*, so strange that within the field of Philosophy of Science, there are many people who hold positions *that scientific knowing is not knowledge of reality: that theoretical entities are not really real!* And although they don't have Lonergan's language for it, their position is often that those theoretical entities, like quarks, like magnetic waves, like gravitational fields — *they're not real! Why? Because they have no parity with 'already out there newness'!* *They just don't have that kind of stuff to them, and so they must be something else: fictitious entities, ideal entities, models by which we are able to then have successful technological innovations.* They're not really about anything; they just are convenient conventions that we adopt for the sake of meeting the purposes, as Bacon has put it, for “the relief of man's estate”.¹ So that's the point to science, that's the point to theoretical entities. *They can't be real because they don't have this real tangibility that goes*

¹ Francis Bacon published “Of Proficiency and Advancement of Learning Divine and Human” in 1605. In this work, which is divided in two books, Bacon starts giving philosophical, civic and religious arguments for the engaging in the aim of advancing learning. In the second book, Bacon analyses the state of the sciences of his day, stating what was being done incorrectly, what should be bettered, in which way should they be advanced.

Among his arguments in the first book, he considered learned kingdoms and rulers to be higher than the unlearned, evoked as example King Solomon, the biblical king who had established a school of natural research, and gave discourses on how knowledge should be used for the “glory of the Creator” and “the relief of man's estate”, if only it was governed by charity.

along with animal extroversion. They can't be real! So what's their point? Their point is that they help us to promote our technological projects that meet human needs more efficiently.

Lonergan has a very different point of view, because he's got a very different commitment and position about realism. And the "understanding correctly" are what chapters nine and ten are about. What does it mean, not just to understand, because we've been working on trying to appropriate what it means to have insights; and to begin to get a feel for the strange contents that supervene upon our sensations when we understand. We've been appropriating that!

The dichotomy of the two types of realism (animal and human) makes us doubt that understanding is really knowing.

This leads to two unsatisfactory options:

— Naïve realism claims that knowing is simple, based on observations. For it, understanding plays no significant role, it merely classifies those things taken as real by "taking a look".

— Kantian Idealism stresses the constructive role played by consciousness. But it claims to only reach knowledge of appearances, not immediate knowledge of things.

— If consciousness is constitutive, our knowledge is limited to the objectivity of appearances.

And now we make the turn to appropriate another level of activity of human consciousness, and the implications of that added level of activity with regard to things like realism and objectivity. And that level is what he calls the *level of judging and reflective understanding*.

He continues his reflection with regard to the doubt that we have about whether understanding correctly is really knowing with this remark:

Under the pressure of that doubt, either one will sink into the bog of a knowing that is without understanding, or else one will cling to understanding but sacrifice knowing on the altar of an immanentism, an idealism, a relativism. (CWL 3, p. 22).

Now, one by one he picks those up in various places within *Insight*, and in some of the other things that we're going to read next semester.

Animal vs. Human Realism

“The naive realist correctly asserts the validity of human knowing, but mistakenly attributes the objectivity of human knowing, not to human knowing, but to some component in human knowing. (CWL 4, p. 214).

“The idealist is not impressed ... All of that is not reality but appearance. And by reality he means what is meant by ... the naïve realist.” (CWL 4, p. 216).

But just to give you a sort of a feel for this: this is a passage that comes from one of the first things we will read next semester, his essay from the nineteen sixties entitled “Cognitional Structure”

The naïve realist correctly asserts the validity of human knowing, but mistakenly attributes the objectivity of human knowing, not to human knowing, but to some component in human knowing. (CWL 4, p. 214).²

“The naïve realist correctly asserts the validity of human knowing, but mistakenly attributes the objectivity of human knowing” (CWL 4, p. 214) to the extroversion of outer sensation. So when Lonergan says: **“Under the pressure of that doubt either one will sink into the bog of a knowing that is without understanding ...” (CWL 4, p. 214),** he’s talking about the naïve realist, what he calls the naïve realist.

Naïve realism is:

we know;

we know what’s really there;

and we know what’s really there by taking a look at it,

By looking outside ourselves and seeing what’s there!

And we see not only shapes and colours, but we see people, and universities, and all other sorts of things; so we don’t need to worry about whether or not we know; we know, and knowing is a real simple matter: You just take a look and you see what’s there! That’s naïve realism! There is what you might call Sophisticated Naïve Realism, and Sophisticated Sophisticated Naïve Realism, and all of that is what he means!

[Some student laughter].

Understanding doesn’t play a role in knowing. What we do by understanding is perhaps we classify things that we’ve already known by taking a look!

But either one thinks that understanding plays no significant role in knowing — or, **“the Idealist is not impressed.” (CWL 4, p. 216).** Why? Because the Idealist — And here usually when Lonergan says *“The Idealist”*, he means the great idealist who for him would be Kant.

² Bernard Lonergan, “Cognitional Structure”, in *Collection*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4, pp. 204-221, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1988). This paper was first published in 1964.

And he does think of Kant as a great figure, a great figure to be struggled with — which he’s doing throughout most of the book of *Insight!* The idealist is not impressed, why? *Because the idealist is quite aware that human consciousness plays a constructive role in human consciousness [knowing?].* But, what the idealist says that human understanding is about, is its understanding of appearances. **“All of that is not reality but appearance. And by reality he means what is meant by ... the naïve realist.”** (CWL 4, p. 216).

So in other words, what Lonergan is saying here is that the idealist is saying: *“No, when you take a look at the world outside, your consciousness is already actively constituting what you see. You don’t have immediate contact with reality in the way that naïve realism thinks.”*

The idealist claims that there is constructive activity; in Kant’s case of course that means first of all with intuition. And then the further level of the syntheses that understanding does. *But whatever you get by way of understanding is not knowledge of reality, but rather knowledge of appearances!* Why? Because reality would have to be what the naïve realist says it is. *You would have to have immediate external extroverted contact with things as they really are in themselves; but unfortunately, we don’t have that. We have always mediated relationships with entities outside of ourselves. And therefore we don’t have knowledge of reality! What we’re doing when we’re understanding is not knowing reality, because we don’t have that immediate contact! The naïve realist was right about what you would have to have in order to get knowledge of reality; we just don’t happen to have it!! So the best we can do is phenomenal, or phenomenal objectivity, or objectivity with regard to appearances!*

So this is — I’m making a connection — Why do chapter nine **“The Notion of Judgment”**, and chapter ten, **“Reflective Understanding”**, follow upon chapter eight **“Things”**? In chapter eight Lonergan makes explicit what he had in mind back in the **“Introduction”**, when he talked about the two kinds of realisms. *And the problem is that one will doubt that understanding correctly is really knowing! And if one doubts that understanding correctly is really knowing, then one will have a variety of different philosophical options, and Lonergan is not satisfied with any of those. Okay?*

Loneragan's cognitional structure as *one* single structure of knowing with the *three* basic levels of consciousness addressed in *Insight*:

- 1: Experiencing.
- 2: Insight.
- 3: Reflective insight and Judgment.

Each level has conscious activities proper to it.

After the book *Insight*, there are higher levels of consciousness that include Value Judging & Choosing (4th level), and religious consciousness (5th level); Lonergan also later speculates about a "0th level" of dreaming.

One Single Structure of Knowing

Judging values and choosing

↑ ?Questions? What good should I do?

Judging Facts

↑ ?Questions? Is it so?

Insights
(understanding)

↑ ?Questions? What, Why. How, Where, When?

Experiencing
(seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, smelling, feeling ...)


So we move on now to this next level. And this is a slide [[One Single Structure of Knowing](#)] that we saw way back, perhaps in the first or second class, where I gave you a sort of a thumb-nail — the “cliff-notes” of Lonergan’s cognitional structure.

In *Insight* — and this is first articulated in chapter nine (*CWL 3*, Chapter 9: “**The Notion of Judgment**” pp. 296-303) — In *Insight*, Lonergan will talk about *levels of consciousness*. Now, we’ll leave the exploration of what he means by talking about ‘levels’ of consciousness until next semester, when we resume chapter eleven on self-affirmation (*CWL 3*, Chapter 11: “**Self-affirmation of the Knower**” pp. 343-371). There he goes into this in a little greater detail. But in *Insight*, Lonergan talks about three levels of consciousness; after *Insight*, he would start to talk about a fourth, and sometimes a fifth; and sometimes also what I would call a zeroth. So when you’re dreaming are you conscious? We-ell, yes and no, because there’s a difference between dreaming consciousness and being completely unconscious, without dreams, the dreamless state. And so *he toyed with trying to figure out how to properly characterise dream-state consciousness, and didn’t assign a level to it*; but if experiencing, if being awake, and sensing, and imagining, and remembering, are the first level of consciousness, then I will call it the zeroth level of consciousness. It’s a way of hip thinking in physics, and so on: postulate a lower, so you see how I get a zero. *And he also talked about a fifth level of consciousness*, which perhaps we’ll have a chance to talk about later in — towards the end of the second semester.

But in Insight, this fourth level of judging values and choosing is not articulated. And one of the things that he does *after* the development of *Insight* is to say that *he had not recognized the fourth level of consciousness, and what he called the transcendental notion of value*. So when I gave you this overview of Lonergan’s thought and the four levels of consciousness and the different activities that are proper to each of those levels of consciousness, we were already looking ahead beyond *Insight*. In *Insight* it’s just the first three, which are spelled out on page two ninety-nine in *Insight*.

I	Data Perceptual Images	Free Images	Utterances
II	Questions for Intelligence	Insights	Formulations
III	Questions for Reflection	Reflection	Judgments

So what we've done so far is to talk about *the first and second levels of consciousness in various ways*: we've been talking about the first level from the very beginning, but we got focussed upon it in the section in chapter three on the "Canon of Selection" (*CWL* 3, pp. 94–102) and the "Canon of Parsimony" (*CWL* 3, pp. 102–107); we got refocussed on it in a new way in chapter six when we were talking about the "Patterns of Experience." (*CWL* 3, pp. 204–214). And of course the second level we've been talking about all through all the chapters that we traced before.



So now we're going to be talking about the third level, where Lonergan will talk about reflective insights and judgment. So that's what we're talking about today: his explorations of this third level – reflective understanding and judgment.

Lonergan’s “intentionality analysis” is similar in some ways to a phenomenological analysis.

So Chapter 9 presents a kind of phenomenology of acts of judging.

The act of consciousness (*noesis*) can be distinguished from the object (*noema*) of consciousness (the latter is not already out there now).

Phenomenology studies the relation of constituting acts to constituted objects.

Since objects are constituted by activities of consciousness, phenomenology begins with the objects and works back to the constituting activities.

This has strong resemblances with self-appropriation.

He begins with this idea that — He begins with what I would call a phenomenological exercise. His language for it — He never adopted the tag ‘phenomenology’ for himself; he preferred the term ‘**intentionality analysis**’; but there are some striking and strong parallels between his work and the work of many of the phenomenological thinkers that followed Edmund Husserl.³

³ **Edmund Husserl** (1859–1938) was a German philosopher who established the school of phenomenology. In his early work, he elaborated critiques of historicism and of psychologism in logic based on analyses of intentionality. In his mature work, he sought to develop a systematic foundational science based on the phenomenological reduction. Arguing that transcendental consciousness sets the limits of all possible knowledge, Husserl re-defined phenomenology as a transcendental-idealist philosophy. Husserl’s thought profoundly influenced the landscape of twentieth century philosophy and he remains a notable figure in contemporary philosophy and beyond.

Husserl taught philosophy as a *Privatdozent* at Halle from 1887, then as professor, first at Göttingen from 1901, then at Freiburg from 1916 until he retired in 1928, after which he remained highly productive. Following an illness, he died at Freiburg in 1938.

Phenomenology of Judging

Phenomenology (Intentionality Analysis)

Intentionality

Act (noesis) ← object (noema)

Three Approaches

(1) “Two distinct mental attitudes”:

Act of Understanding ← Proposition ← Uttered Statement

Act of Judging ← Proposition ← Uttered Statement

(2) Relation to Questions

Act of Judging ← “Is it so?” ← Uttered Question

(3) Act of Judging ← Personal Commitment

Act (noesis) ← object (noema)

And we saw this before, *this fundamental notion in phenomenology of the relationship between an act of consciousness, and the content or object of consciousness.*

Now don't think of object as already out there now! We're used to using the word 'object' as an instance of the already out there now, and then thinking about how is it that the noesis can reach out to the object out there. Don't think about intentionality that way. Think about intentionality as the co-relation, the co-presence, the co-terminousness, the simultaneity, of an activity and its content! That one would have an act that has a content!

We talked about this earlier on in the year: *when I've an act of seeing and I see the cookies over there, the shapes and the colours are in my consciousness because of the act of seeing. So I've got seeing the seen; okay; if I get closer to them, I'll have the smelling and the smell, I can smell the smell of the cookies. That's what's meant by the object or the content of the activity of consciousness. And that's a fundamental characterisation that is made with great emphasis by Edmund Husserl; and the field of phenomenology is the investigation of the relatedness of the constituting acts and the objects that are constituted by those acts.*

In that sense, Lonergan is in that ball-park, though he differs in certain ways with regard to the particulars; but he's at least in that ball park.

Now it's one thing to say that the relationship of intentionality is the relationship between an activity of consciousness and the content that comes to consciousness through and only through that activity; it's another thing to say what phenomenology is. This is taking great liberties with lots of things, but *this is certainly one way of thinking about what phenomenology or intentionality analysis is. If it's possible to think of objects as being constituted by activities, then you can turn that relationship around and say that what intentionality analysis or phenomenology is about is that you begin with the object, you begin with the content, and you trace back to the constituting activities.*

And in a certain sense that is also what self-appropriation is about. So we've had some exercises, and the exercises involve my giving to you different kinds of things which you might say were *the objects*; and asking you to pay attention to *the constituting activities*, whether they be the activities of inquiry or the activities of restructuring your experiences, or the activity of having an insight. So phenomenology, intentionality analysis, and indeed self-appropriation, is a matter of beginning with objects, and moving back towards the constituting activities.

**The three approaches to the self-
appropriation/phenomenology of judging in Chapter 9:**

**The first approach distinguishes two distinct mental
attitudes with regard to a proposition.**

- We can entertain a proposition as a possibility and ponder its meaning.
- Or we can judge the proposition as ‘being the case, being so’; we can *posit* it.

Self-appropriation of judging requires identifying propositions which are intended with this *second* type of mental attitude, attending to that positing, and understanding what sort of an activity it is.

Now that is in fact how Lonergan starts chapter nine of *Insight* (“**The Notion of Judgment**”, *CWL* 3, pp. 296-303). He says that there are three approaches to the self-appropriation of the activity of judging. So in other words, he thinks that the activity of judging is not immediately obvious; that it takes a bit of work to begin to learn to identify in our own conscious activity the activity that is properly called the activity of judging! And so he offers three different reflections as ways of getting the primary assault [sound uncertain] of getting us started down the road of appropriating our own acts of judging.

And he says that one way to begin is with *uttered statements*. So just as any phenomenologist begins with uttered statements — and that includes Husserl. One of the first of his published works was *The Logical Investigations*, and he spends a lot of time with propositions, and trying to sort out the various kinds of conscious activities that are involved in constituting a proposition as a proposition.

Lonergan has a different take on how one ought to proceed, and what one finds when one proceeds, than Husserl. There are some complementarity and there are some differences. But they are alike in starting with uttered statements, expressions. There is a big section in the *Logical Investigations* on expressions. And Lonergan says that among — *If one begins with uttered expressions, particularly if one reflects on the fact that expressions can be uttered in different languages, they have a certain kind of invariance across cultures, for which he uses the term ‘proposition’ to mean.*

But Lonergan is interested in the fact that behind uttered statements, and behind propositions, there are what he calls ‘mental attitudes’. And one mental attitude is the attitude that is simply *considering a proposition*. So as a proposition, you might consider that: “It’s going to snow tonight.” Well, that’s an interesting proposition. I wonder if it will! You’re not — *You have a certain kind of mental attitude towards it. You’re understanding it. That’s a kind of mental attitude. You wouldn’t be able to contemplate whether or not it’s going to snow, if you didn’t already have the entertainment of it as a possibility. And it’s in our act of understanding that we are entertaining things as possibilities. So that’s one mental attitude!*

But there is a different mental attitude that we take towards uttered statements and propositions. You don’t get this by looking at the proposition! You get this by going behind the proposition as uttered, to discern what kind of constituting activity is behind it. And different from the mental attitude of considering, or supposing, or hypothesizing, or just merely understanding as possibility, is the mental attitude that takes one and the same proposition, but takes a stance towards it of positing it. So the activity of positing is different from the activity of considering, of pondering, of merely understanding as possibility.

Contrast between Kant and Aquinas on the meaning of “judgment.”

Judgment as entertaining a possibility and as synthesizing is done by understanding, not by judging, according to Lonergan.

Kant defines judgment in terms of *composition and division*, not in terms of the *act of positing*.

While Aquinas also uses composition and division to speak of judgment (*iudicare*), Lonergan was influenced by Aquinas’s second option in what he will mean by “judging.” He interprets judgment as the

**distinct mental attitude of positing (or denying); this
involves a commitment to the proposition.**

So it's this activity of positing that Lonergan wants us to begin to appropriate. Notice that this is a very, very, different way of talking about judgment than Kant does. For Kant, judgment is the activity of synthesizing; it's the activity of synthesizing concepts.

When Lonergan did his studies of Aquinas on the Inner Word,⁴ he noticed in Aquinas that there is a strong characterization of judgment as *composition and division*. Composition: when you say "All A are B" you're composing the concepts A and B into a proposition. This is a tradition that was already rolling by the time Aquinas got to it. He gave it a forceful elaboration. It carried on for many centuries after Aquinas: that judgment has to do with composing or synthesizing; putting A and B together. Or, on the other hand, "A is not B", so dividing A from B; separating, distinguishing A from B, is another meaning of judging. So judging is either composing or dividing.

What was the real detective work in Lonergan's scholarship on Aquinas, was his discovery that Aquinas used the word *judicere*, the Latin for judgment, in a second and different and easily missed sense, namely, that *judgment wasn't only the synthesizing or the dividing to form a proposition. It was also, and much more profoundly and much more significantly, the positing of the synthesis, or the positing of the division, or if you like, the positing of the synthesis and the denying of the synthesis. That was a more basic meaning of judicere, the judgment, that he found in Aquinas.* You have to sort of be really, really, alert to catch it, because its expressions in Aquinas's thought are pretty seldom. It's easy to notice the stronger sense, of composition and division.

Well, composition and division is the meaning of judgment that finds its way into the work of Kant. Positing does not! The distinct act of positing is something — I'm sure that a Kant scholar could find, just as Lonergan found in Thomas, traces of this in Kant — but *nevertheless the major meaning of judgment that Kant has, has to do with synthesizing and dividing.*

In his studies of Aquinas, Lonergan makes the strong argument that it is understanding that is responsible for the synthesizing and the dividing. In other words, it's

⁴ Bernard Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).

understanding that does the work of expressing itself in a multiplicity of concepts, in which that multiplicity is either a multiplicity of connectedness among concepts or of separateness of concepts. And that just as the understanding moves from direct insights to higher viewpoints, so also the expressing moves from an insight into an intelligibility or a relatedness into an expressing of the intelligibility and composition or division. This is all the work of understanding.

And for judgment, Lonergan is going to reserve that term for the specifically different mental attitude of positing! So this move into chapter nine (“The Notion of Judgment”, CWL 3, pp. 296-303) is an invitation to begin to appropriate our activities, our very distinct activities of positing. So that’s his first approach. The first approach is by means of the difference in the mental attitude between holding a composition or a division, a judgment, a proposition as a possibility, entertaining it as a possibility, something we can only do if we have understanding, versus holding the proposition as something we commit ourselves to, that we posit!

The second approach considers judgment in relation to the other activities surrounding it.

— In particular, judgment in relation to the very distinctive type of question, “Is it so?”

The second way of getting at the activity of judgment, Lonergan says, is not to regard it in relation just to its expressions, but to regard it in relationship to other activities that surround it; and most significantly, the activity of questions, and a particularly new kind of question: “Is it so?” As he remarks, when we ask What? or Why? or How? or How many? or When? or Where? we are in quest of an unknown, but the unknown that we’re questing for is the unknown intelligibility that will only come to our consciousness when we have an insight. But when we ask, “Is it so?” we’re seeking a different kind of unknown. We’re seeking not the unknown as another intelligibility, but rather the ‘unknownness’ of whether or not that intelligibility is so!

The third approach involves personal commitment.

- We have more control over our judgments than over sense experiences and insights.
- More dependent on sources other than ourselves in acts of seeing, or in having insights, than in judging.
- Thus we are more responsible for them. We can always defer judging with “I don’t know.”

And then he talks about the third kind of context, the context of personal commitment. And *personal commitment, in particular, he’s going to contrast with the way in which our sensing and our understanding are far less under our own personal control, so to speak, than is our judgment.* We can either see or not see, hear or not hear something, and we can’t hear it if there’s no sound to be heard. So we’re dependent for our hearing very much on sources beyond ourselves. Likewise, *when we’re understanding, the understanding is in fact our own activity, but we can’t exactly will ourselves to understand.* We can will ourselves to try to understand, to work hard. And as we’ve now discovered, what is most effective in bringing ourselves to understand things is to play around with images, and to be attentive to clues, and to carry the question with us, relentlessly, so that our consciousness is primed for the proper image to get at the insight. *But over our insights and over our sensations, we have only a small amount of personal responsibility.*

With regard to judgments we always can say: “I don’t know!” We are not committed to judging. We have an autonomy with regard to our judging that we don’t have with regard to our understanding and our experiencing.

Summary of Lonergan’s three approaches to the self-appropriation of judgment.

So three ways of starting to feel one’s way into the activity of judging! Why is he doing this? The word ‘judging’ has been around for a long time. He means something very distinct by it. Just as the word ‘understanding’ has been around for a long time, and people have different ideas about what understanding is.


And this is a matter of self-appropriation. This is a matter of finding within oneself, within one's own consciousness, the experience of the activity in question, which will then serve to become the defining feature for what is meant by those terms.

Elaboration of judgment as an answer to the question

“Is it so?”

The activity of judging resolves the ‘Is it so?’ question and thus releases the tension, just as insight releases the tension of what/where/why/who questions.

Understanding, in Lonergan's specific sense, is what is meant by knowing that you have insights. Judging could mean all kinds of things, and it has meant all kinds of things. But for Lonergan it's going to mean — it's going to take its root meaning in the activity of positing, the activity that's responding to its Is it so? questions, the activity that has a distinct a new and higher degree of personal commitments by [that positing](#).



When Lonergan speaks of the activity of judgment being in relationship to other — another kind of question, the Is it so? question — *The Is it so? question emerges with regard*

to some insight. So if we're looking for an intelligibility when we ask What? Where? How? Why? we can't answer What is it? by saying 'Yes!' We can't answer How are you doing? by saying 'No!' What we need to answer the What, and the Where, and the Why questions is the contents of an insight, a direct insight. But if I ask you: "Are you feeling okay?" the answer is not the square root of minus two! That would be the kind of content that would be the answer to a What? question, but not an Is it so? question.

So this is why he is using this approach of questions as a way into the appropriating of the activity of judging. And I would argue that it is the most fundamental phenomenological way into the activity of judging! The activity of judging is the activity that resolves the Is it so? question, that releases the tension of the Is it so? question very much the same way as an insight is the activity that releases the tension of a What, or a Why, or a How or a Where or a Who type of a question. Okay?

Question about the relation of judgment and understanding in Kant and Lonergan.

- Lonergan's second level of consciousness corresponds to Kant's Understanding.**
- Kant confines judgment to Understanding, but Lonergan sees it as a distinct activity on a distinct, higher level, the third level of consciousness.**
- Thus Lonergan's version of judgment is more personal on the 3rd level, and even more so on the 4th level.**
- Discussion of higher levels of consciousness and the construction of a life.**
- Yet even the activities of the 3rd level of consciousness are also matters of self-transcendence.**

Okay. Questions on that? So this is how we're going to get into this new level of self-appropriation, this new level of consciousness, this new set of activities that are proper to that new level of consciousness, by these modes of access. And we'll do some exercises here as well. Ah, Matt?


Matt: So this is different from Kant's notion of — I know just from your chart you had understanding here [Matt gestures towards the "One Single Structure of Knowing" slide], and then judging goes on top. But in Kant's world, like, the understanding is sort of a blanket and the judgment is an instrument of the understanding, okay?

Pat: Right, right.

Matt: And so, just to be clear, we're flipping that on its head here, and saying kind of the judgment is really a higher function of whatever we are! [smile].

Pat: It's sort of flipping it on its head. Kant talks about understanding as the faculty of judgment.

Matt: Right.



Pat: So 'faculty' goes back to the Greek *dynamis* (*δύναμις*), *power* is a way it gets translated, *potentiality*. When it gets trans — When it gets moved down into the terminology of *faculty*, it sounds like a box some place in your brain.

Matt: Yeah.

Pat: That's not what Aristotle originally meant by it. *Dynamis* means *capacity!* So to say that the soul — which is how Aristotle would talk about it — has a *dynamis* means *that it has the potential for certain kinds of activities*. That doesn't put them in boxes any place! When you start to talk about 'faculties' this starts to sound like that! For Kant, understanding is the faculty of judgment. *It's the part of the mind, or if you like, the place of the mind — although it's not really a place — in which the concepts are conscious, or come to our consciousness in the place in which the concepts are synthesized with each other and with — in sensible intuitions. So it's the capacity of our minds to be doing the synthesizing work.* When you went like this [Pat makes large arching gestures above his head] — understanding as over-arching, that's really *like a big box* that the judgments and the synthesizing activities are in.

Roughly speaking, what corresponds to that in Lonergan would be the second level of consciousness, in which many different kinds of things are going on. What corresponds to the over-arching [Pat repeats his large arching gesture above his head] of the faculty of understanding would be what Lonergan calls the second level of consciousness, which would include the level that we arise to when we ask questions about what? and why? and where?; that we activate in a fuller sense when we have insights; that we are engaged in when we're formulating our insights into the various kinds of definitions. So the second level of consciousness corresponds more or less to the faculty of understanding for Kant.

What Lonergan would say is that all of the synthesizing and the dividing, the synthesizing of concepts and the distinguishing of concepts, that all happens on the second level that Kant calls the level of understanding. For Lonergan understanding is an activity that takes place in a level that he calls the level of intelligence. You get a little bit — So you can kind of preserve certain aspects of Kant, and say he's always talking about the second level of consciousness. But he's using the word 'understanding' for that level of consciousness.

You're quite right in saying that for Lonergan there's a distinct third level. There's a distinct third level, because there's another kind of question that takes one beyond the level of synthesizing, the level of what Kant would call appearances. So when we ask Is it so? we're not just asking "does it look like itself?" We're asking about the 'isness' of it. And the exact

activities of reflective insight and judgments of fact that we're going to talk about a little bit later on, those are activities on this third level.

*In effect, Lonergan is saying **that** Kant doesn't know about the third level. That's not entirely true. There are some subtleties there. But in terms of being explicit about it, it's not there! So where Kant is thinking of judging as entirely taking place at this second level which he calls the faculty of understanding, Lonergan is reserving the term 'judging' for a distinct kind of activity that's on a distinct kind of level. Okay?*

Matt: So when he goes to the personal commitment aspect, there seems to be, in Lonergan, there seems to be — that seems to involve more like a totality of like —

Pat: That's quite right!

Matt: — that the understanding is not — it seems more instrumental in the Kantian view; that as opposed to hubris. It's a kind of corresponds to the dramatic pattern of experience. It's about making a life, instead of this affirming or denying things about — that are out there.

Pat: Hmm ... In effect what you've just asked is about the fourth level; the making of a life. We use insights in making a life, but most profoundly what we do is we make ourselves what Lonergan calls *originating values*. That's just going to have to wait until next week.

Matt: I'll wait.

Pat: Okay. But nevertheless, there is a self-transcendence — that we go beyond — There's a way in which Kant, because of the inheritance of some of the later scholastic thinkers — They tend to regard concept formation as an unconscious process. The reasons for that are kind of complicated. But for Kant, the twelve concepts, the twelve categories are not something that we have any control over. They just are a permanent apparatus in the human mind. And we don't have any capacity to not have those concepts.

*So by personal commitment, Lonergan is saying **that** there is something more personal involved in making judgments, when judgment is considered as positing than there is in just the formation of concepts and the synthesizing of concepts. That's where the more personal is. It's even more personal than that when you get to this fourth level, which he hasn't differentiated and sorted out in the context of *Insight*. Okay.*


Student: Thank you!

Question about the meaning of ‘positing’ and the difference between *positing a judgment* and *judging*.

— Positing is committing, affirming a proposition as true.

— Positing a proposition is the same as judging a proposition.

— The [“borrowed”] content of a judgment is an intelligibility that comes from a direct insight and then is affirmed or denied in a judgment [and affirming or denying is the “proper” content of a judgment].



Pat: Greg?

Greg: Could you just explain a little bit more what you mean when you say that Lonergan talks about *positing a judgment*? Because to me that sounds like something that you do before you actually make a judgment, to kind of —

Pat: Oh, it's a — *There's a traditionalist meaning to the word 'positing', and it means committing yourself to it, affirming it.* The word that's close to positing is 'postulating', and that's a little closer to the term 'hypothesizing.' It's postulating as what's assumed for the sake of argument that this was true. That's not positing!


Greg: Okay.

Pat: Positing is: I'm not assuming for the sake of argument that this is true: *this is true!! This is what happened!!*

Greg: So is there is a difference between positing a judgment and judging?

Pat: Ahm So —

[Pat writes with chalk on the board:]



Pat: Okay. If we think of proposition — Excuse me, if we think of a judgment as a proposition, *positing the proposition is judging the proposition.* Okay, so when we posit a proposition, we're judging the proposition. So I'm using that term more or less interchangeably! It's a little tricky because we say positing has got the root of 'positive' in it. There are also denials, so judging is either affirming or denying. *There are two ways in which you can answer an Is it so? question. You can either answer it affirmatively or you can answer it negatively. But you can't answer what? why? where? either affirmatively or negatively; you've got to come up with a content, an intelligibility, that is the answer to the question for intelligence, the question for direct insight. The question for judging is seeking one of two possible alternatives, either yes or no, affirming or denying.*

Go back over the “Single Structure of Knowing” slide here. The content of the proposition is the formulation of a direct insight. And it's about the content of a direct insight

that we ask Is it so? So in this **that** I have written here on the blackboard: the proposition is the formulated insight. As understood, that's one of those two mental attitudes that one can have for it. But one can bring a further activity in relationship to the intelligible content that one got from insight, and that is the activity of judging or positing. Okay?

Greg: Uh, uh!

Question about whether insight into intelligibility
avoids the problem of mediation.

— Judging *is* a second level of mediation.

— Kant denies the possibility of intellectual intuition.

Lonergan agrees; but he spells out the kind of
mediation involved in going from understanding to
positing.

— Newman helped Lonergan to realize that
reasoning toward positing is discursive, it is
mediating; reason is not an unmediated intuitive
connection with the real or the true.

Pat: Okay. Other questions? Mike?

Mike: Maybe this is more, I guess, a further question, but does insight into, say, intelligibility of the world, how does that, or not, how does it — does it avoid the problem of mediation, or is it sort of getting around the problem of mediation, that is, not having to address it?

Pat: If I understand what you mean, *it adds a further kind of mediation! We mediate ourselves into reality! We mediate ourselves into truth! So where Kant is going to say that there's no intellectual intuition in the sense of a direct intellectual look at intelligibility as it already is out there, Lonergan will agree with that. Lonergan will deny that there is an intellectual intuition in that sense.*

The great misfortune is that the book is entitled “*Insight*”; and this famous Conference in Florida in 1970 on Lonergan’s work, one of the people that was invited was Manfred Frings⁵, who wrote this book on Max Scheler’s phenomenology of feelings. It was

⁵ Manfred Frings, (1925-2008) the world’s leading specialist in the philosophy of Max Scheler, was the editor of Max Scheler’s *Collected Works (Gesammelte Werke)*, translated many of Scheler’s works into English, and is preeminently responsible for introducing Scheler’s phenomenology to the English-speaking world. At various points throughout his career, he served as visiting professor and lecturer at the Universities of Cologne, Freiburg, Oxford, and Sorbonne. He was one of six scholars chosen by Martin Heidegger to be

a book that influenced Lonergan a lot in his thinking from *Insight* to *Method*, about feelings and about the fourth level of consciousness. And Frings gave this paper about *Insight* that was all about intellectual intuition. I read this and I said Lonergan really read your book very carefully; how come you didn't read his book a little more carefully!

[Student amusement]

There is no direct intuition into the intelligibility as it's already existing out there. That's not the case for Lonergan. So he's in agreement with Kant. Where he differs from Kant is in spelling out the kind of mediation that's involved in going from an intelligibility as understood, as the content merely of an act of understanding, to a content as posited, as judged, as held in another mental attitude, the noesis of judgement. Okay?

Lonergan will sometimes say “Reasoning is discursive! It's not intuitive!” And that's what he means. That, he learned from John Henry Newman,⁶ even before he read

the original editors of Heidegger's *Collected Works (Gesamtausgabe)*. From 1970, he served as editor of the *Collected Works (Gesammelte Werke)* of Max Scheler (1874-1928), a task completed with the publication of vol. 15 in 1997. He published well over a hundred articles, and edited twenty-four books, including his notable *The Mind of Max Scheler: The First Comprehensive Guide Based on the Complete Works* (1997, 2nd ed. 2001). His work was recognized in a special audience with Pope John Paul II, himself an accomplished Scheler scholar, and by Martin Heidegger in personal meetings in Freiburg.

⁶ **John Henry Newman** (1801–1890) was an important figure in the religious history of England in the 19th century. Originally an evangelical Oxford academic and priest in the Church of England, Newman then became drawn to the high-church tradition of Anglicanism and became known as a leader of, and an able polemicist for, the Oxford Movement, an influential and controversial grouping of Anglicans who wished to return to the Church of England many Catholic beliefs and liturgical rituals from before the English Reformation. In this the movement had some success. However, in 1845 Newman, joined by some but not all of his followers, left the Church of England and his teaching post at Oxford University and was received into the Catholic Church. He was quickly ordained as a priest and continued as an influential religious leader, based in Birmingham. In 1879, he was created a cardinal by Pope Leo XIII in recognition of his services to the cause of the Catholic Church in England. He was instrumental in the founding of the Catholic University of Ireland, which evolved into University College, Dublin, today the largest university in Ireland. Newman's beatification was officially proclaimed by Pope Benedict XVI on 19 September 2010 during his visit to the United Kingdom. His canonisation is dependent on the documentation of additional miracles attributed to his intercession. Newman was also a literary figure of

Plato. He was convinced that Newman was fundamentally correct **in holding** that reasoning is discursive, that reasoning is not a matter of having a direct intuition into realities; that reasoning is something you have to do; you have to reason!! And you have to mediate. And we're going to see, in reflecting — what Lonergan calls 'reflecting' is the mediating that's involved in going from an intelligibility as a possibility to intelligibility as affirmed to be so! Okay? ...

Question: If we cannot yet judge whether the universe is systematic or non-systematic, is that because we have not yet had the insight, or because we do not yet have enough data?

— This is due to the lack of the virtually unconditioned; data are not the only conditions for grounding judgments; further discussion.

Pat: Ah, Jeff?

Jeff: A quick question: I mean, just kind of like a further question a little bit too. With the ideal of process — Sorry, let's say just the universe generally, the series of events either being systematic or nonsystematic? So, with the universe, I'm assuming that they haven't concluded if it's nonsystematic or systematic yet. There's evidence for both, if you will.

Pat: Yeah. That's right!

Jeff: So if you can't affirm that judgment, yes or no, is it a matter of not having made the insight, or not having had enough data?

Pat: *Ah, it's a matter of not having what Lonergan would call the virtually unconditioned.* I'm dodging the word 'data'. We're going to come back to that. Data play a

note: his major writings including the *Tracts for the Times* (1833–1841), his autobiography *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* (1865–66), the *Grammar of Assent* (1870), and the poem *The Dream of Gerontius* (1865), which was set to music in 1900 by Edward Elgar. He wrote the popular hymns “Lead, Kindly Light” and “Praise to the Holiest in the Height” (taken from *Gerontius*).

role in arriving at the virtually unconditioned, but it's not the only contributor to the virtually

unconditioned; and, interestingly enough, it's not even the most important contributor to the virtually unconditioned! *So roughly speaking, in the terms that you asked it, it's a matter of not having enough data to decide on it. But it turns out that there's more to it than having enough data! The more to it has to do with all the further pertinent questions that we would have to answer in order to know whether or not the universe is systematic or nonsystematic.* Okay?

Jeff: Yeah.

The Contents of Judgment: 3 Kinds:

— Proper content. Affirmation or denial is what judgment itself proper contributes to consciousness. This is the content that “supervenes” upon all the contents of prior conscious activities (e.g., intelligible contents of understanding, data contents of sensations, etc.).

— Direct borrowed content. This is borrowed from the relevant insight, from the “Is it so?” question that always arises from the prior, direct borrowed content.

— Indirect borrowed content. This is found in the reflective act linking question and answer.

In short, the insight comes first; then the answering of the “Is it so?” question (by a ‘Yes’ or a ‘No’).

How one's answer depends not on a coin flip, but on reasonably affirming or denying the question.

How one *genuinely, reasonably* satisfies the tension in the “Is it so?” question is addressed in Ch. 10.

The indirect borrowed content which satisfies that tension comes in a “reflective act of understanding,” which grasps the *reasonableness of judging* (positing; affirming or denying).

“Contents of Judgments”

Proper Content: Affirmation or Negation (Yes or No)

Direct Borrowed Content: “Found in the question”

Indirect Borrowed Content: “In the reflective act linking the question and answer”

All right. Now having done that clarification, Lonergan will say: Okay, so there’s three kinds of contents of judgments. There’s what he calls the ‘proper content’. And the proper content of judging is the affirming, the affirmation or the denying — excuse me, the affirmation or the negation. Those are the two proper contents.

In other words, what is it that the activity of judging brings to consciousness that nothing else brings to consciousness, that’s not there at any of the activities associated with the first two levels of experiencing or intelligence. *What is it that judgment properly in and of itself brings? What it properly and in itself brings is affirmation or denial. Yes or No! Now, I’ve put Yes or No in parentheses in this slide, because those are English words. You can go to the German and say Ja and Nein, you can go into your Spanish and say Si or No. You can go to a lot of different languages and get different words. It’s not the words, it’s not the speaking the words out of the mouth that counts. It’s the mental attitude with which the Yes or No is uttered. And the mental attitude with which the Yes or No is uttered is the activity that releases the tension of the Is it so? question. The proper thing, what judging, in and of itself, contributes and supervenes upon every other activity, every other content that comes before it, it the affirmation or the denial. That’s its proper content.*

Pat: So, is it so? Is it so?

[Prolonged silence]

Student: Is what so?


Pat: *Ah! Exactly!! Exactly!!* That was the point to that little exercise!

[Loud student laughter]

Student: It was too tense; I couldn't take it!

Pat! The tension of inquiry!

Student: Yes.



Pat: *Is what so? What Lonergan is getting at here is that the Is it so? question doesn't exist in a vacuum. It always and only arises with, or from, and in response to, some thing that answered the Is what so? It responds to the content that came earlier as a response to a What? or a Why? or a Where?*


“Contents of Judgments”

Proper Content: Affirmation or Negation (Yes or No)

Direct Borrowed Content: “Found in the question”

Indirect Borrowed Content: “In the reflective act linking the question and answer”

*So when he’s talking about the direct borrowed content and saying it’s found in the question, what in effect he’s saying is that *Is it so?* borrows a content from the understanding. And when we think — when we look back over here where I did the little diagram on the board here, the intelligible content of the proposition is the borrowed content.*



But that’s not properly what judgment adds! What judgment adds is an affirmation of that intelligibility. But it’s always an affirmation of *some intelligibility*. *So the act of judging contributes something distinctly its own, but not in a vacuum. It contributes something distinctly its own in relationship to a what, a direct borrowed content.* Okay?

“Contents of Judgments”

Proper Content: Affirmation or Negation (Yes or No)

Direct Borrowed Content: “Found in the question”

Indirect Borrowed Content: “In the reflective act linking the question and answer”

So normally when we think of a judgment, we don't just think of the Yes or the No, the positing or the denying; what we normally think of is the whole intelligible content as affirmed, as somebody taking a stand that this intelligible content is in fact the case! Okay?

But then we have the third: that the “indirect borrowed content”, that it's in the reflective act, linking the question and the answer!

“The indirect borrowed content of the same judgment is the implicit meaning ‘It certainly is true that I am writing.’” (CWL 3, p. 301).

He's doing this while he was writing the book.

Now, what he means by that is: you've got an insight; you've got a question *Is it so?* You know that the outcome can only be yes or no! *How do you answer the Is it so? question about the insight as yes or no in a way that truly satisfies the tension of inquiry about Is it so?* You don't do it by flipping a coin. You know, fifty percent of my judgments are correct.

[Some class amusements]

So what Lonergan means by *being reasonable, by being rational, is the phenomenon that happens in between asking Is it so? and arriving at the activity of judging that either affirms or denies that intelligible content. That is the process that he calls “reflecting.* And that is what chapter ten (CWL 3, “**Reflective Understanding**”, pp. 304-340) is about. Chapter ten is about how do you go from the question to the — It seems like it should be

much easier to arrive at judgments than it is at insights, because when you ask what is it? or why is it? or

who is it? or where is it?, the whole world, the whole universe, is potentially the answer, and you're searching — It's like searching for a needle in a haystack. But when it comes to answering the Is it so? question, well, there's only two possibilities; it must be pretty easy to go from the question to the one or the other of those. But it turns out of course that it's not at all easy!

And what is required is, in addition to the proper content yes or no, and the direct borrowed content the question, is the reasonableness of either affirming or denying. And that's what he means by the indirect borrowed content. The indirect borrowed content is what you discover in the process of going from the question, through reflecting, and arriving at what he calls a reflective insight, a reflective understanding, a new kind of understanding, a new kind of insight. And to that we're going to turn shortly.

The *context* of judgment: knowing is a dynamic structure.

Judgments are plural and we situate them in relation to one another.

All our prior judgments are the context of our new ones; all judgments must be brought into coherence with each other.

Question about the role of revelation and faith in judgment, particularly for the religious believer.

“Contexts of Judgments”

“Knowing is a dynamic structure” (*CWL 3*, p. 302).

“All we know is somehow with us; it is present and operative within our knowing; but it lurks behind the scenes, and it reveals itself only in the exactitude with which each minor increment to our knowing is effected.”
(*CWL 3*, p. 303).

But I just wanted to talk a little bit about this business about *the context of judgment*. It's simply a matter of opening up the dynamic structure. So what we saw a moment ago is that the activity of judging is related to an activity that's called *reflective understanding*; it's related to the activity of *asking Is it so?*; it's related to the activity of *having insights* and *formulating those insights*, which means it's remotely related to the *questions about what? and why? and where? and who?*; which means it's also therefore related to *the experiences which generated those questions*. And that's, so to speak, to look backwards.

But one also looks forward, so to speak, because judgments are plural. *There's a multiplicity of judgments, and when we arrive at one judgment, just as our inquiry about our inquiry drives us to ask questions as a result of having had insights, so also our inquiry drives us to ask questions regarding our judgments. And to situate or to contextualize our judgments with one another.*

Now the simple version of the contextualization of judgments is via logic; that they ought to be logically consistent with one another. And that's a very important context; but it's not the only context! There are more complicated ways in which we begin to have a sense that we need to do something to readjust the context of our judgments whenever we make a new judgment. And that's basically what he's getting at here when he talks about the contextual aspect of judgment. And that every judgment we've ever made is still present to

us, though perhaps at the peripheries of our consciousnesses. And whenever we make a new judgment, some accommodation of that new judgment to our old judgments is set off and inserted [uncertain word] by the dynamic of inquiry.

Question about the role of revelation and faith in judgment, particularly for the religious believer.

— Discussion of belief in general, not just religious belief.

— We affirm or deny beliefs on a basis different from that obtained in an act of reflective understanding (an “immanently generated” ground of judging).

— Believing is accepting something said by someone else as trustworthy.

— In believing, a value judgment about the source of the statement forms the ground for the reasonableness of believing.

— We need to understand the activity of judging before we can discuss believing in general and religious believing in particular.

Insight and Beyond

Class 14, December 16, 2009

Chapter 10 “Reflective Understanding”

Pat: Okay. Questions about that much? ... Tim?

Tim: Lonergan is a philosopher, but he's also a theologian. I'm wondering for the believer, within that single structure of knowing, what is the role of revelation, specifically at the level of judgment? So for example, Lonergan has given to the Council of Nicaea and the tradition of the Church, a notion of God as Trinitarian. And he ends up writing a lot about the Triune God. So in that sense, there's a way in which the Is it so? is kind of given to him, and then he talks about What is it? He's shedding understanding upon that Is it so? So, in terms of the believer, is the judgment made about the contents of the revelation, or is it maybe based upon the authority of the revelation? Yeah, how does that kind of play itself out in the believer — given Thomas's definition of faith, which is an assent of the intellect that's in between scientific knowing and opinion — How does revelation then operate at the level of judgment, for the believer?

Pat: Okay. Well, that's a lot of questions!

[Class laughter]

And I'm going to have to leave aside what Aquinas says about faith, because I'm not an Aquinas scholar. *Lonergan was, and he knew what Aquinas said about faith.* And he certainly believed himself to be in the tradition of Aquinas with regard to the question of faith. But what I can tell you is — I can give you a sort of an answer to that. It is part and parcel of what we're going to do in the second semester, time permitting.

So let's go back to your first question: What about the believer? Now, by that, it became clear as you spoke, that you were talking about a religious believer and a religious believer in a certain faith context — in a certain faith tradition. But let's go back to the question of: *What's a believer?* Because we believe all sorts of things that are not specifically religious, and certainly not specific to people who are of a religious tradition. "I believe that my car is still parked in the garage!" I don't actually have what Lonergan will call *an immanently generated judgment of knowledge* that that is so. We believe all sorts of things! We believe that Christmas will come in a few days. We believe that people will return our papers having read them carefully, and so on. We believe all sorts of things! You believed before you ever heard anything about the book *Insight*, you believed that this was a class worth taking. So you believed all sorts of things!

I like to play around with people, and say “Is there a Guam?”⁷

[Murmurs of amusement]

“How many of you have ever been to Guam?” I used to do Montana, but now we’re starting to get people in the classes who have been to Montana. But we believe there is a Guam!

[Growing laughter]

What’s involved in believing? What’s involved in believing, as something a little different from judging as we’re talking about it, and are now supposed to be relating to it?

Judging as we’re talking about it, and as we’re going to be talking about it, is an act of affirming or denying an intelligible content that’s grounded in this process of reflecting, a process that guided by the tension of Is it so?

But when we believe, we affirm or deny on a different basis. We affirm or deny on the basis of somebody else as trustworthy. But trustworthiness is a judgment of value. It’s a statement about the worth of the person and the worth of what that person has said. So we move from a judgment of fact to a judgment of value that’s going to be the criterion for making the judgment of fact. And that’s true of all believing. And it’s true of all believers. In his summary, Pat summed the issue as follows:

“We affirm or deny beliefs on a basis different from that obtained in an act of reflective understanding (an “immanently generated” ground of judging). Believing is accepting something said by someone else as trustworthy. — We affirm or deny beliefs on a basis different from that obtained in an act of reflective understanding (an “immanently generated” ground of judging).”

This is true of all believing. And it’s true of all believers. And we are all believers!

⁷ Guam is an organized, unincorporated territory of the United States in the western Pacific Ocean. It is one of five U.S. territories with an established civilian government. Guam is the largest and southernmost of the Mariana Islands, and the largest island in Micronesia.

One of the things about common sense is Lonergan writes the chapters about common sense *as intellectual*. But common sense isn't only intellectual. Common sense is also rational! So we've got a section in chapter ten about common sense judging ("Commonsense Judgments", *CWL 3*, pp. 314-324). But common sense is also fiduciary. Common sense also is permeated with believing of all kinds, about all kinds of things. And in fact, if there were no believing, not very much common sense would get by. *Common sense is the accumulation of an inventory of shared insights and judgments, and a lot of the sharing becomes effective by the process of believing.*

What you were asking about specifically is *religious believing*. What is the motivation for believing things said by others — that's that word 'authority'? *When there's a genuine authority, as opposed to power and intimidation — which there is a lot of, and there's a lot of in religion — when there is real authority, it is a person who truly and really is trustworthy to be believed about what they are saying. Now, how does one know that the person and what they're saying is trustworthy when it's about something transcendent? That's what the issue of faith has to do with. What faith based judging or faith-based believing is about is really what you're asking about.*

And all I can say is that Lonergan thought it was important to get clear about what judging is first, to then talk about other kinds of grounds for judging than the one that he's going to go into here. So you're actually jumping away ahead to chapter twenty ("**Special Transcendent Knowledge**", *CWL 3*, pp. 709- 751). The section on believing is in chapter twenty ("The Notion of Belief", *CWL 3*, pp. 725-740). And he does exactly what I just did, which is to say, okay, so let's go all the way back to chapter six ("**Common Sense and its Subject**", *CWL 3*, pp. 196-231), and let's talk about believing outside of the religious realm. And *now* let's talk about what faith is, and how it relates to believing in this more general sense. But in order to do that you have to know what judging is. So that's why we're here now. Okay?

Tim: Thanks! Yeah.

Pat: So, in some sense, it's one of the answers. It's not the only answer! It's one of the answers to: "What's a nice theologian like you doing in a book like this?"

[Amusement in class]

All right! Any other questions? ... Okay, let's take a break!

Insight and Beyond

Class 14, Part Two: December 16th 2009

Judging and Reflective Understanding

(*Insight*, Chapter 10: “Reflective Understanding”)

Summary of Material

Third level: Reflective Understanding and Judging.

How do we proceed from “Is it so?” to a judgment in a way that is truly reasonable, truly rational?

Only on the basis of grasping the sufficiency of evidence in reflective insights.

Reasoning comes from the Latin *ratio*, which comes from the Greek *logos* and means the conversation one has with oneself in order to arrive at the grounds for making a reasonable, rational judgment.

Reasoning is bringing ourselves to a rational, reflective understanding to support our judging.

In order for its utterance to be a reasonable and rational, judgment must be supported by a grasp that it is reasonable, rational to make this judgment.

Lonergan speaks metaphorically of reasoning as “marshalling and weighing the evidence.”

How is evidence weighed or evaluated?

Different scales are used to evaluate different kinds of insights.

Different kinds of reasoning and reflection are surveyed in Chapter 10, in a strategic order (simplest to most complex) for the sake of self-appropriation.

But even these do not exhaust all the kinds of reasoning.

The kind of reasoning depends upon the particular insight (or ‘direct borrowed content’).

Overview of the different forms of reasoning and reflective understanding, section by section.

Reasoning always takes its clue from the kind of insight that is being asked about.

General Form of Reflective Insight illustrated in a logical syllogism, but this is only the most elementary illustration.

§1. The “Virtually Unconditioned in General” – ‘virtually’ meaning “having the power of” the unconditioned.

1. The event as conditioned.
2. The link between the conditioned and conditions.
3. The fulfillment of conditions.

Example of a conditioned event: whether a frozen lake will support a certain weight depends on conditions.

Any event that is contingent is a conditioned event.

Its realization is due to classical correlations and statistical probabilities bringing it about.

The virtually unconditioned in general is something that might come about if the proper conditions are fulfilled.

The fulfilling conditions give the power to the conditioned as if it were unconditioned.

Example of Hurricane Katrina: actually having actually happened it remains with us as an undeniable reality, which makes it like (virtually) an unconditioned that always had to be.

Lonergan takes the general idea of virtually unconditioned and applies it to the example of judgment.

To ask “Is it so?” reveals “it” – the content of the judgment – as merely a conditioned, intelligible possibility.

We then search for links to the conditions under which a judgment would be virtually unconditioned, that is, to know the conditions needed for affirmation and denial.

Reflective understanding grasps the sufficiency of evidence for affirming or denying an insight.

“Grasping a proposition as virtually unconditioned means: knowing what you’d have to know in order to affirm it, and knowing that you know that.”

The conditioned: the proposition as merely entertained or understood.

The link: knowing what conditions would be needed for affirmation or denying it.

The fulfillment of the conditions: knowing that those conditions are fulfilled.

The syllogism as an illustration of the virtually unconditioned.

Starting with the conclusion and inferring the premises needed (Aristotle's method).

Reasoning beyond the limitations of logic: how do you know if the premises are true?

Reflective insight also uses "more rudimentary elements" in cognitional process so as to reach the premises as virtually unconditioned.

Two examples from literature:

An excerpt from Sherlock Holmes: the use of tacit knowledge to arrive at conclusions.

— Holmes grasps the blue chalk as sufficient evidence – as the final fulfilling condition – for his judgment.

The Search by C. P. Snow gives a vivid illustration of a young scientist trying to assemble the conditions he would need to affirm his scientific hypothesis – and his realization that the data actually invalidate his hypothesis.

Student question about whether a term paper aims at the virtually unconditioned.

- When a term paper involves making a case for a certain interpretation, then the paper attempts to grasp the interpretation as virtually unconditioned.
- Here the interpretation would be “the conditioned” and the term paper attempts to transform it into a virtually unconditioned interpretation.

Question about the hierarchy of conditions in the Sherlock Holmes example.

- Discussion of how conditions are related, anticipating the missing piece of the puzzle, etc.

Question as to whether two people can legitimately arrive at different judgments.

- If, as Aristotle says, both people understand and mean the proposition in exactly the same way, then the answer is no.
- Discussion of the problem of generalization and inducing universal truths from particulars.
- Empirical residue (space, time and individuality) can differ without compromising universality.
- Discussion of related complications.

Knowing Sameness and Knowing Change.

§2. Concrete Judgments of Fact.

The structure of “knowing change.”

From Chapter 8, how a thing’s intelligible unity is the same, despite differences in data.

So conditions for knowing change include knowing the intelligible sameness and also difference in data at different times about those things.

§3. Insights into Concrete Situations; Knowing Sameness.

Conditions for the correctness of insights not to be found primarily in sense data, but lie instead somewhere else.

Insights as invulnerable is Lonergan’s most important contribution to epistemology.

Linking an insight to its conditions is done by asking further questions, until there are no further pertinent questions (the point of invulnerability).

If there are not further pertinent questions in the self-correcting process, then there is no way of making the insight more correct – because it is fully correct.

Empirical sense data alone cannot bring us to this point; the invulnerability of the insight does.

Recognizing when the point of ‘no further questions’ has been reached.

Authenticity as living in fidelity with oneself as an inquirer; respecting one's own questioning process as the grounds for knowing.

Student question about the relation of Lonergan to Freud, psychology, and psychoanalysis.

- Lonergan's familiarity with Freud's work, and his critique of the latter's extra-scientific assumptions.
- The real question might be, "Why do we ignore our own questioning process?"

Question about whether a responsible judgment presupposes a community.

- Discussion of common sense judgments, their proximate source (in the individual) and their remote source (in the community), which raises questions the individual overlooks.

Further question about how one lives, practically, prior to arriving at verified judgments.

- Common sense judgments are exactly those that help with immediate concerns.
- 'Pertinence' is the key criterion here; the originating insight will determine what is meant by 'pertinence'.
- Meanwhile, one must appropriate one's strengths as well as one's vulnerabilities. Moreover, one can always withhold assent.

Insight and Beyond

Lecture 14, Part Two: December 16th 2009

Judging and Reflective Understanding

Insight, Chapter 10: “Reflective Understanding”

Third level: Reflective Understanding and Judging.

How do we proceed from “Is it so?” to a judgment in a way that is truly reasonable, truly rational.


Only on the basis of grasping the sufficiency of evidence in reflective insights.

Reasoning comes from the Latin *ratio*, which comes from the Greek *logos* and means the conversation one has with oneself in order to arrive at the grounds for making a reasonable, rational judgment.

Reasoning is bringing ourselves to a rational, reflective understanding to support our judging.

In order for its utterance to be a reasonable and rational, judgment must be supported by a grasp that it is reasonable, rational to make this judgment.


We ended the discussion of the previous chapter (*CWL* 3, Chapter 9: “**The Notion of Judgment**” pp. 296-303) with this reflection, or this realization, that something else was needed in order make the transition from this new dynamic tension introduced by the Is it so? question about an insight, to the goal, the promised land, of affirming or denying in response to that tension, to give it its proper response and its proper release of tension. *And what’s needed is an activity of reflecting that terminates in reflective understanding.*



So in other words, we don't go just straight from questions to judgments. We don't just go just straight from questions about whether or not something is so, and leap immediately to a judgment. It isn't as though we have some revelation that pops into our minds that responds directly to that question: Yes! No! It doesn't sort of come coloured in green and red so that we know immediately that we should choose the green, yes it's coloured green, we choose it, no it's coloured green, we choose it. That's not how it works.

It is rather a much more complicated process that leads from the Is it so? question to a process of reflecting, towards a reflective understanding, reflective insight, which is distinct from the direct insights that we've been talking about. And on the basis of the reflective understanding, and only on that basis, can we utter a judgment to engage in this act of affirming or denying, this act of positing, in a way that's truly reasonable, that is truly rational.

Now the word 'rational' comes from the Latin '*ratio*', which is the translation of the Greek '*logos*'; so *reasoning is the conversation that one has with oneself in order to arrive at the grounds for making a judgment that's something other than arbitrary*. Anybody can say yes or no, or shoot off their mouth about all sorts of things and give the public impression that one knows what one is talking about. But *in order for that utterance to be a rational utterance, it has to be supported by a grasp that Lonergan calls reflective understanding. And reasoning is the bringing ourselves to rational understanding.*



There's a terrific passage in the *Posterior Analytics*, where Aristotle says that a syllogism — a deductive argument — a syllogism is: *logos addressed to the soul*. Syllogism is speech, conversation addressed to the soul, and as we'll see, for the sake of affirming a conclusion of a syllogism on the basis of something that's not at all arbitrary, but is genuinely excellent *logos*, excellent reasoning.

So, reflective understanding, reflective insight, is a new kind of insight, that grasps the sufficiency of evidence for a judgment.

Sufficient Reason for Judging

Reflective Understanding is a new kind of insight that grasps the sufficiency of evidence for a judgment (Cf. *CWL* 3, p. 304).

“What are the scales on which evidence is weighed?” (*CWL* 3, p. 304).

“The whole answer cannot be given at once.” (*CWL* 3, p. 305).

Lonergan speaks metaphorically of reasoning as
“marshalling and weighing the evidence.”

How is evidence weighed or evaluated?

Different scales are used to evaluate different kinds of
insights.

Different kinds of reasoning and reflection are surveyed in Chapter 10, in a strategic order (simplest to most complex) for the sake of self-appropriation.

But even these do not exhaust all the kinds of
reasoning.

The kind of reasoning depends upon the particular
insight (or ‘direct borrowed content’).

And Lonergan says that if reflecting can be spoken of metaphorically, as *marshalling* and *weighing the evidence* — *marshalling* means you get all the evidence together; *weighing* is you put some of the evidence on one side of the balance and some of the evidence on the other side of the balance, and you see which way it tips — if reflecting is marshalling and weighing the evidence, then the question is, *on what scales are you doing the weighing?* It's a metaphor! And what we want to do is probe back to the metaphor, just as the phenomenology of getting at the activity of positing, of judging, means that we start with something and we move back to the constituting activities: this is what we're doing here!

And what are we actually doing when we're weighing? And what if the scales upon which the weighing is done? And to that, Lonergan says that the answer cannot be given all at once!

“What are the scales on which evidence is weighed?”

... **“The whole answer cannot be given at once.”** (*CWL* 3, pp. 304-305).

Chapter 10: “Reflective Understanding

So let us just look briefly at the way in which he lays out chapter ten (*CWL* 3, **“Reflective Understanding”**, pp. 304-340). And let's look just at the overview where we can see that, *for Lonergan, there is not just one kind of reasoning! There are lots of different kinds of reasoning! There is not just one kind of reflecting; there are lots of different kinds of reflecting!* He has, for the sake of self-appropriation, a range for exercises, or at least texts, to stimulate and guide exercises about the different kinds of reflecting. He has arranged them in a strategic order. He's going from what you might call the least subtle to the ever more subtle ones; and suggesting that we can move to appropriate the different kinds of reasoning that we do, by beginning with the simplest exercises and going to the more complicated ones.

One qualifier on this is something that goes back to Tim's question at the end of the previous session before we took the break. And that is: *Don't take this to be an exhaustive*

account of all kinds of reasoning. There is — as Tim was bringing out — there is **theological reasoning**. And theological reasoning is not any of the kinds of reasoning that he's treating in chapter ten. You could say quite accurately that there is **value reasoning**. And value reasoning is not addressed in chapter ten. And you could say that there is a kind of **reasoning that goes on in being a scholar**, particularly a **historian** or a **historian of philosophy**: that means coming to judgments of fact about times and places long gone and far away. There a kind of **reasoning that goes on in the social sciences**, particularly **anthropology**. That's not addressed in chapter ten. Many of those questions are going to be addressed at later stages in the book *Insight*, some of them in his "*Post-Insight*" writings. *So don't think of this as the exhaustive treatment of all kinds of reasoning!*

Sufficient Reason for Judging

Reflective Understanding is a new kind of insight that grasps the sufficiency of evidence for a judgment (Cf. CWL 3, p. 304).

"What are the scales on which evidence is weighed?" (CWL 3, p. 304).

**"The whole answer cannot be given at once."
(CWL 3, p. 305).**

Don't think of the contents of chapter ten as an exhaustive treatment of all the ways in which we come to grasp the sufficiency of evidence! What we have here is a strategically ordered series of them, intended to deal with particular kinds of strategic issues, but not to deal with everything exhaustively. And although in chapter seventeen in particular (CWL 3, "Metaphysics as Dialectic", pp. 553-617), Lonergan is going to talk about the historical-mindedness, and the way in which **hermeneutical reasoning** takes place on the part of historians and interpreters — although he's going to talk about that there, and not here, he even

there doesn't pretend to have exhausted all the appropriation of all the kind of reasoning. But nevertheless, these are key exercises for us to engage in.

Overview of the different forms of reasoning and reflective understanding, section by section.

Reasoning always takes its clue from the kind of insight that is being asked about.

General Form of Reflective Insight illustrated in a logical syllogism, but this is only the most elementary illustration.

Chapter 10: "Reflective Understanding"

So the first thing that he does is what he calls "The General Form of Reflective Insight"; and he's going to illustrate it by a logical syllogism. But he doesn't stop there. And in an important way, it's just the point of departure to get into more complicated things, as we'll see. Then he's going to talk about what he calls "Concrete Judgments of Fact", "Insights into Concrete Situations", "Concrete Analogies and Generalizations", and then "Commonsense Judgments", and particularly the relationship between common sense judgments and scientific judgements, judgments of empirical science; "Probable Judgments". So if the answer to an Is it so? question is properly yes or no, what do you do if you haven't got a sufficient ground for saying either yes or no? As you've been working your way through this reflecting and this reasoning, do you have nothing to show for it? Well, *the answer is you might have the basis for a probable judgment! This is probably true! Now a probable judgment is always a comparative judgment. This understanding is probably better than the one that I was just entertaining. I'm closer, but I know that I'm not yet there, a probable judgment!* But Lonergan can't talk about probable judgments until he's talked about some of these prior things. Then what are called "Analytic Propositions and Principles". And then lastly "Mathematical Judgments". What exactly are mathematical

judgments? And are mathematical judgments about anything? And how do we arrive at them?

So that's the structure of the chapter. And what he says about how do we — *What kind of scales do we use? The answer is: we use different scales for different kinds of insights! And in one sense, the scale upon which we're going to do the weighing and the judging is the insight itself.* There's no one size fits all! That to be rational in reasoning, in Lonergan's sense, is to always take one's clue from the direct borrowed content. *The direct borrowed content is the question about the particular insight, and it's the question about that particular insight that makes demands upon reasoning that reasoning must respect, if it's going to be genuine reasoning, if it's going to be authentic reasoning.*

§1. The “Virtually Unconditioned in General” –
‘virtually’ meaning “having the power of” the
unconditioned.

- (1) The event as conditioned.
- (2) The link between the conditioned and conditions.
- (3) The fulfillment of conditions.

Example of a conditioned event: whether a frozen lake will support a certain weight depends on conditions.

Any event that is contingent is a conditioned event.
Its realization is due to classical correlations and statistical probabilities bringing it about.

The virtually unconditioned in general is something that might come about if the proper conditions are fulfilled.

The fulfilling conditions give the power to the conditioned as if it were unconditioned.

Example of Hurricane Katrina: actually having actually happened it remains with us as an undeniable

reality, which makes it like (virtually) an
unconditioned that always had to be.

**§1. The “Virtually Unconditioned”
in General**

An event as virtually unconditioned:

- (1) Event as conditioned;**
- (2) Link between conditioned and conditions;**
- (3) Fulfilment of conditions.**

For example: Ice on reservoir support my car.

All right. So we get *the virtually unconditioned*. The virtually unconditioned comes out of Lonergan’s reading of Kant on the conditioned and the unconditioned. Kant primarily is interested, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, about the universe; and whether events in the universe are conditioned or unconditioned.

And Lonergan adapts that to talk about *the conditioned and the unconditioned in the area of judgment*. And also he gives an account of *virtually unconditioned as (1) a condition, (2) a link between condition and conditions, and (3) the fulfilment of conditions*. *Virtually means: having the force of, having the power of!* So something that is *virtually unconditioned* is not in itself absolutely, or as he says, *formally unconditioned, but it has the power of that!*

Now take as an example an event as unconditioned. So Lonergan, on page 305: there’s two little charts there! The first follows the sentence:

“Accordingly, a virtually unconditioned involves three elements, namely, (1) a conditioned, (2) a link between

the conditioned and its conditions, and (3) the fulfilment of the conditions.” (*CWL* 3, p. 305).

Then he repeats it, and says:

“Hence a prospective judgment will be virtually unconditioned if (1) it is the conditioned, (2) its conditions are known, and (3) the conditions are fulfilled.” (CWL 3, p. 305).

So there’s a distinction here between a *general idea of a virtually unconditioned*, and a *specific application to the area of a judgment of fact, a judgment of fact as virtually unconditioned*. So the first thing I want to do is to get clear about what is meant by a *virtually unconditioned in general*, and then look at what he means by a *virtually unconditioned in particular*.

So take as the example of a virtually unconditioned: “The ice on the reservoir is frozen solid enough to support my car.” What my car is in out there is not the question!!

[Murmurs of amusement]

That’s an event, the state of affairs. It’s a state of affairs that is conditioned, because when I drove by there this morning, I was not prepared to drive my car out over the bank. It was still watery! So there’s nothing absolutely necessary about the reservoir being frozen, or about the reservoir being frozen to a sufficient degree to support my car. If it were absolutely necessary, the reservoir would always be frozen that way, there would always be that kind of ice, and I could drive my car up there without fear of damaging it. So that state of affairs is a conditioned event. It doesn’t happen always, it doesn’t happen necessarily, it doesn’t happen absolutely. It’s just a conditioned event! I don’t know the last time that it was frozen to that extent. I’m probably not going to try it out! But just to give you a concrete vivid image of what’s meant by a conditioned event. You can think of anything you like. The light turning red at the next intersection is a conditioned event. There’s nothing absolutely necessary about the light turning red, or turning green. It could be broken! So think of anything you like as an example of an event that happens but doesn’t have to happen, that happens sometimes and not other times. *That’s the contingency of events! Any event that’s contingent is a conditioned event!*

When it happens, it happens because, number one, there are some reasons, or if you like, scientific classical correlations and/or statistical nonsystematic processes, that bring it about, bring it into happening! So there's a link between that event and other conditions that are distinct from it. *So when a conditioned event comes about, it comes about because it is somehow intelligibly connected with other events, that when the other events happen, the conditioned event happens.* That's a simple meaning of the virtually unconditioned! It seems like much language to do about nothing!

[Some class amusement]

So the virtually unconditioned in general is something that doesn't have to be, that under certain circumstances will be, because those circumstances are linked by, say, the laws of science, the laws of nature, to the event that's the conditioned event! When the fulfilling conditions happen, they give the power, or the force, to the event, as though it were unconditioned! When Hurricane Katrina⁸ hit the Gulf Coast, it remains with us as an undeniable reality. It has the kind of reality of the absolute. People could become "Katrina Deniers", but there it is; it happened! *It has the force of having the immovability of force of having happened. It's like an unconditioned!* It's like it always had to be, because we can't get rid of its having happened. So it's got the force, or it's a virtually unconditioned. So much for the language.

⁸ **Hurricane Katrina** (August 2005) was the costliest natural disaster, as well as one of the five deadliest hurricanes, in the history of the United States. Overall, at least 1,245 people died in the hurricane and subsequent floods. Total property damage was estimated at \$108 billion (2005 USD). Katrina originated over the Bahamas on August 23. The cyclone headed generally westward toward Florida and strengthened into a hurricane only two hours before making landfall on August 25. Over fifty breaches in New Orleans's hurricane surge protection were the cause of the majority of the death and destruction during Katrina on August 29, 2005. Eventually 80% of the city and large tracts of neighbouring areas became flooded, and the floodwaters lingered for weeks. At least 1,400 died directly due to levee failure.

Loneragan takes the general idea of virtually unconditioned and applies it to the example of judgment.

To ask “Is it so?” reveals “it” – the content of the judgment – as merely a conditioned, intelligible possibility.

We then search for links to the conditions under which a judgment would be virtually unconditioned, that is, to know the conditions needed for affirmation and denial.

Reflective understanding grasps the sufficiency of evidence for affirming or denying an insight.

Reflective Understanding of the “Virtually Unconditioned”

**Reflective Understanding =
Understanding the Prospective Judgment
as virtually unconditioned**

- (1) Judgment as conditioned;**
- (2) Consciousness of the link between conditioned and conditions;**
- (3) Consciousness of fulfilment of conditions.**

Now what Lonergan does is to take this idea, which he borrowed from Kant, and apply it to judgments; and to say that we can think of a judgment as a conditioned. Now we can think of a judgment as a conditioned because before it's affirmed or denied, it sits in a hypothetical state. It sits in our consciousness just as an intelligible possibility, that might or might not be. And in particular, when we ask Is it so? we are in a heightened sense aware of it as merely a conditioned possibility. If it were not a conditioned possibility, we would not be asking about it. So it's through our intelligence, our understanding and especially when our understanding asks about — when our rationality asks about it Is it so? that we come to awareness of that intelligibility as no more than conditional!

So the judgment begins as merely conditioned. And what do we do? We try to bring forward the conditions under which we would be able to say, in a reasoned way, that it is so! And so we go from — We're seeking to go from the content of the judgment as a conditioned, to the content of the judgment as a virtually unconditioned. Conditioned though it was, it's not just merely hypothetical, but it's a conditioned whose conditions for affirmation or conditions for denial are now fully assembled and fully known. And that's what he means by that! *The crucial thing in this is how we do — how we go from the process of recognition of the content of a judgment as conditioned to searching for the links so that we can determine the condition — whether or not the conditions are met!*

Another way of saying this is that reflective understanding is grasping the sufficiency of evidence for affirming, or the sufficiency of evidence for denying. Don't think that just because you don't have the evidence for affirming something, that q.e.d. you have the evidence for denying it. Quite frequently, the lack of evidence for affirming is also the lack of evidence for denying. And you need a different kind of evidence quite frequently for affirming than you do for denying. And it's in the process of reflecting that you're seeking out what are the links to the evidence that I need to pursue so that I can go from this merely as a possibility to something that I can affirm.

**Reflective Understanding of
the “Virtually Unconditioned”**

**Reflective Understanding is grasping the
sufficiency of evidence for affirming (or
denying) that the content of an insight (direct
understanding) is correct.**

**To grasp sufficiency of evidence for affirming
(or denying) a proposition means grasping the
proposition as virtually unconditioned.**

*So reflective understanding is grasping the sufficiency of
evidence for affirming or denying that the content of an
insight, a direct understanding, is correct! And to grasp the
sufficiency of the evidence, to grasp sufficient — that you’ve
got sufficient reason for your affirming or a sufficient
reason for your denying is what it means to have a reflective
insight! And to have a reflective insight means to grasp the
judgment proposition, the judgment of intelligibility, as
virtually unconditioned, not just as conditioned, but as
virtually unconditioned.*

“Grasping a proposition as virtually unconditioned means: knowing what you’d have to know in order to affirm it, and knowing that you know that.”

The conditioned: the proposition as merely entertained or understood.

The link: knowing what conditions would be needed for affirmation or denying it.

The fulfillment of the conditions: knowing that those conditions are fulfilled.

**Reflective Understanding of
the “Virtually Unconditioned”**

**Grasping a proposition as virtually
unconditioned means**

**knowing what you would have to know in
order to reasonably affirm (or deny) the
proposition,**

and knowing that you know that.

And a way of thinking about this is in the following terms:

Grasping a proposition, grasping intelligible content, as virtually unconditioned, means knowing what you would have to know in order to reasonably affirm or deny that proposition, and knowing that you know that: knowing what you would have to know in order to make the judgment, and knowing that you know that, that’s what’s meant by grasping the content of the proposition as virtually unconditioned.

**Reflective Understanding of
the “Virtually Unconditioned”**

**The proposition merely as understood, as
merely a possible way things might be =**

the conditioned:

**knowing what you would have to know in order
to reasonably affirm or deny the proposition =**

the link:

knowing that you know that =

fulfilling the conditions

So the proposition as merely understood, as merely a possible way that things might be: that's **the conditioned**; knowing what you would have to know in order to reasonably affirm or deny, is **knowing the link**, knowing what you'd have to look for, knowing what you would have to have to hand, in order to make the affirmation: that is **the knowing of the link**. And knowing that you know those things, that's **the fulfilling of the conditions**. *Put that all together and you would have knowledge of the proposition for judgment as virtually unconditioned.; you would have the sufficient grounds for affirming or denying that proposition.*

The syllogism as an illustration of the virtually
unconditioned.

Starting with the conclusion and inferring the
premises needed (Aristotle's method).

Reasoning beyond the limitations of logic: how do
you know if the premises are true?

Reflective insight also uses "more rudimentary
elements" in cognitional process so as to reach the
premises as virtually unconditioned.

Example of Syllogism

If X is material and alive, X is mortal.

But humans are material and alive.

Therefore, humans are mortal. (CWL 3, p. 306).

So the first example that Lonergan gives is the example of a syllogism.

**We proceed to illustrate [the general form of reflective
insight] from the form of deductive inference. Where
A and B each stand for one or more propositions, the
deductive form is**

If A, then B

But A

Therefore B.

For instance

If X is material and alive, X is mortal.

But humans are material and alive.

Therefore, humans are mortal.

Now the conclusion is a conditioned, for an argument is needed to support it. The major premise links this conditioned to its conditions, for it affirms ‘If A, then B.’ The minor premise presents the fulfilment of the conditions, for it affirms the antecedent A. The function, then, of the form of deductive inference is to exhibit a conclusion as virtually unconditioned. Reflective insight grasps the pattern and by rational compulsion there follows the judgement.

However, deductive inference cannot be the basic case of judgment, for it presupposes other judgments to be true. For that reason we have said that the form of deductive inference is merely a clear illustration of what is meant by grasping a prospective judgment as virtually unconditioned. (CWL 3, pp. 305-306).

So a syllogism is the first example that Lonergan gives in this context. We tend to think of syllogisms as: you start from the premises and you deduce the conclusion. Aristotle didn't think that way. Aristotle thought of starting with the conclusion and figuring out what premises you would need. And so, from Aristotle's point of view, from the guy who gets the credit for coming up with syllogistic logic, what you do is you start with the conclusion: "humans are mortal." Why are humans mortal? Well, the link is: what makes something be mortal? It's mortal if it's material and alive! So that's the link. So the link is expressed then [Unclear word] in the first premise. The conditioned is the conclusion, "**for an argument is needed to support it**" (CWL 3, p. 306). And the conditions are fulfilled by the proposition, the statement, the affirmation that humans are material and alive.

This is just right out of the example that Lonergan himself gives, just to stay with that example. So Lonergan uses this as a way of illustrating what it means to have: “humans are mortal” as a conditioned statement, that is linked to its conditions by the major premise, and the conditions are fulfilled in the minor premise.

Reasoning Beyond the Limitations of Logic.

“The remarkable fact about reflective insight is that it can make use of those more rudimentary elements in cognitional process to reach the virtually unconditioned. Let us now see how this is done in various cases.” (CWL 3, p. 306).

But, as he goes on to say, “Well, how do you know if the major premise is true or not? How do you know if the minor premise is true? It’s all well and good to say that the conclusion will be virtually unconditioned true, if the other two, if the two premises are. But how do you know those are? *Do you not then get into the problem of an infinite regress where you have to prove the premises by an argument, and prove those premises by an argument, and prove those premises by an argument?* So Lonergan is not going to stay in “logic land” very long!

What he’s more interested in is the remarkable fact that reflective insight can make use of more rudimentary elements in cognitional process to reach a virtually unconditioned, which is what you would have to do if you ever had any premises known to be true which you could then use in a deductive argument. Otherwise you would never have any deductive argument to use to even get started. You’d never have knowledge of anything that you could use as a premise in a logical argument.

So Lonergan is giving Logic a kind of a nice wave, but he's moving on to something more important, just taking this as the simplest possible illustration of what he means by a virtually unconditioned, and move quickly on! And so I will move quickly on also, but not quite immediately in the direction that Lonergan did.

Two examples from literature:

An excerpt from Sherlock Holmes: the use of tacit knowledge to arrive at conclusions.

— Holmes grasps the blue chalk as sufficient evidence – as the final fulfilling condition – for his judgment.

The Search by C. P. Snow gives a vivid illustration of a young scientist trying to assemble the conditions he would need to affirm his scientific hypothesis – and his realization that the data actually invalidate his hypothesis.

**Reflecting Towards
Reflective Understanding**

Examples from Literature

Sherlock Holmes and
“The Adventure of the Dancing Men”

And I'll move on with a couple of illustrations here. One is the opening of a Sherlock Holmes story entitled "The Adventure of the Dancing Men."⁹ And it begins this way:

[Pat reads what follows most dramatically]

Holmes had been seated for some hours in silence with his long, thin back curved over a chemical vessel in which he was brewing a particularly malodorous product. His head was sunk upon his breast, and he looked from my point of view like a strange, lank bird, with dull grey plumage and a black top-knot.

The movie is coming out, so you can see [for yourselves](#) if this is true or not.

[Class Laughter]

"So, Watson," said he, suddenly, "you do not propose to invest in South African securities?"

I gave a start of astonishment. Accustomed as I was to Holmes's curious faculties, this sudden intrusion into my most intimate thoughts was utterly inexplicable.

"How on earth do you know that?" I asked.

He wheeled round upon his stool, with a steaming test-tube in his hand and a gleam of amusement in his deep-set eyes.

"Now, Watson, confess yourself utterly taken aback," said he.

"I am."

"I ought to make you sign a paper to that effect."

"Why?"

⁹ "The Adventure of the Dancing Men", one of the 56 Sherlock Holmes short stories written by the Scottish author Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, is one of 13 stories in the cycle collected as *The Return of Sherlock Holmes*. Doyle ranked "The Adventure of the Dancing Men" third in his list of his twelve favourite Holmes stories.

“Because in five minutes you will say that it is all so absurdly simple.”

“I am sure that I shall say nothing of the kind.”

“You see, my dear Watson”—he propped his test-tube in the rack and began to lecture with the air of a professor addressing his class —

[Loud laughter]

— “it is not really difficult to construct a series of inferences, each dependent upon its predecessor and each simple in itself. If, after doing so, one simply knocks out all the central inferences and presents one’s audience with the starting-point and the conclusion, one may produce a startling, though possibly a meretricious, effect. Now, it was not really difficult, by an inspection of the groove between your left forefinger and thumb —

[Pat holds up his left index finger and thumb, and draws attention with his right hand to the intervening groove.]

— to feel sure that you did not propose to invest your small capital in the goldfields.”

“I see no connection.”

“Very likely not; but I can quickly show you a close connection. Here are the missing links of the very simple chain: 1. You had chalk between your left finger and thumb when you returned from the club last night. 2. You put chalk there when you play billiards to steady the cue. 3. You never play billiards except with Thurston. 4. You told me four weeks ago that Thurston had an option on some South African property which would expire in a month, and which he desired you to share with him. 5. Your cheque-book is locked in my drawer, and you have

not asked for the key. 6. You do not propose to invest your money in this manner.”

“How absurdly simple!” I cried.

[Loud class laughter]

Reflecting Towards Reflective Understanding

Examples from Literature

Sherlock Holmes and
“The Adventure of the Dancing Men”

C.P. Snow, *The Search*

Now Conan Doyle puts in Sherlock Holmes’s mouth the language of logic as providing the links, because in the Victorian era — and arguably still to this day — to a large extent people think of reasoning as identical with *the use of logical reasoning*. Logical reasoning is what we just saw in the illustration about mortality and humanity. *That is actually not what Holmes did*. What Holmes did was to take advantage of what Lonergan calls “**those more rudimentary elements in cognitional process**” (CWL 3, p. 306). He presents it in a mode that would make it sound like he was being entirely logical, but in fact that’s not what he did. It’s not as though he wasn’t using some logic, but something much more significant is involved. Watson walks in, Holmes sees blue chalk on this part of his hand [Pat demonstrates again], and *Holmes recognizes the blue chalk on that part of his hand as the fulfilling conditions for the judgment, “Watson is not going to invest in those securities.” Everything else that he talks about is the link.*

Reasoning Beyond the Limitations of Logic.

“The remarkable fact about reflective insight is that it can make use of those more rudimentary elements in cognitional process to reach the virtually unconditioned. Let us now see how this is done in various cases.” (CWL 3, p. 306).

Now, [Holmes](#) presents it as though the link is in fact a matter of logic, *but there's all sorts of other things there, that Lonergan is going to expand upon in the various sections in this chapter. There's a great deal of common sense involved.* Among the things, is the common sense knowledge that Watson only plays billiards with Thurston, and the common sense knowledge that the cheque-book is still in his drawer. There's all kinds of backgrounds to all those judgments that he presents merely as though they were logical steps in a formal logical argument. If you go through that paragraph using your talents in Symbolic Logic, and symbolize every one of those propositions, you will soon discover that you cannot draw a formal logical conclusion from them, of any kind, let alone the one that Holmes did. *There's an awful lot of what you might call "tacit knowledge"; there is an awful lot of this knowledge of linking the chalk on Watson's fingers to the proposition. There is a massive amount of reflecting and linking going on.* Okay. Any questions about that?

This is just an illustration of how reasoning really works. The grasping of the chalk on the fingers is the final fulfilling condition linked to the proposition by a whole series of ideas, questions, insights, judgments that form the background linking for that.

**Reflecting Towards
Reflective Understanding**

Examples from Literature

Sherlock Holmes and
“The Adventure of the Dancing Men”

C.P. Snow, *The Search*

Another example, a book that I recommend to your reading. It’s a book called *The Search*, by C. P. Snow. Snow started out as a biochemist, and gradually left the field of biochemistry, and became a novelist and a literary figure. *The Search* is a somewhat autobiographical book. It has a lot of very interesting details to it. But it’s about a young man who is at the cutting edge of a new experimental technique of using x-ray spectroscopy to study organic molecules, to study the structures of organic molecules. Something that I’m not sure if Snow himself did that, but it was an area of research that he was very familiar with that was just blooming at that time.¹⁰

It’s a very interesting story; it’s a story **in which** Snow very deliberately shows a person whose faith is a faith in science. He has a marvelous passage where this young man walks into a hall in Cambridge and sees around him some things like you might see if you went to MIT and saw the figures identified, the great pantheon of scientists, around the great

¹⁰ *The Search* was first published in 1934.

rotunda at MIT. And it's a story about a man who loses his faith in science, and it's a very fascinating deep psychological development.

But when he is still passionately in pursuit of science, he's come up with a hypothesis about a group of organic molecules, and a thesis about what makes them be the kind of molecules that they are. And he is going through these films — they did it in films in those days, as opposed to on computers which they largely do now — he's going through these films, and he's looking at the spots that are left on the films by the x-ray scattering.

What he's doing in that passage in the book, is assembling the conditions, the fulfilling conditions to verify his hypothesis, his judgment, about the explanatory structure of these molecules. *And by his knowledge of the theoretical insights, by his knowledge of chemistry, the vast range of insights that he has gathered in his understanding of chemistry, he has an understanding of how to link his hypothesis to conditions that would have to be fulfilled for his hypothesis to be verified. And as he's going through the films — the wonderful thing about Snow is he shows how much this guy wants his theory to be correct; and yet how his wanting it to be correct for the sake of fame and fortune is overridden by a deeper wanting it to be correct, which comes from his inquiry. And like Columbo, "something starts to bother him!" and he looks back and sees this dimple spot on the film, and realizes that that blows his hypothesis out of the water. It's just a marvelous example of what goes on in real linking of conditions to an unconditioned.*

So those are a couple of examples.

**Student question about whether a term paper aims at
the virtually unconditioned.**

**— When a term paper involves making a case for a
certain interpretation, then the paper attempts to grasp
the interpretation as virtually unconditioned.**

**— Here the interpretation would be “the conditioned”
and the term paper attempts to transform it into a
virtually unconditioned interpretation.**

Pat: Questions? ... Byron?

Byron: How different are — the form that, you know, let's say a term paper, takes towards — Is that trying to get at a virtually unconditioned?

Pat: It depends! It depends on the kind of term paper that you are writing. A term paper can be a couple of different kinds of things. Many of you, most of you perhaps,

wrote interpretative term papers. You were giving an interpretation, or you were giving an interpretative comparison: “Kant and Lonergan on Space”, for example; “Lonergan and Du Bois on diet [unclear word] Consciousness”,¹¹ and so on. People did — So a term paper can be developing a thesis about how these figures relate. Or it can be developing an interpretation of what Lonergan means by X, or what Kevin Lynch means by Y. And in order to do that, you have to pull together the information, the quotations, the connections, to make your case for that interpretation. So, yeah, it can be! Not every term paper is like that. But where a term paper is giving an exposition or an interpretation of something, the something that it’s — the conditioned is the interpretation, that this is the correct understanding of these passages. — Hence the interpretation would be “the conditioned”, and the term paper attempts to transform it into a virtually unconditioned interpretation. Okay?

**Question about the hierarchy of conditions in the
Sherlock Holmes example.**

**— Discussion of how conditions are related,
anticipating the missing piece of the puzzle, etc.**

¹¹ **W. E. B. Du Bois** (1868 – 1963) was an American sociologist, historian, civil rights activist, Pan-Africanist, author and editor. Born in Massachusetts, Du Bois grew up in a relatively tolerant and integrated community. After completing graduate work at the University of Berlin and Harvard, where he was the first African American to earn a doctorate, he became a professor of history, sociology and economics at Atlanta University. Du Bois was one of the co-founders of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) in 1909. Racism was the main target of Du Bois’s polemics, and he strongly protested against lynching, and discrimination in education and employment. Du Bois made several trips to Europe, Africa and Asia. After World War I, he surveyed the experiences of American black soldiers in France and documented widespread bigotry in the United States military.

Du Bois was a prolific author. His collection of essays, *The Souls of Black Folk*, was a seminal work in African-American literature; and his 1935 magnum opus *Black Reconstruction in America* challenged the prevailing orthodoxy that blacks were responsible for the failures of the Reconstruction Era. Du Bois believed that capitalism was a primary cause of racism, and he was generally sympathetic to socialist causes throughout his life. He was an ardent peace activist and advocated nuclear disarmament. The United States' Civil Rights Act, embodying many of the reforms for which Du Bois had campaigned his entire life, was enacted a year after his death.

Pat: Mike?

Mike: In terms of knowing that you know the conditions, it seems like within all those conditions there is a hierarchy of conditions, and a central condition around which the others orbit. And what I'm thinking of is like, in the Holmes example that you read, wouldn't it be sufficient to simply know that a month has elapsed, and Watson hasn't opened his cheque-book?

Pat: Ah —

Mike: — I mean, in other words, the blue chalk is a superfluous condition.

Pat: No, that's a good point. You're quite right! Yeah! It doesn't make it a good example —

Mike: No, let's take another example!

Pat: I used to love that example!

[Loud laughter but both speak simultaneously rendering
decipherment impossible]

Mike: No, but the blue chalk is important in so far as it needs the blue chalk that makes it relevant to that morning and —

Pat: Yeah.

Mike: Because then you can say you were with Thurston last night and you didn't [unclear words]. But he really doesn't need to know all that.

Pat: Right. The reason that I liked it as an example was *because* people tend to think that sense data is what verifies a proposition; and *what I liked about that is it showed that the sense data was a fulfilling condition in a network of other conditions.*

Mike: Right.

Pat: But you're absolutely right!

Mike: Right. There was one core condition generally, and there were other conditions which were simple enough conditions — ?

Pat: Ahm, sometimes it's a core condition but often it is — This is jumping ahead to a couple of *later* sections in chapter ten (*CWL* 3, “**Reflective Understanding**”, pp. 304-340) — *sometimes, it's the last missing piece of the puzzle.* What is or isn't a core thing,

a core condition, is something you sort of do by looking back and seeing which was the most important and most central and the most comprehensive; but quite frequently it's everything else is in place but you're waiting for the one last piece.

Mike: Right.

Pat: And that's what Lonergan is going to say: the last further pertinent question has not yet been answered. That's the piece that can seem like it's a core one, but just in fact is the last insight. For some judgments you can be assembling the conditions that you need for making the judgment over twenty or thirty or in some cases more years. So it's on the basis of having asked and answered a lot of questions that this is the last question that needs to be answered; this is the last condition that needs to be fulfilled in order to make the judgment. That can seem like the core one, but in fact maybe it's just the last one.

Mike: Right!

Question as to whether two people can legitimately arrive at different judgments.

— If, as Aristotle says, both people understand and mean the proposition in exactly the same way, then the answer is no.

— Discussion of the problem of generalization and inducing universal truths from particulars.

— Empirical residue (space, time and individuality) can differ without compromising universality.

— Discussion of related complications.

Pat: Greg?

Greg: This might be anticipating where we're going to go; but is it possible, for Lonergan, for two people to come to reasonable, self-appropriated, but mutually exclusive judgments?

Pat: Ahm, if we say, as Aristotle does, about the same thing, in the same manner, at the same time, in the same place, with regard to the same quality, no!

Greg: All right!

Pat: Now the reasons for that will maybe become a little clearer as we look at some of the other parts of the chapter; but it sort of jumps ahead to what he has to say about generalizations and analogies (*CWL 3*, “Concrete Analogies and Generalizations,” pp. 312-314) As he says, *by this we have solved the problem of induction*, by which he means not that from particular instances we get general insights. *The problem of induction is how from particular instances you not only get insights, but you affirm them to be universally true.*

And his answer is: “Well, they’re universally true because similars are understood similarly.” If the experience — if the experiential data are alike in all respects except three, they differ only in place, only in time, and only in individuality — if those are the only empirical differences, then everything else in the image, the sense image, is the same, and so the insight will be exactly the same. And you can generalize and say *that* everything that’s exactly like this except for individuality, time, and place, will always be like this. Every other instance that’s different only in the empirical residue will be understood exactly that way! I can generalize, and say, everything that’s exactly like this, that’s what you say, that’s what it is.

But *the difficulty is that almost nothing is exactly the same and differs only by the empirical residue.* And to your question, people can be saying — You know, one person can be saying “Everybody’s stupid!” and another person saying “Everybody’s nice!” Ah, they’re talking about different people! Everybody that I’m referring to is stupid! Everybody that you’re referring to is nice! And that’s perfectly fine!

So as Lonergan says, one of the problems we have in both analogies and generalizations, but beyond that, in the disagreement about judgments of fact, is that people are not always keeping their judgments specifically to the conditions that are fulfilling for those judgments. *But if people do that, they’re going to have exactly the same judgments. They’re going to be very limited, and very particular judgments for the most part, but they will be the same!*

Greg: Are there for Lonergan — I don’t want to say ‘things’ after the last chapter — subjects, or things, or situations, about which a virtually unconditioned judgment is impossible? Are there any —

Pat: Sure!

Greg: There are. Okay.

Pat: And maybe, not that are impossible, but their conditions are such that they haven't yet been fulfilled, and in a finite amount of time, they won't be.

Knowing Sameness and Knowing Change.

§2. Concrete Judgments of Fact.

The structure of "knowing change."

From Chapter 8, how a thing's intelligible unity is the same, despite differences in data.

So conditions for knowing change include knowing the intelligible sameness and also difference in data at different times about those things.

§2. Concrete Judgments of Fact

"Something happened." = Conditioned Judgment

Knowing change: "The link between the conditioned and the fulfilling conditions is a structure immanent and operative within cognitional process" (CWL 3, p. 307).

If there is change, there has to be a concrete unity of concrete data extending over some interval of time, there has to be some difference between the data at the beginning and at the end of the interval, and this difference can be only partial, for otherwise there would occur not a change but an annihilation and a new creation." (CWL 3, p.

272).

I'm just going to mention this, but I'm just going to go on — in the interests of time — I'm going to go on to Section Three (“Insights into Concrete Situations”, *CWL* 3, pp. 308-312), which I think is one of the most important sections in Lonergan's reflection in these chapters on **“Judgment”** and **“Reflective Understanding.”**

He talks about this person that comes home and sees the apartment deshelled, and makes the bold judgment: “Something happened!” (*CWL* 3, pp. 306-307).

[Some class amusement]

And the basis on which the person makes the judgment “Something happened” is what Lonergan calls a link between the conditioned and the fulfilling conditions, as a structure immanent and operative within cognitional process.

Suppose a man to return from work to his tidy home and to find the windows smashed, smoke in the air, and water on the floor. Suppose him to make the extremely restrained judgment of fact, ‘Something happened.’ The question is, not whether he was right, but how he reached his affirmation.

The conditioned will be the judgment that something happened.

The fulfilling conditions will be two sets of data; the remembered data of his home as left it in the morning; the present data of his home as he finds it in the evening. Observe that the fulfilling conditions are found on the level of presentations. They are not judgments, as is the minor premise of syllogisms. They involve no questions for intelligence nor insights nor concepts. They lie simply on the level of past and present experience, of the occurrence of acts of seeing and smelling.

The link between the conditioned and the fulfilling conditions is a structure immanent and

operative within cognitive process. It is not a judgment. It is not a formulated set of concepts, such

as a definition. It is simply a way of doing things, a procedure within the cognitional field. (*CWL* 3, pp. 306-307).

So, a structure immanent and operative within cognitional process. And the structure Lonergan is referring to is the structure of knowing change. And recall last week, I mentioned what Lonergan has to say about *things as subject to change*: he says that *things can be unity, identity, wholes, same intelligibility, across data that differs in time; that the unity is one and the same and the data is different. And so the thing that is the thing that's the intelligible unity of the temporally different data is that which changes because the data is what is the changing! The intelligible unity is the same, the data is the changing.*

And what Lonergan says here is this is something that people learn very, very, early on. Children learn this very early on, when they discover **that** they can walk out of a room and then come back and the same things are there. You discover it when you come back and you discover “Oh, it’s Professor Byrne!” Now how do we know **that** I’m the same thing? I don’t have the same shirt or tie on that I did last week. My hair is a little bit longer; my voice is a little more gravelly. You don’t know me because the data on me are the same as what you saw last week. In fact they are different, I regret to say, because I’m older.

[Class amusement]

So the data are not the same. It isn’t by comparing what you see before you **now**, with your memory of me, and matching them up. That’s not how you know me to be the same! *You know me to be the same because you have an understanding of my intelligible unity; and you understand that the data you’re seeing today is the data on that same intelligible unity that you’ve known over the past few weeks.*

§3. Insights into Concrete Situations

Knowing Sameness: “By direct insights he refers both sets of data to the same set of things, which he calls his home.” (*CWL* 3, p. 307).

So knowing change, knowing that this change is happening in the apartment, is something that he calls **a structure immanent and operative** (*CWL* 3, p. 307) in consciousness, because as children we learn to have insights into the unities, identities, wholes, over changing data.

Now in the particular instance under consideration, the weary worker not only experiences present data and recalls different data but by direct insights he refers both sets of data to the same set of things, which he calls his home. The direct insight, however, fulfils a double function. Not merely are two fields of individual data referred to one identical set of things but a second level of cognitional process is added to a first. The two together contain a specific structure of that process, which we may name the notion of knowing change. Just as knowing a thing consists in grasping an intelligible unity-identity-whole in individual data, so knowing change consists in grasping the same identity or identities at different times in different individual data. If the same thing exhibits different individual data at different times, it has changed. If there occurs a change, something has happened. But these are statements. If they are affirmed, they are judgments. But prior to being either statements or judgments, they exist as unanalysed structures or procedures immanent and operative within cognitional process. It is such a structure that links the conditioned with the fulfilling conditions in the concrete judgment of fact.

The three elements have been assembled. On the level of presentations there are two sets of data. On the level of intelligence there is an insight referring

both sets to the same things. When both levels are taken together, there is involved the notion of knowing

change. Reflective understanding grasps all three as a virtually unconditioned to ground the judgment ‘Something happened’ (*CWL* 3, pp. 307-308).

§3. Insights into Concrete Situations; Knowing Sameness.

Conditions for the correctness of insights not to be found primarily in sense data, but lie instead somewhere else.

Insights as invulnerable is Lonergan’s most important contribution to epistemology.

Linking an insight to its conditions is done by asking further questions, until there are no further pertinent questions (the point of invulnerability).

If there are not further pertinent questions in the self-correcting process, then there is no way of making the insight more correct – because it is fully correct.

Empirical sense data alone cannot bring us to this point; the invulnerability of the insight does.

§3. Insights into Concrete Situations

Knowing Sameness: “By direct insights he refers both sets of data to the same set of

things, which he calls his home.” (*CWL* 3, p. 307).

Now the crucial thing in Lonergan's example of the modest statement that 'something happened' is that this has to be the same set of things, what he calls — he says something happened **“to the same set of things, which he calls his home** (CWL 3, p. 307), the set of things that the person calls his home: so chair things, table things, curtain things, floor things, kitchen things, supper things, rug things, books and shelve things, and so on; that that's the same set of things that he calls his apartment or his home, and now there's different data on them.

But what if he is wrong? What if those really are not the same things? How do we know the correctness of the judgments about the sameness of things? We can know the correctness of change by the differences in data. But it's only change, versus annihilation and creation, if the judgments about the things are correct — And we don't know the judgments about the things as correct from sense data. Because there's a —

Lonergan is an odd kind of empiricist! He's empiricist in the sense that experiencing is an intrinsic and indispensable element in our knowledge! And yet it's not the final determining element in our knowledge! Something else is more determining, something else that ruthlessly takes hold of experiencing and makes it do what it wants it to do, or what it needs it to do, if it can! It sets the links for the conditions that would need to be fulfilled, and then asks sense data: “Are you up to the task?”

So the question then is: the person can only be making a concrete judgment of fact if the person has the basis for making a judgment of the correctness of insights. And the judgment of the correctness of insights is not going to be found in the data, but somewhere else!

*And this, to my mind, is the most brilliant and the most important of everything that Lonergan did in his *Cognitional Theory and Epistemology*. And it's this notion that he has of insights as vulnerable and insights as invulnerable.*

§3. Insights into Concrete Situations

Insights are vulnerable when there are further questions to be asked on the same issue. For the further questions lead to further insights that certainly complement the initial insight, that to a greater or lesser extent modify its expression and implications, that perhaps lead to an entirely new slant on the issue.

But when there are no further questions, the insight is invulnerable. For it is only through further questions that there arise the further insights that complement, modify, or revise the initial approach and explanation.

[Pat reads from the slide:]

Insights are vulnerable when there are further questions to be asked on the same issue. For the further questions lead to further insights that certainly complement the initial insight, that to a greater or lesser extent modify its expression and implications, that perhaps lead to an entirely new slant on the issue.

Okay. This is the process of the self-correcting cycle of understanding. We saw it, so to speak, in its kind of native and originary form when Lonergan talked about it in the context the growth of scientific knowledge, the growth of common sense knowledge.

Now what Lonergan is doing is showing that this natural dynamic of question giving rise to insight, giving rise to action, giving rise to changes in experiences, giving rise to further questions, and further insights, is an accumulation of insights in which the later insights correct and modify and nuance the earlier ones; that that is also of use to reflecting, is the fundamental form of the linking.

The fundamental way in which we link from an insight to its conditions is by means of asking and answering the further pertinent questions, until we reach a point where there are no further pertinent questions.

[Pat's slide continues as follows:]

But when there are no further questions, the insight is invulnerable. For it is only through further questions that there arise the further insights that complement, modify, or revise the initial approach and explanation.

So if there are no further pertinent questions, there will follow no further modifying insights. And that means that the insight that we've arrived at, for which there arise no further pertinent questions, is invulnerable, is un-correctible, and is, so to speak, procedurally and factually correct!

**Recognizing when the point of 'no further questions'
has been reached.**

**Authenticity as living in fidelity with oneself as an
inquirer; respecting one's own questioning process as
the grounds for knowing.**

We arrive at a correct insight by the process of asking and answering the further pertinent questions that would have any way of modifying and changing that original insight; and as we do that, our understanding gets modified, our understanding grows to be a nuanced and modified assembly of a first naïve and overgeneralized insight corrected by further insights, refined and modified and nuanced by still further insights.

And when there are no further pertinent questions, that understanding has become invulnerable, and thereby correct. It's an invulnerable insight; it's been corrected, all the correcting that it can have, and it is thereby correct.

That for him is the key to the answer of how we come to know the correctness of insights. It is not by seeing if we can compare the insight to some sense data, and see if it matches up. Because remember, insights are intelligibilities; insights don't have any colours or shapes to them. Insights cannot be matched up to sense data. Reflection can make use of sense data, because it understands that those are requisite conditions for making the affirmation; that those are requisite for dealing with the further pertinent questions. But what makes an insight ultimately be correct is not the empirical data, but its invulnerability.

§3. Insights into Concrete Situations

“Now this reveals a law immanent and operative in cognitional process. When an insight meets the issue squarely, when it hits the bull's eye, when it settles the matter, there are no further questions to be asked, and so there are no further insights to challenge the initial position. But when the issue is not met squarely, there are further questions that would reveal the unsatisfactoriness of the insight and would evoke the further insights that put a new light on the matter.” (CWL 3, p. 309).

What makes an insight ultimately be correct is not the empirical data, but its invulnerability.

As he says:

“this reveals a law immanent and operative” within our consciousness. **When an insight meets the issues squarely, when it hits the bull’s-eye, when it settles the matter, there are no further questions to be asked, and so there are no further insights to challenge the initial position. But when the issue is not met squarely, there are further questions that would reveal the unsatisfactoriness of the insight and would evoke further insights that put a new light on the matter”** to change and modify the intelligibility. (*CWL 3*, p. 309).

But “note that it’s not enough to say “but no further questions occur to me!” You have to give further questions a chance to arise.

§3. Insights into Concrete Situations

“Note that it is not enough to say that the conditions are fulfilled when no further questions occur to me.” (*CWL 3*, p. 309).

“One has to give the further questions a chance to arise.” (*CWL 3*, p. 310).

“Now this amounts to saying that good judgment about any insight has to rest on the previous acquisition of a large number of other, connected, and correct insights.” (*CWL 3*, p. 310).

As he says, “One has to give the further questions a chance to arise.” (CWL 3, p. 310).

“Now this amounts to saying that good judgment about any insight has to rest on the previous acquisition of a large number of other, connected, and correct insights.” (CWL 3, p. 310).

So I’ll put this in other words. *The criterion for judging the correctness of our insights is to learn to pay attention to our consciousness, and the peripheral, sometimes whispering, questions that are lingering — the questions that maybe we don’t want to pay attention to, like the character in C. P. Snow’s *The Search* who wants to brush aside the question, “What was that spot on that film?” But because he’s still a person passionate about science, he cannot let himself ignore that further pertinent question, and has to go back and answer that question; because he understands, without having read Lonergan, without having a theory about what he’s doing, he, spontaneously, immanently operating in his own dynamics of his consciousness, recognises that only bringing your questions to satisfactory completion is the criterion for the correctness of judgments.*

*This is what Lonergan means by authenticity!
Authenticity is living in fidelity to yourself as an inquirer!
Authenticity means learning to pay attention to the
questions that you are easily able to brush aside, or
habitually tend to brush aside. Authenticity is learning to
fall in love with your questioning as the ground for your
knowing, rather than other kinds of things that you can be
in love with, that can motivate you to make statements
about things, when in fact you don’t have a virtually
unconditioned invulnerable set of insights as the basis for
making those judgments.*

Okay. Let me stop there, and see if people have some questions before we break for the holidays. ...

Student question about the relation of Lonergan to
Freud, psychology, and psychoanalysis.

— Lonergan’s familiarity with Freud’s work, and his
critique of the latter’s extra-scientific assumptions.

— The real question might be, “Why do we ignore
our own questioning process?”

Pat: Mike?

Mike: Okay! How — In reading this, the question kept coming up, and so in order to be authentic, I want to ask you: How dependent is Lonergan on Sigmund Freud? Have his views been sort of — I guess, I don’t know a lot about modern psychology, but I know enough that Freud is my question in a lot of areas in modern psychology. So how dependent is he on Freud? And is it possible to integrate Lonergan’s view with modern psychology?

Pat: Well the simple question I’m not in a position to answer. I don’t know enough about modern psychology — I don’t even know enough about Freud, to answer how compatible is Lonergan with modern psychology. *How dependent is he on Freud? I don’t think very!* And I’m not quite sure why it’s coming up in this context. I can maybe make a stab at what you might have in mind.

Remember in Chapter Six (“**Common Sense and its Subject**”, *CWL* 3, pp. 196-231) *he has a pretty significant criticism of Freud for the interpretative context within which Freud puts the various dynamics that he’s given some — that he’s made some discoveries about.* He read Freud because, among other things, *I think he was convinced, at a time when it was not easy for a Catholic priest to be convinced, about the importance of psychoanalysis; and he wanted to understand it better.* But he also was very wary of some of the extra-scientific implications of it. *So was he familiar with Freud? Yeah! Was he influenced by him? I don’t think so.*

I'm guessing, and I'll ask you to confirm this: I'm guessing that you're asking this because *one might ask*: "*Why do we ignore our questions?*" You know, the most natural thing it is for a human being to do is to ask questions, and to seek answers to those questions. And to work fairly conservatively to get answers to those questions. *Why do we ignore those questions? Well, that would be an area in which the psychoanalytic theory of repression would have some relevance.* Is that what you had in mind?

Mike: There was a lot of things on my mind, and that was one of them.

Pat: I frankly don't know how Lonergan's account of psychodynamics that he articulates in the section of chapter six on "Dramatic Bias" (*CWL* 3, pp. 214-231) conforms with the current state of psychiatry and psychology, I just don't know!

**Question about whether a responsible judgment
presupposes a community.
— Discussion of common sense judgments, their
proximate source (in the individual) and their remote
source (in the community), which raises questions the
individual overlooks.**

Pat: Ah, Greg?

Greg: It seems, particularly with the topic of reflective understanding, that Lonergan has this idea — particularly when we were talking about positing judgments — it means we then need some sort of questioning community. In other words, if I can't rely on myself to some degree to ask all the relevant questions, I really need — even though I may be authentically and personally ultimately responsible for the judgment — there is a point at which I need to go outside my own questioning?

Pat: *That's quite right!* ... Ah —

Greg: Okay.

[Pat seeks a passage in the book *Insight*]

At the beginning of section 5 on “*Commonsense Judgments*” (CWL 3, pp. 314-324) ... Yeah, and let’s look at the initial subsection 5.1 on “The Source of Commonsense Judgments” (CWL 3, pp. 314-316): so this is on page 314:

The proximate ground and source of commonsense judgments lies in the procedures just described of concrete judgments of fact, judgments on the correctness of insights into concrete situations, and concrete analogies and generalizations. *The remote source is more complex.* (CWL 3, p. 314, emphasis added).

Well, it turns out that the remote source is the community that Greg is talking about. Because the bottom quote on the current slide here (§3. **Insights into Concrete Situations**) says that:

“this amounts to saying that good judgment about any insight has to rest on the previous acquisition of a large number of other, connected, and correct insights.” (CWL 3, p. 310).

Being a good judge about anything requires a vast accumulation of a lot of other corrected insights. And it takes a long period of time before people can be good judges about things in particular areas. It is the community that helps us to get those insights, and that challenges and corrects our oversimplified insights, that is going to facilitate the capacity to become a good judge about anything. That’s what he means by the remote source. The remote source of making good judgments in commonsense or in science or in any other area, is exactly as you say, a community in which there is an effective accumulation of insights and an effective mutual self-correction of the oversights. That’s quite right!

Further question about how one lives, practically, prior to arriving at verified judgments.

— Common sense judgments are exactly those that help with immediate concerns.

— ‘Pertinence’ is the key criterion here; the originating insight will determine what is meant by ‘pertinence’.

— Meanwhile, one must appropriate one’s strengths as well as one’s vulnerabilities. Moreover, one can always withhold assent.

Greg: So then my question as a result of that: How, practically speaking, how does — given that this is some of the time an intensive process in terms of really coming to a kind of a virtually unconditioned judgment, *when we’re talking about living life and making choices like, how do we kind of function in the meantime, knowing that we don’t know, knowing that we don’t know enough in having answered all the questions: how do we make judgments that enable us to live?*

Pat: Well, *part of the answer is that our commonsense judgments are objective judgments about what’s going to make an immediate difference in our lives or the lives of those around us. And those are objective judgments!* And people can be wrong about it! People can really have no good commonsense, meaning they are not capable of making good commonsense judgments. So it’s not as though, now that we have discovered this, you have to hold off and not do anything for the next twenty years until you have answered all of the questions.

[Gentle class amusement]

Pertinence is the key notion here! What makes the further questions pertinent? And that is determined by the insight; the insight will determine the pertinence!

So what do you do in the meantime? What you do in the meantime is that you start to recognize the areas in which you've gotten very good at respecting the way in which your consciousness raises, spontaneously evokes, feelings of uneasiness about something! There's something bothering you about this! And respect that! Learn to pay attention to and embrace yourself as a questioner, and the fact that you've got unanswered questions about things!

And as Lonergan says, You don't have to say Yes or No until you've got the further — until you've got a grasp of the virtually unconditioned! You can withhold assent; and you can withhold the No!

As de la Rochefoucauld remarked, 'Everyone complains of his memory but no one of his judgment.' One is ready to confess to a poor memory because one believes that memory is not within one's power. One is not ready to confess to poor judgment because the question for reflection can be answered not only by yes or no but also by 'I don't know'; it can be answered assertorically or modally, with certitude or only probability; finally, the question as presented can be dismissed, distinctions introduced, and new questions substituted. The variety of possible answers makes full allowance for the misfortunes and shortcomings of the person answering, and by the same stroke it closes the door on possible excuses for mistakes. A judgment is the responsibility of the one that judges. It is a personal commitment. (CWL 3, p. 297).

What you do in the meantime is *learn to take responsibility and to appropriate those areas in which you've gotten very good at paying attention to your questions*; and likewise the areas in which you start to discover: “Oh, I kind of habitually ignore those kinds of questions, don't I? So I've been making judgments that are really not very good judgments.” *And to move into those areas, and start taking the questions that we have been habitually ignoring, and start to take them more seriously.*

With that we'll have to bring the semester and the class to an end. Thank you so much! I look forward to seeing you in the New Year. I wish you happy holidays; and please travel safely!